Withdraw ₳45,217 for MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Cardano.nix
214 DReps voted · 53 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 10.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 8.8M ₳ Rationale
「275M ADA Administered by Intersect」に含まれるすべての個別提案に対して、エクレシア投票の段階では必ずしもすべてに賛成していたわけではありませんが、最終的には本ガバナンスアクションに賛成票を投じました。Cardanoエコシステム全体への貢献を高く評価し、その前進を後押しする立場から、今回提出された39件すべての提案に賛成票を投じる判断をいたしました。\n\nWhile I did not necessarily support every individual proposal included in "275M ADA Administered by Intersect" during the Ekklesia vote, I ultimately voted Yes on this governance action. Recognizing its overall contribution to the Cardano ecosystem and in support of continued progress, I cast a Yes vote on all 39 proposals submitted under this initiative.
- Yes 8.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 7.8M ₳ No rationale
- No 7.3M ₳ No rationale
- No 7.1M ₳ Rationale
I read the MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Cardano.nix and it did not convince me that the direct funding from the Treasury is necessary at this moment nor that Catalyst Fund 14 would not be a better avenue. If approved, Catalyst Fund 14 should launch with ₳20 M budget. I judge that Cardano.nix can tolerate that delay, while admitting that the funds would be disbursed only later this year - if the proposal is funded by Catalyst.
Catalyst aside, I have assessed the importance of this proposal through my individual understanding of the current environment and the text of the proposal. This is a personal assessment and it might be wrong. However, I will try to explain my reasoning.
Note: some other similar open source maintenance and enhancement proposals might differ in their perceived importance - and in those cases I may make exceptions in the first year of on-chain governance. I am still developing my personal approach.
For this proposal, I was not convinced I should set it as an exception. I am more in favor of seeing proposals like this funded through an initiative such as the OSC Budget Proposal - Paid Open Source Model for Sustainable Development. It doesn't have to be the OSC, it could be another umbrella group of open source advocates / body that will prioritize and correctly value certain critical packages of maintenance and enhancement work on open source tools that are important for the Cardano ecosystem.
This group or groups would ideally rank the importance / relevance of these open-source tools and software kits, as well as realistically estimate how much maintenance / enhancement is needed and when it is critical.
Multiple tiny contracts (this is a relatively tiny ask) approved by the treasury complicate oversight, whereas larger open-source infrastructure umbrella programs can rank repos by impact and rotate funding annually. The more exceptions the Treasury grants, the harder it becomes to enforce future budget discipline.
I imagine the maintenance and improvement of open source tools as something that could be tentatively grouped. Of course, these larger maintenance and enhancement support groups (like the OSC) for open source tooling could start discriminating against certain tools. In those cases, if a proposer such as MLabs is unsatisfied with the ranking or grouping, they could always directly apply to the Treasury with a rationale why the proposal needs funding and why it cannot obtain it elsewhere - but only directly from the Treasury.
So some granularity at the open source program‑level (with an annual ranking) might be interesting, so individual repos needn’t come to governance each time. We might not need on-chain governance to micromanage every repo.
So, in this case I maintain my original intention to vote YES for the OSC Budget Proposal - Paid Open Source Model for Sustainable Development when it comes to a vote - and I maintain my original intention to vote NO for the "Withdraw ₳45,217 for MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Cardano.nix".
Yes, I want granularity in decision-making, but some kind of over-arching approach to funding maintenance and enhancment of open-source infrastructure tools might be needed. There may be exceptions to this approach - if I encounter some proposals that I deem to be more urgent in Year 1. Note: as a DRep, I am still developing my approach to this issue - and some of my votes might be in conflict as time passes. This is part of "learning on the job".If I am at a lower level of certainty whether a direct withdrawal from the treasury is necessary right now, I will tend to vote No as this is being financed by the Cardano Treasury. My objection is about process efficiency for this type of proposals and prioritisation, not about spending less. If the OSC budget fails, I would reassess stand‑alone asks like this one based on proven urgency.
- Yes 6.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 6M ₳ Rationale
Voting YES for MLabs, which deviates from my prior voting decisions made from a prior offchain vote for Ekklesia. I'm in favor of the MLab suite of proposals.
https://2025budget.intersectmbo.org/voters/drep1yfdfs28uwafjgmrkatdektlzrvha2cmvqjhuz700e04mawq23rmrgReady to move forward overall with the budgeting process and look forward to a smoother process next year. I voted for a lower NCL overall (200M), however found in supporting things that we really ought to have funded to keep momentum in development and enhancements on-chain (supporting both open and non-open-sourced projects) I came a bit higher than that (250M+).
We will need to strike a balance in treasury withdrawels for projects that push development forward (and therefore the chains efficiency, performance, resiliancy, and security) -- and businsess that wish to participate, of any size, and extend the capabilities and real-world use cases of Cardano.
My votes, I hope, align with my overall goal as a DRep to see continuous improvement in the ecosystem. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Tarrant64/mr_cata_gov/refs/heads/main/mr_cata_gov%20.txt
- Yes 5.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.3M ₳ Rationale
While the budget lacks granularity and milestone details are not public, the request is modest and comes from a deeply committed team with a solid delivery track record. Cardano.nix is an essential tool for reproducible infrastructure deployment, and its ongoing maintenance serves a broad range of ecosystem actors. We support this as a show of trust in MLabs and to ensure continuity of key infra work. That said, we encourage future proposals to bundle under the OSC or Catalyst to streamline oversight, or have a more detailed breakdown of budget allocations.
- Yes 4.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.2M ₳ Rationale
I'm voting yes for this, a no brainer for the amount of ADA asked.
- Yes 4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 3.8M ₳ Rationale
Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals
The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.
⸻
Cardano: State of Play
The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.
The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.
Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.
However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.
⸻
Fiscal Philosophy
I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.
Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.
⸻
Approach to the Budget Process
This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.
Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.
I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.
However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.
⸻
Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source
Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.
Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.
⸻
Additional Beliefs and Disclosures
I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.
I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.
- Yes 3.7M ₳ Rationale
MLabs is an exceptional team that actively supports and contributes to Cardano's core infrastructure. I will support all their proposals.
- Yes 3.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 3.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.8M ₳ Rationale
I am following through with my YES vote from the Cardano Budget 2025 Ekklesia process. This proposal falls within my personal NCL of 250,000,000 ADA.
- Yes 2.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.7M ₳ Rationale
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision.
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already undergone extensive scrutiny and received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision and the work these prospective developers have put in by voting yes on all the proposals from the Intersect Budget team.
- Abstain 2.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.5M ₳ Rationale
YES BUILD IT ALREADY MY GOD LETS GO FASTER
- Yes 2.5M ₳ Rationale
提案種別：Treasury Withdrawal
私はこの提案に賛成（Yes）します。
本提案は、Cardanoノードの構築・運用に欠かせないツール「Cardano.nix」の保守・改善に対して、Cardanoトレジャリー（公共資金）から₳45,217を引き出すことを求めるTreasury Withdrawal提案です。
Cardano.nixは、SPOやDaedalusウォレット、IOG開発チームを含む多数のプロジェクトで活用されており、インフラの再現性や安定性を高める基盤的ツールです。その開発元であるMLabsは、実績ある技術チームであり、本提案では1年間の継続的なメンテナンスと拡張を予定しています。
資金の管理と執行はIntersectが担い、Sundae Labs製スマートコントラクト＋外部監査体制（5団体）によって、トレジャリー資金の適正な執行が保証されています。
このような基盤ツールの安定運用を公共資金（トレジャリー）で支えることは、エコシステム全体への恩恵が大きく、非常に高い投資効果をもたらします。私はDRepとして、本提案を強く支持します。
Proposal Type: Treasury Withdrawal
I vote Yes on this proposal.
This proposal requests ₳45,217 from the Cardano Treasury to fund one year of maintenance and enhancement for Cardano.nix, a foundational tool for building and deploying Cardano nodes using the Nix framework.
Cardano.nix is critical infrastructure used by SPOs, the Daedalus wallet team, and many ecosystem participants to ensure reproducibility and configuration consistency across Cardano systems. MLabs, a proven and trusted development team, will provide the services.
Treasury funds will be managed by Intersect through smart contracts developed by Sundae Labs and safeguarded by a 5-entity external oversight committee. This ensures transparent and verifiable fund execution.
Supporting such essential public infrastructure through Treasury funding benefits the broader ecosystem and delivers high return on investment. As a DRep, I strongly support this proposal. - Yes 2.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.8M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.8M ₳ Rationale
I am voting No on the proposal to withdraw ₳45,217 from the Treasury for MLabs’ maintenance and enhancement of Cardano.nix. While I recognize the importance of infrastructure tooling like Cardano.nix, this proposal lacks the strategic urgency or ecosystem-wide justification to merit direct Treasury funding. The requested work—focused on maintenance, enhancements, and documentation—is valuable but better suited for Project Catalyst, where iterative tooling improvements can be more directly aligned with developer needs and community feedback. Treasury funds should be reserved for initiatives with broad, long-term protocol impact and clear governance alignment. This proposal, while well-intentioned, does not meet that threshold at this time.
- Yes 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.6M ₳ No rationale
- No 1.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.5M ₳ Rationale
It is necessary for maintaining critical Nix-based infrastructure, ensuring node compatibility and reliability with future developments