IO: Cardano Upgrades
245 DReps voted · 79 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 536.5K ₳ Rationale
Happy to vote Yes on this.
This proposal adds several very useful primitives to the cardano ledger, the IOG team delivering them is undoubtedly the best implementor we could ask for.
It is a little pricey, but that is to be expected if we are demanding the best of the best to work on our core infrastructure.
- Yes 534.3K ₳ Rationale
All IO request IMO at non-negotiable at the point, No other team in the world can deliver the results at a cheaper rate.
- Yes 487.1K ₳ No rationale
- No 481.5K ₳ Rationale
- Yes 473.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 466.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 445.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 443.5K ₳ Rationale
I support all IO projects.
- Yes 441.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 438.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 426.2K ₳ Rationale
I’m a big fan of IO and everything they’ve accomplished over these nearly 10 years regarding Cardano. I believe it’s a top-tier company in terms of research, implementation, and blockchain, and I don’t question their capabilities at all.
However, as an observer—since I’m not deeply involved, but would still like to share my perspective. I feel that IO owes the community a clear, solid, and concise explanation of what has been achieved in previous governance actions. From my point of view, it’s very confusing; it feels like there are overlaps between this year’s proposals and last year’s, and it’s not clear at all.
It creates a lot of confusion, raising questions like: “Didn’t we already pay for this last year?” or “Why are we paying again if this was supposed to have been implemented already?” This starts to generate distrust across the community.I would like to see clear, measurable frameworks and informative checkpoints for all these governance actions something like a “Messari-style” State of Cardano report. I understand that a report like that isn’t cheap, but considering that we are about to spend nearly $40 million, the minimum expectation would be a clear report outlining what is intended to be achieved and what was accomplished last year.
This is a humongous amount of money, and it’s unreasonable for there to be so much confusion especially knowing that IO does very good work, yet their efforts start to be questioned. I wouldn’t like to see that happen. If producing such a report costs $50,000 or $100,000, then include it in the budget it doesn’t matter. There needs to be clarity and a formal way to track the return on what is being done. It’s simply too much money for this to remain so informal.
This time, I will support the proposal. However, I want to express that if clarity fails again in future proposals if ambiguity and confusion persist regarding what was delivered versus what was supposed to be delivered—then unfortunately I won’t be able to support with my vote. Cardano is no longer what it was five years ago; now it’s up to us to ensure that what gets done is logical and properly scrutinized.
- Abstain 385.6K ₳ Rationale
Abstaining, as I’m part of the Cardano Constitution Committee Tingvard.
Reading proposals and staying updated, just like you.
Thanks to all fellow DReps who are also doing the hard work.
Follow and DM me on X: @kenerik if you have any questions. - Yes 382.6K ₳ No rationale
- No 377.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 371.8K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 365.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 332K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 328.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 327.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 321.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 314.4K ₳ Rationale
I'm voting YES on the IO: Cardano Upgrades proposal. Implementing Babel fees, Account Addresses, and a Multi-Asset Treasury are crucial for DeFi, L2 scaling, and treasury resilience. However, I continue to urge IO to provide greater budget granularity in future funding requests.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting YES to fund the IO: Cardano Upgrades initiative. This proposal encompasses three highly anticipated and fundamentally important technical upgrades that I am eager to see implemented.
First, Babel fees have been a promised feature for years - in fact, it was one of the core technologies that initially drew my excitement to Cardano. While it has been a long time coming, I am optimistic that we will finally see this materialize, at the very least as a production-ready MVP, through this funding.
Second, the account address enhancement is critical. It unlocks the ability to implement micro-fees and significantly reduces operational costs for DeFi applications, which are currently relatively high. Leveling up our DeFi ecosystem is an absolute necessity right now. Furthermore, this upgrade provides the amount-based patterns essential for robust Layer 2 scaling solutions.
Third, implementing a Cardano Multi-Asset Treasury is a profound strategic enhancement. Had the Treasury been able to hold a portion of its funds in stablecoins, its current fiat value would be substantially larger. Beyond stablecoins, this feature will allow the Treasury to hold Cardano Native Tokens (CNTs). This effectively transforms the Treasury into a stakeholder in promising ecosystem projects - a powerful mechanism for ensuring our ecosystem remains strong, resilient, and mutually invested.
However, despite my strong support for these technologies, I remain concerned by the lack of cost granularity provided by IO. The budget is once again presented as a financial "black box" divided into three broad workstream buckets. While this lack of detail might be acceptable for a private corporation operating on its own capital, it is not an acceptable standard when requesting external public funding from the Treasury. As I have stated in previous rationales, I strongly urge IO - and all proposers - to adopt greater transparency in their funding requests.
Nevertheless, the technological merit of these three upgrades is undeniable, and I am highly motivated to see all of them implemented. The long-term benefits to the ecosystem far outweigh my reservations regarding the budget presentation.
- Yes 313.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 298.6K ₳ Rationale
Voting YES on ALL IOG Withdrawals
May 20th 2026
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Summery
Nine treasury withdrawals from IOG totalling
162M ada ($40M USD)Important Citation
https://x.com/EdnStuff/status/2051321214728118360
EdnStuff said the following on May 4th 2026
I see the IO proposals as a package deal. But by all accounts I see most dreps only voting yes on a small selection of the 9. This is going to lead to some extremely lopsided, fragmented, and piecemeal results that will fall short of what we need on #Cardano $ADA.Charles quote tweeted saying
https://x.com/IOHK_Charles/status/2051376829949464792
Sadly, this is the end result of a piecemeal roadmap. It's an iPhone by committee, with people deciding whether they prefer the fingerprint sensor to wireless charging. You end up with a bizarre, useless product.Statement
There are a handful of people who, when they speak, I think it unwise not to listen to. Charles is one such person. His statement above makes this choice pretty easy.
While we need to foster a wide ecosystem of R&D firms, we cannot afford to jeopardize our relationship with our biggest contributor. It is obvious and undeniable that the long-term success of Cardano remains dependent on the continued efforts of IO.
I am voting for all of these IO proposals because Charles has made it clear that he does not believe Cardano can be successful without each of them, and it would be unwise to disregard his intuition.
Signed,
William DoyleYour friendly neighbourhood DRep!
$computerman
drep1yfpgzfymq6tt9c684e7vzata8r5pl4w84fmrjqeztdqw0sgpzw3nt
https://x.com/william00000010 - No 295.2K ₳ No rationale
- No 279.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 271.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 261.3K ₳ No rationale
- No 258.6K ₳ Rationale
Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]
Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.
My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.
In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.
At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.
Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.
Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.
This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.
Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:
- Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
- Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
- Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
- Lack of credible execution capacity;
- Structural governance or transparency concerns;
- Severe budgetary or coordination risks.
Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.
This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.
Governance Action Review
1. Introduction
The proposal “Cardano Upgrades” requests ₳13,103,039 from the Cardano Treasury to fund three platform-level enhancements: CIP-159 Multi-Asset Micro Fees / Account Address Enhancement, CPS-23 Cardano Multi-Asset Treasury, and Babel Fees. The proposal states that these workstreams are technically independent but provide compounding benefits when combined. CIP-159 introduces ledger-level account primitives intended to support direct deposits, micro-fee collection, L2 reserve patterns, and future multi-asset account functionality. CPS-23 focuses on the design of a multi-asset Treasury, including the ability for the Cardano Treasury to hold assets beyond ADA. Babel Fees aims to allow users to pay transaction fees in native assets other than ADA, using Nested Transactions as its technical foundation.
The proposal allocates ₳7,069,985 to Workstream 1, ₳2,356,662 to Workstream 2, and ₳3,676,392 to Workstream 3. Its public funding distribution assigns ₳11,268,614, or 86% of the total budget, to Development, with several other categories assigned as high-level percentage allocations.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
The underlying direction has value. A multi-asset treasury could improve treasury resilience and reduce exposure to ADA volatility. Babel Fees could reduce onboarding friction by allowing users to transact without first acquiring ADA. CIP-159 may enable important improvements for micro-fees, wallets, DeFi infrastructure, and future account-based patterns. These are meaningful and potentially necessary improvements for Cardano.
Although the proposal states that the three workstreams are technically independent, there is a plausible conceptual and strategic interconnection between them. CIP-159, Multi-Asset Treasury design, and Babel Fees all relate to broader improvements in Cardano’s economic usability, asset flexibility, fee mechanics, and treasury resilience. If only one or two of these workstreams were approved separately, the broader concept presented by the proposal might lose part of its coherence and potential impact.
For that reason, the bundled structure is not treated as a decisive negative factor in this vote. At the same time, it is also not treated as a positive justification for approval. The bundle may be defensible in concept, but it does not resolve the proposal’s more serious accountability problem.
Negative aspects
As a general governance principle, proposals and workstreams should be submitted with the highest reasonable level of granularity. Bundled proposals reduce the ability of dReps to assess each component independently and can force an all-or-nothing decision where a more nuanced vote would be preferable. This has been a relevant concern in previous governance actions and remains part of the evaluation framework.
However, in this specific case, bundling is not considered a sufficient reason for rejection.
The primary reason for voting NO is the lack of adequate budget granularity.
The proposal requests ₳13,103,039 from the Cardano Treasury, with ₳11,268,614, or 86% of the total budget, allocated broadly to “Development.” Several other categories appear to be assigned as high-level percentage estimates, including 1% allocations for areas such as infrastructure, security and audits, legal and compliance, governance, and others. The proposal does not provide a sufficiently detailed methodology explaining how these figures were calculated.
For a funding request of this size, the public budget breakdown is not detailed enough to support a responsible assessment of treasury prudence. There is no clear breakdown of FTEs, headcount, seniority assumptions, hourly or monthly rates, time allocation per workstream, or the specific distribution of engineering resources between the different components. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether the proposal is overbudgeted, underbudgeted, appropriately priced, or financially disciplined.
Strategic importance does not remove the need for budget accountability. Technical credibility should not operate as a blank check. The fact that a founding entity is considered technically capable does not justify approving a poorly detailed budget, especially when the requested amount is this large.
Risks and concerns
There is a broader institutional concern. Some of these capabilities, particularly Babel Fees, have been discussed in the Cardano ecosystem for years and have often been associated with the expected evolution of the protocol. When historically anticipated roadmap-adjacent deliverables are later submitted as new treasury-funded work, dReps should be cautious about normalizing a pattern where the Treasury becomes the default funding source for items that may reasonably be perceived as part of earlier protocol development expectations.
This does not mean the work is unimportant. It means that the standard for funding it should be higher, not lower.
Across the Cardano ecosystem, many smaller proposals with five- or six-figure budgets have been criticized or rejected for insufficient budget detail. It would be inconsistent to apply strict scrutiny to smaller community proposals while lowering the standard for an eight-figure ADA request from a major founding entity. If anything, larger treasury requests should be subject to stronger transparency requirements, clearer cost models, and more auditable delivery assumptions.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
The vote is NO due primarily to insufficient budget granularity and the inability to assess whether the requested treasury allocation is financially prudent.
The bundled structure is neutral in this specific case. As a general governance principle, proposals and workstreams should be submitted with the highest reasonable level of granularity, because bundled proposals reduce the ability of dReps to assess each component independently and can force an all-or-nothing decision. However, in this case, bundling is not a sufficient reason for rejection, since there is a plausible conceptual and strategic interconnection between CIP-159, Multi-Asset Treasury design, and Babel Fees.
The decisive issue is the budget. The proposal requests ₳13,103,039 from the Cardano Treasury, with ₳11,268,614, or 86% of the total budget, allocated broadly to “Development.” The proposal does not provide a sufficiently detailed methodology explaining how these figures were calculated. There is no clear breakdown of FTEs, headcount, seniority assumptions, hourly or monthly rates, time allocation per workstream, or the specific distribution of engineering resources between the different components.
Despite recognizing the technical relevance and strategic potential of the workstreams, the proposal cannot be supported in its current form.
4. Conclusion
The workstreams may be strategically relevant and technically meaningful for Cardano, but the funding request does not provide enough budget granularity to support a responsible treasury decision. The bundled structure is neutral in this case. The decisive factor is the inability to assess whether the requested allocation is financially prudent.
Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]
Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.
Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.
Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.
Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.
Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.
Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.
Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.
Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:
- Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
- Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
- Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
- Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
- Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
- Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.
Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.
Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.
Revisão de Ação de Governança
1. Introdução
A proposta “Cardano Upgrades” solicita ₳13.103.039 do Tesouro da Cardano para financiar três melhorias de nível de plataforma: CIP-159 Multi-Asset Micro Fees / Account Address Enhancement, CPS-23 Cardano Multi-Asset Treasury e Babel Fees. A proposta afirma que esses workstreams são tecnicamente independentes, mas geram benefícios compostos quando combinados. A CIP-159 introduz primitivas de conta em nível de ledger destinadas a permitir depósitos diretos, cobrança de microtaxas, padrões de reserva para L2s e funcionalidade futura de contas multiativos. A CPS-23 foca no desenho de um Tesouro multiativo, incluindo a capacidade de o Tesouro da Cardano manter ativos além de ADA. Babel Fees busca permitir que usuários paguem taxas de transação em ativos nativos diferentes de ADA, usando Nested Transactions como sua base técnica. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
A proposta aloca ₳7.069.985 ao Workstream 1, ₳2.356.662 ao Workstream 2 e ₳3.676.392 ao Workstream 3. Sua distribuição pública de recursos atribui ₳11.268.614, ou 86% do orçamento total, a Desenvolvimento, com várias outras categorias atribuídas como alocações percentuais de alto nível. :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
A direção subjacente tem valor. Um tesouro multiativo poderia melhorar a resiliência do Tesouro e reduzir a exposição à volatilidade da ADA. Babel Fees poderia reduzir o atrito de onboarding ao permitir que usuários transacionem sem antes adquirir ADA. A CIP-159 pode permitir melhorias importantes para microtaxas, carteiras, infraestrutura DeFi e futuros padrões baseados em contas. Essas são melhorias significativas e potencialmente necessárias para a Cardano.
Embora a proposta afirme que os três workstreams são tecnicamente independentes, há uma interconexão conceitual e estratégica plausível entre eles. CIP-159, o desenho do Multi-Asset Treasury e Babel Fees estão todos relacionados a melhorias mais amplas na usabilidade econômica da Cardano, flexibilidade de ativos, mecânicas de taxas e resiliência do Tesouro. Se apenas um ou dois desses workstreams fossem aprovados separadamente, o conceito mais amplo apresentado pela proposta poderia perder parte de sua coerência e de seu impacto potencial.
Por esse motivo, a estrutura em bundle não é tratada como um fator negativo decisivo neste voto. Ao mesmo tempo, ela também não é tratada como uma justificativa positiva para aprovação. O bundle pode ser defensável em conceito, mas não resolve o problema mais sério de accountability da proposta.
Aspectos negativos
Como princípio geral de governança, propostas e workstreams devem ser submetidos com o maior nível razoável de granularidade. Propostas agrupadas reduzem a capacidade dos dReps de avaliar cada componente de forma independente e podem forçar uma decisão de tudo ou nada quando um voto mais nuançado seria preferível. Essa foi uma preocupação relevante em ações de governança anteriores e continua fazendo parte do framework de avaliação.
No entanto, neste caso específico, o agrupamento não é considerado uma razão suficiente para rejeição.
A principal razão para o voto NO é a falta de granularidade orçamentária adequada.
A proposta solicita ₳13.103.039 do Tesouro da Cardano, com ₳11.268.614, ou 86% do orçamento total, alocados amplamente para “Development”. Várias outras categorias parecem ser atribuídas como estimativas percentuais de alto nível, incluindo alocações de 1% para áreas como infraestrutura, segurança e auditorias, jurídico e compliance, governança, entre outras. A proposta não fornece uma metodologia suficientemente detalhada explicando como esses valores foram calculados.
Para uma solicitação de financiamento desse tamanho, a decomposição orçamentária pública não é detalhada o suficiente para sustentar uma avaliação responsável de prudência do Tesouro. Não há uma decomposição clara de FTEs, headcount, premissas de senioridade, taxas horárias ou mensais, alocação de tempo por workstream ou distribuição específica de recursos de engenharia entre os diferentes componentes. Como resultado, não é possível determinar se a proposta está superorçada, suborçada, adequadamente precificada ou financeiramente disciplinada.
A importância estratégica não remove a necessidade de accountability orçamentária. Credibilidade técnica não deve funcionar como um cheque em branco. O fato de uma entidade fundadora ser considerada tecnicamente capaz não justifica aprovar um orçamento pouco detalhado, especialmente quando o valor solicitado é tão alto.
Riscos e preocupações
Há uma preocupação institucional mais ampla. Algumas dessas capacidades, particularmente Babel Fees, foram discutidas no ecossistema Cardano por anos e muitas vezes foram associadas à evolução esperada do protocolo. Quando entregáveis historicamente antecipados e adjacentes ao roadmap são posteriormente submetidos como novo trabalho financiado pelo Tesouro, dReps devem ter cautela para não normalizar um padrão em que o Tesouro se torna a fonte padrão de financiamento para itens que podem ser razoavelmente percebidos como parte de expectativas anteriores de desenvolvimento
- Yes 257K ₳ Rationale
I am voting YES on “IO: Cardano Upgrades” at 13,103,039 ADA, because it funds three tightly scoped protocol‑level improvements that directly target long‑standing economic and UX limitations on Cardano. CIP‑159 account address enhancements unlock true micro‑fees, cheaper batchers, and better L2 reserve patterns; CPS‑23 multi‑asset Treasury design is a necessary first step toward holding stablecoins and other native assets in the Treasury, improving long‑term financial resilience; and Babel Fees builds on CIP‑118 to let users pay transaction fees in native assets like USDC or bridged BTC, removing the “buy ADA first” barrier that has hurt onboarding. These workstreams are well‑timed with the Dijkstra/Euler eras and the arrival of BTC bridges and USDC, and they align closely with 2030 KPIs for TVL, transactions, MAU, protocol revenue, and Pillar 5’s focus on financial stewardship.
At the same time, I share several concerns raised by other DReps. IO and affiliates have already been allocated around 130.7M ADA via prior treasury actions, with ~78.46M ADA withdrawn, and this proposal sits alongside larger IO asks for Leios and maintenance in the same Net Change Limit window. While this ask is smaller and its scope is much cleaner than the maintenance bundle, the budget detail is still weaker than I would like: we see per‑workstream amounts (≈7.07M ADA for CIP‑159, 2.36M for CPS‑23, 3.68M for Babel Fees) but no FTE rates, team sizes, or cost per role, despite smaller teams routinely providing that level of breakdown. I therefore treat this as a conditional YES: I support these specific upgrades because they address critical gaps and are well‑structured and time‑bound, but I expect any follow‑on funding in these areas to come with (1) clear delivery on the milestones promised here, (2) demonstrable adoption and impact, and (3) more granular, benchmarkable budgets so that IO can be evaluated to the same standard as other ecosystem teams.
- Yes 253.3K ₳ No rationale
- No 245K ₳ Rationale
Babel Fees and CIP-159 are features worth building, however due to the lack of budget transparency I must vote no. There's no FTE count, no per-role cost breakdown, and no individual compensation figures. Therefore it is impossible to judge whether this is a fair price or not.
- Yes 238.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 237.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 234.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 215.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 212.5K ₳ No rationale
- No 208.6K ₳ Rationale
I'm increasingly concerned about Cardano's overall treasury spend rate, especially following the recent approval of the Draper/Dragon Orion Fund. To provide a necessary counter-balance, I am defaulting to NO on treasury withdrawals at this time.
This proposal (₳13 M) is important Treasury related improvement work, but it does not meet my strict criteria for approval right now. It is not core/critical infrastructure such as IO Hydra L2 production hardening or deliverables directly required to advance the Midnight partnership.
I will continue voting YES only on the highest-priority items that directly strengthen essential scaling and partnership infrastructure.
To be clear, I do support this initiative, just not right now. - Yes 207.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 206.4K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 203.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 190.2K ₳ No rationale
- No 183.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 182K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 181.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 180.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 142.3K ₳ Rationale
I want to be able to pay my fees with anything that has value.
- Yes 137.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 131.7K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 131.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 127.9K ₳ No rationale