Will Norris

I am voting YES on Cardano Critical Integrations V2.

My view is that Cardano has already made a significant strategic commitment to critical integrations through CCI V1, and it would be poor treasury discipline to fund major integrations but then fail to maintain, support, and operationalise them properly.

The integrations covered by this proposal — including USDCx, Pyth, Dune, LayerZero, and Fireblocks — are important infrastructure for liquidity, DeFi, institutional access, analytics, interoperability, and broader ecosystem adoption. These are not peripheral “nice to have” items; they are part of the connective tissue Cardano needs if it is to compete as a serious global financial and application platform.

That said, my support is not unconditional. The size of the ask, the confidentiality around some vendor-level costs, and the fact that some CCI V1 work remains incomplete mean that the proposers must be held to a high standard of transparency, reporting, auditability, and delivery discipline. I expect clear milestone reporting, responsible fund management, and the return of unused funds where appropriate.

I see this as a vote for continuity, operational maturity, and adoption infrastructure — not as automatic approval for indefinite future funding. On balance, I believe this proposal is aligned with Cardano’s long-term interests and is constitutionally acceptable, so I am voting YES.

I am voting YES on this proposal to update the Plutus cost models.

This is a necessary technical parameter update to support the van Rossem / Protocol Version 11 upgrade and enable new Plutus primitives across Plutus V1, V2 and V3. These primitives expand the built-in functionality available to Cardano smart contract developers, while the cost model ensures that CPU and memory usage are priced appropriately and safely at the protocol level.

This proposal appears aligned with the Cardano Constitution, particularly the Plutus Cost Model guardrails requiring cost model values to be benchmarked, updated when new primitives are introduced, and supplied for each supported Plutus language version.

I recognise that changes to existing cost settings may create some operational impact for dApps that rely on hardcoded or pre-calculated execution budgets. However, the proposal has been reviewed through the relevant technical process, is based on benchmarked cost model updates, and is important for Cardano’s continued smart contract capability and developer experience.

As this is a constitutionally aligned, technically necessary, non-treasury parameter update that supports Cardano’s protocol evolution, I am voting YES.

I am voting YES on the Eternl treasury proposal because I believe independent wallet and access infrastructure is critical to Cardano’s long-term usability, decentralisation and governance participation.

Eternl is already widely used across the ecosystem for staking, DApp interaction, payments and on-chain governance. Supporting reliable wallet infrastructure helps ensure users can actually participate in the Cardano ecosystem, not just theoretically benefit from protocol-level improvements.

The proposal is also relatively modest in size compared with many current treasury requests and includes a path toward greater long-term sustainability through a Pro-plan revenue model and treasury repayment mechanics.

I recognise the concerns raised around closed-source components, self-administration and the lack of milestone-based disbursement. I believe those concerns are valid and should continue to be discussed as Cardano governance matures.

However, on balance, I believe the practical ecosystem value of maintaining stable, independent wallet infrastructure outweighs those concerns in this case.

This vote aligns with my broader DRep philosophy of supporting:

1 critical ecosystem infrastructure,
2 decentralisation in practice,
3 governance participation,
4 user accessibility,
5 and sustainable long-term ecosystem growth,

while still remaining mindful of treasury discipline and responsible capital allocation under current NCL constraints.

I am voting ABSTAIN on the Scalus: Cardano’s Application Platform proposal.

I believe this proposal is directionally valuable and addresses a real challenge for Cardano: improving developer experience, application-layer infrastructure, smart contract tooling, verification workflows, and the ability for builders to ship production-ready applications more easily.

I also recognise that the Lantr / Scalus team has already delivered meaningful work, and this proposal is materially stronger than many treasury requests in terms of structure, technical ambition, milestone design, oversight, and treasury-control mechanisms.

However, I am not fully comfortable voting Yes on this version of the proposal.

The ask of ₳8.503m is significant, and I do not believe there is currently enough demonstrated adoption, community consensus, or proven demand from the wider developer market to justify approving this level of funding at this stage. The proposal may be technically strong, but treasury funding also requires proportionality, timing, and confidence that the requested investment matches ecosystem readiness.

I also take the current community signal seriously. The live voting trend shows substantial resistance, and while I do not believe that should automatically determine every DRep’s vote, it does suggest that the proposal has not yet won sufficient trust or conviction from the ecosystem.

My abstain vote is therefore not a rejection of Scalus, Lantr, JVM tooling, developer infrastructure, or application-layer investment. It is a signal that I would like to see this proposal return in a more staged, smaller, adoption-measured format with clearer evidence of demand and a more incremental funding path.

I support the direction, but I cannot actively support the full treasury ask in its current form.

For those reasons, I am voting ABSTAIN.

I am voting YES on Cardano Vision 2026.

While I understand the concerns around the size and breadth of this proposal, I believe this is one of the clearest examples of the type of long-term public-good investment the Cardano Treasury exists to support.

Cardano’s competitive advantage has always been its research-first foundation, high-assurance engineering culture, formal methods, and willingness to solve hard problems properly rather than chase short-term narratives. The work proposed here — including scalability, Leios/Peras research, post-quantum security, ZK, developer experience, governance, incentives and research-to-engineering translation — is not optional if Cardano is to remain technically credible over the long term.

I recognise the concern that this proposal is broad and bundled. However, in this case I believe the workstreams are deeply interconnected. Breaking this into many smaller proposals may appear cleaner from a governance perspective, but it also risks fragmentation, delay, loss of coordination, and potentially the loss of specialised talent that is extremely difficult to rebuild once dispersed.

My support is not a blank cheque. I expect clear milestone reporting, transparent oversight, community visibility, and the return of any unused or undisbursed funds in line with the proposal’s refund commitments. But I believe the strategic risk of failing to fund this research programme is greater than the risk of approving it.

For these reasons, I believe this proposal is aligned with Cardano’s long-term interests, its research-driven identity, and the responsible use of treasury funds for foundational ecosystem infrastructure.

I am voting NO on the Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program.

I strongly support the underlying problem this proposal is trying to address. Cardano depends on open-source infrastructure, tooling, maintainers, SDKs, libraries and ecosystem contributors, and I do believe long-term open-source maintenance needs a serious and sustainable funding model.

However, I do not believe this proposal is the right structure for a ₳12m, 36-month treasury commitment.

My concern is not with the intent, but with the governance and funding model. This proposal appears to create a broad ecosystem funding institution that would itself allocate treasury resources to other parties. That is a much higher-risk model than funding a clearly scoped technical delivery with direct milestones, direct accountability, and stronger treasury controls.

For an ask of this size and duration, I would expect a more mature structure before funds are committed: clearer escrow mechanics, stronger on-chain enforcement, fully established independent governance before funding begins, tighter milestone-based release controls, and better coordination with existing Cardano open-source funding mechanisms such as Intersect’s open-source maintenance work.

I am also concerned about overlap and fragmentation. Cardano should absolutely fund critical open-source maintenance, but we should avoid creating parallel funding structures that duplicate or compete with existing ecosystem processes unless the need, scope and governance model are extremely clear.

In my view, this proposal is trying to solve an important problem, but it asks the treasury to take too much structural and governance risk up front.

I would be open to supporting a revised version that starts smaller, operates as a pilot, has stronger escrow and refund protections, is better integrated with existing ecosystem maintenance frameworks, and provides clearer accountability for how funds are selected, released, measured and audited.

For those reasons, I am voting NO.

I am voting YES because Gerolamo has the potential to materially strengthen Cardano’s decentralisation, client diversity, and developer infrastructure by enabling a browser-capable Cardano node. This aligns with Cardano’s long-term strategy and with my DRep principles of supporting open-source public-good infrastructure that improves resilience and reduces reliance on centralised service providers.

I recognise the delivery risk: Gerolamo is not yet a production-ready validating browser node, and the project must demonstrate real progress through its milestones. I would also like continued clarity around independent audit and oversight costs, milestone acceptance, and adoption pathways for wallets and dApps.

However, I believe this is the type of ambitious infrastructure work the treasury should support when paired with transparent delivery controls, refundable contingency, and independent oversight. For that reason, I support this proposal.

I am voting NO on the TOKEN2049 Title Sponsorship Top-Up.

I support Cardano having a strong presence at major global events, and I recognise the value of TOKEN2049 as one of the most important conferences in the crypto industry. I also appreciate that the proposal has been structured with clearer administration, oversight, and refund provisions.

However, my concern is with the proportionality of this additional spend.

The baseline TOKEN2049 proposal already gives Cardano a meaningful presence at the event. This top-up is specifically asking the Treasury to fund an upgrade from Platinum to Title sponsorship, with benefits such as a larger booth, mainstage keynote slot, branding visibility, media introductions, lanyards, networking access, and other premium exposure.

Those benefits may well have value, but I do not believe the case has been made that this additional premium package is necessary or represents the best use of Treasury funds at this time.

This is not a vote against marketing, events, EMURGO, or Cardano being visible on the global stage. It is a vote against this specific incremental top-up. In my view, Treasury spending should be disciplined and proportionate, especially when the additional ask is for premium brand positioning rather than core delivery, infrastructure, builder support, or activity that is clearly essential to the ecosystem.

For those reasons, I am voting NO.

I am choosing to ABSTAIN on the Tweag Core Infrastructure proposal.

I recognise the importance of the work being proposed. The scope includes serious Cardano infrastructure priorities, including Peras, history expiry, conformance testing, ledger/node improvements, adversarial testing, Mithril-related work and broader protocol resilience. I also recognise Tweag as a credible technical contributor with relevant experience in the Cardano ecosystem.

However, I cannot actively support the proposal in its current form because the requested amount — approximately ₳39.8 million over 24 months — is extremely large relative to the remaining Net Change Limit. At this stage of Cardano treasury governance, I believe DReps have a responsibility to be especially disciplined with large multi-year withdrawals, even where the underlying work appears valuable.

My concern is not that the work lacks merit. My concern is the structure, scale and precedent. A proposal of this size should ideally be broken into clearer staged tranches, with more granular work-package-level budgets, stronger visibility into milestone acceptance, clearer FX/conversion risk controls, and tighter mechanisms for pausing or reassessing funding if delivery, market conditions or ecosystem priorities change.

I do not view this as a clear constitutional rejection. The proposal appears to address many of the required areas for a Treasury Withdrawal. My abstention instead reflects a governance judgement: the work may be important, but I am not sufficiently comfortable approving this level of Treasury commitment as currently structured.

I would be open to supporting a revised version that preserves the most important infrastructure work while reducing the initial Treasury exposure, improving budget transparency, and staging funding in a way that better protects the Cardano Treasury and the remaining NCL.

For these reasons, I am abstaining.

I am voting NO on this proposal.

I recognise the ambition behind OriLife × TonFarm and I support the broader goal of bringing real-world adoption, supply-chain traceability, identity, and agricultural use cases to Cardano. The proposal is interesting, and I appreciate the work already done by the team, including the existing proof of concept, field deployment, and the attempt to structure the funding through milestones and escrow.

However, I do not believe this proposal currently meets the burden of proof required for a 2.4m ADA treasury withdrawal.

My concern is not with the sector or the idea itself. My concern is whether Cardano’s treasury should fund a large-scale vertical commercial deployment where the ecosystem-wide return remains uncertain. The projected adoption numbers are substantial, but they still appear highly aspirational without enough hard evidence of binding customer commitments, guaranteed transaction volume, or a clear path for the Cardano treasury and wider ecosystem to benefit proportionately from the investment.

I would be more comfortable supporting a smaller, staged proposal that proves real mainnet usage, demonstrates repeatable demand, and establishes clearer treasury-aligned economics before requesting funding at this scale. For commercial deployments, I believe the treasury should increasingly expect stronger repayment, revenue-sharing, or ecosystem-value mechanisms, especially where the funded infrastructure may directly benefit a private or semi-commercial operator.

This may become a strong Cardano real-world adoption case in the future, but at this stage I do not believe the risk/reward profile justifies the requested treasury spend.

For these reasons, I am voting NO.

I am voting YES on the Revised Cardano Summit 2026 Singapore proposal because I believe Cardano needs credible external visibility, ecosystem coordination and real-world adoption efforts alongside protocol and infrastructure development.

Importantly, this revised proposal responded constructively to community feedback. The budget was reduced materially, the Summit was decoupled from TOKEN2049, and the proposal now includes clearer scope, measurable KPIs and a more focused delivery approach.

While I remain mindful of treasury discipline and current NCL constraints, I also believe Cardano cannot rely solely on technical excellence to grow. Developer engagement, enterprise visibility, institutional networking and ecosystem showcase events all play a role in long-term adoption and ecosystem expansion when executed responsibly.

I recognise the concerns around event ROI and large ecosystem spending. Those concerns are valid, and future treasury-funded events should continue moving toward stronger accountability, measurable outcomes and efficient budgeting.

However, on balance, I believe the revised proposal represents a significantly improved and more reasonable approach compared with the original version, and I believe supporting a well-scoped flagship ecosystem event is aligned with Cardano’s broader growth and adoption goals.

This vote aligns with my broader DRep philosophy of supporting:

1 sustainable ecosystem growth,
2 external adoption and visibility,
3 developer and enterprise engagement,
4 responsible treasury stewardship,
5 and long-term Cardano ecosystem resilience.

I voted YES on IO & VacuumLabs: Enhancing Plutus because Plutus is foundational to Cardano’s smart-contract ecosystem. The proposal improves execution efficiency, expands useful primitives, strengthens formal specification and conformance testing, and improves developer tooling through better compiler architecture, clearer errors, reduced boilerplate, and easier setup. These improvements support lower-cost DApps, better developer experience, stronger security, and future node diversity. The ask is proportionate to the importance of Plutus as core infrastructure and the collaboration with VacuumLabs helps broaden stewardship beyond IO.

I voted YES on IO: Cardano High Assurance Technical Collaboration because security and correctness are central to Cardano’s long-term value proposition. This proposal makes formal verification more accessible to everyday developers by extending Blaster to DApp-level verification, integrating with major Cardano smart contract languages, delivering a VS Code extension, building a Common Vulnerability Library, and providing a preconfigured developer environment. As Cardano grows DeFi, bridges, stablecoins, and institutional use cases, stronger verification tooling reduces exploit risk and increases trust. The ask is proportionate, collaborative across multiple ecosystem teams, and aligned with Cardano’s high-assurance identity.

I voted YES on the Cardano Maintenance Initiative because a stable, secure, and well-maintained Cardano platform is the foundation for every other ecosystem objective. The proposal funds essential work across node bugfixing, security reviews, CI/CD, monitoring, performance, QA, release management, incident response, DB-Sync, APIs, CLI tooling, Plutus Core maintenance, and the Cardano Blueprint. While the ask is large and must be scrutinised carefully, underfunding core maintenance would create unacceptable technical and operational risk for the network. My support is conditional on strong milestone-based disbursement, independent assurance, transparent reporting, and return of unspent funds.

I voted YES on the IO Consensus Initiative because Leios is a critical base-layer scaling upgrade for Cardano. The proposal funds the path from public testnet toward a mainnet-ready release candidate, including formal conformance testing, adversarial validation, parameter exploration, and hard-fork enabling work. Cardano’s 2030 adoption targets require a major throughput increase at L1, not only L2 scaling, and Leios directly addresses that requirement while preserving Cardano’s security and decentralisation principles. The ask is significant but proportionate to the strategic importance of the work and remains within the applicable Net Change Limit.

I voted YES on IO: Cardano Upgrades because the proposal funds strategically important platform-level improvements that directly support Cardano adoption, DeFi usability, treasury resilience, and ecosystem growth. CIP-159 account address enhancements can unlock micro-fees, cheaper DeFi batcher models, wallet revenue models, and L2 reserve patterns. Multi-Asset Treasury design is an important step toward reducing treasury exposure to ADA volatility and enabling more sustainable budgeting. Babel Fees removes a major onboarding barrier by allowing users to pay transaction fees in native assets rather than needing ADA first. The ask of ₳13.1M is meaningful but proportionate to the protocol-wide impact and remains well within the current Net Change Limit. I recognise concerns around bundling, budget granularity, and the wider IO package, but this specific proposal is strongly aligned with long-term utility, adoption, and Cardano’s competitiveness.

I support this proposal because improving Cardano’s developer experience is a high-leverage investment in adoption, utility, and ecosystem growth. The current builder journey remains fragmented, with tooling, documentation, onboarding, and reusable contract patterns spread across the ecosystem. This initiative addresses those issues through practical deliverables including cardano-init, an OpenZeppelin-style contracts library, Developer Portal improvements, bounties, outreach, and measurable DevX assessment. The ask of ₳3.6M is modest relative to the Net Change Limit, and the proposal includes milestone-based disbursement, Intersect administration, independent assurance, auditable treasury contracts, refund conditions, and prior treasury disclosure. While I recognise concerns about the wider IO funding package and potential overlap with other initiatives, this specific proposal is well aligned with long-term Cardano adoption and builder growth.

I am voting ABSTAIN on the Pogun proposal because I believe it raises genuinely important strategic questions for the future of Cardano, particularly around Bitcoin integration, BTCfi, liquidity growth and ecosystem capital formation.

I recognise the potential long-term value of bringing Bitcoin liquidity and economic activity into the Cardano ecosystem. I also appreciate that the proposal attempts to move beyond a simple grant model by exploring treasury-alignment concepts such as revenue sharing and repayment mechanisms. I believe this is a positive direction for governance maturity and ecosystem funding design.

However, I also believe this proposal sits in a more commercially oriented category than many of the protocol, infrastructure and public-goods-focused treasury requests currently under consideration.

As a DRep, I am increasingly focused on treasury stewardship, Net Change Limit constraints and the long-term sustainability of treasury allocation decisions. With approximately 13 months remaining in the current NCL window and many competing infrastructure, governance and ecosystem proposals still seeking funding, I am cautious about making strong affirmative allocations toward commercially speculative ecosystem growth initiatives at this stage.

My abstain vote therefore reflects both:

1 respect for the strategic ambition of the proposal,
2 and uncertainty around whether this type of ecosystem venture-style funding should currently be prioritised over more foundational public infrastructure and governance-critical ecosystem layers.

I believe Cardano governance is still collectively evolving its framework for how treasury funding should interact with commercially monetisable ecosystem businesses, particularly around:

1 repayment structures,
2 revenue-sharing models,
3 treasury participation in upside,
4 and long-term ecosystem capital allocation strategy.

I would welcome continued discussion and refinement in this area as Cardano governance matures further.

I am voting NO on the Blockfrost: Maintenance and Next Generation Indexing proposal, not because I believe Blockfrost lacks value to the Cardano ecosystem, but because I believe Cardano governance now needs to evolve toward a more sustainable and sophisticated treasury funding model for commercially viable infrastructure providers.

Blockfrost is clearly important ecosystem infrastructure. Many developers, wallets, applications and services rely on its APIs and indexing capabilities, and I recognise the strategic value of the proposed next-generation indexing work.

However, Blockfrost is also an operational commercial business with monetisable products, existing customers and a credible path toward long-term commercial sustainability.

As DReps, we are now operating under meaningful Net Change Limit constraints, with approximately 13 months remaining in the current NCL window and many competing infrastructure, adoption and research proposals still seeking treasury funding.

Because of this, I believe Cardano governance should begin distinguishing more clearly between:

1 pure public goods,
2 ecosystem-critical open infrastructure,
3 and commercially monetisable ecosystem businesses.

In cases where treasury funding is used to accelerate commercial infrastructure providers, I believe future proposals should increasingly explore:

1 repayment mechanisms,
2 treasury revenue-sharing,
3 ecosystem pricing guarantees,
4 or other models that allow the Cardano treasury and community to participate in the upside created by treasury-funded ecosystem growth.

I do not believe perpetual operational subsidy through treasury withdrawals should become the default model for commercially viable infrastructure businesses.

This vote is therefore not a rejection of Blockfrost’s technical contributions or ecosystem importance. It is a reflection of my broader view that Cardano governance is maturing from simple grant distribution toward more disciplined treasury stewardship and long-term capital allocation thinking.

I would welcome a revised proposal structure in the future that incorporates stronger treasury-alignment mechanisms alongside the important infrastructure work being proposed.

I voted YES on the IO & Midgard Labs L2 Scalability Initiative because Cardano needs credible L2 infrastructure alongside L1 scaling to compete for high-performance applications such as DeFi, AI micropayments, gaming, and consumer payments. The proposal funds shared L2 infrastructure, Hydra production hardening, and Midgard’s path to mainnet, giving Cardano a broader scaling portfolio rather than relying on a single approach. I recognise the valid concern that these workstreams could have been separated because they carry different maturity and risk profiles. However, the ask is modest relative to the potential ecosystem benefit, remains within the Net Change Limit, and supports adoption, throughput, TVL, and protocol revenue.

I am voting NO on the original Cardano Summit 2026 and TOKEN2049 Singapore treasury withdrawal. I support Cardano having a strong global presence, and I am not opposed to a Cardano Summit or a targeted TOKEN2049 strategy in principle. However, this proposal bundles two materially different spending decisions into one vote, requests a very large treasury allocation, and does not provide a sufficiently convincing ROI case for the scale of spend. The subsequent community pushback and the move toward revised standalone Summit and TOKEN2049 proposals confirms that the original structure was not the right approach. Treasury funds should be deployed with strong discipline, clear voter choice, measurable ecosystem impact, and the highest possible accountability. For those reasons, I believe the original bundled proposal should be rejected and considered only through leaner, separate, better-scoped proposals.

NO — I support the strategic value of HLabs’ work on Gerolamo, Pebble and TypeScript ecosystem maintenance, and I believe these workstreams could materially improve Cardano’s decentralization, developer experience and infrastructure resilience. However, this Treasury Withdrawal does not clearly satisfy Article II, Section 7(4) of the current Cardano Constitution, which requires an allocation of ADA for periodic independent audits and oversight metrics. The proposed escrow and oversight board are strong safeguards, but they do not clearly replace the need for an explicit audit/oversight allocation in the funding request itself. Given the size of the request and the importance of maintaining clean Treasury standards, I am voting NO on this version while encouraging HLabs to resubmit with the constitutional gap addressed and clearer budget separation.

I support this proposal as a necessary and pragmatic step to ensure the continuity of Project Catalyst operations. The transition of the managing entity from Input Output Global to the Cardano Foundation is required under the Catalyst Foundation Company’s statutes and helps prevent disruption to ongoing Fund 10–14 project delivery and payouts.

This action does not introduce new spending or alter governance structures but instead safeguards existing commitments and protects the integrity of the ecosystem. It aligns with the principles of accountability and responsible stewardship outlined in the Cardano Constitution.

While broader improvements to Catalyst’s effectiveness and impact may still be needed, maintaining operational continuity is the correct and responsible course of action at this stage. For these reasons, I am voting YES.

Vote: YES

This proposal represents a high-impact investment in core infrastructure resilience and decentralisation, which are foundational to Cardano’s long-term success. Today, block production relies on a single Haskell implementation, creating systemic risk. Dingo introduces a second independent node implementation in Go, materially improving network robustness—an approach proven effective in ecosystems like Ethereum.

Blink Labs has demonstrated credible delivery capability, with substantial prior output (1,000+ PRs, full Plutus conformance, working infrastructure components already in production). This is not a speculative idea, but an advanced, partially completed system requiring funding to reach mainnet readiness.

From a cost and ROI perspective, the proposal is reasonable and competitive. The requested 6.9M ADA (~$2.07M) covers a full year of engineering, audit, and delivery, and is priced conservatively relative to comparable efforts. The inclusion of a security audit, milestone-based escrow, independent oversight board, and on-chain accountability mechanisms significantly reduces execution risk and aligns with responsible treasury usage.

Importantly, the proposal is strongly aligned with the Cardano Constitution (v2.4):

Supports ecosystem growth and technical decentralisation
Includes transparent fund administration and auditability (Article IV)
Respects Net Change Limit constraints
Provides clear reporting, verifiability, and governance safeguards

Strategically, this also strengthens Cardano’s readiness for future upgrades such as Leios and Dijkstra, while expanding accessibility to a broader developer base via Go—supporting long-term ecosystem growth.

Overall, this is the kind of high-leverage, infrastructure-level investment the treasury should fund: it improves resilience, unlocks developer participation, and delivers lasting public goods under strong accountability frameworks.

This is the right thing to do for the network.

I support this proposal as a measured, well-structured first step toward addressing one of Cardano’s most critical gaps: DeFi liquidity. Rather than deploying large capital immediately, this withdrawal prudently focuses on establishing the legal, technical, and governance infrastructure required to manage funds responsibly. This staged approach aligns strongly with the Cardano Constitution (Article I, Sections 6 & 7), particularly around transparency, defined terms of withdrawal, auditability, and clear refund conditions.

The proposal demonstrates strong fiscal discipline and risk awareness: development is contributed at zero cost, funds are milestone-based, unused ADA is returned, and there are explicit failure/refund clauses covering legal, technical, and governance risks. The use of a 5-of-9 multisig (Amaru contract), monthly reporting, and independent audit further strengthens accountability and decentralised oversight.

Importantly, this initiative builds on prior community signalling (~67% support) and targets a high-impact area with potential ecosystem-wide ROI. Deep liquidity is foundational for stablecoins, DeFi growth, and broader adoption—without it, Cardano risks stagnation relative to other ecosystems.

While I will expect continued scrutiny in future withdrawals (particularly capital deployment and performance metrics), this initial tranche is proportionate, constitutionally compliant, and strategically sound.

Vote: YES — prudent groundwork for scalable, accountable DeFi growth on Cardano.

Vote: YES

This Info Action establishes a Net Change Limit of 300M ADA for Epochs 613–713, aligning closely with the treasury’s historical annual inflows and maintaining a sustainable fiscal guardrail as required by the Cardano Constitution. Setting the NCL near the replenishment rate helps ensure the ecosystem can continue to fund meaningful development without materially depleting the treasury. Strategic investment will be essential to drive adoption, particularly through infrastructure, liquidity growth, and the development of critical components such as stablecoins and financial rails that strengthen Cardano’s position in the broader digital economy. At the same time, the NCL represents a ceiling, not a spending target. Treasury withdrawals must continue to be evaluated carefully, prioritising initiatives that deliver real adoption, infrastructure, and measurable impact for the ecosystem. The treasury should support builders who execute and deliver value, not serve as an open-ended funding mechanism for projects that fail to produce results.

YES — This proposal delivers a measured, constitution-aligned increase to Plutus memory limits, improving developer flexibility and user experience without compromising network safety. The staged (Part 1 of 2) approach respects governance guardrails, allows real-world observation, and avoids reckless parameter jumps. Supporting this change helps Cardano scale practically today while preserving long-term decentralisation and robustness.

This Info Action is constitutionally appropriate, non-binding, and fully aligned with the intended purpose of informational governance actions. It introduces no technical, financial, or governance risk, and does not alter protocol parameters, ledger rules, or constitutional provisions. Naming a hard fork is a symbolic act that helps coordinate shared understanding across the ecosystem and has precedent within Cardano’s culture. Recognising Max van Rossem’s contributions to the community and the Hard Fork Working Group is not only harmless, but the right thing to do—it acknowledges meaningful service, reinforces positive norms around contribution and stewardship, and strengthens the social fabric of Cardano governance. As such, this proposal is sound, respectful, and worthy of support.

I support Constitution v2.4 as it strengthens Cardano governance through improved clarity, integrity, and accountability without changing power dynamics or weakening safeguards. By removing non-binding expectations, the Constitution is reaffirmed as an enforceable framework rather than advisory guidance; by integrating Budget Info requirements directly into Treasury Withdrawals, oversight is simplified and applied where funds actually move; and by mandating proposal document immutability, voter trust and governance integrity are materially improved. The reversion of specific wording to address EMURGO’s concerns reflects a pragmatic, consensus-driven approach that supports constitutional legitimacy and governance stability at this stage of Cardano’s decentralisation.

YES Vote Rationale – Cardano 2030 Vision & Strategy Framework and KPIs

I support this Info Action because Cardano governance requires a shared strategic framework and measurable reference point to guide treasury allocation, prioritisation, and long-term decision-making. A community-led Vision, Strategy and KPI framework provides DReps with a common measuring stick while remaining non-binding and fully compatible with the Cardano Constitution. My YES vote reflects support for strategic clarity and accountability, not automatic endorsement of any future funding or implementation details.

With respect to governance compensation, my support is contingent on clear, disciplined design. I support DRep compensation only when it is tied to measurable and active participation, assessed over a rolling six-month, epoch-based period, and paid proportionally based on completion of defined metrics (e.g. voting participation, rationale submission, and verifiable governance engagement). Compensation should be flat per qualifying DRep, not scaled by ADA delegated, and should require a minimum delegation threshold (e.g. 500k ADA) to ensure representational legitimacy and prevent governance farming. I support Constitutional Committee compensation due to the responsibility, accountability, and independence required by the role. I remain sceptical of additional SPO compensation, as SPOs already earn revenue through pool fees and governance participation is an expected responsibility; any additional costs should be reflected transparently in pool fee structures rather than paid separately from the treasury.

This YES vote supports strategic direction and governance maturity, while making clear that any future compensation mechanisms must prioritise accountability, fairness, anti-capture safeguards, and constitutional alignment.

I am voting YES on the proposal to add Christina as an additional Constitutional Committee member.

This action is fully compliant with CIP-1694 and the Cardano Constitution. Constitutional Committee size is not fixed, the proposal remains within existing guardrails, preserves the 67% voting threshold, and correctly references the prior Update Committee action that added Cardano Curia, ensuring proper ledger ordering and non-conflict.

The snap election to fill the vacant Constitutional Committee seat was implemented on-chain, and this proposal does not override, replace, or invalidate that outcome. Cardano Curia remains duly selected and ratified.

From a governance-resilience perspective, adding an additional member above the current minCommitteeSize of 7 reduces operational fragility and lowers the risk of governance stalling due to resignation, inactivity, or term expiry during the current mandate.

The exceptionally close snap-election result provides reasonable justification for broader representation without undermining the original on-chain decision.

Caveat: going forward, the community should clearly define whether snap-election processes are intended to be strictly single-seat outcomes, or whether close results may justify additional on-chain committee appointments. Expectations should be set in advance so that committee expansion remains principled rather than ad-hoc.

On balance, this proposal strengthens governance continuity while remaining aligned with both the letter and spirit of the Cardano Constitution.

Vote: YES — with a clear expectation of transparency, accountability, and measurable delivery

Cardano urgently needs tier-one integrations that unlock real-world utility: institutional custody, robust oracles, tier-one stablecoins, cross-chain connectivity, and analytics. These are not luxuries — they are foundational infrastructure for Cardano to compete globally as a serious settlement layer.

This proposal from the Cardano founding entities is, in my view, strategically necessary. It is aligned with the Constitution’s intent for ecosystem budgets, and it directly addresses several long-standing gaps that have limited adoption and liquidity on Cardano.
The network cannot scale institutional, DeFi, RWA, or enterprise activity without this infrastructure in place.

For these reasons, I am firmly voting YES on this Budget Info Action.

However — and this is important — a YES vote today must not be interpreted as a blank cheque.

The Constitutional framework requires:

Clear cost breakdowns

Dedicated audit and oversight provisions

Transparent administration of funds

Milestones, deliverables, and public reporting

My support is therefore paired with an expectation that the subsequent Treasury Withdrawal(s) will include:

Transparent allocation across the five integration pillars

Independent auditing and reporting in line with Article IV

Open standards and minimisation of vendor lock-in

Regular public progress updates and measurable KPIs

Clear governance oversight to prevent centralisation risks

This budget represents a major step forward — one that could meaningfully accelerate Cardano’s maturity and global competitiveness. If implemented with transparency and accountability, it will strengthen the ecosystem for builders, institutions, users, and delegators alike.

YES to the vision — with firm expectations for responsible execution.

If the later Treasury Withdrawal actions fail to meet these standards, I will reassess my support at that stage. For now, this proposal is the right direction at the right moment.

Vote: YES — with strong reservations regarding the exclusion of DJED

After reviewing the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget proposal, I will be voting YES, as it represents a major strategic step forward for Cardano DeFi and the responsible evolution of our Treasury. However, I want to state clearly my dismay that algorithmic stablecoins—particularly DJED, Cardano’s native stablecoin—have been excluded from consideration.

Summary

This proposal requests a ₳50,000,000 allocation from the Treasury to deepen stablecoin liquidity across Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem.
The funds will form a balanced pool of ADA and fiat-backed stablecoins, deployed into DEXs and lending protocols to:

Increase trading depth and efficiency

Provide a more reliable medium of exchange and unit of account for DeFi activity

Generate yield and diversify Treasury exposure

Strengthen Cardano’s competitiveness in on-chain liquidity and real-world adoption

A 9-member interim committee will manage deployment, subject to oversight by the Treasury DAO (tDAO), with on-chain checks such as:

Annual re-election or recall

Transparent reporting

Guardrails to remain within the Net Change Limit (NCL)

Why I Support It

Liquidity is the lifeblood of any DeFi ecosystem. Cardano’s weakness today is not technology—it’s depth and usability.
This proposal directly addresses that issue while introducing a repeatable, risk-managed framework for future Treasury deployments.

I believe this design is both constitutional and pragmatic, aligning with:

Fiscal responsibility: It diversifies Treasury exposure, aims to generate returns, and keeps risk within defined parameters.

Decentralized governance: The tDAO oversight and recall powers align with the Constitution’s principles of accountability and transparency.

Ecosystem growth: It materially improves liquidity, user experience, and protocol attractiveness—supporting builders, DEXs, and lending markets.

If implemented well, it can serve as Cardano’s first on-chain sovereign liquidity engine, showing the ecosystem’s ability to self-organize, self-fund, and grow sustainably.

Where I’m Disappointed

Despite supporting this initiative, I am deeply disappointed that DJED has been excluded.
DJED is Cardano’s native algorithmic stablecoin, built on academic principles, overcollateralized in ADA, and powered by COTI’s transparent smart contract model. Excluding DJED from participation sends a negative signal to innovation and decentralization, especially when it embodies the scientific and open-source ethos that Cardano stands for.

Yes, fiat-backed stablecoins offer near-term peg stability, but they rely on centralized custodians, off-chain collateral, and regulatory whims.
Cardano’s long-term vision is to build a self-sovereign financial system, not one dependent on fiat intermediaries. Algorithmic stablecoins are essential to that vision.
Treasury funds should not explicitly favor off-chain custodial assets over native, on-chain collateralized models that reflect the Constitution’s values of autonomy and decentralization.

It would have been more balanced to allocate a percentage (e.g., 10–20%) of the stablecoin liquidity fund toward DJED, subject to transparent risk assessments.
This would strengthen liquidity diversity, demonstrate technological confidence, and ensure Cardano’s DeFi infrastructure remains resilient even if fiat-backed tokens face restrictions or blacklisting.

Risks & Oversight

While the framework is well designed, success will depend on:

Professional liquidity management and transparent reporting.

Clear KPIs and yield/risk disclosures.

Continuous accountability of the committee to DReps and the wider community.

Prudent adherence to the Net Change Limit and Constitution’s fiscal prudence guardrails.

As a DRep, I will continue to monitor implementation closely to ensure:

Risk controls are enforced.

No single custodian or protocol gains undue advantage.

Reporting remains transparent and accessible to all ADA holders.

Conclusion

This proposal is a bold and necessary move for Cardano to strengthen its DeFi foundations and generate sustainable Treasury revenue. It is constitutional, fiscally sound, and growth-oriented.
However, I urge future revisions or follow-up proposals to integrate DJED and other algorithmic stablecoins, ensuring that Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem remains true to its decentralized DNA and not dependent solely on fiat bridges.

Therefore, my vote is YES — with the expectation that the next phase will restore balance by recognizing the importance of algorithmic stablecoins like DJED to Cardano’s long-term sovereignty and resilience.

I am voting Yes on this governance action because it is both constitutionally compliant and strategically valuable for the long-term growth of the Cardano ecosystem.

1. Constitutionality

This proposal is consistent with the Cardano Constitution:

Article III.5 – Submitted in a legible, standardized format with rationale, budget, administration plan, and reporting.

Article IV.1 – Advances adoption, liquidity, and token infrastructure, directly serving Cardano’s sustainability and competitiveness.

Article IV.2 – Funds are administered by Intersect, with oversight from a Board of Advisors and provision for audits.

Article IV.3 – At ₳5M, it sits comfortably within the Net Change Limit (₳86M still available for 2025).

Article IV.4 – Provides for independent yearly audits, ensuring transparency and accountability.

There are no constitutional violations present.

1. Strategic Value

Loan, not grant – This is the first-ever Treasury loan, with repayment terms (5 years, 2.44% APR). It sets a precedent for sustainable Treasury use.

Ecosystem-wide benefit – While led by the Snek Foundation, the benefits extend far beyond SNEK:

ADA liquidity and trading pair depth will increase.

Exchange infrastructure and compliance frameworks will be reusable by future Cardano Native Tokens (CNTs).

Visibility and accessibility of Cardano assets on Tier 1 platforms will grow.

Proven track record – Snek has already self-funded $4.5M to deliver Cardano’s first three Tier 1 listings (Kraken, Crypto.com, Kucoin). This demonstrates competence, credibility, and “skin in the game.”

Momentum alignment – This loan complements other strategic listing pushes (e.g., Midnight Foundation / $NIGHT), enabling a positive chain reaction for CNT listings.

1. Treasury Context

With ₳86M ADA still available under the Net Change Limit, allocating ₳5M (just ~6%) to this initiative is proportionate and justified.

Given that much of the Net Change allowance will likely be consumed this year, supporting a high-impact, repayable initiative is a responsible use of funds.

1. Risk Assessment

Repayment risk exists, as repayment depends on Snek revenues and broader market conditions.

However, the safeguards (Intersect administration, Board oversight, yearly audits, enforceable loan agreement) reduce risk to an acceptable level.

Even in the unlikely event of repayment default, the Treasury benefits from the exchange infrastructure and ecosystem visibility established.

1. Conclusion

This proposal combines innovation, accountability, and ecosystem impact. It addresses a major bottleneck for Cardano adoption (CEX visibility and liquidity), introduces a sustainable funding model (repayable loans), and leverages a proven team with significant prior investment.

For these reasons, I believe the benefits to ADA, CNT adoption, and the broader Cardano ecosystem far outweigh the manageable risks. Supporting this initiative demonstrates confidence in new Treasury models and accelerates Cardano’s competitiveness globally.

I therefore cast my vote: YES.

Vote: NO — Cardano in Oceania: A community-led strategic plan for investing in growth

While I support the spirit of this initiative, I cannot back it in its current form.

My reasons:

The proposal leaves too many unanswered questions:
• Which countries/cities will actually be covered?
• Who is the BD Lead, and what’s the hiring/timeline?
• Where are the early partner LOIs/MOUs to prove traction?
• Who is delivering the hackathon (director, venue, mentors, post-event support)?
• What are the Pacific Island partnerships & multilingual education plans?
• Who is the independent auditor?
• How will the ₳100k Ikigai reimbursement be managed without crowding out program delivery?

These gaps make it hard to judge ROI and accountability, despite the proposal being constitutionally compliant.

Conclusion:
I respect the proposers and the intent, but until there is a clearer definition of scope, partners, and deliverables, I cannot vote to allocate ₳778k.

For 2026, I’d welcome a revised submission with stronger BD leadership, defined regional coverage, and proven early traction.

I am voting YES on the Van Rossem Hard Fork.

This is exactly the kind of core protocol upgrade Cardano should be supporting: technically reviewed, constitutionally appropriate, infrastructure-focused, and designed to improve the long-term capability of the network. Moving to protocol version 11 strengthens Cardano’s smart contract and ledger foundations, introduces important new Plutus primitives, improves developer experience, and supports more advanced applications being built on Cardano.

This is not a speculative treasury request or vague ecosystem initiative. It is a serious protocol upgrade with clear scope, clear technical rationale, and strong alignment with Cardano’s long-term mission as a secure, decentralised, high-assurance blockchain.

Subject to the required hard fork readiness and SPO upgrade thresholds being met, I am a resounding YES.

I am voting YES on Eternl: Path to Sustainability v2.

Eternl is important user-facing infrastructure for Cardano. It supports ordinary ADA holders, delegators, DRep participation, staking, dApp usage, governance interaction, and the broader usability of the ecosystem. In my view, mature wallet infrastructure is not optional if Cardano is serious about adoption, decentralised governance, and real-world utility.

The previous proposal failed to receive a constitutional vote from the Constitutional Committee, and I believe the feedback was valid. Treasury withdrawals must meet a high standard around audit allocation, oversight metrics, administrator responsibility, refund conditions, and transparency. This revised version appears to have responded directly to that feedback by clarifying the audit and oversight provisions, naming the administrator, disclosing prior treasury receipts, and setting out refund / repayment mechanics.

I also support the sustainability direction of the proposal. Treasury funding should not become permanent dependency, but in this case the proposal includes a pathway toward paid-plan revenue, public reporting, and potential repayment or return of surplus value to the Cardano Treasury. That is the correct model: support critical infrastructure while expecting discipline, transparency, and a route away from ongoing treasury reliance.

My YES vote is therefore based on three points: Eternl’s proven value to the Cardano ecosystem, the improvements made in v2 following constitutional feedback, and the expectation that the team will provide transparent reporting, auditable use of funds, and clear accountability throughout the funded period.

I am voting YES on this Treasury Withdrawal to reimburse the Ikigai governance action deposit.

My rationale is that this appears to be a narrow and exceptional restitution case arising from an early Voltaire-era governance/node issue, where a good-faith participant lost the ability to recover a ₳100,000 governance action deposit. I do not view this as normal treasury funding, nor as a precedent for reimbursing failed proposals, user error, rejected actions, or ordinary opportunity cost.

The requested amount is small, fixed, and clearly scoped. Supporting reimbursement here helps maintain trust in Cardano governance during the early implementation phase, especially for participants who engaged constructively and were affected by technical edge cases outside their control.

I support this action on the basis that it is a one-off correction for a specific governance implementation issue, not a general policy of compensating governance participants for unsuccessful or unrecovered deposits.

I am voting No on this Info Action.

I agree with the underlying concern that Cardano needs better treasury governance, clearer prioritisation, stronger accountability, and more effective coordination between proposers, DReps, SPOs, the Constitutional Committee, and the wider community.

However, I do not believe this proposal is defined clearly enough to justify an on-chain endorsement. It appears to signal support for a broad reform direction that may later require changes to governance processes or even constitutional interpretation, but it does not yet provide enough detail on the proposed model, accountability structures, decentralisation safeguards, implementation pathway, or how competing coordination approaches would remain open and permissionless.

Cardano does need better treasury coordination, but that coordination should emerge transparently through open tooling, public analysis, milestone tracking, community review, and competitive governance infrastructure — not through a broad mandate that risks pre-shaping the process before the ecosystem has fully debated the design.

For these reasons, I support continued discussion and future refinement, but I cannot support this Info Action in its current form.