{"@context":{"CIP100":"https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0100/README.md#","hashAlgorithm":"CIP100:hashAlgorithm","body":{"@id":"CIP100:body","@context":{"comment":"CIP100:comment"}}},"hashAlgorithm":"blake2b-256","body":{"comment":"As both a DRep and a stake pool operator, we disclose our economic interest in changes to stake pool fees. Our abstention reflects uncertainty about the proposal’s net effect on independent operators, rather than our SPO role alone.\n\nWe previously abstained on the bundled minPoolCost and Plutus memory proposal and requested separate submissions. This action resolves that procedural concern.\n\nThe economic trade-off remains. A fixed minimum fee disproportionately reduces returns for delegators supporting small pools, and declining rewards make that disadvantage worse. Lowering the floor provides greater pricing flexibility and may help these pools attract delegation.\n\nHowever, improved delegator returns do not necessarily translate into sustainable operator income. Although no pool is required to lower its fee, competitive pressure may lead operators to accept less income without sufficient additional delegation to compensate. This change neither increases total rewards nor reduces infrastructure costs.\n\nWe are therefore not sufficiently confident to support or oppose this standalone reduction. We would welcome a coordinated transition toward proportional minimum-margin protection, supported by operator-income modelling and a defined review of independent-operator viability, delegation movement and concentration.\n\nOur abstention acknowledges both the cost of retaining the current disadvantage and the uncertainty surrounding the proposed remedy."}}