Withdraw ₳12,000,000 for Cardano Builder DAO administered by Intersect
189 DReps voted · 59 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 14.2M ₳ No rationale
- No 14.1M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 13.3M ₳ Rationale
RCADA has chosen to** abstain at this time while reserving the option to review and update this vote prior to the voting deadline**. This approach allows RCADA to allocate focus where immediate evaluation is most impactful, particularly on proposals that are close to threshold or raise significant procedural or constitutional concerns. If this proposal reaches the approv-al threshold prior to our review, the abstention will stand as a neutral signal of deferral, not op-position. Should further analysis be warranted, RCADA will update this vote accordingly.
- Yes 12.2M ₳ Rationale
Disclaimer: This is a general rationale we have prepared to support our “yes” vote on all the 39 treasury withdrawal actions. This follows careful review and consideration of the metadata of these treasury withdrawal proposals and hence is not a blanket voting practice.
We, the Wada DRep Committee, have decided to upvote on all 39 Treasury Withdrawal governance actions currently live on-chain and submitted under the administration of IntersectMBO. These actions are the necessary implementation step following the community's approval of the ₳275.3 million Cardano Ecosystem Budget, the necessary budget info action that precedes the treasury withdrawal process. Our support reflects not only continuity with our earlier "yes" votes on the overarching budget info action and its constituent proposals but also our confidence in the smart contract guide and project execution mechanisms Intersect has established as an administrative body for these proposals.
Each of these 39 withdrawals corresponds directly to proposals that have already passed a respective Budget Info Action with wide community and DRep support of 64.23%. As Wada DRep, we reviewed, scored, and supported many of these initiatives during the budgeting phase, using our internal ₳280M Net Change Limit framework. Our endorsement of the full ₳275.3M package was not a blanket approval but the outcome of detailed deliberation. Therefore, we see it as our responsibility to honor those community-approved funding decisions by affirming these follow-up Treasury withdrawal governance actions.
Importantly, we are confident in Intersect’s role as the administrator of these treasury disbursements. We have independently reviewed the Smart Contract Guide, disbursement architecture, and accountability structures associated with these withdrawals. The use of milestone-gated smart contracts, multi-signature treasuries, and on-chain/off-chain tracking mechanisms provides strong assurance of transparency, risk management, and community accountability. We are particularly satisfied that Intersect has adopted security-audited contract templates and provides public documentation on how treasury funds will be administered, paused if necessary, and even returned if unused.
In our view, rejecting or abstaining from these Treasury Withdrawals at this stage would risk destabilizing delivery timelines, undermining community trust, and introducing administrative conflicts that may violate the spirit of the Constitution’s Articles on budgeting. We believe that treasury funding is not just about allocation; it’s about consistent and credible execution. As such, the DRep role requires continuity and follow-through, especially when prior voting outcomes have clearly mandated action.
Therefore, in alignment with our constitutional responsibilities, community-aligned decision-making, and our assessment of Intersect’s administrative protocols, we have decided to upvote on all 39 Treasury Withdrawals Governance Actions.
- Yes 11M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 10.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 8.8M ₳ Rationale
「275M ADA Administered by Intersect」に含まれるすべての個別提案に対して、エクレシア投票の段階では必ずしもすべてに賛成していたわけではありませんが、最終的には本ガバナンスアクションに賛成票を投じました。Cardanoエコシステム全体への貢献を高く評価し、その前進を後押しする立場から、今回提出された39件すべての提案に賛成票を投じる判断をいたしました。\n\nWhile I did not necessarily support every individual proposal included in "275M ADA Administered by Intersect" during the Ekklesia vote, I ultimately voted Yes on this governance action. Recognizing its overall contribution to the Cardano ecosystem and in support of continued progress, I cast a Yes vote on all 39 proposals submitted under this initiative.
- Yes 8.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 7.8M ₳ No rationale
- No 7.3M ₳ No rationale
- No 7.1M ₳ Rationale
I have voted NO for this proposal in Ekklesia and then voted over Tempo, however my rationale has not been added - not sure why. Alas, I didn't save the rationale, so this is a novel effort to write it up - as I try to accompany every vote with a rationale.
I maintain my NO vote on this proposal.I have voted NO for this proposal in Ekklesia and then voted over Tempo, however my rationale has not been added - not sure why. Alas, I didn't save the rationale, so this is a novel effort to write it up - as I try to accompany every vote with a rationale.
I maintain my NO vote on this proposal. Let me preface this rationale with information that I think that the Cardano Builder DAO (CB DAO) is a worthwile idea and that the members are many renounced builders.
One issue here is whether DReps divest their responsibility to disburse Treasury funds to a DAO that will then manage the treasury allocation based on principles that it sets. The DAO states it wants to "support the application-layer growth of the Cardano ecosystem". This is necessary, of course.
The DAo wants to provide sustainable financial backing and strategic oversight to high-impact projects. I agree with the oversight part.
I disagree with the conclusion that "there remains a substantial gap in ongoing support for live, user-facing products/services." The Treasury mechanism in now live and DReps are participating in minimal viable governance.
As DReps we already have accepted the idea of having middlemen in the form of Budget Administrators - which are needed. There is no need to devolve DRep powers to multiple DAOs - that will be allocated funding. DReps represent the wider interests of the entire ADA holding community, DAOs represent the interests of the DAO members.
For example this very Cardano Builder DAO proposal proves that it is already possible to apply for Treasury Funding directly - I think that direct applications are better especially in these early days of governance. Namely, DReps have a mandate to look at proposals holistically, from the point of view of ADA holders, SPOs, the ecosystem interests and the needs of the application-layer.
Cardano Builder DAO proposes to use a transparent governance framework, strict accountability mechanisms, and a metrics-first funding approach. However, I think that on-chain governance already provides us with new opportunities, as well as initatives such as Project Catalyst.
I would not be in favour of derogating DRep responsibilities to mutliple DAOs, as if I vote YES to this proposals I would find it difficult to say NO to a second and third DAO applying for a fruther ₳12,000,000 or ₳20,000,000.
I think that governance decisions relating to allocating Treasury Funds should in principle be performed by DReps primarily, unless there are other circumstances that warrant it.
The proposals states that it "seeks to address the lack of dedicated, sustainable financial support", however I would point towards the examples of Gov Tool that was not approved as part of the Intersect Ekllesia process, but still applied with a budget governance info action and if approved it will move to the Treasury Withdrawal stage.
I think that there is now a dedicated source of financial support for projects that are deemed to be worthy of it. Maybe Cardano Builder DAO should think of coming with a proposal for specific projects - individually or in small groupings.Still, I am not in favour of DReps - at this moment for sure - entrusting a DAO to choose what should be financed among their member projects with Treasury funding.
Many of CB DAO projects are stellar with exceptional devs and they have projects already live on mainnet. Having a CB DAO is a worthwile initiative - but I do not favour allocating ₳12,000,000 to create a new funding structure through CB DAO - that does not involve direct DRep approvals of such withdrawals / funding.Maybe rethink the approach. Finally, I would point out that there are many Devs and Dev teams that are active as DReps and I am sure that their endorsement for all and any projects supporting the application-layer growth of the Cardano ecosystem - would be widely heard by the entire DRep group.
There is opportunity to apply directly to the Treasury by such projects or a group of projects - for specific needs. I prefer that to a delegation of such decisions by DReps to one or multiple member-based DAOs.
- Yes 6.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.3M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 5.3M ₳ Rationale
STORM Partners is abstaining on this proposal. We respect and appreciate the Builders DAO team, and we acknowledge the many members behind the initiative which have delivered real value to the ecosystem. However, our approach is to abstain on proposals that may have strong community backing but don’t yet present clear strategic value or sufficient delivery confidence for us. In this case, concerns remain around the lack of detailed budget breakdowns, internal-only governance structures, and an unproven execution model at this scale. We acknowledge the potential, but we prefer to abstain on this one.
- Yes 4.8M ₳ Rationale
Supporting killer apps in the ecosystem is crucial.
Supporting killer apps in the ecosystem is crucial.
- Yes 4.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.5M ₳ No rationale
- No 4.4M ₳ No rationale
- No 4.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 3.8M ₳ Rationale
First, I believe this proposal began with positive and meritocratic intentions. However, as someone trained in investigating fraud, I am skeptical of how this will evolve over time—particularly the risk of it devolving into an “old boys’ club” siphoning public funds for the benefit of insiders. Unfortunately, that is the historical pattern in similar systems outside of blockchain.
That said, this concern is tempered by a fundamental question: how do we expect teams building critical infrastructure for what should ultimately become a public utility to survive today? Especially in a context where the market is immature, the funding environment unstable, and governance still finding its footing.
I’ve decided to vote in favor of this proposal in order to give it a chance to fulfill its stated goals. It is a bet on the economic viability of building on Cardano—while the broader ecosystem works toward long-term sustainability through real adoption and meaningful fee revenue. In that light, I view this as a form of public funding for development-stage research and tooling.
At the same time, I remain skeptical. I will be looking for measurable success and demonstrable value before supporting future budget requests. I do not believe indefinite draws from the treasury are viable. If this becomes a long-term subsidy model, it will erode the very ecosystem it’s trying to build. I would far prefer a market-based mechanism: teams should raise capital in exchange for future expected returns, as is done in venture funding.
For me, this proposal would be considered successful if this budget serves as a short-term bridge—one that is gradually phased out within 1–2 years. Over that time, I would like to see it evolve into a publicly seeded investment vehicle: one that funds builders with an expectation of returns, not a welfare model of indefinite grants.
- Yes 3.7M ₳ Rationale
The Builder DAO initiative is a promising endeavor to unite our ecosystem's brightest minds and streamline bureaucracy in the Voltaire era. The team's thoughtful response to Cardano Yoda's insightful and constructive criticism has convinced me of their dedication and aligned incentives, earning my support.
- Yes 3.7M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 3.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.8M ₳ Rationale
I initially voted no for this proposal during the Ekklesia voting process as I felt other proposals were more deserving of budget allocation.
Since not all of my selected proposals made it into the treasury withdrawal process, I have extra room in my personal NCL.
After further research and listening to the CBDAO Megaspace, I am convinced that this service will be a worthwhile contribution to the Cardano 2025 Budget:
https://x.com/atrium_lab/status/1950586973623599283
I have changed my vote to YES for this proposal, and it fits within my personal NCL of 250,000,000 ADA.
- No 2.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.7M ₳ Rationale
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already undergone extensive scrutiny and received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision and the work these prospective developers have put in by voting yes on all the proposals from the Intersect Budget team.
- No 2.6M ₳ Rationale
У нас уже есть Catalyst. У нас уже есть Withdrwal proposials. Я не думаю, что экосистеме нужен еще дополнительный "фонд" с непрозрачными правилами управления и распределения средств.
- Yes 2.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.5M ₳ No rationale
- No 2.5M ₳ Rationale
We have too many middle men on trying to support builders. We have dreps ready to vote at all times, I see no reason to prop up another DAO. Go to catalyst as well. This is just not needed for minimum viable governance.
- Yes 2.5M ₳ Rationale
TVLや実取引の増加に貢献する稼働中のdAppsに対し、スマートコントラクトベースで資金支援するDAOモデルは、アプリ層の定常的な成長に資する合理的な仕組みです。ガバナンス設計と財務運用が適切に機能し、既存の初期開発支援と補完関係にあることを確認のうえ、賛成します。
This proposal establishes a DAO-driven funding mechanism targeting active dApps contributing to Cardano’s adoption and TVL. It fills a critical gap between protocol development and sustained application-layer growth. Given its smart contract-based governance and complementarity to existing funding mechanisms, I vote in favor.
- Yes 2.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.8M ₳ Rationale
Voting Yes. This proposal establishes a DAO-based funding mechanism for live Cardano projects driving on-chain activity. It supports sustainable ecosystem growth by helping projects scale.
- No 1.8M ₳ Rationale
I am voting No. While the idea of a Builder DAO has merit in supporting long-term innovation, this proposal lacks the foundational elements necessary for responsible Treasury funding—there is no clear governance structure, member selection process, or sustainable funding model. It does not explain how builders will be evaluated or how this initiative would complement rather than duplicate Catalyst and other funding pathways. The top-down approach and lack of community-led decision-making raise concerns about decentralization and transparency. Given the extremely high budget request and absence of concrete operational detail, I cannot support this initiative.
- Abstain 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.7M ₳ No rationale