Withdraw ₳592,780 for Beyond Minimum Viable Governance: Iteratively Improvin....
211 DReps voted · 60 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 16.7M ₳ Rationale
Long-Term Sustainability
This proposal aims to enhance the usability and accessibility of Cardano’s on-chain governance tooling, a necessary step for ensuring that Voltaire succeeds beyond its technical minimum. It supports long-term sustainability by addressing human factors that influence system adoption and effectiveness.Builder and Ecosystem Growth
The proposal targets onboarding flows, UX audits, documentation, and interface components—resources that benefit wallet teams, DReps, and future governance tools. If well executed, these deliverables can lower the barrier to contribution and drive better user participation in governance processes.Decentralization and Community Engagement
Improved UX and educational content are directly aligned with decentralization goals, as they help more ADA holders participate in governance with confidence. That said, the proposal’s focus on design and education rather than protocol-level infrastructure limits its decentralization impact to soft layers of engagement.Responsible Treasury Spending
₳592,780 is a substantial amount for a proposal centered on UX improvements, documentation, and non-technical deliverables. The proposal lacks a detailed cost breakdown for specific outputs or FTE allocations, which makes it difficult to evaluate value-for-money. We support the intent—but funding should be milestone-based, publicly trackable, and outcomes-driven. Without clear accountability, this risks overspending on deliverables that are subjective and hard to measure. - Yes 16.4M ₳ Rationale
Treasury withdrawals
Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs ResearchAbstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations. - Yes 14.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 14.1M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 13.3M ₳ Rationale
RCADA has chosen to** abstain at this time while reserving the option to review and update this vote prior to the voting deadline**. This approach allows RCADA to allocate focus where immediate evaluation is most impactful, particularly on proposals that are close to threshold or raise significant procedural or constitutional concerns. If this proposal reaches the approv-al threshold prior to our review, the abstention will stand as a neutral signal of deferral, not op-position. Should further analysis be warranted, RCADA will update this vote accordingly.
- Yes 12.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 12.2M ₳ Rationale
Disclaimer: This is a general rationale we have prepared to support our “yes” vote on all the 39 treasury withdrawal actions. This follows careful review and consideration of the metadata of these treasury withdrawal proposals and hence is not a blanket voting practice.
We, the Wada DRep Committee, have decided to upvote on all 39 Treasury Withdrawal governance actions currently live on-chain and submitted under the administration of IntersectMBO. These actions are the necessary implementation step following the community's approval of the ₳275.3 million Cardano Ecosystem Budget, the necessary budget info action that precedes the treasury withdrawal process. Our support reflects not only continuity with our earlier "yes" votes on the overarching budget info action and its constituent proposals but also our confidence in the smart contract guide and project execution mechanisms Intersect has established as an administrative body for these proposals.
Each of these 39 withdrawals corresponds directly to proposals that have already passed a respective Budget Info Action with wide community and DRep support of 64.23%. As Wada DRep, we reviewed, scored, and supported many of these initiatives during the budgeting phase, using our internal ₳280M Net Change Limit framework. Our endorsement of the full ₳275.3M package was not a blanket approval but the outcome of detailed deliberation. Therefore, we see it as our responsibility to honor those community-approved funding decisions by affirming these follow-up Treasury withdrawal governance actions.
Importantly, we are confident in Intersect’s role as the administrator of these treasury disbursements. We have independently reviewed the Smart Contract Guide, disbursement architecture, and accountability structures associated with these withdrawals. The use of milestone-gated smart contracts, multi-signature treasuries, and on-chain/off-chain tracking mechanisms provides strong assurance of transparency, risk management, and community accountability. We are particularly satisfied that Intersect has adopted security-audited contract templates and provides public documentation on how treasury funds will be administered, paused if necessary, and even returned if unused.
In our view, rejecting or abstaining from these Treasury Withdrawals at this stage would risk destabilizing delivery timelines, undermining community trust, and introducing administrative conflicts that may violate the spirit of the Constitution’s Articles on budgeting. We believe that treasury funding is not just about allocation; it’s about consistent and credible execution. As such, the DRep role requires continuity and follow-through, especially when prior voting outcomes have clearly mandated action.
Therefore, in alignment with our constitutional responsibilities, community-aligned decision-making, and our assessment of Intersect’s administrative protocols, we have decided to upvote on all 39 Treasury Withdrawals Governance Actions.
- No 11.3M ₳ Rationale
While important intent, I am not compelled by the impact-value ratio communicated in this proposal. I think it needs more information/quantification of the amount of people reached and the tangible impact of educational/onboarding/development efforts.
- Yes 11M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 10.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 8.8M ₳ Rationale
「275M ADA Administered by Intersect」に含まれるすべての個別提案に対して、エクレシア投票の段階では必ずしもすべてに賛成していたわけではありませんが、最終的には本ガバナンスアクションに賛成票を投じました。Cardanoエコシステム全体への貢献を高く評価し、その前進を後押しする立場から、今回提出された39件すべての提案に賛成票を投じる判断をいたしました。\n\nWhile I did not necessarily support every individual proposal included in "275M ADA Administered by Intersect" during the Ekklesia vote, I ultimately voted Yes on this governance action. Recognizing its overall contribution to the Cardano ecosystem and in support of continued progress, I cast a Yes vote on all 39 proposals submitted under this initiative.
- Yes 8.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 7.8M ₳ No rationale
- No 7.3M ₳ No rationale
- No 7.1M ₳ Rationale
I voted NO to the Beyond Minimum Viable Governance: Iteratively Improving on Cardano Voltaire proposal on Ekklesia. I repeat my NO vote here.
I generally am in favor of initiatives that aim to improve Cardano's governance system. So, my default position coming to a proposal like this is to be interested in it such proposals. I am a DRep so obviously, I would be partial to it.
The proposed outcome here is a 'State of Governance' report that will be produced by engaging the Cardano community through various channels.
I think that a proposal of this type - because it is being proposed by one of the founding entities - runs a risk of being less objective. Admittedly, I would be more worried if IOG was directly participating in governance as a DRep or a CC member.
I agree with the proposed statement that to "truly evolve beyond Minimum Viable Governance (MVG) and unlock Cardano's full potential, we must establish a robust, data-driven foundation for continuous improvement."
What I think is missing in this proposal is outside views. The proposal to me reads like to much of a Cardano-centric approach to MVG and its criticisms. I think that most of the players involved behind this proposal are too close to the process to be as neutral as outsiders can be.
Essentially, I would have liked to see more Cardano-unaffiliated governance researchers and experts involved with this proposal.
I would even start with presuppositions such as "This initiative ... ensuring Cardano remains a leader in decentralized decision-making.". I think that the Beyond Minimum Viable Governance proposal should be objective enough to determine whether Cardano's MVG is a leader and in which segments of decentralized decision-making, while also finding out where - if anywhere - it trails behind others. Starting with presuppositions that it is a leader, sort of stacks the decks of cards towards an outcome that will mean we are slapping ourselves on the back.
To use IOG own example from developing Leios, IOG recently decided to part ways with Well Typed on the upcoming work on Leios. There are good arguments for changing vendors, and I think that shaking up things from time to time may be good.
In this case, after MVG has been delivered, I would have prefered to read a proposal that shakes things up a bit. This proposal offers that the "project will be driven by a robust coalition of experienced stakeholders dedicated to the advancement of Cardano's governance. nput Output's Voltaire team will provide core leadership, leveraging their unique role as the architects of Cardano's governance framework. As the team responsible for implementing key governance mechanisms---including the Cardano Constitution, the DRep liquid democracy model, and various on-chain and off-chain tools---we possess strong insight into their performance and optimization potential.".
I am afraid that the team will not be able to be objective enough without strong outside experts to realistically assess any failures or shortcomings in the current governance system.
Yes, there will be other players: Constitutional Delegate Committee Members (already participated in creating/approving MVG), Partner organizations (also already involved in determining MVG) and Active community members (still no outside - indepedent - non-Cardano participation).
As I want more outside expertise and more critical thinking from outside the Cardano governance bubble, I vote NO again. However, I would vote YES for a resubmitted proposal by this team - if it were to include a much more significant non-Cardano outside governance expertise and voices. Probably, even if it was sligthly more expensive. - Yes 6.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 6M ₳ Rationale
Updated Vote YES
This proposal ultimately aligns with my needs of finding continuous improvement opportunities within Cardano as a whole. After having gone through the recent governance days workshops I would like to see this work continue. We need more actionable data to drive governance discussions and decisions going forward. This directly serves Cardano’s core principles—people, purpose, technology, research, and opportunity—while educating the community and enabling continuous improvement. Therefore, we should be making efforts to fund governance's success in what ways we can. - Yes 5.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 5.3M ₳ Rationale
This proposal directly aligns with STORM Partners’ DRep principles: it enhances ecosystem efficiency and promotes governance adoption by operationalizing post-MVG feedback loops. Given the importance of building a sustainable, self-improving governance process for the upcoming years, this is a timely and essential investment.
- Yes 4.8M ₳ Rationale
Quantitative approach to improving the governance model is sound. Supporting it.
Quantitative approach to improving the governance model is sound. Supporting it.
- Yes 4.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.6M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 4.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 4.2M ₳ Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança (gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlzyc3clg6), pois o estado de participação da comunidade ainda é muito baixo em comparação ao potencial saudável, visando diminuir o poder das baleias e descentralizar a tomada de decisão. Para isso, é necessário continuar estudando, debatendo e modificando as estruturas de governança. Além disso, a justificativa de gastos apresentada, bem como as métricas de avaliação e controle, foram bem apresentadas.
[English]
We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action (gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlzyc3clg6), because the level of community participation is still very low compared to a healthy potential, aiming to reduce the power of whales and decentralize decision-making. For this, it is necessary to continue studying, debating, and modifying governance structures. Furthermore, the expense justification presented, as well as the evaluation and control metrics, were well presented. - No 4.2M ₳ No rationale
- No 4.2M ₳ Rationale
I vote NO, not a priority of my DRep, too much capital for not enough clarity.
Strength and honor.
- No 4M ₳ No rationale
- No 3.8M ₳ Rationale
I can not approve of this for the same reasons given on initial submission which is since it is almost assured that IOG will be the primary receiptient of public funds going forward, having IOG running the processes which will design how future funds will be allocated is litteraly the definition of “regulatory capture”. The project’s intentions are good, and IOG should participate, but not lead or be the primary influence on this project.
As the proposal submitter and Voltaire Team Lead has also resigned, I see that as another reason that we are not better off with IOG being the lead for this project.
- Yes 3.7M ₳ Rationale
Our governance system undoubtedly requires continuous research and improvement, and I believe IO's Voltaire team is the ideal vendor for this task. I fully support their efforts to enhance Cardano's governance framework.
- Yes 3.7M ₳ No rationale
- No 3.5M ₳ No rationale
- No 3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.7M ₳ Rationale
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already undergone extensive scrutiny and received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision and the work these prospective developers have put in by voting yes on all the proposals from the Intersect Budget team.
- No 2.6M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.5M ₳ No rationale
- No 2.5M ₳ Rationale
We have a ton of people working on the effectiveness of governance. We have all these governance days and workshops all over the world. We are going to do this in a decentralized way whether or not this gets funded.
- Yes 2.5M ₳ Rationale
Voltaire期におけるガバナンスの健全性評価・改善提案の体系化を目指す本提案は、データに基づく意思決定とプロトコル改善の基盤づくりとして意義があります。構造化された評価レポートとアクション可能な提言の提出が含まれており、低予算で高い公益性が期待できるため賛成します。
This proposal introduces a structured framework for evaluating and improving Cardano's governance through data-driven metrics and reporting. By moving beyond Minimum Viable Governance and enabling iterative improvement, it supports long-term system integrity. Given the public value and modest cost, I vote in favor.
- Yes 2.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 1.8M ₳ Rationale
Voting Yes. This proposal builds on Cardano’s decentralised governance (a key differentiator) by establishing a structured process to measure performance, gather community input, and deliver improvements, ensuring the system evolves effectively and remains fit for purpose.