Net Change Limit of 300 Million ADA for Epochs 613–713
167 DReps voted · 60 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 785.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 733.1K ₳ Rationale
The proposed limit appears balanced and well-justified, supporting sustainable treasury usage and governance stability.
VOTE: YES. - Yes 717.1K ₳ Rationale
I will vote YES on this proposal.
Setting the Net Change Limit at 300 million ADA is a careful and responsible choice. It helps protect the treasury during uncertain market conditions and shows that we take spending seriously. A lower limit reduces pressure on ADA price while still allowing strong projects to be funded.
Starting with 300 million ADA gives us a safe baseline and flexibility for the future. For these reasons, I vote YES.
- No 670.2K ₳ Rationale
300 Million Ada is still too high and the only argument I've seen is that the price of Ada is lower and so we need a higher NCL at this time to spend on our future. And then in that future the price will be higher, and we can spend less Ada. It is a good argument but financially we cannot continue down this path as we will run out of funds in 4 years at this rate. We need a lower NCL now before its too late. We have spent so much on integrations and are still getting more. 250 Million Ada or lower makes more sense, and balances between the extremes of wanting to spend barely any Ada, and those who want to spend 300-350 million which is nearly a quarter of the treasury. I want us to try again once more for a lower NCL. Its not asking for much to suggest 250M.
- Yes 654.5K ₳ Rationale
🚨 CARDANO GOVERNANCE VOTE: TREASURY LIMIT 300M ADA (2026–2027)
📅 Submitted: 7 February 2026
📅 Active Period: 13 February 2026 — 3 July 2027
📊 Proposal: Treasury Net Change Limit — 300,000,000 ADA
👉 WHAT THIS VOTE IS ABOUT
This vote sets a limit on how much treasury funds can change during Epoch 613–713.
This is not about ADA price.
This is about treasury budget control.
👉 WHAT WE HAD BEFORE
📊 Treasury inflow in 2025:
➡ 306,940,195 ADAThe network earned roughly this amount in one year.
👉 WHAT IS PROPOSED NOW
Set treasury limit to:
➡ 300M ADAMeaning:
The network spends roughly what it earns.
👉 WHY I SUPPORT THIS
📌 Fiscal discipline
The network does not overspend.📌 Economic predictability
Important for investors and institutions.📌 Ecosystem protection
Treasury cannot be drained quickly.📌 Healthy blockchain economy
Spending ≈ Income.
👉 WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE FUTURE
Cardano is building a system similar to a state-level financial model:
✔ Revenue exists
✔ Budget exists
✔ Spending limits existThis is the foundation for:
— Institutional capital
— Asset tokenization
— Global financial integration
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- Yes 624.8K ₳ Rationale
I'm voting yes on the 300 million ADA Net Change Limit because fiscal discipline demands we start conservative, especially when ADA has dropped nearly 30% since the previous 350 million NCL proposal failed, now trading at 2021 levels around $0.25. The amount is grounded in demonstrable capacity: 2025 treasury inflows totaled 306,940,195 ADA, making 300 million a prudent cap slightly below realized income. Anchoring spending limits to historical inflow data prevents excessive expansion beyond what the network actually generates and ensures long-term sustainability without enabling unchecked treasury depletion.
The timing is critical. Without an approved NCL, no treasury withdrawals can proceed constitutionally after Epoch 612 (February 13, 2026), blocking legitimate ecosystem funding and creating governance paralysis. I voted yes on the 350 million NCL; this proposal is 50 million ADA lower, reflecting tighter fiscal posture in response to market conditions. At current prices, 300 million ADA represents approximately $75 million in purchasing power, $13 million less than the 350 million NCL would have provided. That reduction is acceptable and forces proposers to demonstrate genuine value rather than competing for easy access to inflated budgets. The NCL can be adjusted anytime via governance action if stronger needs or improved conditions justify it.
Establishing this clear, time-bound Net Change Limit provides predictability, discipline, and confidence that treasury spending will not expand without boundaries. Starting conservative with 300 million ADA, while spanning 505 days at roughly 594,000 ADA daily burn rate if fully utilized, balances protecting against selling pressure while preserving capacity for smart investments that support long-term growth. - Yes 619.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 601.8K ₳ No rationale
- No 589.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 559.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 534.3K ₳ Rationale
A Healthy Maximum budget reduced from 350 million ADA. More long term stability will be needed later to.
- No 471.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 445.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 443.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 438.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 409.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 377.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 365.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 341.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 324.4K ₳ Rationale
I vote yes because 300M is the lesser evil, compared to 350M as proposed in gov_action1m3xx08yv788vfxqh6nfvrjtvmqpwezsy0ggaczctkyjmttc2wmxsq4jsr7q
- Yes 321.1K ₳ Rationale
Might consider even lower around 250/275
- Yes 314.4K ₳ Rationale
I'm voting YES to maintain budget continuity.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting YES on this Info Action to establish a Net Change Limit (NCL) of 300 million ADA for Epochs 613–713.
I previously voted in favor of the "2025 Net Change Limit Extension" which did not pass. While this current proposal is for a smaller amount, I am supporting it because it is critical that we do not stall the budget process by operating without an NCL in place. Going forward, 300 million ADA represents my floor; I would most likely vote NO on any future limits proposed below this threshold, but would remain open to supporting a subsequent Info Action for a higher limit, such as 350 million ADA, to ensure adequate funding for ecosystem growth.
- Yes 298.6K ₳ Rationale
Summary
The net change limit is ₳300M for epochs 613–713, or from February 13, 2026, to July 3, 2027. This is a period of 505 days, with an average burn rate of ₳594,059.
Conclusion
I voted in favor of the ₳350M budget, which did not pass. This budget is ₳50M less than that, so I see no reason to vote against it.
- No 295.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 279.5K ₳ Rationale
Reduce from 350M to 300M to ensures we are not spending more than the treasury replenishes. Long-term (20-50 years) sustainability of the treasury should take priority over short-term.
- Yes 260K ₳ Rationale
A 300M ADA Net Change Limit aligned with prior treasury inflows reinforces fiscal discipline and constitutional governance. It sets a responsible spending boundary while supporting long-term ecosystem sustainability.
- No 258.6K ₳ Rationale
English
1. Introduction
This Governance Action proposes a Net Change Limit of 300,000,000 ADA for the period from the start of Epoch 613, on 13 February 2026, to the end of Epoch 713, on 3 July 2027. If approved, this limit would apply to Epochs 613 to 713 and would replace any previously agreed Net Change Limit covering the same period.
A Net Change Limit establishes the maximum net amount that may be withdrawn from the Treasury during a defined window. In this case, the proposed period was selected to align the cycle with the mid-year budget season and to ensure that a full prior year of Treasury inflow data is available before the next limit is set.
The motivation provided is procedural: a Net Change Limit must be established for a defined period in accordance with the Constitution. The justification for the 300 million ADA figure is based on 2025 Treasury inflows, defined as the inflows from Epoch 532 through Epoch 604, which are stated as totaling 306,940,195 ADA.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
The proposed Net Change Limit of 300,000,000 ADA is lower than the previously proposed 350,000,000 ADA. From a Treasury resource preservation standpoint, this may be regarded as a positive element.
The current concern is not limited to the nominal cap itself, but to the absence of structured guardrails around its use, including lack of non-binding allocation frameworks, lack of anti-concentration expectations, lack of anti-bundling signals, and lack of a clearer strategic posture for Treasury use. Under those conditions, a lower cap reduces the maximum amount of Treasury resources that may be deducted within an insufficiently structured governance environment.
To that extent, even without resolving the underlying governance deficiencies, the lower value may be viewed as a partial restraint on resource outflows under unfavorable conditions.
Negative aspects
An operational role for an NCL is acknowledged, since establishing a cap is required to keep the Treasury withdrawal process constitutionally workable. However, the issue is not whether an NCL should exist, but whether this specific Governance Action meets a minimum standard of institutional quality and governance discipline.
A prior NCL action for the same period had already been evaluated and rejected. In that prior vote, structural gaps had already been identified that went beyond the nominal cap value: lack of clear auditability, lack of coordination guidance, lack of safeguards against concentration, lack of anti-bundling expectations, unclear revision cadence, and absence of any stated fiscal posture for the Treasury. Those gaps are not meaningfully addressed here. The present Governance Action is materially more underspecified.
The justification provided is extremely thin. “Fiscal discipline” is asserted and 2025 inflows are referenced as the benchmark, but no verifiable source, link, annex, dataset reference, or reproducible methodology is provided in the text. There is also no discussion of what fiscal model is being pursued, whether preservation of principal, runway control, or growth-first drawdown. No Treasury floor or drawdown constraints are provided, and no framework is stated for how the cap should behave under changing conditions. The NCL is therefore reduced to a number without coherent fiscal policy context.
The action also fails to address governance failure modes that have already surfaced in practice: concentration and bundling. A single aggregate cap, without accompanying public allocation guidance, even if non-binding, and without anti-bundling expectations, creates predictable incentives for large actors to capture a disproportionate share of fiscal space and for heterogeneous work to be packaged in ways that reduce accountability and force bad compromises. These dynamics are not hypothetical and have already appeared in prior cycles. No corrective posture is provided, even at the level of norms and expectations.
No clarity is provided on revision cadence. Without an explicit norm such as a minimum cooldown period and clearly defined exceptional circumstances, the NCL risks remaining a malleable parameter that can be revisited whenever it becomes inconvenient. Its credibility as a coordination and discipline instrument is thereby further weakened. Reducing the nominal cap from a prior proposal does not solve this problem. Only the number is changed, while the underlying governance dynamics remain intact.
Risks and concerns
Externalities that matter to Treasury governance in practice are neither acknowledged nor mitigated. These include sell-pressure risk and the incentives created by USD-indexed budgeting converted into ADA with large volatility buffers. Even if milestone-based disbursement exists elsewhere in the ecosystem’s operational machinery, a proposal that sets the macro fiscal ceiling should at least recognize these risks and articulate baseline expectations for mitigation and reporting.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
The need for an NCL mechanism is recognized, but this Governance Action does not meet a minimum threshold of completeness, auditability, or governance seriousness.
A prior NCL action for the same period had already been rejected on structural grounds, including lack of auditability, lack of coordination guidance, lack of safeguards against concentration, lack of anti-bundling expectations, unclear revision cadence, and absence of a stated fiscal posture for the Treasury. Those deficiencies remain. The present proposal reduces the cap, but provides less structure, less evidence, and no meaningful response to the structural gaps already identified.
The justification offered for the 300 million ADA figure is not sufficient to support the cap as a credible governance instrument. A benchmark based on prior inflows is referenced, but no verifiable source or reproducible methodology is included, no fiscal model is stated, no Treasury floor or drawdown constraint is defined, and no framework is provided for how the cap should function under changing conditions.
The action also leaves unresolved governance dynamics that have already emerged in practice, especially concentration and bundling, and provides no clear norm for revision cadence. For those reasons, the position remains unchanged.
4. Conclusion
An NCL mechanism is necessary for Treasury governance, but this specific Governance Action remains too incomplete and underspecified to support. The nominal cap is reduced, yet the structural deficiencies previously identified remain unresolved, including weak auditability, lack of fiscal framing, absence of governance safeguards, and no meaningful discipline around revision.
Português do Brasil
1. Introdução
Esta Governance Action propõe um Net Change Limit de 300.000.000 ADA para o período entre o início da Epoch 613, em 13 de fevereiro de 2026, e o fim da Epoch 713, em 3 de julho de 2027. Se aprovada, essa regra se aplicará às Epochs 613 a 713 e substituirá qualquer Net Change Limit previamente acordado para a mesma janela.
Um Net Change Limit estabelece o valor líquido máximo que pode ser retirado do Tesouro durante um período definido. Neste caso, o intervalo proposto foi escolhido para alinhar o ciclo com a temporada orçamentária do meio do ano e para garantir que um ano completo de dados de entradas no Tesouro esteja disponível antes da definição do próximo limite.
A motivação apresentada é procedural: um Net Change Limit deve ser estabelecido para um período definido em conformidade com a Constituição. A justificativa para o valor de 300 milhões de ADA se baseia nas entradas do Tesouro em 2025, definidas como as entradas entre a Epoch 532 e a Epoch 604, que são indicadas como totalizando 306.940.195 ADA.
2. Análise da Governance Action
Aspectos positivos
O Net Change Limit proposto de 300.000.000 ADA é inferior ao valor anteriormente proposto de 350.000.000 ADA. Do ponto de vista de preservação de recursos do Tesouro, isso pode ser considerado um elemento positivo.
A preocupação atual não se limita ao valor nominal do teto em si, mas à ausência de guardrails estruturados para seu uso, incluindo falta de frameworks não vinculantes de alocação, falta de expectativas contra concentração, falta de sinais contra bundling e falta de uma postura estratégica mais clara para o uso do Tesouro. Nessas condições, um teto menor reduz o montante máximo de recursos do Tesouro que pode ser deduzido em um ambiente de governança insuficientemente estruturado.
Nessa medida, mesmo sem resolver as deficiências de governança subjacentes, o valor mais baixo pode ser visto como uma contenção parcial das saídas de recursos sob condições desfavoráveis.
Aspectos negativos
Um papel operacional para o NCL é reconhecido, já que estabelecer um limite é necessário para manter o processo de Treasury Withdrawals constitucionalmente viável. No entanto, a questão não é se um NCL deve existir, mas se esta Governance Action específica atende a um padrão mínimo de qualidade institucional e disciplina de governança.
Uma ação anterior de NCL para o mesmo período já havia sido avaliada e rejeitada. Naquele voto anterior, já haviam sido identificadas lacunas estruturais que iam além do valor nominal do limite: falta de auditabilidade clara, falta de diretrizes de coordenação, falta de salvaguardas contra concentração, falta de expectativas anti-bundling, cadência de revisão pouco clara e ausência de qualquer postura fiscal declarada para o Tesouro. Essas lacunas não são abordadas de forma significativa aqui. A presente Governance Action é materialmente ainda mais subespecificada.
A justificativa apresentada é extremamente fraca. “Disciplina fiscal” é afirmada e as entradas de 2025 são usadas como referência, mas nenhuma fonte verificável, link, anexo, referência de dataset ou metodologia reproduzível é fornecida no texto. Também não há discussão sobre qual modelo fiscal está sendo buscado, seja preservação do principal, controle de runway ou drawdown orientado a crescimento. Nenhum piso do Tesouro ou restrição de drawdown é apresentado, e nenhum framework é definido para como esse limite deveria se comportar sob condições variáveis. O NCL, portanto, é reduzido a um número sem contexto coerente de política fiscal.
A ação também falha em enfrentar modos de falha de governança que já apareceram na prática: concentração e bundling. Um único limite agregado, sem diretrizes públicas complementares de alocação, ainda que não vinculantes, e sem expectativas anti-bundling, cria incentivos previsíveis para que grandes atores capturem uma parcela desproporcional do espaço fiscal e para que trabalhos heterogêneos sejam empacotados de formas que reduzem accountability e forçam maus compromissos. Essas dinâmicas não são hipotéticas e já apareceram em ciclos anteriores. Nenhuma postura corretiva é apresentada, nem mesmo no nível de normas e expectativas.
Nenhuma clareza é fornecida sobre a cadência de revisão. Sem uma norma explícita, como um período mínimo de cooldown e circunstâncias excepcionais claramente definidas, o NCL corre o risco de permanecer um parâmetro maleável, que pode ser revisitado sempre que se tornar inconveniente. Sua credibilidade como instrumento de coordenação e disciplina é, assim, ainda mais enfraquecida. Reduzir o valor nominal em relação a uma proposta anterior não resolve esse problema. Apenas o número é alterado, enquanto a dinâmica de governança subjacente permanece intacta.
Riscos e preocupações
Externalidades relevantes para a governança do Tesouro na prática não são reconhecidas nem mitigadas. Entre elas estão o risco de pressão de venda e os incentivos criados por orçamentos indexados em USD convertidos para ADA com grandes margens de volatilidade. Mesmo que desembolsos baseados em milestones existam em outras partes da maquinaria operacional do ecossistema, uma proposta que define o teto fiscal macro deveria ao menos reconhecer esses riscos e articular expectativas mínimas de mitigação e reporte.
3. Voto e Justificativa
Voto: NÃO
A necessidade de um mecanismo de NCL é reconhecida, mas esta Governance Action não atinge um limiar mínimo de completude, auditabilidade ou seriedade de governança.
Uma ação anterior de NCL para o mesmo período já havia sido rejeitada por razões estruturais, incluindo falta de auditabilidade, falta de diretrizes de coordenação, falta de salvaguardas contra concentração, falta de expectativas anti-bundling, cadência de revisão pouco clara e ausência de uma postura fiscal declarada para o Tesouro. Essas deficiências permanecem. A proposta atual reduz o limite, mas oferece menos estrutura, menos evidência e nenhuma resposta significativa às lacunas estruturais já identificadas.
A justificativa apresentada para o valor de 300 milhões de ADA não é suficiente para sustentar o limite como um instrumento de governança crível. Uma referência baseada em entradas anteriores é mencionada, mas nenhuma fonte verificável ou metodologia reproduzível é incluída, nenhum modelo fiscal é declarado, nenhum piso do Tesouro ou restrição de drawdown é definido, e nenhum framework é apresentado para como o limite deveria funcionar sob condições variáveis.
A ação também deixa sem resposta dinâmicas de governança que já surgiram na prática, especialmente concentração e bundling, e não apresenta nenhuma norma clara para a cadência de revisão. Por essas razões, a posição permanece inalterada.
4. Conclusão
Um mecanismo de NCL é necessário para a governança do Tesouro, mas esta Governance Action específica continua incompleta e subespecificada demais para receber apoio. O limite nominal é reduzido, mas as deficiências estruturais previamente identificadas permanecem sem solução, incluindo fraca auditabilidade, ausência de enquadramento fiscal, falta de salvaguardas de governança e nenhuma disciplina significativa em torno da revisão.
- No 238.2K ₳ Rationale
The proposed 300M ADA limit for Epochs 613-713 is calibrated to match 2025 treasury inflows (~307M ADA). This isn't fiscal discipline — it's spending parity. A treasury designed to last decades shouldn't operate on a "earn it, burn it" cycle.
Real discipline requires spending meaningfully less than inflows to build reserves against market downturns and future ecosystem needs. This proposal spends virtually everything that comes in, leaving no buffer for volatility or strategic accumulation.
Counter-cyclical treasury management demands restraint when inflows are uncertain or prices are depressed. Instead, this proposal locks in maximum spending velocity regardless of macro conditions. It treats the treasury as a checking account rather than an endowment.
The "reference to previous year's inflows" rationale reveals the core problem: the goal is maintaining spending capacity, not establishing sustainable constraints. A 300M limit that consumes 98% of annual inflows isn't a guardrail — it's a license.
Vote NO to signal that treasury management requires actual restraint: spending less than we earn, building reserves for generational sustainability, and rejecting the assumption that all inflows must be deployable capital.
- Yes 215.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 208.6K ₳ Rationale
These are tough times and sadly do require austerity measures. I agree with the logic of staying below previous year inflows. Stay strong, we'll be the ecosystem that survives!
- Yes 195.9K ₳ Rationale
Last year we spent 270M against a 350M limit, so this vote isn't really about the number. Without an NCL, no treasury withdrawal is constitutional. The previous attempt at this same period expired without passing. We can't keep leaving that gap open. Yes, governance quality needs constant improvement. That work happens on individual withdrawal votes and framework debates, not here. Don't cut the fuel line while you're fixing the steering. This ship needs to be moving.
- Yes 190.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 190.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 182K ₳ No rationale
- No 177.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 174.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 137.3K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 131.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 120.8K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 111.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 85.4K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 69.8K ₳ No rationale
- No 65.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 61.9K ₳ No rationale
- No 60.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 55.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 51.8K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 49.4K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 49.3K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 48.6K ₳ No rationale