IO: Consensus Initiative
248 DReps voted · 80 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 536.5K ₳ Rationale
Even though Scaling was part of the original road-map, paid for by the ICO and the Genesis ADA allocation
Leios is very important to the future of Cardano and IOG is the only organization with the Capacity to deliver it in a timely fashion
- Yes 534.3K ₳ Rationale
All IO request IMO at non-negotiable at the point, No other team in the world can deliver the results at a cheaper rate.
- Yes 487.1K ₳ No rationale
- No 481.5K ₳ Rationale
- Yes 473.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 467.4K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 466.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 445.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 443.5K ₳ Rationale
I support all IO projects.
- Yes 441.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 438.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 426.2K ₳ Rationale
I’m a big fan of IO and everything they’ve accomplished over these nearly 10 years regarding Cardano. I believe it’s a top-tier company in terms of research, implementation, and blockchain, and I don’t question their capabilities at all.
However, as an observer—since I’m not deeply involved, but would still like to share my perspective. I feel that IO owes the community a clear, solid, and concise explanation of what has been achieved in previous governance actions. From my point of view, it’s very confusing; it feels like there are overlaps between this year’s proposals and last year’s, and it’s not clear at all.
It creates a lot of confusion, raising questions like: “Didn’t we already pay for this last year?” or “Why are we paying again if this was supposed to have been implemented already?” This starts to generate distrust across the community.I would like to see clear, measurable frameworks and informative checkpoints for all these governance actions something like a “Messari-style” State of Cardano report. I understand that a report like that isn’t cheap, but considering that we are about to spend nearly $40 million, the minimum expectation would be a clear report outlining what is intended to be achieved and what was accomplished last year.
This is a humongous amount of money, and it’s unreasonable for there to be so much confusion especially knowing that IO does very good work, yet their efforts start to be questioned. I wouldn’t like to see that happen. If producing such a report costs $50,000 or $100,000, then include it in the budget it doesn’t matter. There needs to be clarity and a formal way to track the return on what is being done. It’s simply too much money for this to remain so informal.
This time, I will support the proposal. However, I want to express that if clarity fails again in future proposals if ambiguity and confusion persist regarding what was delivered versus what was supposed to be delivered—then unfortunately I won’t be able to support with my vote. Cardano is no longer what it was five years ago; now it’s up to us to ensure that what gets done is logical and properly scrutinized.
- Abstain 385.6K ₳ Rationale
Abstaining, as I’m part of the Cardano Constitution Committee Tingvard.
Reading proposals and staying updated, just like you.
Thanks to all fellow DReps who are also doing the hard work.
Follow and DM me on X: @kenerik if you have any questions. - Yes 382.6K ₳ No rationale
- No 377.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 371.8K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 365.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 332K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 328.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 327.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 321.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 314.4K ₳ Rationale
I am voting YES on the IO Consensus Initiative. While the development budget lacks granular FTE details, delivering Ouroboros Leios is absolutely essential for Cardano's survival and 2030 scalability targets. I have full confidence in IO to execute this critical network upgrade.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting YES to fund the IO: Consensus Initiative. After careful consideration, I view Ouroboros Leios not merely as a highly desirable upgrade, but as an absolute necessity for Cardano's long-term survival and ecosystem growth.
To achieve our 2030 roadmap targets (specifically the ambitious goal of 27 million monthly transactions), this consensus upgrade is mathematically necessary. Without Leios, scaling to meet that level of global demand is simply impossible.
However, I do not take the requested treasury amount lightly. My primary reservation lies with the "Development" portion of the budget. Requesting ₳23.8M (86% of the total budget) without providing granular details, such as the number of full-time equivalents (FTEs), the split between senior and junior engineers, or estimated hourly rates, creates a financial "black box". As an advocate for responsible and justifiable treasury spending, I strongly urge IO and others to provide greater transparency in future proposals of this magnitude.
Despite this reservation, I am fully committed to funding this initiative. Even after intentionally playing devil's advocate, I simply could not find any convincing reasons where the costs outweigh the immense benefits. My confidence in IO's proven ability to deliver complex, high-assurance engineering ultimately outweighs my budgetary critiques. I look forward to seeing Leios implemented, ensuring our network is fully equipped for sustainable, long-term expansion.
- Yes 313.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 298.6K ₳ Rationale
Voting YES on ALL IOG Withdrawals
May 20th 2026
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Summery
Nine treasury withdrawals from IOG totalling
162M ada ($40M USD)Important Citation
https://x.com/EdnStuff/status/2051321214728118360
EdnStuff said the following on May 4th 2026
I see the IO proposals as a package deal. But by all accounts I see most dreps only voting yes on a small selection of the 9. This is going to lead to some extremely lopsided, fragmented, and piecemeal results that will fall short of what we need on #Cardano $ADA.Charles quote tweeted saying
https://x.com/IOHK_Charles/status/2051376829949464792
Sadly, this is the end result of a piecemeal roadmap. It's an iPhone by committee, with people deciding whether they prefer the fingerprint sensor to wireless charging. You end up with a bizarre, useless product.Statement
There are a handful of people who, when they speak, I think it unwise not to listen to. Charles is one such person. His statement above makes this choice pretty easy.
While we need to foster a wide ecosystem of R&D firms, we cannot afford to jeopardize our relationship with our biggest contributor. It is obvious and undeniable that the long-term success of Cardano remains dependent on the continued efforts of IO.
I am voting for all of these IO proposals because Charles has made it clear that he does not believe Cardano can be successful without each of them, and it would be unwise to disregard his intuition.
Signed,
William DoyleYour friendly neighbourhood DRep!
$computerman
drep1yfpgzfymq6tt9c684e7vzata8r5pl4w84fmrjqeztdqw0sgpzw3nt
https://x.com/william00000010 - No 295.2K ₳ No rationale
- No 279.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 271.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 261.3K ₳ No rationale
- No 258.6K ₳ Rationale
Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]
Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.
My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.
In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.
At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.
Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.
Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.
This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.
Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:
- Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
- Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
- Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
- Lack of credible execution capacity;
- Structural governance or transparency concerns;
- Severe budgetary or coordination risks.
Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.
This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.
Governance Action Review — Vote: NO
1. Introduction
The “Consensus Upgrades” treasury withdrawal requests ₳27,714,342 to continue Leios development as a consensus-layer scalability upgrade for Cardano. The proposal presents Leios as an enhancement to Ouroboros Praos, intended to increase throughput capacity and support faster settlement while preserving Cardano’s security guarantees.
The proposal positions Leios as necessary for Cardano’s 2030 strategy, which targets growth from approximately 800,000 transactions per month to more than 27 million monthly transactions.
The 2026/2027 cycle focuses on moving Leios from an early public testnet stage toward mainnet readiness. The work is organized around three objectives: producing a release candidate, increasing confidence through testing and adversarial validation, and enabling the conditions for a future Leios hard fork.
The proposal identifies Carlos Lopez De Lara and Sebastian Nagel as leads, with an expected duration of 6–9 months.
The budget allocates ₳23,834,334, or 86% of the total treasury ask, to Development. Additional categories include Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance, and Others.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
This decision should not be interpreted as opposition to Leios, to L1 scalability, or to the technical capacity of the teams involved.
On the contrary, Leios is considered one of the most important scalability efforts currently under discussion in Cardano. Without a robust scalability path, Cardano cannot realistically achieve mass adoption, support broader use cases, increase transaction volume, grow protocol fee revenue, or fulfill its long-term ecosystem ambitions.
The importance of Leios and the strong technical case for improving Cardano’s scalability at the consensus layer are recognized.
Negative aspects
The treasury withdrawal cannot be supported primarily due to insufficient budget granularity for a proposal of this magnitude.
Strategic importance does not remove the need for treasury discipline.
The proposal requests ₳27,714,342, with ₳23,834,334, or 86% of the total budget, allocated to “Development.” This category is not broken down with enough detail to allow dReps and the community to assess whether the requested amount is proportionate, efficient, inflated, or properly mapped to concrete deliverables.
For a treasury withdrawal of this size, especially one related to consensus-layer infrastructure, clearer information would be expected on staffing assumptions, team composition, FTE allocation, rate assumptions, subcontractor scope, work-package costing, milestone-linked budget mapping, and artifact-based acceptance evidence.
Risks and concerns
This is also a matter of governance consistency. Throughout Project Catalyst and on-chain governance, many proposals with five-, six-, and seven-figure budgets have been rejected by reviewers and dReps due to insufficient budget detail.
Applying a lower standard to an eight-figure proposal would perpetuate an unhealthy dynamic. Larger requests should require stronger transparency, not weaker scrutiny.
A secondary concern is that some parts of Cardano’s core scalability roadmap may reasonably be perceived as work that should have been delivered as part of earlier roadmap commitments, especially considering the historical resources and allocations received by founding entities.
There is a legitimate governance question about how long the treasury should continue funding work that may be seen as correcting delayed delivery of foundational protocol evolution. However, this is not the main reason for the vote.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
The decisive issue is the lack of sufficient budget granularity.
The treasury withdrawal cannot be supported because the proposal requests an eight-figure amount while allocating 86% of the total budget to “Development” without enough detail for independent assessment.
The available budget structure does not provide sufficient clarity on whether the requested amount is proportionate, efficient, inflated, or properly mapped to concrete deliverables.
This decision is not opposition to Leios, L1 scalability, or the technical capacity of the teams involved. Leios remains one of the most important scalability efforts under discussion in Cardano, and there is a strong technical case for improving Cardano’s scalability at the consensus layer.
However, strategic importance does not remove the need for treasury discipline.
For a treasury withdrawal of this size, stronger transparency is required, especially in relation to staffing assumptions, FTE allocation, rate assumptions, subcontractor scope, work-package costing, milestone-linked budget mapping, and artifact-based acceptance evidence.
If the budget were revised with clearer cost decomposition, stronger milestone-linked financial accountability, and enough detail for independent assessment, the position would be open to reconsideration.
4. Conclusion
Leios has strategic importance for Cardano’s scalability, and the technical case for consensus-layer improvement is recognized.
The vote remains NO because an eight-figure treasury withdrawal should not be approved with this level of budget opacity.
Stronger budget decomposition and milestone-linked accountability would be required for reconsideration.
Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]
Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.
Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.
Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.
Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.
Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.
Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.
Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.
Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:
- Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
- Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
- Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
- Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
- Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
- Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.
Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.
Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.
Revisão de Ação de Governança — Voto: NÃO
1. Introdução
A retirada do tesouro “Consensus Upgrades” solicita ₳27.714.342 para continuar o desenvolvimento do Leios como uma atualização de escalabilidade na camada de consenso da Cardano. A proposta apresenta o Leios como uma melhoria ao Ouroboros Praos, destinada a aumentar a capacidade de throughput e apoiar uma liquidação mais rápida, preservando as garantias de segurança da Cardano.
A proposta posiciona o Leios como necessário para a estratégia Cardano 2030, que mira um crescimento de aproximadamente 800.000 transações por mês para mais de 27 milhões de transações mensais.
O ciclo 2026/2027 foca em mover o Leios de uma etapa inicial de testnet pública em direção à prontidão para mainnet. O trabalho é organizado em três objetivos: produzir um release candidate, aumentar a confiança por meio de testes e validação adversarial, e viabilizar as condições para um futuro hard fork do Leios.
A proposta identifica Carlos Lopez De Lara e Sebastian Nagel como líderes, com duração esperada de 6 a 9 meses.
O orçamento aloca ₳23.834.334, ou 86% do valor total solicitado ao tesouro, para Desenvolvimento. Categorias adicionais incluem Infraestrutura, Segurança & Auditorias, Legal & Compliance, Engajamento & Suporte ao Ecossistema, Operações & Entrega, Governança e Outros.
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
Esta decisão não deve ser interpretada como oposição ao Leios, à escalabilidade de L1 ou à capacidade técnica das equipes envolvidas.
Pelo contrário, o Leios é considerado um dos esforços de escalabilidade mais importantes atualmente em discussão na Cardano. Sem um caminho robusto de escalabilidade, a Cardano não pode realisticamente alcançar adoção em massa, suportar casos de uso mais amplos, aumentar o volume de transações, crescer a receita de taxas do protocolo ou cumprir suas ambições ecossistêmicas de longo prazo.
A importância do Leios e o forte caso técnico para melhorar a escalabilidade da Cardano na camada de consenso são reconhecidos.
Aspectos negativos
A retirada do tesouro não pode ser apoiada principalmente devido à granularidade orçamentária insuficiente para uma proposta dessa magnitude.
A importância estratégica não remove a necessidade de disciplina do tesouro.
A proposta solicita ₳27.714.342, com ₳23.834.334, ou 86% do orçamento total, alocados para “Desenvolvimento”. Essa categoria não é detalhada o suficiente para permitir que dReps e a comunidade avaliem se o valor solicitado é proporcional, eficiente, inflado ou adequadamente mapeado para entregáveis concretos.
Para uma retirada do tesouro desse porte, especialmente uma relacionada à infraestrutura da camada de consenso, seriam esperadas informações mais claras sobre premissas de equipe, composição do time, alocação de FTEs, premissas de valores, escopo de subcontratados, custo por pacote de trabalho, mapeamento orçamentário vinculado a marcos e evidências de aceitação baseadas em artefatos.
Riscos e preocupações
Esta também é uma questão de consistência de governança. Ao longo do Project Catalyst e da governança on-chain, muitas propostas com orçamentos de cinco, seis e sete dígitos foram rejeitadas por revisores e dReps devido à insuficiência de detalhes orçamentários.
Aplicar um padrão inferior a uma proposta de oito dígitos perpetuaria uma dinamica prejudicial. Pedidos maiores devem exigir maior transparência, não menor escrutínio.
Uma preocupação secundária é que algumas partes do roadmap central de escalabilidade da Cardano podem razoavelmente ser percebidas como trabalho que deveria ter sido entregue como parte de compromissos anteriores de roadmap, especialmente considerando os recursos históricos e alocações recebidos por entidades fundadoras.
Existe uma questão legítima de governança sobre por quanto tempo o tesouro deve continuar financiando trabalho que pode ser visto como correção de entrega atrasada da evolução fundacional do protocolo. No entanto, esse não é o principal motivo do voto.
3. Voto e Justificativa
Voto: NÃO
A questão decisiva é a falta de granularidade orçamentária suficiente.
A retirada do tesouro não pode ser apoiada porque a proposta solicita um valor de oito dígitos enquanto aloca 86% do orçamento total para “Desenvolvimento” sem detalhes suficientes para avaliação independente.
A estrutura orçamentária disponível não fornece clareza suficiente sobre se o valor solicitado é proporcional, eficiente, inflado ou adequadamente mapeado para entregáveis concretos.
Esta decisão não é oposição ao Leios, à escalabilidade de L1 ou à capacidade técnica das equipes envolvidas. O Leios continua sendo um dos esforços de escalabilidade mais importantes em discussão na Cardano, e há um forte caso técnico para melhorar a escalabilidade da Cardano na camada de consenso.
No entanto, a importância estratégica não remove a necessidade de disciplina do tesouro.
Para uma retirada do tesouro desse porte, é necessária maior transparência, especialmente em relação a premissas de equipe, alocação de FTEs, premissas de valores, escopo de subcontratados, custo por pacote de trabalho, mapeamento orçamentário vinculado a marcos e evidências de aceitação baseadas em artefatos.
Se o orçamento fosse revisado com decomposição de custos mais clara, accountability financeira mais forte vinculada a marcos e detalhes suficientes para avaliação independente, a posição estaria aberta a reconsideração.
4. Conclusão
O Leios tem importância estratégica para a escalabilidade da Cardano, e o caso técnico para melhoria da camada de consenso é reconhecido.
O voto permanece NÃO porque uma retirada do tesouro de oito dígitos não deve ser aprovada com esse nível de opacidade orçamentária.
Maior decomposição orçamentária e accountability vinculada a marcos seriam necessárias para reconsideração.
- Yes 257K ₳ Rationale
I am voting YES on “IO Consensus Initiative (Leios)” at 27,714,342 ADA, with explicit reservations about cost transparency and IO’s aggregate draw on the treasury.
Leios is a must‑have consensus upgrade if Cardano is serious about its own 2030 plan (27M monthly transactions, materially higher fee revenue, and credible performance versus rival L1s). The current cycle already funds an early public testnet and feature‑complete prototype; this proposal pays for the hard part: taking Leios from prototype (SRL 4) to a mainnet‑ready release candidate (SRL 5–8), validating it under load and adversarial conditions, and doing everything within IO’s control to enable a Dijkstra‑era hard fork. Without that base‑layer scaling, most other adoption and revenue targets become aspirational marketing rather than realistic outcomes.
From a governance and constitutional perspective, the proposal is well structured. Funds are denominated purely in ADA, sit within the 350M Net Change Limit window, and are administered through Intersect’s Treasury Reserve Smart Contract plus project‑specific contracts, using audited Sundae Labs infrastructure, auto‑abstain delegation, multi‑sig controls with an independent Oversight Committee, milestone‑based disbursement, and a commitment to return undisbursed funds at the end of the period. Scope is clear: Q4 2026 release candidate, Q1 2027 high‑confidence validation, and Q4 2026–Q1 2027 hard‑fork enabling activities, with explicit acknowledgement that mainnet activation depends on external governance and ecosystem readiness and therefore cannot be guaranteed in this governance action.
I share several of the concerns raised by other DReps. First, cost transparency is weaker than it should be at this scale: 27.7M ADA (~6.65M USD) is heavily weighted to development (86%), which is appropriate for consensus work, but the proposal does not provide FTE rates, team sizes, or per‑workstream allocation that would let DReps benchmark IO’s efficiency against industry norms or alternative implementations. This is part of a broader pattern of IO submitting large technical asks outside the main Intersect budget cycle, after already having been allocated ~130.7M ADA across prior treasury‑funded workstreams, with ~78.46M ADA withdrawn so far. Second, Leios introduces non‑trivial downstream obligations and risks for SPOs and alternative clients: higher operational complexity, traffic prioritization requirements, and the need for Amaru, Dingo, and others to implement and maintain compatibility. The proposal acknowledges parameter and integration risk and the possibility that smaller pools could be squeezed, but the trade‑offs on SPO economics are not quantified.
Despite these negatives, this proposal is far closer to core, non‑substitutable infrastructure than most other large asks in this cycle. As DReps like YUTA, CardanoYoda and Dr. Navjit have argued, Cardano can delay or down‑scale many marketing, L2, or ancillary initiatives, but it cannot credibly pursue its 2030 adoption and revenue targets without a base layer that can actually carry that load. The downside of not funding this stage of Leios—remaining a structurally low‑throughput L1 in a market that increasingly assumes “high TPS by default”—is, in my view, greater than the discomfort of funding a relatively expensive, high‑risk engineering program.
For these reasons, my position is:
Vote: YES, treating this as a one‑off, foundational consensus upgrade that should go ahead, even given IO’s imperfect cost transparency and treasury footprint.
Conditions going forward: I expect IO to (1) provide more granular, benchmarkable budgeting (FTE bands, team sizes, per‑workstream splits) in any future Leios‑related asks or follow‑ons, (2) articulate a clear plan for how Leios costs and responsibilities are shared with alternative clients over time, and (3) keep DReps informed on parameter choices and SPO impact, so the ecosystem can make informed decisions when the actual hard‑fork governance action arrives.
If those expectations are not met, my tolerance for additional large, out‑of‑cycle IO treasury withdrawals will be significantly lower, even for technically important work.
- Yes 253.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 245K ₳ Rationale
Leios remains the most consequential long-term protocol initiative in the Cardano ecosystem. The 2030 target of 27 million monthly transactions is structurally unachievable without it. CIP-164 is merged, a public testnet is imminent, and the consortium model - explicitly including Tweag and TxPipe as delivery partners - is the right structural direction for Cardano core development. IO owns the Leios research and protocol specification, so there is no opportunity to wait for proposals from other teams here. The Leios testnet targeting June 2026 and mainnet by end-2026 are ambitious milestones that should be held to strict community accountability, however if achieved that means we can finally be done funding Leios' initial development.
- Yes 238.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 237.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 234.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 215.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 212.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 208.6K ₳ Rationale
I'm increasingly concerned about Cardano's overall treasury spend rate, especially following the recent approval of the Draper/Dragon Orion Fund. To provide a necessary counter-balance, I am defaulting to NO on most treasury withdrawals at this time.
This proposal (₳27.7M) is a clear exception. It directly funds production hardening of Leios and shared L2 infrastructure which is exactly the type of high-priority critical scaling work I support.
I will continue voting YES only on the highest-priority items that directly strengthen essential infrastructure like IO Hydra L2, Leios, or deliverables required to advance key partnerships such as Midnight. - Yes 207.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 206.4K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 203.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 190.2K ₳ No rationale
- No 183.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 182K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 181.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 180.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 167.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 142.3K ₳ Rationale
If Cardano wants to fulfill its 2030 narrative, Leios is not optional
- Yes 137.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 131.7K ₳ No rationale