Withdraw ₳3,126,000 for Ecosystem Exchange Listing and Market Making service...
209 DReps voted · 60 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No 1.8M ₳ Rationale
Voting No. This proposal lacks clear and transparent criteria for how tokens are selected and how funds are managed. Without community input or oversight, the process risks arbitrary decisions that may not benefit the broader ecosystem. More accountability and a well-defined strategy are needed before allocating significant treasury resources.
- No 1.8M ₳ Rationale
I am voting no. While improving liquidity and accessibility is important, exchange listings should occur organically based on genuine market demand—not be driven by large Treasury subsidies. The requested amount is excessively high, and the proposal lacks clear, measurable outcomes to justify the cost.
- No 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 1.6M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.6M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.5M ₳ Rationale
While I am supportive in principle of securing top-tier exchange listings for Cardano Native Tokens (CNTs) and improving ecosystem liquidity, I do not believe that this specific proposal demonstrates a proportional return on the significant amount of ADA being requested.
The projected outcomes — potentially only one to three listings, dependent on exchange fee negotiations — are limited in scope compared to the ₳3.12M requested. Without clear criteria for token selection, measurable adoption targets, or a robust framework for assessing long-term market impact, it is difficult to ensure this expenditure will yield sustained benefits for the Cardano ecosystem.
I would prefer to see a smaller-scale, pilot initiative brought forward first. Such a proposal could focus on one or two listings with comprehensive reporting on cost, liquidity impact, trading volume changes, and ecosystem adoption metrics. This would allow the community to evaluate the true effectiveness of funded listings and market making before committing larger treasury amounts.
For these reasons, while I support the underlying objective, I cannot support this request in its current form.
VOTE0018
- No 1.5M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.4M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.4M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.2M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.2M ₳ Rationale
I decided to vote ✅ YES on 37 treasury withdrawals, ➖ ABSTAIN on none, and ❌ NO on 2 treasury withdrawals from the Intersect 2025 budget.
It’s obvious I consider all proposals I approved in the budget vote on Ekklesia beneficial for Cardano, so those all receive a ✅ YES vote.
I also vote ✅ YES for most proposals I initially abstained from or voted against in the Ekklesia vote. There are a few reasons for this:
- Some proposals gained strong community support after all, so I don’t want to be the one standing in the way, especially when the requested amount is negligible in the bigger picture.
- Some proposals I actually liked, but I found them more suitable for Catalyst. However, with all the delays, it now makes more sense to fund them as soon as possible.
- Some didn’t get my initial support because I thought the requested amount was too high. But I now believe it’s better for the ecosystem to fund them, despite the larger budget, than not fund them at all.
- I needed to vote for budget proposals with my own NCL in mind. Not all those I approved made it, however, so that leaves some room for other ones.
I won’t approve the treasury withdrawal for two proposals:
❌ Withdraw ₳3,000,000 for High-yield RWA Asset for Cardano: Tokenized Real Estate
This proposal won’t bring much value to our ecosystem, imho.❌ Withdraw ₳1,500,000 for Complement Catalyst: Extended Quadratic Funding---Zero Operational Costs
While the proposal includes some interesting ideas for a fairer voting mechanism, I now support Catalyst and don’t see the need for an additional funding system at this moment, especially considering total spending. The requested amount also seems too small to meaningfully fund multiple projects. While the model relies on donations, it’s unclear what the donor incentive is. Since voting power is tied to donation size, why wouldn’t donors just support specific fundraisers run directly by the projects they care about? That way, they can ensure their contribution goes straight to their preferred initiative without needing it to win a vote first.
I do appreciate the idea of a hybrid funding model where the treasury covers part of a project, but ideally, the remaining portion should come from investors rather than donations, imho.
Lastly, I don’t appreciate that the proposal’s title refers to Catalyst, even though it has no relationship to it. This seems intended to mislead people into thinking Catalyst would benefit from this proposal, which it doesn’t...I acknowledge there’s a metadata issue in the proposal “Withdraw ₳45,217 for MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Cardano.nix”, but I approved it nonetheless, as the problem is minor and not worth obstructing the process.
- Abstain 1.1M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.1M ₳ No rationale
- No 1M ₳ Rationale
If we want our tokens to be taken seriously outside of our bubble, liquidity and visibility are key. The diagnosis of the proposal is right: lack of exchange presence and low liquidity are the bottlenecks to growth of the ecosystem.
Does it scale? No, this is a one-off solution that won't help the next CNT unless we do the same exercise (and pay for it) over and over.
Is it sustainable? No, once the treasury funding is gone so is market making and the incentive for exchanges to keep us on their exchange.
Does it build Cardano's main strengths? No, it will reinforce our dependence on centralized venues and market makers instead of building native liquidity infrastructure.
This proposal is an attempt to brute-force Cardano into the top tier exchanges with expensive deal-making and "market making as a service". I agree that visibility and liquidity are problems but it is a short-sighted solution that will cost millions for little and temporary gain while making us more dependent on centralized intermediaries.
- Yes 1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 947.9K ₳ No rationale
- No 929.9K ₳ No rationale
- No 922.9K ₳ No rationale
- No 860.4K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 819K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 810K ₳ No rationale
- No 793K ₳ Rationale
Token selection criteria, prioritization, and ROI unclear.
- Yes 785.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 765.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 733.1K ₳ No rationale
- No 718.3K ₳ Rationale
It is my experience that each project needs to grow to the point the listings make sense due to strickt volume requirements and delisting penalties in failure to do so.
Spending money on this activity does not guarantee long term sustainability.
- No 717.1K ₳ Rationale
I prioritized funding open-source tools and proposals that I believe will most effectively support Cardano’s long-term growth. I voted in favor of the highest-priority items that fit within my preferred budget cap of 250 million ADA, abstained from proposals where I may have had a personal interest, and voted NO on all remaining proposals after reaching that budget limit.
- Yes 716.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 670.2K ₳ Rationale
I vote YES because securing CNT listings on tier-1 exchanges and enabling professional market making directly address two of the biggest barriers to adoption: liquidity and visibility. Without this, Cardano tokens remain disadvantaged compared to ecosystems with deeper exchange integration. The governance structure ensures transparency: funds go directly to exchanges and MMAAS providers, not intermediaries, with oversight from Intersect and independent entities. While expensive and not without risk, the strategic upside of enabling CNTs to compete globally justifies this investment.
- No 654.5K ₳ No rationale
- No 624.8K ₳ Rationale
This proposal raises concerns about the appropriate use of treasury funds for market-making services and exchange listings that primarily benefit selected private commercial projects rather than the broader Cardano ecosystem. The fundamental issue lies in using public treasury resources to subsidize centralized exchange listings and market-making services that represent private commercial risks rather than public infrastructure investments. It has been demonstrated that Cardano native tokens can achieve tier-one exchange listings through strategic project execution, as evidenced by SNEK's successful Kraken listing without treasury intervention. This precedent suggests that viable projects with strong fundamentals can secure exchange partnerships through merit-based approaches rather than requiring subsidization from community funds. The allocation structure lacks transparency and community governance in token selection processes, creating a system where treasury funds support a limited number of predetermined projects without clear participation pathways for the broader developer community. This approach risks creating market distortions by selecting winners and losers rather than supporting infrastructure that benefits all ecosystem participants equally. The proposed budget allocation of up to one and a half million dollars for exchange listing fees represents substantial treasury expenditure with unclear return on investment or measurable ecosystem growth targets. Without specific key performance indicators, success measurements, or repayment mechanisms, these expenditures constitute grants to private commercial enterprises rather than strategic infrastructure investments. Treasury funds should prioritize reinforcing decentralized infrastructure, on-chain liquidity solutions, and reusable development tools that create lasting value for the entire ecosystem rather than subsidizing centralized services that primarily benefit individual token projects. Supporting market-making services for selected tokens does not materially contribute to protocol sustainability or broader network effects. The proposal lacks accountability mechanisms including treasury repayment plans, performance benchmarks, or community oversight of service allocation decisions. Public funds should not underwrite private commercial risks without corresponding public benefits and accountability structures that ensure responsible stewardship of community resources. A more appropriate approach would involve treasury loans with repayment expectations rather than outright grants, enabling support for promising projects while protecting community resources and establishing precedents for responsible treasury utilization. Supporting this proposal would set concerning precedents for treasury fund allocation that prioritizes private commercial interests over public infrastructure development and ecosystem-wide benefits.
- Yes 589.2K ₳ No rationale
- No 587.1K ₳ Rationale
I vote NO on this proposal. Treasury funds should not be used for covering exchange listing fees, as that effectively sets a dangerous precedent—it’s akin to paying for legitimacy rather than earning it through merit and product viability. If projects need to outbid one another with millions of ADA for exchange visibility, it signals deeper systemic issues that funding alone cannot resolve.
Furthermore, this proposal lacks the essential components of responsible fiscal governance: there's no repayment plan, no clearly defined KPIs, and no historical performance analysis that would justify the investment. As Charles Hoskinson rightly affirmed, the treasury should not be tapping into such funds for listing fees. Without structural accountability and transparent ROI metrics, this proposal does not meet the standards of stewardship expected for the Cardano Treasury.
- Yes 534.3K ₳ No rationale
- No 521.2K ₳ Rationale
I voted no, consistent with my prior positions in the 2025 Cardano Budget Reconciliation.
- No 502K ₳ Rationale
Paying exchanges for listings is essentially legitimizing a protection racket. Good projects get listed on merit and user demand. If Cardano native tokens need million-dollar bribes to get exchange attention, we have bigger problems than funding can solve.
This sets a terrible precedent and basically announces to every exchange that we're willing to pay ransom for legitimacy. - Yes 466.2K ₳ No rationale
- No 445.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 443.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 438.7K ₳ No rationale
- No 385.6K ₳ Rationale
As a Cardano DRep, I vote NO on this proposal. Allocating 3,126,000 ADA, including 126,000 ADA for market-making services for specific tokens (SNEK, IAG, MIN, HOSKY, USDM, USDA, iUSD, DJED, KINKA), is an improper use of treasury funds. Centralized exchanges, profiting from token listings, will list Cardano Native Tokens based on market demand without subsidies. There’s no guarantee against delisting, making the expenditure risky. The selective inclusion of tokens raises concerns about fairness and potential market manipulation. Treasury funds should support decentralized ecosystem growth, not subsidize private entities for listings that should occur organically based on market conditions.
- Yes 382.6K ₳ No rationale
- No 377.3K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 371.8K ₳ No rationale