2025 Net Change Limit
289 DReps voted · 54 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 20.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 19.9M ₳ No rationale
- No 18.2M ₳ No rationale
- No 17.1M ₳ No rationale
- No 16.7M ₳ No rationale
- No 16.4M ₳ Rationale
We voted 'yes' on the 300M Net Change Limit proposal and are choosing to support the lower limit over the higher limit because that represents the more conservative approach.
- Yes 14.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 14.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 14.1M ₳ No rationale
- No 13.3M ₳ Rationale
I’ve taken the time to review the proposal to set the 2025 Net Change Limit at 350 million ADA. While I support the broader principle of placing structured limits on treasury withdrawals, I’ve decided to vote No on this specific proposal.
One key reason is the timing. We’re already in April, a full quarter into the year. Setting a fixed annual limit this late in the cycle raises concerns about how the remaining allocation would be managed and monitored over a shortened period. A more adaptive or phased approach would allow for better oversight and responsiveness.
Another important factor is the amount itself. Historical on-chain data indicates that Cardano’s treasury inflows for 2025 are projected to be around 300 million ADA. Approving a limit above that number risks depleting treasury reserves instead of maintaining a balanced flow. As someone who advocates for long-term sustainability—both economic and ecological—I see this as a red flag.
Additionally, may I suggest exploring the option of a dynamic method of setting the Net Change Limit, such as tying it to a percentage of actual treasury inflows, rather than hardcoding an absolute ADA figure. This approach could offer greater flexibility and better reflect the performance of the ecosystem over time. It would also help smooth out volatility and adapt automatically to growth or contraction in network usage.
Economic impact is also worth considering. Treasury withdrawals inevitably lead to spending and spending often involves converting ADA into fiat. Without proper emission pacing or vesting structures, these withdrawals could create sell pressure that affects the health of the ADA market, especially in the absence of safeguards to manage outflows more gradually.
Lastly, I share the concerns voiced by several community members regarding the process itself. The rationale for selecting 350 million ADA hasn’t been made sufficiently clear. For a decision this impactful, I believe we owe it to the community to back proposals with transparent data and modeling assumptions, whilst leaving room for further discussion.
For all these reasons, I cannot support the 350 million ADA cap as it stands. I encourage the submission of a revised proposal—ideally one that is better aligned with inflow-based calculations, includes more transparency around how the figure is derived and reflects the values of fiscal responsibility, inclusivity and decentralization that we aspire to uphold. - Yes 12.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 12.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 11.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 11M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 10.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 8.8M ₳ Rationale
このガバナンスアクションは2025年の純変動上限だけを扱っていて、今決めるべきことに絞っている点を評価しています。金額も2024年の実績に基づいていて納得できる水準ですし、まずは制度を前に進める意味でも、私はこのガバナンスアクションに賛成します。\n\nThis governance action focuses only on the 2025 Net Change Limit, which I appreciate as it keeps the decision focused on what’s needed right now. The amount is based on last year’s actual inflow, which feels reasonable. I support this governance action as a step forward.
- Yes 8.1M ₳ No rationale
- No 7.8M ₳ No rationale
- No 7.3M ₳ No rationale
- No 7.1M ₳ Rationale
I welcome the proposed Net Change Limit proposal. It is important to approve an NCL and I am voting NO on this one due to several reasons:
- The problem I see with a very large first year NCL is that our budgetary and governance processes are the weakest, keep changing from week to week and are probably the most inefficient in the first year. Our ability to audit, prevent waste and abuse are questionable. A lower NCL would focus minds.
- The proposers have stated that from January 5th, 2024, Epoch 459, through December 30th, Epoch 531, the actual total income into the Cardano Treasury was 335,957,093 ada. The proposed NCL is 350M ada. This is roughly 14M ada HIGHER than the total income in the Cardano Treasury for 2024. I welcome the proposed reference to modelling and the reference to a previous period for which we have data. The motion uses modelling of ADA inflow for the previous year as the main basis for approving an NCL. It is indeed one of the factors that must be considered.
- What I am missing in this proposal - as it proposes a relatively large NCL - is even a minor economic analysis of how approvals of different NCLs could impact the valuation of ADA. An NCL of 350M ADA is sending a signal to the market. What is this signal? How does it compare to previous signals? If we do not have the data, is there room for a prediction at least? With the lack of this economic/monetary analysis, we are left to speculate. My feeling is that NCL approvals in the future will shape the ADA exchange rate vs the USD. It is a signal how much ADA could be released - a signal approved by the majority of DReps. The approval of a large NCL could have an immediate price impact on the value of ADA, thus diminishing the purchase power of the 350M ADA. Before the budget elements are approved.
- After approving a large NCL, the budgetary discussions will probably take place in the shadow of a lower ADA/USD exchange rate. Thus we might be forced by the market to push an annual budget towards the top limit of the NCL. We could create a self-fulfilling prophesy.
- Without a monetary/economic analysis or forecast, I would consider voting for a NCL in the 200-250M ADA in 2025 (depending on the text of the NCL proposal) as it would give a better signal to the market about our intentions to balance the development of the system and the intention to safeguard the value of ADA and Cardano's Top 10 position. Especially, as our abilities to manage the potential spending of so much ADA in the early days of decentralized governance are the lowest.
- I see this conservative approach as something that protects the interests of ADA holders and stakers. We SHOULD approve the closest NCL to the actual budget that we want as DReps. If the intention is to approve a lower budget than 350M ada as some (many?) DReps seem to have indicated, then to preserve the value of that ada for those who will receive it, the best thing we can do is to vote for an NCL that is closest to that intended 2025 budget total.
- Yes 6.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 6.2M ₳ No rationale
- No 6M ₳ Rationale
Some community sentiment are still strong around having a lower NCL. As a proponent of forward progress/continuous improvement, I'm inherently inclined to vote Yes. In this case, I can find some measures to cast this aside for a moment to get to NO. After some more review of budget proposals that continue to come in at meaningful values (millions of ADA) I think the right course of action here is to switch to a NO vote. It's clear that some downward pressure is needed for budgets (<300M NCL).
With ongoing committee elections (changing of the guard), a steady stream of budget proposals approaching 500M (not inherently bad), concentrated DRep delegate distributions, and continued lack of transparency to a degree over past programs (ie. Catalyst) - we as DReps should leverage the biggest stick we have to control budgets - and that's the NCL.
- Yes 5.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.3M ₳ No rationale
- No 4.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.6M ₳ No rationale
- No 4.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.2M ₳ Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança, pois o limite de gasto anual do tesouro proposto está alinhado com a responsabilidade financeira desejada, visto que a faixa de 350 milhões de ADA foi definida com base na receita do tesouro em 2024 — 335 milhões de ADA — e em simulações de arrecadação para 2025. Outro fator que levamos em conta é a necessidade de definição prévia de um valor fixo, pois uma quantia variável baseada em percentuais inviabiliza a elaboração de um orçamento preciso e alinhado às demandas da comunidade.
[English]
We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action because the proposed annual treasury spending cap aligns with the desired financial responsibility, considering that the 350 million ADA range was defined based on the treasury’s 2024 revenue — 335 million ADA — and revenue projections for 2025. Another factor we considered is the need to define a fixed amount in advance, as a variable amount based on percentages makes it impossible to create a precise budget aligned with the community’s needs.
- Yes 4.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.2M ₳ No rationale
- No 4.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 3.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 3.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 3.7M ₳ No rationale
- No 3.5M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 3.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 3M ₳ No rationale
- No 2.9M ₳ No rationale
- No 2.8M ₳ Rationale
A NCL of 350 Million ADA is too high to be considered fiscally responsible. Submitted budgets have not reasonably proven this amount of ADA is necessary, so I cannot in good conscience approve this level of spending.
I am willing to approve a NCL of ~200 Million ADA, and will do so if a GA is submitted to support this.
If we had community pooled GA supported tooling from Intersect / gov.tools / IOG this would be a non-issue, as average Cardano community members would have been able to submit their own GAs and this would be done already.
I'm disappointed that this necessary tooling has been withheld and was promised as part of a compromise for a 100 Million ADA deposit for GAs.
- Yes 2.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.7M ₳ Rationale
As this is one of 2 competing net change proposals, it appears the choice is between a net change limit of 300 or 350 million. This proposal (350M NCL) gives us a bit more freedom to maneuver during the first year of on-chain governance, and I appreciate the part of the rationale explaining the predicted motivation to increase fee revenue if the yearly NCL is tied to yearly treasury inflows. I will vote yes on this proposal and no on the other.
- No 2.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.5M ₳ Rationale
本提案について、慎重な姿勢を保ちつつも、Yes票を投じます。支出上限額が350M ADAと比較的大きく設定されている点については、予算規律の観点からは懸念が残ります。しかしながら、Intersectがこの時期をCardanoにとって極めて重要なフェーズと捉え、エコシステムに競争力をもたらすために意図的に多めの予算を提案したのであれば、それは戦略的判断として一定の理解が可能です。現在のCardanoは、dApp開発、L2技術、分散ガバナンスなど多方面での急速な進展が求められる局面にあり、もしその加速を実現するための布石としてこの提案があるのならば、意義はあると考えます。
一方で、トレジャリー支出は長期的視点での持続可能性を常に意識すべきであり、今回の決定が今後の支出水準のデフォルトとして扱われることには慎重であるべきです。したがって、今回のYes票はこの時期における「例外的な支出上限」としての性格を重視した上での判断であることを明示します。
I cast a Yes vote on this proposal, albeit with a cautious stance. The proposed upper limit of 350M ADA is relatively large, and from the perspective of fiscal discipline, I have some reservations. However, if Intersect has intentionally proposed a larger budget because it views this period as a critical phase for Cardano—and believes that such funding is necessary to enhance the competitiveness of the ecosystem—then I can understand that as a strategic decision.
Cardano is currently at a juncture where rapid progress is needed across various domains, including dApp development, L2 technologies, and decentralized governance. If this proposal serves as a foundation to accelerate those developments, I see merit in supporting it.
That said, treasury expenditures must always be considered with long-term sustainability in mind. We must be cautious not to treat this level of spending as the default for future cycles. Therefore, my Yes vote on this proposal should be interpreted as support for an exceptional funding limit specific to this period—not as a blanket endorsement of high spending levels moving forward.