Withdraw ₳5,885,000 for OSC Budget Proposal - Paid Open Source Model...

System 11mo ago1post

175 DReps voted · 50 with a rationale

Open a row to read the rationale.

  • Yes 8.1M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 7.8M ₳ No rationale
  • No 7.3M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 7.1M ₳ Rationale

    I will keep the rationale brief for expediency - as 38 proposals were submitted concurrently by Intersect today. I voted YES for this proposal in the previous Ekklesia temp check and will vote YES now again.
    This might be a good approach to finding a way to fund long-term sustainability of open-source development in the Cardano ecosystem. Pretty important and gets my support. I hope it yields to positive results and avoids any gridlock during implementation, while setting a positive example how to support common infrastructure that is significant for all of us.

  • No 6.2M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 6M ₳ Rationale

    Voting decision was made to be consistent with my reconciliation back in May 2025;
    https://2025budget.intersectmbo.org/voters/drep1yfdfs28uwafjgmrkatdektlzrvha2cmvqjhuz700e04mawq23rmrg

    Ready to move forward overall with the budgeting process and look forward to a smoother process next year. I voted for a lower NCL overall (200M), however found in supporting things that we really ought to have funded to keep momentum in development and enhancements on-chain (supporting both open and non-open-sourced projects) I came a bit higher than that (250M+).

    We will need to strike a balance in treasury withdrawels for projects that push development forward (and therefore the chains efficiency, performance, resiliancy, and seucrity) -- and businsess that wish to participate, of any size, and extend the capabilities and real-world use cases of Cardano.

    My votes, I hope, align with my overall goal as a DRep to see continuous improvement in the ecosystem. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Tarrant64/mr_cata_gov/refs/heads/main/mr_cata_gov%20.txt

  • Yes 5.5M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 5.3M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 5.3M ₳ Rationale

    This proposal directly addresses a systemic weakness in Cardano’s development lifecycle: the lack of structured, recurring support for open-source infrastructure. By operationalizing a Paid Open Source Model, it creates a scalable path to retain talent and maintain core tools. While the budget is significant, the strategic value and the end goal - supporting Cardano’s open-source path - justify the price.

  • Yes 4.8M ₳ Rationale

    Do support open source dev tool growth acceleration through treasury funding.

    Do support open source dev tool growth acceleration through treasury funding.

  • Yes 4.8M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 4.6M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 4.6M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 4.4M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 4.2M ₳ No rationale
  • No 4.2M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 4M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 3.8M ₳ Rationale

    Funding withdrawal of previously ratified project.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

    The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

    Cardano: State of Play

    The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

    The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

    Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

    However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

    Fiscal Philosophy

    I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

    Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

    Approach to the Budget Process

    This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

    Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

    I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

    However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

    Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

    Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

    Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

    Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

    I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

    I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

  • Yes 3.7M ₳ Rationale

    The proposed amount is substantial, and I would not support such a withdrawal without clearly defined outcomes. However, as Intersect is the vendor, we must place trust in them for now and evaluate their performance later.

  • Yes 3.7M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 3.5M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 3M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 2.8M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 2.7M ₳ Rationale

    A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.

    Each of these proposals has already received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision.

    A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.

    Each of these proposals has already undergone extensive scrutiny and received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision and the work these prospective developers have put in by voting yes on all the proposals from the Intersect Budget team.

  • Abstain 2.6M ₳ Rationale

    I strongly support initiatives like this, but unfortunately, I’m also a developer and maintainer of open-source projects in the Cardano ecosystem. That makes me a potential beneficiary — which presents a clear conflict of interest. Therefore, I abstain.

  • Yes 2.5M ₳ No rationale
  • No 2.5M ₳ Rationale

    If someone has an idea take it to a treasury withdrawal or catalyst. This is another abstraction that is not needed for minimum viable governance.

  • Yes 2.5M ₳ Rationale

    Cardanoの中核OSSリポジトリ維持とセキュリティ向上を目的とした、有償型の持続可能モデル導入は重要なステップです。メンテナンス報酬、バグバウンティ、貢献者育成の各要素がバランス良く設計されており、委員会ベースの運営体制も明確なため、賛成します。


    Ensuring the sustainability of Cardano’s open-source infrastructure through a structured, paid model is essential. This proposal introduces well-balanced initiatives—maintainer compensation, bug bounties, and contributor engagement—under a clear committee-led framework. I vote in favor.

  • Yes 2.5M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 2.4M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 2.1M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 2.1M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 2.1M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 1.9M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 1.9M ₳ No rationale
  • No 1.8M ₳ Rationale

    I am voting No. While supporting open-source contributors is a worthy goal, this proposal lacks a focused and transparent strategy for long-term sustainability. It does not clearly define how funding decisions will be made, how work will be prioritized, or how outcomes will align with Cardano’s evolving needs. The vague structure risks dispersing funds without measurable impact or accountability, and the centralization of funding authority in a small committee undermines principles of decentralization and community governance. At ₳5.88 million, this is one of the largest single requests to date, yet it offers minimal detail on oversight or deliverables. I cannot support such a high-cost proposal without a rigorous, transparent framework that ensures responsible use of Treasury resources.

  • Abstain 1.7M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 1.7M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 1.7M ₳ No rationale
  • Abstain 1.5M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 1.4M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 1.4M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 1.2M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 1.2M ₳ Rationale

    I decided to vote ✅ YES on 37 treasury withdrawals, ➖ ABSTAIN on none, and ❌ NO on 2 treasury withdrawals from the Intersect 2025 budget.

    It’s obvious I consider all proposals I approved in the budget vote on Ekklesia beneficial for Cardano, so those all receive a ✅ YES vote.

    I also vote ✅ YES for most proposals I initially abstained from or voted against in the Ekklesia vote. There are a few reasons for this:

    • Some proposals gained strong community support after all, so I don’t want to be the one standing in the way, especially when the requested amount is negligible in the bigger picture.
    • Some proposals I actually liked, but I found them more suitable for Catalyst. However, with all the delays, it now makes more sense to fund them as soon as possible.
    • Some didn’t get my initial support because I thought the requested amount was too high. But I now believe it’s better for the ecosystem to fund them, despite the larger budget, than not fund them at all.
    • I needed to vote for budget proposals with my own NCL in mind. Not all those I approved made it, however, so that leaves some room for other ones.

    I won’t approve the treasury withdrawal for two proposals:

    ❌ Withdraw ₳3,000,000 for High-yield RWA Asset for Cardano: Tokenized Real Estate
    This proposal won’t bring much value to our ecosystem, imho.

    ❌ Withdraw ₳1,500,000 for Complement Catalyst: Extended Quadratic Funding---Zero Operational Costs
    While the proposal includes some interesting ideas for a fairer voting mechanism, I now support Catalyst and don’t see the need for an additional funding system at this moment, especially considering total spending. The requested amount also seems too small to meaningfully fund multiple projects. While the model relies on donations, it’s unclear what the donor incentive is. Since voting power is tied to donation size, why wouldn’t donors just support specific fundraisers run directly by the projects they care about? That way, they can ensure their contribution goes straight to their preferred initiative without needing it to win a vote first.
    I do appreciate the idea of a hybrid funding model where the treasury covers part of a project, but ideally, the remaining portion should come from investors rather than donations, imho.
    Lastly, I don’t appreciate that the proposal’s title refers to Catalyst, even though it has no relationship to it. This seems intended to mislead people into thinking Catalyst would benefit from this proposal, which it doesn’t...

    I acknowledge there’s a metadata issue in the proposal “Withdraw ₳45,217 for MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Cardano.nix”, but I approved it nonetheless, as the problem is minor and not worth obstructing the process.

  • Yes 1.1M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 1.1M ₳ No rationale
  • No 1M ₳ Rationale

    The proposal’s goal to sustainably fund open-source development is crucial and aligned with Cardano’s needs. However, the requested ₳5,885,000 is too large for a single withdrawal without clear, phased milestones, rigorous KPIs, and stronger transparency. Governance control remains too concentrated, risking accountability gaps. Coordination with existing Cardano entities is unclear, risking duplication. I vote NO—we must insist on a more disciplined, incremental funding model with robust oversight to protect the treasury and ensure long-term ecosystem resilience.

  • Yes 1M ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 947.9K ₳ No rationale
  • Yes 922.9K ₳ No rationale