Aichi/Tokai_DRep

I am voting YES.
This proposal maintains Cardano’s critical Tier‑1 integrations—USDCx, LayerZero, Pyth, Dune, and Fireblocks—which are essential for liquidity, cross‑chain connectivity, institutional access, and overall ecosystem functionality.
These systems form the operational backbone of Cardano, and their continuity is vital.
The governance structure is strong, with Intersect management, smart‑contract‑based treasury controls, independent oversight, and clear refund conditions.
As foundational infrastructure required for Cardano’s ongoing operation, this proposal merits support.

I am voting YES.
Eternl is a critical wallet for payments, staking, governance, and dApp interactions across Cardano. This proposal ensures stable maintenance and development at a modest cost, providing clear ecosystem value.
The team’s sustainability plan through a Pro subscription model demonstrates reduced long‑term Treasury dependence. As a low‑cost yet essential piece of infrastructure, this proposal merits support.

I am voting NO.
While I recognise the value of Scalus as an application platform for Cardano, I believe that at this stage treasury funding should prioritise concrete dApps and real-world use cases over additional developer platforms and infrastructure.
Cardano already has multiple strong tools and frameworks, and I consider it more important now to fund teams that ship production applications on top of this existing foundation, directly contributing to adoption, transactions, and TVL.

I am voting YES.
This proposal supports several research areas that are essential for Cardano’s long‑term evolution, including PQ security, ZK, L2 scalability, and governance.
While some components align with existing research roadmaps, I view this as additional resourcing to maintain and accelerate the pace of critical research, which is important for Cardano’s future competitiveness.
I look forward to continued improvements in transparency and progress reporting as the work advances.

I am voting NO (with a positive stance).
This proposal presents a highly valuable vision for strengthening Cardano’s open‑source infrastructure,
with data‑driven prioritization, dual advisory councils, and strong transparency mechanisms.
The overall direction is something I strongly support.

However, approving ₳12,000,000 over a 36‑month period in a single withdrawal feels too large and too long from a treasury sustainability and governance accountability perspective.
A structure that allows annual evaluation and renewal would provide clearer checkpoints, reduce risk, and help the community validate progress before committing to multi‑year funding.

I support the intent of this program and would be eager to reconsider a one‑year version of this proposal in a future submission.

I am voting NO.

While I recognize the technical value of this proposal, my current priority is to support projects that drive real‑world adoption and create practical, socially impactful use cases on Cardano.
With that focus in mind, I will not support this proposal at this time.

I am voting No on this proposal.

While this top-up upgrade increases Cardano’s visibility at TOKEN2049, the event remains heavily investor‑focused with relatively few developers present. As a result, the expected impact on real adoption—such as attracting new builders or expanding actual usage of Cardano—appears limited.

The additional 1.76M ADA requested for the Title Sponsorship does not present a clear or measurable return on investment, especially when compared to more balanced, chain‑neutral events where both developers and investors are present in meaningful numbers.

Given the weak adoption pathway and the unclear cost‑effectiveness of this upgrade, I cannot support the proposal.

I am voting Yes on this proposal.

Tweag has consistently delivered high‑quality work on Plutus, Plutus Core, formal methods, and other core components that directly support the safety and long‑term reliability of Cardano. This proposal continues that essential infrastructure work over a multi‑year period, providing clear public‑goods value to the entire ecosystem.

The requested budget is significant, but it is reasonable for a highly specialized research and engineering team operating at this level. Strengthening Cardano’s core infrastructure is foundational for future adoption, developer experience, and ecosystem resilience.

For these reasons, I support this proposal.

I am voting YES.
This proposal delivers high‑value public goods for Cardano, including the TypeScript ecosystem and the Pebble compiler.
The funding structure is transparent, with escrow, third‑party oversight, and clear refund conditions, which significantly reduces risk.
All outputs are open‑source and directly strengthen Cardano’s developer experience and long‑term competitiveness.

I am voting No on this proposal.

While TOKEN2049 provides visibility among investors and media, it does not offer a balanced environment for both developers and investors. The event is heavily investor‑focused, with relatively few developers present, which limits its potential to drive meaningful adoption or attract new builders to the Cardano ecosystem.

Given the high cost of the Platinum sponsorship and the lack of clear, measurable return on investment—especially compared to more balanced, developer‑inclusive, chain‑neutral events—I do not believe this proposal provides sufficient external value to justify Treasury funding.

For these reasons, I cannot support the proposal.

After careful review, I will vote No on this proposal.

While I appreciate the real-world adoption focus and alignment with Cardano technologies such as DID, Hydra, and CIP-68, I am not convinced this is an appropriate Treasury investment at this stage.

The proposal appears closer to a private business operation than a public good. Key components such as MAGIC credits, LampNet, and operational infrastructure remain highly centralized and dependent on a specific organization.

I am also concerned about long-term sustainability and future Treasury dependency. It is still unclear whether the project can become fully self-sustaining without continued ecosystem funding.

In addition, for a 2.4M ADA request, I believe the transparency and proven large-scale execution track record of the team are currently insufficient.

I support Cardano real-world adoption, but Treasury funds should prioritize decentralized, reusable public infrastructure with clear long-term value for the entire ecosystem.

I am voting No on this proposal.

The cost-effectiveness of the revised Summit plan remains unclear, and the proposal does not demonstrate a convincing level of external value for Cardano. While community events have internal benefits, the expected impact on real-world adoption—bringing new users, developers, or enterprises into the ecosystem—appears limited.

Given the lack of clear return on investment and the weak pathway to meaningful external adoption, I cannot support this proposal.

I support this proposal because improving Plutus performance is critical for dApp growth, developer adoption, and Cardano’s competitiveness as a smart‑contract platform.

While I still have meaningful concerns about the proposal’s limited urgency, high cost, and the lack of clear prioritization, I ultimately decided to support it after considering Cardano’s long‑term stability and the importance of maintaining high‑assurance research for future protocol safety.

Although I still have significant concerns about the proposal’s broad scope, cost, and the limited clarity around prioritization, I ultimately decided to support it after considering Cardano’s long‑term stability and the importance of maintaining reliable core infrastructure.

I support this proposal as it advances Ouroboros research, enhances Cardano’s security guarantees, and aligns with the core roadmap for long‑term resilience.

I support this proposal because it directly strengthens Cardano’s L1 roadmap, improves protocol reliability, and delivers essential upgrades that protect long‑term network value.

I initially opposed this due to concerns about overlap with existing tools and unclear cost effectiveness, but after reassessing the role of developer experience in Cardano’s growth, I decided to change my vote to Yes.

Additional Note:
I had already changed my vote from No to Yes, but I mistakenly forgot to update the voting message. To correct this, I temporarily switched to Abstain in order to revise the comment, and then restored my vote to Yes.
The sequence is No → Yes → Abstain → Yes.

I am voting No on this proposal.

Sundial already provides a public-good foundation for a BitVM-based BTC bridge on Cardano.
Given this existing work, the requested amount in this proposal presents an unfavorable cost‑to‑risk balance, and the public‑good value of the project is relatively limited.

For these reasons, I cannot support the proposal.

I am voting No on this proposal.

Key reasons:

• The proposal asks the Treasury to subsidize Blockfrost’s ongoing operational costs, creating a risky precedent for funding private infrastructure.
• Funding a Bitcoin indexer with Cardano Treasury resources lacks clear justification and falls outside Cardano’s public‑goods mandate.
• The proposal increases ecosystem dependence on a single private provider, which raises centralization and resilience concerns.
• The requested amount is large, and the cost-effectiveness of the spending is not sufficiently demonstrated.

For these reasons, I cannot support the proposal at this time.

I support this proposal since Hydra and Mithril scalability improvements complement L1 development and help Cardano handle future demand without compromising decentralization.

I am voting NO on this proposal.
Based on the outcomes and impact of previous Cardano Summit events, I do not believe that continuing the Summit at its current scale is justified. The Summit primarily functions as an internal Cardano community gathering, with limited measurable influence on broader ecosystem adoption or external engagement. Going forward, the Summit should be reduced in scope or restructured to better align with ecosystem needs.
Cardano’s most urgent priority is not marketing exposure or event presence, but the development of practical, real-world products and infrastructure that individuals and enterprises can actively use. Without useful tools, applications, and services, increased visibility at external events will not translate into sustainable adoption or meaningful ecosystem growth.
Treasury resources should be directed first toward initiatives that create tangible utility—products that solve real problems and infrastructure that supports everyday use. For these reasons, I am voting NO on this proposal.

I am voting NO.
While I acknowledge that both Gerolamo and Pebble may provide value to the Cardano ecosystem, the highest‑priority needs are already being addressed. Amaru, as a Rust-based node implementation, meaningfully contributes to client diversity, and Aiken is already widely adopted as a practical and mature smart contract language. Given this existing foundation, the urgency and priority of this proposal appear lower.
I do not consider this work unnecessary; however, with limited Treasury resources, I believe funding should prioritize practical dApps and initiatives that drive real-world adoption and user-facing utility.

I am voting YES.
There are still projects in Funds 10–14 awaiting milestone reviews and payments, and a pause in Catalyst operations would cause real harm to these teams. Without approving this transition, further delays in reviews and payouts are likely, which would negatively impact the broader community.
At the same time, I remain concerned that a clear plan for Catalyst’s redesign has not yet been presented. I expect the Cardano Foundation to provide greater transparency and to outline concrete steps for improving Catalyst going forward.

I am voting Yes on this proposal.

Network decentralization and security benefit greatly from having multiple independent node
implementations, and Dingo contributes meaningfully to that diversity. Blink Labs has a strong
track record, having delivered several important projects such as gOuroboros and Plutigo, and
their consistent contributions demonstrate the capability required for this work.

While Amaru (Rust implementation) is currently ahead, having an additional implementation—or even
two—strengthens Cardano’s long‑term resilience and reduces reliance on any single codebase.

Although 6.9M ADA is a substantial amount, the detailed budget breakdown shows that the costs are
allocated to essential areas such as engineering, auditing, infrastructure, and operations. The
structure appears reasonable and not inflated. For these reasons, I support this proposal.

I am voting YES because this withdrawal establishes the essential foundation—legal structure, independent audit, and multisig contract—needed for Cardano’s DeFi growth. The proposal includes strict refund conditions and strong transparency requirements, ensuring unused funds return to the Treasury. Going forward, the community must continue to closely monitor how all funds are used, especially as we move toward the larger liquidity deployment.

I am voting YES.
This proposal introduces a new investment approach that complements Catalyst and brings professional capital allocation into the ecosystem. The structure provides a reasonable level of transparency and accountability, and I see potential value in diversifying how Cardano supports builders. At the same time, it will be important for the community to closely monitor investment decisions and the fund’s execution to ensure long‑term trust and alignment with Cardano’s goals.

I am voting Yes on this proposal.

Requiring more detailed and structured documentation at the submission stage makes it easier for DReps to evaluate proposals. It also allows various community groups to review drafts in advance, enabling proposers to incorporate feedback and improve the quality of their submissions.

By clarifying the process and reducing inconsistencies between proposals, this framework enhances comparability and transparency. These improvements are essential for a healthy and accountable budget process, and therefore I support this Info Action.

I am voting Yes on this proposal.

Compared with other core development initiatives in the Cardano ecosystem, the overall budget and FTE cost assumptions appear reasonable and consistent with industry standards. The team has also demonstrated a strong commitment to transparency through clear reporting, on‑chain treasury management, and the return of unused funds in the previous cycle.

While I acknowledge that some parts of the 2025 roadmap experienced delays, I will continue to monitor the project’s delivery pace and technical progress closely. Even so, I believe the work Amaru is doing is strategically important for node diversity and long‑term network resilience, and I want to support their continued development.

I look forward to seeing the technical advancements they bring to Cardano in the coming year.

I support the establishment of a Net Change Limit as a necessary fiscal guardrail. However, given the current level of ADA price volatility and the evolving nature of on-chain governance, I believe it would be prudent to incorporate a mid-term review mechanism. I would support this proposal if it included a formal commitment to reassess and, if necessary, adjust the NCL halfway through the proposed period (for example, after 6–12 months). This would preserve predictability while maintaining fiscal flexibility in changing market conditions.

I am voting Yes for the following reasons:
• Developer feedback collected through PCP‑003 indicates clear support for increasing Plutus memory limits.
• The change reduces unnecessary complexity in dApp development and improves the overall developer experience.
• Benchmarking and technical evaluations show that the associated risks to network performance are minimal.

I am voting No on this proposal.

My reasons are as follows:

• The Interim Committee, which will control 500,000 ADA, has not disclosed its member list or their qualifications. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess accountability and governance safety.
• The requested budget is extremely large, with a significant portion allocated to legal costs. From a treasury preservation perspective, the scale of spending is not sufficiently justified.
• I believe the project should proceed in smaller, incremental steps. Clear transparency and demonstrated progress at each stage would make future proposals easier to evaluate and support.

For these reasons, I cannot approve the proposal at this time.

I support naming Protocol Version 11 the “van Rossem Hard Fork” in recognition of Max van Rossem’s meaningful contributions to Cardano’s governance and community.

I’m supporting this Net Change Limit proposal for a few simple reasons:

1. The proposed limit feels appropriate when compared with the treasury’s actual inflows, and it maintains a healthy balance for the ecosystem.
2. The amount is in line with previous NCLs, which helps keep Cardano’s financial governance steady and predictable.
3. The longer timeframe makes sense, as it aligns better with the mid‑year budgeting cycle and allows decisions to be based on complete annual data.
   Overall, this NCL strikes a good balance between respecting past commitments and preparing for the development needs ahead.

While DeltaDeFi has shown steady progress in developing Hydra‑based infrastructure, the requested 1.5M ADA budget does not appear proportionate to the current stage of the project. The justification provided is not sufficient to demonstrate that this level of funding is appropriate.
For these reasons, I oppose this proposal.

In v2.4, the roles and responsibilities of proposers have been clarified, including stricter requirements for immutable documentation, audit funding, and transparent fund management. These changes increase accountability to the community and improve the overall transparency of Treasury-related activities.
For DReps and SPOs, the clearer standards and strengthened procedural requirements make it easier to evaluate proposals consistently.
Therefore, I support this proposal.

This document establishes guidelines for the future direction of Cardano's development and its societal applications. I believe sharing these guidelines collectively is meaningful as it provides a basis for steering governance. I generally agree with the content.

The primary reason is that the vote margin between Cardano Curia and Christina in the snap election was extremely close. I believe this demonstrates that Christina is a trustworthy individual. Furthermore, maintaining a committee size above the baseline value ensures governance stability.

Further enhance Cardano's reliability and recognition.

I support this version of the Cardano Constitution because it provides clearer definitions and a more inclusive governance framework. The roles and responsibilities of DReps, SPOs, and general Ada Holders are expressed in a flexible and accessible manner, which encourages broader participation while maintaining transparency and accountability. This balance between clarity and openness strengthens the foundation for sustainable, decentralized governance.

Reasons for opposing this proposal:
The changes are too drastic. There has been insufficient discussion within the community, and it is difficult to summarize multiple perspectives and determine whether the overall proposal should be approved or rejected. Each individual case should be examined more thoroughly.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value and importance of the work presented in this proposal. However, given the current Treasury balance and the remaining Net Change Limit, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not essential to Cardano’s operational continuity.
To preserve long‑term financial sustainability, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value and importance of the work presented in this proposal. However, given the current Treasury balance and the remaining Net Change Limit, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not essential to Cardano’s operational continuity.
To preserve long‑term financial sustainability, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value of Tx3 and TxPipe’s strong track record, and I understand the importance of standardized, agent‑ready interfaces for Cardano’s future.
That said, given the current Treasury balance and Net Change Limit utilization, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not strictly essential to Cardano’s operational continuity. To preserve long‑term financial sustainability and prioritize life‑support infrastructure, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I acknowledge the importance of UTxO RPC as a core integration standard for Cardano and appreciate TxPipe’s ongoing open‑source maintenance work.
That said, given the current Treasury balance and Net Change Limit utilization, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not strictly essential to Cardano’s life‑support infrastructure. To preserve long‑term financial sustainability and prioritize core operational continuity, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value of this proposal in bringing real‑world payments infrastructure to Cardano and appreciate Wirex’s track record and the open‑source components it would deliver. This would clearly contribute to adoption and utility.
That said, given the current Treasury balance and Net Change Limit utilization, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not strictly essential to Cardano’s operational continuity. To preserve long‑term financial sustainability and prioritize core life‑support infrastructure, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote No on this proposal because the current governance framework for Treasury withdrawals is fundamentally insufficient.
First, the Net Change Limit (NCL) does not function as a meaningful financial guardrail. Whenever the limit becomes insufficient, a new proposal to raise the NCL is simply submitted and approved, which undermines the purpose of having a limit in the first place.
Second, the recent decline in ADA’s price suggests that past Treasury approvals may have weakened market confidence, highlighting the need for stronger financial governance.
Third, Treasury funding decisions should follow a holistic annual process, as previously suggested by Charles, where all proposals are submitted together once per year and prioritized based on the full budget picture. This approach would allow DReps to make strategic, well‑informed decisions. Under the current ad‑hoc approval model, DReps cannot accurately assess priorities, and projects that should be lower priority may receive funding merely due to timing.
For these reasons, improving the governance framework must come before raising the NCL, and I therefore vote No on this proposal.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value and importance of the work presented in this proposal. However, given the current Treasury balance and the remaining Net Change Limit, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not essential to Cardano’s operational continuity.
To preserve long‑term financial sustainability, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I agree with the overall direction of improving treasury governance and recognize the importance of establishing a more strategic and structured process. However, this information action does not define the concrete implementation process required to move from concept to execution.

In particular, the proposal does not specify the responsible entity, the method for selecting such an entity, or the scope of authority it would hold. Without clarity on these foundational elements, it is difficult to assess how the proposed reforms would function in practice.

For these reasons, I cannot support this action at this stage.