2025 Net Change Limit
289 DReps voted · 54 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 592.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 428.5M ₳ Rationale
I am thinking of voting Yes for both Intersect-led NCL(350M-2025) and Community-led NCL(300M-2025,250M-2026).
There are two reasons for this.
- Regarding the amount of NCL, I believe that Community-led NCL is better. Therefore, I will vote Yes for this. I will provide more details later.
- On the other hand, the worst-case scenario is that NCL is not agreed upon and set. To avoid this, I will also vote Yes for Intersect-led NCL. Although I believe that Community-led NCL is better, Intersect-led NCL is also acceptable in my opinion. I will provide more details later.
Details of reasons and concerns
- Why I think Community-led NCL is better
I will consider the pros and cons of Intersect-led NCL and Community-led NCL. I believe that Community-led NCL proposes a substantially better figure, so I will support it.
1-a) Points where I think Community-led NCL is better than Intersect-led NCL.
・The inflow to the treasury in 2025 is clearly less than the inflow in 2024, so I think it would have been better to use the projected inflow for 2025. The logic behind using the actual results for 2024 did not seem very clear to me from the rationale in this governance action.
・It would have been better to set the NCL for 2026 at the same time. The current Intersect block budget appears to be scheduled so that all expenditures are made from the treasury in 2025, including items that may be fine to spend in 2026. Not defining the NCL for 2026 could be an incentive to unnecessarily bring forward spending plans in 2025.1-b) Points where I think the Intersect-led NCL is better than the Community-led NCL.
・The Intersect-led NCL is better organized in terms of format. This includes the definition of the NCL and its period.- Reasons for voting Yes on the Intersect-led NCL at the same time
In my opinion, the worst outcome is that the NCL is not agreed upon after all. With the trend of global deregulation of blockchain, if the NCL is not agreed upon, the creativity of the community is limited, and Cardano's progress slows down, it will be a big loss in terms of Cardano's vision and roadmap.
One concern about voting Yes to both is the troubling question of what will happen if both NCLs are approved.
2-a) If we consider that the 2025 NCL will be overwritten, we may end up with an NCL of 350M ADA applied in 2025 and an NCL of 250M ADA applied in 2026.
2-b) The 2025 Net Change Limit does not contain any wording to the effect that "if this is adopted after the adoption of 'Set 2025 Net Change Limit of 300M ADA, 2026 Net Change Limit of 250M ADA,' the NCLs equivalent to 2025 in 'Set 2025 Net Change Limit of 300M ADA, 2026 Net Change Limit of 250M ADA' will be revoked." Therefore, if we consider that the 2025 NCL will not be automatically overwritten and that both NCLs will coexist and the stricter NCL will be applied, the 300M ADA NCL may be applied in 2025 and the 250M ADA NCL may be applied in 2026.
This interpretation will likely be determined by the Constitutional Committee, but I believe that either interpretation is better than having no NCLs at all.
*I have no particular conflict of interest related to this governance action.
私は、Intersect主導NCLとコミュニティ主導NCLの両方にYes投票をしようと考えています。
理由は２つです。
NCLの金額については、私は、コミュニティ主導NCLの方がより良いと考えています。よってこれにYesを投票します。後ほど詳細を記載します。
一方で、NCLが合意されず設定されないというシナリオは最悪のシナリオです。これを回避するために、Intersect主導NCLにもYesを投票します。コミュニティ主導NCLの方がより良いと考えていますが、Intersect主導NCLも私の考えでは許容可能です。後ほど詳細を記載します。
理由の詳細と懸念事項
- コミュニティ主導NCLの方がより良いと考える理由
Intersect主導NCLとコミュニティ主導NCLのメリットデメリットを考えます。コミュニティ主導NCLの方が実質的に良い数値を提案していると考えているため、これに賛成します。
Intersect主導NCLよりコミュニティ主導NCLの方が優れていると思う点。
・2025年の流入額は明らかに2024年の流入額より少ないため、2025年の流入額見込みを使用する方が良かったと考えています。2024年の実績を使った方が良いロジックはあまり私にとってこのガバナンスアクションに記載されるRationaleからは明確ではないように思えました。
・2026年のNCLも同時に設定した方が良かったように思えます。現在のIntersectのブロックBudgetは、おそらく2026年に支出しても問題ない可能性がある項目も含めて、2025年に全てトレジャリーから支出されるように支出スケジュールが組まれているように見えます。2026年のNCLが定義されないことで2025年に不必要に支出計画を前倒しするインセンティブになると可能性があります。コミュニティ主導NCLよりIntersect主導NCLの方が優れていると思う点。
・形式面はよりIntersect主導NCLの方がより良く整理されています。NCLやその期間の定義などです。- 同時にIntersect主導NCLにもYesを投票する理由
私が思うに、最悪の結末はNCLが結局合意されないことです。ブロックチェーンの世界的な規制緩和の潮流が巻き起こる中で、NCLが合意されず、コミュニティの創造性が制限され、Cardanoの歩みが遅くなることはCardanoのビジョンやロードマップから見て大きな損失です。
両方にYesをする点の１つの懸念として、この２つのNCLが２つともに承認された場合に何が起こるのかは悩ましい問いです。
2025年のNCLが上書きされると考える場合、2025年に350M ADAのNCLが適用され、2026年に250M ADAのNCLが適用される状態になるかもしれません。
・2025 Net Change Limitにおいて、「「Set 2025 Net Change Limit of 300M ADA, 2026 Net Change Limit of 250M ADA」が採択されたのちにこれが採択されたら、「Set 2025 Net Change Limit of 300M ADA, 2026 Net Change Limit of 250M ADA」の2025年に相当するNCLを取り消す」という旨の文言がないため、2025年のNCLが自動的に上書きはされず、両方のNCLが併存し、より厳しい方のNCLが適用されると考える場合、・2025年に300M ADAのNCLが適用され、2026年に250M ADAのNCLが適用される状態になるかもしれません。
この解釈は、憲法委員会が判断を下すと考えられますが、いずれの解釈を取ったとしても、NCLが全く設定されない状態と比べるとより良いと私は考えています。*このガバナンスアクションに関連する利益相反は私には特にありません。
- Abstain 328.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 297.4M ₳ Rationale
Summary
EMURGO as a DRep votes Yes on the info governance action.
Rationale
This Info Action proposes a 2025 budget of 350 million ADA. The year 2025 is expected to mark a critical period of transition, with significant regulatory developments anticipated in the United States and other key jurisdictions.
These developments are likely to open up new business opportunities across the blockchain industry. In light of this evolving landscape, and recognizing the importance of being strategically positioned for growth, we believe that setting the budget at 350 million ADA is appropriate. It provides the flexibility needed to respond to emerging opportunities while supporting Cardano’s ability to engage actively with an increasingly dynamic global environment.
Proposal link
https://adastat.net/governances/9b62b3c632f329016a968ac25211825bb4f84b12461121c7da3aa11df92370f900 - Yes 240.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 221.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 174.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 135.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 93.3M ₳ Rationale
As a DRep, I have decided to vote YES on the second governance action regarding the setting of the Net Change Limit (NCL).
Currently there are 2 governance actions submitted regarding NCL. The first one is submitted by the community and the second one by Intersect. This creates chaos.First GA from the community:
gov_action10ueqgzwenxr39le68n0se9peu92r7gm2846xwehh3u0ahc0qd0uqqyljxu5Second GA from the Intersect:
gov_action1nd3t833j7v5sz65k3tp9yyvztw60sjcjgcgjr37682s3m7frwrusqmd2k80It is logical to compare both actions and choose only one.
GA from Intersect defines the term NCL and specifies the validity period of NCL.
"The 2025 Net Change Limit will begin at the start of Epoch 532 and continue for 72 epochs, finishing at the conclusion of Epoch 604 in December 2025."
This is just a cosmetic improvement. I assume that all DReps understand the term NCL. I don't mind that the period is vaguely defined for 2025 and 2026 in the first GA.
Intersect GA is better structured, more accurate, and contains relevant links. I appreciate that.
The most important thing regarding NCL is the amount of ADA that should be set as the limit for treasury withdrawals.
The first GA wants to cap the NCL at 300M ADA while the second GA wants to cap it at 350M ADA.
In my rationale for the first GA, I mentioned that I would like to see the NCL lower, somewhere around 280M ADA. 300M ADA was acceptable to me.
350M ADA is the maximum amount I am willing to accept from my perspective. I am aware that this is a relatively high NCL. My poll shows that the NCL of 350M ADA is considered high by most respondents.
Although it is not necessary to withdraw ADA up to the NCL, there will always be a risk that the maximum possible amount will be withdrawn. My concern is that this may happen.
The cryptocurrency ecosystem is unique in that Treasury investments in the ecosystem have a direct negative impact on the market price of ADA. Entities that receive ADA will mostly sell them because they are forced to pay costs in USD. Selling pressure can grow.
If the ADA price is low in a bear market, in 2026 it may be necessary to sell a relatively large amount of ADA to obtain the necessary amount in USD. Treasury can quickly run out. Of course, it will be possible to approve the NCL for 2026, which can prevent this. It is likely that a new NCL will be proposed.
ADA is perceived as money. Their market price, or rather the capitalization of Cardano, is an important factor from a demand perspective. If Cardano does not stay in the top 10, it could prevent the adoption of the ecosystem.
Another negative impact could be the US government's disinterest in including ADA in the state stockpile. Let us keep these risks in mind.
On the other hand, without continuous protocol improvements and ecosystem development, adoption is largely limited. Cardano's attractiveness would depend only on decentralization and monetary policy.
Cardano is being built as an SC platform. As such, it depends on the growing network effect. This in turn depends on scalability.
As a DRep, I have to carefully balance the short-term negative impact on the ADA price that will harm SPOs, stakers and possibly adoption and the long-term potentially positive impact on the ecosystem.
So I would like to see the NCL set to a maximum of 280M ADA. 350M ADA is too much. Nevertheless, I decided to vote YES for this GA. Why?
A GA can be submitted at any time that will lower or increase the NCL for a given period.
Individual withdrawals are more important than NCL. DReps should carefully consider each withdrawal and assess the long-term impact. This is where savings must be made. Let's invest primarily in technology, not in meetings and discussion groups.
With a higher NCL, we have more maneuvering options. It is not necessary to invest all ADA up to NCL. Theoretically, we can lock ADA in DeFi. These are relevant reasons to have a higher NCL. I can justify to myself why I approve of a high NCL.
In addition, we need to ratify some NCL so that we can start withdrawing ADA from the Treasury. We are at the end of Q1 and NCL is still not defined.
The dilemma I have is whether to vote YES for only one GA or for both. In the previous rationale, I stated in the disclaimer that if a better GA for NCL appears, I can change my vote.
From my point of view, the community GA is more treasury-friendly, so I support it a little more. So I will not change my vote for the community GA. Let both GAs have my support. Let the better one win.
I am aware that I am contributing to the chaos. It would be better to vote for only one GA. I will monitor the feedback and read other rationales. I will respond if necessary.
At this point, I want to vote as quickly as possible and provide my thoughts.
- Yes 92.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 89.8M ₳ Rationale
[SIPO Voting Statement Update]
Change of Position on the 2025 Net Change Limit (NCL) Budget Committee Proposal (350M ADA)Dear Cardano Community,
As a Delegated Representative (DRep) for the Cardano ecosystem, I, SIPO, would like to publicly update my voting position regarding the 2025 Net Change Limit (NCL) proposal submitted by the Budget Committee.
Originally, I opposed the proposal to set the 2025 NCL at 350 million ADA, favoring instead the community-driven alternative that proposed a more conservative limit of 300 million ADA for 2025 and 250 million ADA for 2026. However, due to the recent failure of the community proposal to pass, I have reassessed my position in light of the broader implications for the ecosystem.
⸻
Reason for Changing My Vote to “YES”
If the 350M ADA proposal were also to fail, no valid NCL would exist, which would effectively halt all budget-related actions for 2025. This includes the disbursement of Catalyst funds and the approval of any treasury-funded proposals. Such a delay would negatively impact the entire ecosystem, especially smaller developers and community projects that rely on timely funding.
My decision to now vote “YES” on the Budget Committee’s 350M ADA proposal is based on the following key considerations:
• Avoiding Development Delays:
The absence of a confirmed NCL blocks all budgetary processes, delaying funding decisions and development activities across the ecosystem.
• Protecting Smaller Contributors:
While larger entities such as IOG may be able to operate at financial risk for some time, smaller builders and independent teams are particularly vulnerable to long funding delays.
• Preserving the Ecosystem’s Operational Integrity:
The longer we go without a functioning budget framework, the more Cardano risks losing its momentum, credibility, and trust from internal and external stakeholders.⸻
SIPO’s Policy Position Going Forward
Let me be clear: I continue to believe that fiscal responsibility and long-term sustainability are critical to Cardano’s success. The change in my vote should not be interpreted as a shift in those principles, but rather as a pragmatic response to current governance realities.
Going forward, I will continue to advocate for:
• Responsible use of the treasury based on actual inflows and sustainability;
• Multi-year NCL frameworks that enhance predictability and stability;
• Community-driven governance mechanisms that empower decentralized decision-making;
• The eventual reintroduction of conservative and phased NCL proposals with long-term planning in mind.⸻
Updated Voting Position
• Budget Committee Proposal: Set 2025 NCL to 350M ADA
→ Original Vote: NO → Updated Vote: YES⸻
This decision was not made lightly. I understand and appreciate the intent and merit behind the previously submitted community proposal, which emphasized sustainability and prudent financial planning. However, we now face a time-sensitive governance bottleneck, and I believe that approving the 350M ADA NCL proposal is the only viable path forward at this stage to ensure continuity and development across the ecosystem.
This is a vote for practical governance, not a blanket endorsement of higher spending limits. The NCL defines a maximum cap, not a spending target—a distinction that must always be respected in implementation.
⸻
Final Note
My role as a DRep obligates me to act with accountability and foresight. I respect that other DReps and stakeholders may reach different conclusions based on their values and analysis. However, I stand by this decision as the most responsible one under current circumstances.
Let us continue to build Cardano on the foundations of decentralized governance, community trust, and shared responsibility.
Sincerely,
SIPO
Cardano SPO & DRep - No 89.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 89.2M ₳ No rationale
- No 77.3M ₳ Rationale
我在上一次投票中投了反对票，主要原因在之前分享过， 最重要的原因是目前缺乏对财政资金使用效率的评估机制 。目前 Cardano 生态尚未建立成熟的财政支出审查制度。在缺乏透明数据支持的前提下设定总支出额度，可能会掩盖资金浪费或滥用的问题。而在这个新提案中，这一问题仍未得到实质改善。 综上，这个提案我投反对。
- Yes 76.1M ₳ No rationale
- No 75.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 74.7M ₳ No rationale
- No 71.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 70.8M ₳ Rationale
As a DRep, i have voted ✅YES for this proposal.
It clearly defines the timespan of the NCL: 'The 2025 Net Change Limit will begin at the start of Epoch 532 and continue for 72 epochs, finishing at the conclusion of Epoch 604 in December 2025'
It also defines what the NCL is - Its the total maximum amount we can withdrawal from the treasury during this time period. Independent from the inflow into the treasury via like tau or a treasury donation.THIS IS A MAXIMUM LIMIT - similar to the guardrails!
This does NOT mean, that we have to spend all of that amount within the given timespan. The DReps are still voting on the Budget/Treasury Withdrawals that are coming along, and we DO NOT have to agree on all of them.
So the NCL is really a max. limit boundary per definition.
I support this proposal so we can move forward with the Budget and Treasury-Withdrawals. - Yes 68M ₳ Rationale
たしかに上限が少し高めに設定されていますが、これはあくまで“最大引き出し額”であって、必ず使い切るわけではありません。実際にIntersectが提案している予算も350M ADAを下回っていますし、この上限は“使わなくてはいけない額”ではなく“これ以上使ってはダメ”という制限であることを考えると、余裕を持った設計はむしろ安心材料だと思いました。必要があればその中から必要な分だけをDRepが判断して承認すればよく、無駄に使われるわけではありません。
It is true that the limit is set a little high, but this is only the “maximum withdrawal amount” and does not necessarily mean that the money will be used up. In fact, the budget proposed by Intersect is less than 350M ADA, and considering that this limit is not a “must spend” limit but a “can't spend more than this” limit, I thought the design was rather generous. Considering that this limit is not a “must spend” limit, but a “can't spend more than this” limit, I thought the generous design was rather reassuring. DRep can determine and approve only the necessary amount, if necessary, and it will not be used unnecessarily.
- Yes 65.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 62.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 51.1M ₳ No rationale
- No 50.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 49.8M ₳ Rationale
I decided to vote Yes, for two reasons:\n1. Even though 350M is quite high limit, it does not actually mean all this money will definitely be taken from treasury. Decision about withdrawal will be made by DReps for each proposal separately, and they are the ones who will decide in the end - to give requested amount or not.\n2. We need to accept the budget so we can move forward. Even if we make mistake now, we can change it later. But if we do not move forward, we will never know if we were right or wrong. So it seems better to take a step - even if it’s not perfect - than to stay stuck and do nothing.
- Abstain 49.7M ₳ Rationale
For decentralisation, it’s always better to minimise Treasury withdrawals. However, keeping unnecessary ADA in the Treasury is also unhealthy for the ecosystem. “Yes” and “No” are options I cannot fully support, so my answer would be "abstain" for this case.
- No 48.4M ₳ Rationale
Current Cardano Constitution does not include adequate guardrails to prevent misuse, mismanagement, or corruption of the treasury, which is a crucial concern in any blockchain ecosystem. Due to the issues listed below, we believe it is better for Cardano Budget to be prudent and start first year budget with a small minimalist budget to focus on technological improvement and developer experience only.
Weak Oversight on Treasury Withdrawals (TREASURY-01 to TREASURY-04) The most glaring issue in the Constitution lies in its handling of Treasury Withdrawal actions. The Constitution specifies that any net change limit on the treasury's balance must be agreed upon by DReps (Delegated Representatives) through a governance action (TREASURY-01a), but this is far from a safeguard. There are several issues with this approach: Vague Governance Thresholds: The Constitution leaves the approval of treasury changes to an on-chain governance vote by DReps. While the threshold for approval is set at 50% of the active voting stake, this presents a potential for centralization. If the voting pool is manipulated or controlled by a few large stakeholders or entities, they could unilaterally decide how the treasury funds are allocated, leading to conflicts of interest or potential corruption. Without stricter rules to prevent the undue influence of a few powerful players, the treasury could easily become a tool for personal or factional gain. Lack of Specificity on Treasury Spending: The Constitution allows for the possibility of treasury withdrawals to be denominated in Ada (TREASURY-03a), which is standard, but it lacks more specific guidelines on how funds are to be allocated. The absence of clear, transparent spending criteria opens the door to poorly justified or even fraudulent expenditures. Insufficient Pre-Withdrawal Scrutiny: According to TREASURY-04a, treasury withdrawals are only permissible once there is an approved ecosystem budget, yet this "budget" could be as vague as the governance actions themselves. This creates an unnecessary layer of ambiguity, making it harder for stakeholders to track the movement of funds or to know if treasury withdrawals align with the Cardano blockchain’s long-term goals. The lack of stringent oversight means there is a potential for funds to be allocated to initiatives that serve the interests of the few, rather than the community at large.
No Mechanisms to Prevent Treasury Mismanagement or Corruption The Cardano Treasury is essentially the lifeblood of the ecosystem’s development and growth. However, the Constitution falls short in providing sufficient safeguards to prevent corruption, fraud, or simple mismanagement. Here are a few critical concerns: Potential for Conflict of Interest: Since treasury management can be influenced by DReps or other governing bodies, there is a risk of conflict of interest. DReps, especially those who are heavily invested in the ecosystem or who may have alliances with specific development projects, could prioritize personal or group interests over the interests of the broader Cardano community. Without a system of independent checks and balances—such as independent audits or decentralized oversight—there is little preventing these entities from using the treasury for their own benefit. No Protection Against Fraudulent or Misleading Proposals: While the Constitution requires treasury withdrawals to be tied to an approved budget, it does not outline how fraudulent or misleading proposals are to be detected and prevented. There is no mention of auditing mechanisms, third-party reviews, or community accountability mechanisms that would ensure proposed projects have proper oversight before being funded. This leaves room for individuals or entities to create false narratives around certain initiatives, directing funds toward nonviable projects, or worse, diverting funds for personal gain. Treasury Withdrawal Caps Are Too Lenient: The TREASURY-01a guideline, which mandates a net change limit agreed upon by the DReps, could be a source of great vulnerability. The Constitution's wording leaves this decision too open to the discretion of DReps, and the 50% voting threshold isn’t enough to deter the influence of large stakeholders who may push for excessive withdrawals or allocations. A stronger cap on how much can be withdrawn at any given time, with more robust accountability mechanisms in place, would create better safeguards against reckless spending.
Lack of Transparency in Treasury Actions One of the key pillars of decentralized governance is transparency, especially when it comes to the handling of public funds. The Cardano Constitution falls short in this regard: Opaque Treasury Management: While TREASURY-03a specifies that withdrawals must be denominated in Ada, it says little about how treasury management will be communicated to the broader community. How are the public to know that the funds are being allocated in an equitable and responsible manner? There is no clear roadmap for community members to review treasury decisions, track fund allocation, or participate in discussions about how the funds should be used. This lack of visibility invites suspicions of backroom deals or secretive funding decisions. No Public Disclosure of Entities Receiving Treasury Funds: The Constitution fails to address the lack of public disclosure about which entities or individuals are receiving treasury funds. Without mandated public transparency for all recipients of treasury funding, it becomes far too easy for funds to flow to projects or organizations with close ties to decision-makers or even entities that do not fully represent the interests of the broader community. Public disclosure of who receives treasury funds is a basic form of accountability that is crucial in preventing favoritism, corruption, or misappropriation of resources. The absence of such a provision in the Constitution signals a major oversight in terms of safeguarding the treasury from potential misuse. No Clear Roadmap for Transparency Mechanisms: The Constitution provides no detail on the process for tracking treasury withdrawals after approval, nor how public stakeholders can challenge or provide input on treasury spending. A transparent, community-driven platform for tracking the spending of treasury funds, perhaps akin to a public ledger or open-source project for Cardano treasury activities, would help to bolster confidence in the system and reduce fears of corruption. Without such mechanisms in place, the system risks creating an us-vs-them mentality, where community members feel left out of the decision-making process. Conclusion: A Call for Stronger Treasury Protections While the Cardano Constitution represents an ambitious attempt to create a decentralized governance framework for the blockchain ecosystem, it lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent mismanagement, corruption, and poor oversight of the treasury. In its current form, it opens the door for significant risks to the Cardano community’s financial resources, allowing for undue influence by powerful stakeholders, ambiguous withdrawal processes, and lack of transparency in treasury management. While the Constitution sets forth a number of Guardrails to protect the Cardano Blockchain from technical failure, it fails to apply a similar level of protection to the treasury. Without clearly defined repercussions for those who misuse the treasury, there is little incentive to ensure that funds are used ethically and responsibly. If the Cardano community is to truly thrive in a decentralized environment, it is essential that the Constitution be amended to include stronger guardrails and accountability measures around treasury management. Until such amendments are made, stakeholders should carefully reconsider supporting this Constitution in its present form, as it does not sufficiently protect the Cardano Blockchain Treasury from the risks of corruption and misallocation of funds
- Yes 42.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 42.4M ₳ No rationale
- No 40M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 38.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 36.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 34.4M ₳ Rationale
If this is a pivotal moment that will determine the fate of Cardano's ecosystem and development structure, then I support this provisional budget decision. In any case, the current budget decision format is highly unrealistic, so I strongly hope that it will be changed to a more appropriate form.
- Yes 34.3M ₳ Rationale
Socious – Rationale for Voting Yes (350M ADA Proposal)
Socious voted Yes on the proposal to set the 2025 Net Change Limit at 350M ADA.
We support this proposal because it reflects a data-driven, forward-looking approach to Cardano’s treasury management. The limit is grounded in actual treasury inflow data from 2024 and represents a balanced plan to empower ecosystem growth while preserving financial sustainability.
Why we voted Yes:
- Aligned with past inflows: The 350M ADA limit is based on a well-modeled estimation of actual 2024 treasury inflows, making it a reasonable and informed cap.
- Supports innovation: By linking the Net Change Limit to real utility on the blockchain, this approach encourages projects to deliver meaningful value.
- Enables budget cycle stability: Setting the Net Change Limit allows the community to move forward with the 2025 budget and withdrawal actions in a transparent and structured way.
- Future-focused: This model also creates a natural incentive to grow treasury inflows, aligning project success with the network’s economic health.
We believe that well-governed treasury usage is key to Cardano’s long-term impact and sustainability. For a mission-driven project like Socious, this proposal helps ensure that funding remains available for impactful initiatives while maintaining accountability.
Sociousの「Yes」投票理由（350M ADA 提案）
Sociousは、2025年のNet Change Limit（財務支出上限）を350M ADAに設定する提案に対し、賛成（Yes）で投票しました。
この提案は、実際のトレジャリー収入データに基づいた、現実的かつ未来志向のアプローチであると評価しています。2024年の実績データを元に設計されたこの上限は、カルダノの成長を支えつつ、財務の持続可能性も両立させる内容です。
賛成の理由：
- 過去の実績と整合している：350M ADAという上限は、2024年の実際のトレジャリー収入に基づいており、信頼性のある根拠に基づいています。
- プロジェクトの価値創出を促進：ブロックチェーン上での実用性やユーティリティが、今後の収入や支出枠に反映される設計で、建設的なインセンティブを生み出します。
- 予算サイクルの安定性を確保：支出上限を設定することで、2025年の予算やトレジャリーの申請プロセスが透明かつ秩序あるものになります。
- 将来への成長インセンティブ：収入とリンクした支出枠により、より多くの価値が生まれることで財務の健全性が保たれます。
Sociousは、責任ある財務運営こそが、カルダノの持続的な成長と社会的インパクトの基盤であると考えています。この提案はその実現に向けた、重要なステップだと捉えています。
Yes: 3. Abstain: 1. Not voted: 6
- No 32.3M ₳ Rationale
I am voting no on the proposed 350 million ADA Net Change Limit because it sets the maximum that can be withdrawn from the treasury far too high without clearly defined needs or constraints. While the NCL is not a spending requirement, setting it this high risks framing it as a target rather than a safeguard, which goes against the principle of fiscal conservatism.
My platform emphasizes responsible, impact-driven spending. If we are to spend conservatively, we must also signal restraint at the framework level, and that starts with setting limits that reflect real strategic priorities, not just past inflows. Approving an NCL equal to 100 percent of last year’s treasury income sends the wrong message.
Until we have stronger data on actual funding needs, outcomes, and transaction volume growth, setting the NCL this high is not just unnecessary, it is the opposite of conservative.
- No 31M ₳ No rationale
- No 30.5M ₳ No rationale
- No 28.2M ₳ Rationale
I am voting against this proposal because the proposed 350M ADA limit is excessively high. A limit set at this level risks incentivizing the community to withdraw funds up to the maximum rather than adopting a more conservative spending approach. Moreover, given that our governance process is still evolving, we do not yet have the maturity and robust oversight mechanisms needed to justify such expensive treasury withdrawals. I believe a more conservative approach is necessary to safeguard the long-term sustainability of our treasury and ensure that spending aligns with genuine strategic priorities rather than the convenience of a high limit.
- Yes 27.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 27.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 26.1M ₳ No rationale
- No 25.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 25.2M ₳ No rationale
- No 22.7M ₳ Rationale
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- Yes 22M ₳ No rationale
- No 22M ₳ Rationale
I strongly disagree with any governance proposal that sets an annual budget spending limit that closely matches or exceeds the annual budget income. Such a policy would rapidly deplete the treasury, posing a significant risk to the long-term sustainability of the Cardano ecosystem. Setting a spending limit near this figure would create an unstable financial situation, undermining the community's resources.
In the previous governance action, transaction [transaction ID: https://cexplorer.io/tx/7f320409d9998712ff3a3cdf0c9439e1543f236a3d746766f78f1fdbe1e06bf8/governance#data], I voted 'No' for similar reasons, as that proposal also suggested an excessively high spending limit, inconsistent with sound financial management principles. My consistent 'No' votes in these instances underscore my unwavering commitment to protecting the community's financial resources and ensuring Cardano's sustainable growth.
Cardano's budget must be managed prudently, maintaining a healthy balance between income and expenditure. This approach safeguards the community's interests and fosters a stable environment for the ecosystem's future development.
- Yes 21.3M ₳ Rationale
I vote YES for this proposal for the following reasons:
✅ The 350 million ADA figure is based on actual 2024 data (≈336 million ADA in treasury inflow), with less than a 5% margin – making this limit reasonable and data-driven.
✅ Setting the Net Change Limit (NCL) is a prerequisite for any 2025 budget proposals to be considered valid. Without it, all treasury withdrawals would be blocked.
✅ While 350M ADA may seem high to some, it does not mean the entire amount will be spent. Rather, it provides flexibility for DReps to evaluate each withdrawal proposal based on merit and priority.
✅ In a potential bear market, it is crucial to maintain flexibility in funding, especially for technology and infrastructure, to ensure Cardano stays competitive.
✅ From a structural standpoint, this proposal is clear and well-prepared, with defined timeframes (Epochs 532–604) and supporting data sources – demonstrating professionalism and transparency.
💡 I recognize that many DReps, including myself, also value the more conservative community-led NCL of 300M ADA. However, in the worst-case scenario where no NCL is passed, I support both proposals to avoid delays in budgeting and disruption to the ecosystem.
Vietnamese
Tôi bỏ phiếu YES cho đề xuất này vì các lý do sau:
✅ 350 triệu ADA được tính toán dựa trên dữ liệu thực tế của năm 2024 (khoảng 336 triệu ADA thu về), chênh lệch dưới 5%, phản ánh một giới hạn chi tiêu hợp lý và có cơ sở.
✅ Việc xác định Net Change Limit là điều kiện bắt buộc để các đề xuất ngân sách trong năm 2025 được xem là hợp lệ về mặt quản trị. Nếu không có NCL, mọi hoạt động rút ngân sách đều sẽ bị chặn.
✅ Dù mức NCL này có thể cao với một số người, nhưng không có nghĩa toàn bộ số tiền sẽ được rút ra, mà nó tạo khung linh hoạt để DReps đánh giá từng đề xuất rút kho bạc theo giá trị và mức độ ưu tiên.
✅ Trong trường hợp thị trường bước vào giai đoạn suy giảm, cần duy trì khả năng xoay chuyển ngân sách, đầu tư vào công nghệ và hạ tầng, giúp Cardano duy trì sức cạnh tranh và không bị tụt lại.
✅ Về mặt cấu trúc, đề xuất này rõ ràng, có định nghĩa thời gian cụ thể (Epoch 532–604) và các đường dẫn dữ liệu hỗ trợ đầy đủ – thể hiện sự chuyên nghiệp và minh bạch.
💡 Tôi hiểu rằng nhiều DRep, bao gồm cả tôi, đánh giá cao phương án NCL 300M ADA do cộng đồng đề xuất – mức đó mang tính tiết kiệm và thận trọng hơn. Tuy nhiên, trong trường hợp xấu nhất là không có NCL nào được thông qua, tôi ủng hộ cả hai đề xuất để tránh trì hoãn tiến độ ngân sách và ảnh hưởng đến sự phát triển toàn hệ sinh thái.
Japanese
私は以下の理由から、この提案にYES票を投じます：
✅ 3億5千万ADAという数値は、2024年の実際のデータ（トレジャリー収入約3億3600万ADA）に基づいており、誤差は5％未満。合理的でデータに基づいた上限です。
✅ NCL（Net Change Limit）の設定は、2025年の予算提案を有効とみなすための前提条件です。設定されなければ、すべてのトレジャリー引き出しはブロックされてしまいます。
✅ このNCLは一部にとって高く感じられるかもしれませんが、全額を使う必要はありません。DRepが各引き出し提案を重要度と優先度に基づいて柔軟に評価できる余地を与えるものです。
✅ 弱気市場に入る可能性を考慮すると、資金運用の柔軟性を維持することが重要です。特に技術とインフラへの投資は、Cardanoの競争力維持に不可欠です。
✅ この提案は構成が明確で整っており、期間（エポック532～604）やデータ資料も明示されていて、透明性と専門性が高いと評価できます。
💡 私自身を含む多くのDRepが、より慎重なアプローチであるコミュニティ提案（300M ADA）を評価していることも理解しています。しかし、どちらのNCLも否決される最悪のシナリオを避けるため、私は両方の提案を支持します。
- No 21.2M ₳ Rationale
I have decided to vote “no” to the second Net Change Limit proposal (9b62b3c632f329016a968ac25211825bb4f84b12461121c7da3aa11df92370f9#0). A Net Change Limit is a requirement before any treasury withdrawals can occur, as mandated by the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution. Currently, there are two competing Net Change Limit proposals up for voting. This one, the second Net Change Limit proposal, has suggested a Net Change Limit of 350 million ada for the year of 2025.
The format of the proposal is solid. It provides a clear Abstract, Motivation, Rationale with a Metadata anchor link hosted in the more immutable IPFS format. Supporting links are similarly hosted in this manner and provides both CSV and PDF formats when providing economic models to support the proposals reasonings. The PDF versions provide easier access for voters to analyse as well as a snapshot of CSV files at the time of proposal, which may have data amended or appended in the future.
I am uneasy with the threshold being set to greater than just 50%. This is mandated by the TREASURY-01(a) Guardrail in Appendix I Section 3 of the Cardano Constitution. However, the Guardrails section was considered “out of scope” for large parts of the constitutional workshops and the Constitutional Convention itself. While I understand that many Guardrails are technical in nature and necessarily set by those with more technical expertise, the Net Change Limit is not an on-chain parameter and is to be determined by an info action. Other economic parameters have a 67% threshold and a Net Change Limit should be no different given its very economic nature. Treasury withdrawals have very economic consequences for the ecosystem and should be managed appropriately.
Secondly, a Net Change Limit has yet to even be approved and we have already seen budget proposals taking centre stage and frankly getting out of hand. The process has exposed itself prematurely and raised numerous concerns. The process has highlighted some duplication amongst proposals, exorbitant asks and some clear cash grabs. Meanwhile, we have some large DReps publicly announcing blind support for proposals without any further due diligence, in combination with a concerning rate of ever-increasing concentration of DRep voting power amongst a number of DReps, opening the system up to manipulation the more concentrated that voting power becomes.
I appreciate that a Net Change Limit is required before any treasury withdrawals can happen, as mandated by the Cardano Constitution itself, and is also essential for the growth and development of the ecosystem. The level of budgetary ask put forward by some already, in anticipation of a 350 million Net Change Limit, has demonstrated a need for a lower Net Change Limit to reduce the risk of fiscal irresponsibility. I liked the amounts proposed by the other proposal, 300 million for 2025 and 250 million for 2026. Although only a spending cap and not a spending target, it is clear that this is not how many budget proposals are approaching this right now.
- Abstain 21.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 21.1M ₳ No rationale