IO & Ensurable Systems: Cardano Maintenance Initiative
239 DReps voted · 78 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 534.3K ₳ Rationale
All IO request IMO at non-negotiable at the point, No other team in the world can deliver the results at a cheaper rate.
- Yes 487.1K ₳ No rationale
- No 481.5K ₳ Rationale
- Yes 473.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 467.4K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 466.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 445.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 443.5K ₳ Rationale
I support all IO projects.
- Yes 441.7K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 438.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 426.2K ₳ Rationale
I’m a big fan of IO and everything they’ve accomplished over these nearly 10 years regarding Cardano. I believe it’s a top-tier company in terms of research, implementation, and blockchain, and I don’t question their capabilities at all.
However, as an observer—since I’m not deeply involved, but would still like to share my perspective. I feel that IO owes the community a clear, solid, and concise explanation of what has been achieved in previous governance actions. From my point of view, it’s very confusing; it feels like there are overlaps between this year’s proposals and last year’s, and it’s not clear at all.
It creates a lot of confusion, raising questions like: “Didn’t we already pay for this last year?” or “Why are we paying again if this was supposed to have been implemented already?” This starts to generate distrust across the community.I would like to see clear, measurable frameworks and informative checkpoints for all these governance actions something like a “Messari-style” State of Cardano report. I understand that a report like that isn’t cheap, but considering that we are about to spend nearly $40 million, the minimum expectation would be a clear report outlining what is intended to be achieved and what was accomplished last year.
This is a humongous amount of money, and it’s unreasonable for there to be so much confusion especially knowing that IO does very good work, yet their efforts start to be questioned. I wouldn’t like to see that happen. If producing such a report costs $50,000 or $100,000, then include it in the budget it doesn’t matter. There needs to be clarity and a formal way to track the return on what is being done. It’s simply too much money for this to remain so informal.
This time, I will support the proposal. However, I want to express that if clarity fails again in future proposals if ambiguity and confusion persist regarding what was delivered versus what was supposed to be delivered—then unfortunately I won’t be able to support with my vote. Cardano is no longer what it was five years ago; now it’s up to us to ensure that what gets done is logical and properly scrutinized.
- Abstain 385.6K ₳ Rationale
Abstaining, as I’m part of the Cardano Constitution Committee Tingvard.
Reading proposals and staying updated, just like you.
Thanks to all fellow DReps who are also doing the hard work.
Follow and DM me on X: @kenerik if you have any questions. - Yes 382.6K ₳ No rationale
- No 377.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 365.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 332K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 328.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 327.1K ₳ No rationale
- No 321.1K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 314.4K ₳ Rationale
My Abstain vote is a demand for transparency. While Cardano needs this maintenance, the ₳45.9M Development budget is a black box. We preach “Don’t Trust, Verify”, yet are forced to blindly trust IOG. If IOG provides a structural breakdown off-chain, I will gladly switch my vote to Yes.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I currently feel almost blackmailed into voting for this proposal. Not because of direct pressure, but because of the stark reality of our situation: I know we absolutely need this maintenance initiative to materialize, yet we are given close to nothing regarding how IOG actually arrived at the final number.
The massive “Development” budget is a black box that we are expected to somehow just “trust”. Yet, as an ecosystem, we preach every single day: “Don’t Trust, Verify!”. How are we supposed to blindly trust this? Let’s be honest with ourselves: if this exact proposal had been submitted by any entity other than IOG, we would scrutinize every single item (best case!). In the worst case, we would have downvoted it the moment it went on-chain. This is a glaring double standard, and I feel guilty even entertaining it.
I am deeply frustrated because it feels like I am being forced to choose the least damaging option: compromising my own governance integrity, or risking the network’s security, which is absolutely at stake if this isn’t approved.
We have a right to know how IOG came to this figure. I am not looking to micromanage, challenge individual FTEs, or debate how well developers are compensated. I simply want to understand the big picture. Why do we need 45.9M for development and not 30M, or 100M? Right now, from a governance perspective, it is just an arbitrary number.
- Abstain 313.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 298.6K ₳ Rationale
Voting YES on ALL IOG Withdrawals
May 20th 2026
Summery
Nine treasury withdrawals from IOG totalling around 162M ada ($40M USD)
Important Citation
https://x.com/EdnStuff/status/2051321214728118360
EdnStuff said the following on May 4th 2026
I see the IO proposals as a package deal. But by all accounts I see most dreps only voting yes on a small selection of the 9. This is going to lead to some extremely lopsided, fragmented, and piecemeal results that will fall short of what we need on #Cardano $ADA.Charles quote tweeted saying
https://x.com/IOHK_Charles/status/2051376829949464792
Sadly, this is the end result of a piecemeal roadmap. It's an iPhone by committee, with people deciding whether they prefer the fingerprint sensor to wireless charging. You end up with a bizarre, useless product.Statement
There are a handful of people who, when they speak, I think it unwise not to listen to. Charles is one such person. His statement above makes this choice pretty easy.
While we need to foster a wide ecosystem of R&D firms, we cannot afford to jeopardize our relationship with our biggest contributor. It is obvious and undeniable that the long-term success of Cardano remains dependent on the continued efforts of IO.
I am voting for all of these IO proposals because Charles has made it clear that he does not believe Cardano can be successful without each of them, and it would be unwise to disregard his intuition.
Signed,
William DoyleYour friendly neighbourhood DRep!
$computerman
drep1yfpgzfymq6tt9c684e7vzata8r5pl4w84fmrjqeztdqw0sgpzw3nt
https://x.com/william00000010 - No 295.2K ₳ No rationale
- No 279.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 271.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 261.3K ₳ No rationale
- No 258.6K ₳ Rationale
Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]
Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.
My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.
In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.
At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.
Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.
Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.
This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.
Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:
- Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
- Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
- Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
- Lack of credible execution capacity;
- Structural governance or transparency concerns;
- Severe budgetary or coordination risks.
Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.
This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.
Governance Action Review — Cardano Maintenance
1. Introduction
Cardano Maintenance is a treasury withdrawal proposal focused on core platform maintenance and support for the Cardano network. The proposal seeks continued support for the Cardano codebase and infrastructure from the second half of 2026 through the first half of 2027.
The proposal covers nine functional areas: Node Bugfixing and Architecture, DevOps and Infrastructure, Monitoring, Documentation, Open Source Support, Performance, Quality Assurance, Release and Support, and Component Maintenance. These areas include issue resolution, hot fixes, CI/CD maintenance, disaster recovery, testnet maintenance, mainnet monitoring, Cardano Blueprint documentation, GitHub issue triage, performance benchmarking, E2E testing, release management, incident support, Plutus maintenance, DB-Sync maintenance, Cardano API and CLI maintenance, and related component work.
The total treasury request is ₳62,134,630. The budget allocates ₳45,979,626 to Development, representing 74% of the total request. Additional allocations include Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance, and Others.
Delivery is presented as continuous rather than sequential, with all deliverables running in parallel across the funded period.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
This should not be interpreted as opposition to Cardano maintenance, to the continuation of core infrastructure work, or to the technical capability of the teams involved. Maintenance is essential. The proposal covers important areas such as node bugfixing, DevOps, infrastructure, monitoring, documentation, QA, release management, security support, and component maintenance. These activities are clearly relevant to the stability, reliability, and continuity of the Cardano network.
Negative aspects
Essential work still requires treasury discipline.
The proposal requests ₳62,134,630, making it one of the largest, if not the largest, treasury withdrawal requests in the current cycle. Of this amount, ₳45,979,626 is allocated to “Development,” representing 74% of the total budget. Yet the proposal does not provide enough detail on FTE allocation, salary or rate assumptions, team composition, seniority levels, work-package costing, or the distribution of responsibilities between IO and Ensurable Systems.
Without that level of detail, it is not possible to assess whether the requested amount is proportionate, efficient, inflated, or properly mapped to concrete maintenance activities.
Risks and concerns
This is also a governance standards issue. If dReps accept this level of budget abstraction for the largest proposal in the cycle, it becomes difficult to justify demanding stronger granularity from smaller proposals requesting far less from the treasury. The standard applied to major infrastructure proposals should not be weaker simply because the proposer is a well-known entity.
If the name of the proposing entity were removed and the community were asked to approve nearly ₳46 million under a generic “Development” category, without clear FTE assumptions, cost breakdown, seniority levels, or workstream-level pricing, this would not meet the level of scrutiny expected from responsible treasury governance.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
The vote is NO on this treasury withdrawal due to insufficient budget granularity for a proposal of this magnitude.
The decision does not represent opposition to Cardano maintenance, to the continuation of core infrastructure work, or to the technical capability of the teams involved. The importance of the work is recognized, and the need for Cardano maintenance to be funded is also recognized.
However, the proposal does not provide enough detail on FTE allocation, salary or rate assumptions, team composition, seniority levels, work-package costing, or the distribution of responsibilities between IO and Ensurable Systems. Without that level of detail, the requested amount cannot be assessed as proportionate, efficient, inflated, or properly mapped to concrete maintenance activities.
For that reason, while the importance of the work and the need for Cardano maintenance funding are recognized, the proposal cannot be supported in its current form.
4. Conclusion
Maintenance is essential for Cardano’s stability, reliability, and continuity. However, a treasury request of this magnitude requires stronger budget granularity. Without clearer detail on staffing, cost assumptions, work-package pricing, and responsibility allocation, the proposal does not meet the standard expected for responsible treasury governance.
My vote is NO.
Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]
Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.
Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.
Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.
Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.
Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.
Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.
Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.
Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:
- Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
- Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
- Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
- Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
- Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
- Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.
Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.
Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.
Revisão de Ação de Governança — Cardano Maintenance
1. Introdução
Cardano Maintenance é uma proposta de retirada do tesouro focada em manutenção da plataforma central e suporte à rede Cardano. A proposta busca garantir suporte contínuo ao código-base e à infraestrutura da Cardano do segundo semestre de 2026 ao primeiro semestre de 2027.
A proposta cobre nove áreas funcionais: Node Bugfixing and Architecture, DevOps and Infrastructure, Monitoring, Documentation, Open Source Support, Performance, Quality Assurance, Release and Support, e Component Maintenance. Essas áreas incluem resolução de problemas, hot fixes, manutenção de CI/CD, recuperação de desastres, manutenção de testnets, monitoramento da mainnet, documentação do Cardano Blueprint, triagem de issues no GitHub, benchmarks de performance, testes E2E, gerenciamento de releases, suporte a incidentes, manutenção do Plutus, manutenção do DB-Sync, manutenção da Cardano API e CLI, e trabalhos relacionados a componentes.
O pedido total ao tesouro é de ₳62.134.630. O orçamento aloca ₳45.979.626 para Development, representando 74% do pedido total. Outras alocações incluem Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance e Others.
A entrega é apresentada como contínua, e não sequencial, com todos os entregáveis sendo executados em paralelo ao longo do período financiado.
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
Isto não deve ser interpretado como oposição à manutenção da Cardano, à continuidade do trabalho de infraestrutura central ou à capacidade técnica das equipes envolvidas. A manutenção é essencial. A proposta cobre áreas importantes como correção de bugs do node, DevOps, infraestrutura, monitoramento, documentação, QA, gerenciamento de releases, suporte de segurança e manutenção de componentes. Essas atividades são claramente relevantes para a estabilidade, confiabilidade e continuidade da rede Cardano.
Aspectos negativos
Trabalho essencial ainda exige disciplina de tesouraria.
A proposta solicita ₳62.134.630, tornando-se uma das maiores, se não a maior, solicitação de retirada do tesouro no ciclo atual. Desse montante, ₳45.979.626 são alocados para “Development”, representando 74% do orçamento total. Ainda assim, a proposta não fornece detalhes suficientes sobre alocação de FTEs, premissas salariais ou de taxas, composição da equipe, níveis de senioridade, custeio por work-package ou distribuição de responsabilidades entre IO e Ensurable Systems.
Sem esse nível de detalhe, não é possível avaliar se o valor solicitado é proporcional, eficiente, inflado ou devidamente mapeado para atividades concretas de manutenção.
Riscos e preocupações
Isto também é uma questão de padrões de governança. Se os dReps aceitarem esse nível de abstração orçamentária para a maior proposta do ciclo, torna-se difícil justificar a exigência de maior granularidade de propostas menores que solicitam muito menos do tesouro. O padrão aplicado a grandes propostas de infraestrutura não deve ser mais fraco simplesmente porque o proponente é uma entidade conhecida.
Se o nome da entidade proponente fosse removido e a comunidade fosse solicitada a aprovar quase ₳46 milhões sob uma categoria genérica de “Development”, sem premissas claras de FTE, detalhamento de custos, níveis de senioridade ou precificação por workstream, isso não atenderia ao nível de escrutínio esperado de uma governança de tesouraria responsável.
3. Voto e Justificativa
Voto: NO
O voto é NO nesta retirada do tesouro devido à granularidade orçamentária insuficiente para uma proposta dessa magnitude.
A decisão não representa oposição à manutenção da Cardano, à continuidade do trabalho de infraestrutura central ou à capacidade técnica das equipes envolvidas. A importância do trabalho é reconhecida, assim como a necessidade de financiar a manutenção da Cardano.
No entanto, a proposta não fornece detalhes suficientes sobre alocação de FTEs, premissas salariais ou de taxas, composição da equipe, níveis de senioridade, custeio por work-package ou distribuição de responsabilidades entre IO e Ensurable Systems. Sem esse nível de detalhe, o valor solicitado não pode ser avaliado como proporcional, eficiente, inflado ou devidamente mapeado para atividades concretas de manutenção.
Por esse motivo, embora a importância do trabalho e a necessidade de financiamento da manutenção da Cardano sejam reconhecidas, a proposta não pode ser apoiada em sua forma atual.
4. Conclusão
A manutenção é essencial para a estabilidade, confiabilidade e continuidade da Cardano. No entanto, uma solicitação ao tesouro dessa magnitude exige maior granularidade orçamentária. Sem detalhes mais claros sobre equipe, premissas de custo, precificação por work-package e alocação de responsabilidades, a proposta não atende ao padrão esperado de uma governança de tesouraria responsável.
Meu voto é NO.****
- No 257K ₳ Rationale
I am voting NO on “IO & Ensurable Systems: Cardano Maintenance Initiative” at the requested 62,134,630 ADA. I fully agree that core maintenance is non‑discretionary and that IO’s expertise has been central to Cardano’s stability and upgradeability to date. The governance and custody setup via Intersect’s treasury contracts, Oversight Committee controls, auto‑abstain delegation, and refund conditions is also robust and aligned with constitutional best practice. My objection is not to funding essential maintenance itself, but to the way this proposal bundles many different activities into a single, very large “maintenance” envelope without sufficient cost transparency or scope discipline.
In its current form, the proposal conflates true, safety‑critical maintenance (uptime, DR, incident response) with a broad set of improvements and support functions: Cardano Blueprint documentation, open‑source community support, code modernization and technical‑debt work, performance analysis, and QA/release work that should be scoped and costed as part of specific feature or node deliverables. Many of these are valuable, but they are not all non‑optional “keep the lights on” tasks, and the proposal does not provide the granular FTE rates, team sizing, or per‑component cost breakdown needed to judge whether 62M ADA is reasonable. For a single vendor, in a treasury that has already committed to other large initiatives, this size and level of bundling is not something I can support.
For a future maintenance proposal, I would be prepared to reconsider a smaller, better‑structured request that:
(1) clearly modularizes the scope into separate governance actions—for example, a narrowly defined core maintenance contract for node uptime/DR/incident response, and distinct, smaller proposals for documentation (Blueprint), performance improvements, open‑source support, and ecosystem engagement;
(2) adopts a tighter definition of “maintenance”, reserving that label and budget for truly non‑discretionary operational work, while treating modernization, technical debt, and documentation as explicit upgrades or improvements with their own scope and evaluation criteria; and
(3) provides a transparent, benchmarkable cost model (FTE bands, roles, and per‑workstream allocations), so DReps can compare core Haskell node maintenance costs against alternative node teams and industry norms, and see exactly how much is being requested for Blueprint, tooling, and other “extras”. - Yes 253.3K ₳ No rationale
- No 245K ₳ Rationale
The 62.1M ADA ask covers only Q3 2026 to Q1 2027 (approximately nine months) with no published FTE breakdown, no disclosed rate card, and no competitive process. That figure demands independent justification that has not been provided. Furthermore, the parallel Tweag proposal demonstrates that non-IO teams have the depth and transparency to deliver core Cardano infrastructure competitively. Voting "Yes" on an uncontested, financially opaque maintenance would be irresponsible in my opinion.
- Yes 238.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 237.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 234.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 215.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 212.5K ₳ No rationale
- No 208.6K ₳ Rationale
I'm increasingly concerned about Cardano's overall treasury spend rate, especially following the recent approval of the Draper/Dragon Orion Fund. To provide a necessary counter-balance, I am defaulting to NO on treasury withdrawals at this time.
This proposal (₳62 M) is important infrastructure work, but it does not meet my strict criteria for approval right now. It is not core/critical infrastructure such as IO Hydra L2 production hardening or deliverables directly required to advance the Midnight partnership.
I will continue voting YES only on the highest-priority items that directly strengthen essential scaling and partnership infrastructure. - Yes 207.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 206.4K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 203.6K ₳ No rationale
- No 190.9K ₳ No rationale
- No 190.2K ₳ No rationale
- No 183.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 182K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 181.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 180.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 142.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 137.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 131.7K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 131.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 127.9K ₳ No rationale