{"@context":{"CIP100":"https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0100/README.md#","hashAlgorithm":"CIP100:hashAlgorithm","body":{"@id":"CIP100:body","@context":{"comment":"CIP100:comment"}}},"hashAlgorithm":"blake2b-256","body":{"comment":"I am voting NO on “Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal.” The proposal aims to create an independent structure dedicated to managing open-source sustainability funds for the Cardano ecosystem, including a new public charity, two advisory councils, and a 2,000,000 ADA maintenance fund for “critical” open-source infrastructure, all coordinated under a one-year program. It frames itself as an execution-focused, governance-accountable alternative to traditional foundations and DAOs, with the administrator role initially held by the proposer and DReps able to replace the administrator or sunset the program via Info Action.\n\nWhile the motivation is understandable — Cardano does rely heavily on underfunded open-source infrastructure and maintainers — this proposal addresses that problem by introducing yet another central entity whose primary function is to allocate funds, rather than by funding specific, well-scoped OSS projects or tooling directly. Creating a new branded program, legal entity, and advisory structure that sits between the Treasury and open-source projects increases the number of secondary allocators in the ecosystem and adds another layer of coordination and politics, when the broader governance trend should be toward reducing such intermediary structures.\n\nThe structure also concentrates significant discretion in a single administrator role for the term of the program. Although the proposal emphasizes that councils are advisory, that the charter will be published, and that DReps can replace the administrator or shut the program down by Info Action, the practical effect for the year is still that one new entity and its initial administrator are being funded to decide, at their discretion, which projects receive multi-tier retainers and under what conditions. That is a material governance decision in itself, and it is not clear that creating a new allocator is the best way to achieve open-source sustainability.\n\nFinally, the proposal remains broad in scope relative to the specificity of the requested allocation. It speaks in general terms about dependency audits, bus-factor metrics, contributor pathways, and commercial open source transitions, but leaves the concrete list of funded projects, specific deliverables for each, and clear exit conditions largely to the future program’s discretion after funds are granted. In this budget cycle, with multiple existing institutions already involved in ecosystem and open-source support, I do not believe it is prudent to establish another independent entity to manage unspecified “sustainability funds,” even for a limited initial term. For these reasons, I am voting NO."}}