{"@context":{"CIP100":"https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0100/README.md#","hashAlgorithm":"CIP100:hashAlgorithm","body":{"@id":"CIP100:body","@context":{"comment":"CIP100:comment"}}},"hashAlgorithm":"blake2b-256","body":{"comment":"**Vote: YES**\n\nI support reducing `minPoolCost` from **170 ada to 75 ada**.\n\n---\n\n### **1. Core Incentive & Arbitrage Mechanics**\n\nThe strongest case for this change is not delegator yield — **it's incentive design**. A high fixed-fee floor rewards single-block pools disproportionately: as long as a pool produces at least one block in an epoch, it draws the full fixed fee out of that block's reward before anything is split with delegators. The fewer blocks a pool produces, the larger a share of its reward the floor consumes.\n\nA well-capitalized operator can exploit this by splitting stake across many single-block pools rather than consolidating into fewer, better-performing ones, collecting the floor repeatedly instead of once. **Lowering the floor directly weakens that arbitrage.**\n\nThis matters more for genuine decentralization than pool count itself:\n\n* Of the **1,614 active pools** referenced in this proposal, **873 sit below the delegation threshold** needed for consistent block production.\n* *Note:* The underlying incentives report doesn't break that 873 down by cause. Some share reflects fee-farming of this kind, while some reflects other factors like sticky delegation or insufficient network-wide stake to saturate more pools. While I don't have a precise split, the incentive distortion itself is real regardless of the mix.\n\n---\n\n### **2. Impact on Small, Independent Pools**\n\nI don't think **75 ada** meaningfully changes the survival odds of a small, genuinely independent pool. At current ada prices, that is roughly two days' worth of the fixed fee over a five-day epoch — well below the operating cost of a properly run node, regardless of where the floor sits.\n\nThe argument that this reduction *\"saves small pools\"* is weaker than the argument that it **removes an outsized payout specifically for single-block operation**.\n\n---\n\n### **3. Empirical Precedent (2023 Reduction)**\n\nThe 2023 precedent (**340 ada → 170 ada**) is relevant evidence here:\n\n* The feared *\"race-to-the-bottom\"* in operator pricing didn't materialize.\n* **340 ada** remained the dominant fee setting among established pools.\n\nThis history gives the current reduction an empirical basis rather than a purely theoretical one.\n\n---\n\n### **4. Key Reservation & Structural Timeline**\n\nMy one reservation: this reduction is explicitly framed as an interim step ahead of a proportional `minPoolMargin` ([CIP-0023](https://www.google.com/search?q=https://cips.cardano.org/cips/cip23/&utm_source=gemini)), which by current sequencing is still roughly two hard forks away.\n\n**I would like to see Intersect and the Technical Steering Committee (TSC) commit to a concrete timeline for that structural work**, ensuring this floor doesn't become a permanent substitute for the more complete fix it is meant to bridge toward.\n\n---\n\n### **Conclusion**\n\nI am voting **YES** on the substance of the case as submitted, with the expectation of a clear CIP-0023 timeline noted for the record.\n\n---\n\n### **DRep Delegation Info**\n\n* **CIP-1694 DRep ID:**\n```text\ndrep1y28xhrjxe496rnle8ln3slpggnp8leu3mn244ujrhwet0cc2vmte4\n\n```\n\n* **Legacy DRep ID (CIP-105):**\n```text\ndrep13e4cu3kdfwsul7fluuv8c2zycfl70ywu64d0ysamk2m7xrv7rsv\n\n```"}}