Governance ReviewNo. 9Epochs 542 to 54423 Feb 2025 to 10 Mar 2025

Intersect's 2025 roadmap draws 87 yes votes in three epochs

Intersect's product committee submitted its 2025 roadmap, the first proposal under Cardano's new constitution, to inform its budget plans. Some supporters questioned parts of the technical agenda, including whether work on scaling and alternative nodes was spread across too many projects.

87
yes votes across the three roles on Intersect's 2025 roadmap in its first three epochs, against 4 no and 6 abstain, superseded votes included
84.9%
of DRep power in the stored tally of the constitution, which took effect at the start of epoch 542 with all seven committee members finding it constitutional
42.94%
of delegated power held by the ten largest DReps at epoch 544, their smallest share up to then, down from 50.16% at epoch 522
386
DReps with at least one vote in the previous twelve epochs at epoch 544, the most up to then, a count that includes DReps without delegated power

Cardano’s constitution takes effect in epoch 542

Cardano Constitution to Replace the Interim Constitution took effect at the start of epoch 542, one epoch after the ratification covered in the review of epochs 538 to 541, its stored tally at 84.9% of DRep power and all seven committee members finding it constitutional. As in the interim text, the treasury cut, the share of each epoch’s rewards that goes to the treasury, has to stay between 10% and 30%. All seven committee members in place at epoch 544 hold interim terms that run through epoch 580, in September 2025, and the constitution proposal records that the community can then elect a new committee.

Intersect puts its 2025 roadmap to the DReps

Defining the Cardano Vision and Roadmap for 2025 and beyond, submitted in epoch 542, was the only proposal filed in the window and so the first under the new constitution. It is an information action from Intersect’s product committee, with its chair Samuel Leathers named as author, and puts to the DReps a roadmap drawn up from community survey results and with key technical stakeholders. Its priorities include scaling the main chain with parallel block production through Leios, bringing in liquidity from other chains, expanding layer two, better tools for developers, programmable assets and several independent node implementations. The document states that the vote would inform the budget proposals Intersect develops, including the budget conversations under way. Its deadline was the start of epoch 549.

The product committee would revise the roadmap while the vote ran, based on DRep feedback, and the document encourages DReps to attach rationales and to vote again as versions change. In its first three epochs it drew 87 yes votes across the three roles, 4 no and 6 abstain, superseded votes included. Among its yes votes by epoch 544, the DReps with the most delegated power were YUTA, JAZZ and Phil UPLC, with ₳403.0M, ₳119.0M and ₳76.8M at epoch 544.

YUTA voted yes in epoch 543 but wrote that it might change the vote after hearing “honest opposing opinions from developers and researchers”, having heard cautious opinions on Hydra, nested transactions and partner chains. CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool) voted yes the same epoch, writing that scalability “is addressed from three sides, which might be unnecessary”, and suggested focusing on two things. Martin Lang, also voting yes in epoch 543, found the roadmap solid, asked that work on several nodes not be overdone, and would have liked a mention of post quantum research. William Doyle voted no in epoch 543, calling the vote tentative, and wrote that adding post quantum research would be enough to change it to yes.

CryptoCrow and SIPO vote to halve the treasury cut

Decrease Treasury Tax from 20% to 10%, filed in epoch 539, asked for 10%, the lowest treasury cut the range allows, and was open through the window, with voting ending at the start of epoch 546. CryptoCrow voted yes in epoch 542, writing that “we have a substantial treasury already” and that higher staking rewards would help offset expenses in a bear market. SIPO voted yes the same epoch, putting the gain at approximately 12.5% more in staking rewards and calling the 20% rate arbitrary and never reassessed. Martin Lang voted yes in epoch 544, writing that the 20% rate had built a massive treasury and that a lower one would “put pressure on the expenses that are planned for the next year”.

Socious voted no in epoch 544 because continuous investment in research and a stable treasury are essential, and because the proposal “relies on the uncertain assumption” that the price of ada will rise. Wada DRep voted no the same epoch, writing that it would be more prudent to watch how the new governance structures manage funding for at least 12 months, and that a later cut, possibly smaller or staged, could be introduced more safely with the required reversion plan. In epoch 544 the Eastern Cardano Council found the proposal unconstitutional by a split decision, and the Cardano Atlantic Council found it constitutional.

The ten largest DReps fall to 42.94%

The power delegated to DReps rose ₳169.5M across the window, from ₳3.71B at epoch 542 to ₳3.88B at epoch 544, held by 792 DReps, both the highest readings since epoch 508. The ten largest held 42.94% of it at epoch 544, their smallest share up to then, down from 50.16% at epoch 522.

Share of delegated power held by the ten largest DReps, epochs 522 to 544

In percent of the power delegated to DReps, the two default options excluded

40.0%43.0%46.0%49.0%52.0%Epoch 522: 50.2%522Epoch 523: 46.8%Epoch 524: 46.2%Epoch 525: 45.7%525Epoch 526: 44.4%Epoch 527: 44.2%Epoch 528: 44.8%Epoch 529: 44.7%Epoch 530: 45.4%530Epoch 531: 45.5%Epoch 532: 46.4%Epoch 533: 46.5%Epoch 534: 46.5%Epoch 535: 45.9%535Epoch 536: 45.6%Epoch 537: 45.2%Epoch 538: 43.9%Epoch 539: 44.3%Epoch 540: 43.6%540Epoch 541: 43.2%Epoch 542: 43.5%Epoch 543: 43.7%Epoch 544: 42.9%544Epoch 544: 42.94%, low up to then42.94%, low up to then
The share fell from 50.16% at epoch 522 to 42.94% at epoch 544, with a rise to 46.48% at epoch 533 in between.

The Gini figure for the same 792 DReps rose to 0.9197 at epoch 544, the highest up to then. The two measures look at different parts of the distribution: the ten largest held less of the power, while the spread across all DReps holding some became more unequal.

Across the three epochs DReps cast 192 votes, committee members 3 and pools 3, superseded votes included, and 155 distinct DReps cast a final vote. The three pool votes were all yes votes on the roadmap. The count of DReps with a vote in the previous twelve epochs rose from 368 to 386, the most up to then. The treasury reading rose ₳8.7M to ₳1.69B, with nothing paid out of it.

Decided in this window

Open at the close of the window

ActionStatusDRep yes
Defining the Cardano Vision and Roadmap for 2025 and beyondVoting ends at the start of epoch 549n/a
Decrease Treasury Tax from 20% to 10%Voting ends at the start of epoch 546n/a

n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 542
₳3.71B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 544
₳3.88B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
198
DReps whose final vote fell in the window
155
Treasury, at the start of epoch 542
₳1,686.1M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 544
₳1,694.9M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
  • The constitution was ratified at the start of epoch 541, before this window, and its tally is quoted as the record stores it. The treasury cut range, the committee terms and what the roadmap put to the DReps are read from the documents named under the sources below, the terms also from the committee record. That the roadmap is the first proposal filed under the new constitution rests on the site's proposal data, which lists no other proposal filed in epochs 542 to 544. This edition makes no clause by clause comparison with the interim text.
  • Neither open proposal is decided here, so the record holds no share for either from inside this window, only tallies read after they closed. Vote counts per epoch cover all three roles and include superseded votes, and vote power is measured at the epoch of the vote rather than at the end. Votes on the open proposals are quoted with the epoch they were cast in and without a share, and a DRep may change a vote until the deadline. The reasons quoted are the published rationales of the voters named, cited under the sources below, and say nothing about voters who published none. The committee votes quoted on the treasury cut proposal carry hot keys that the committee votes on the constitution in epochs 539 and 540 tie to the Cardano Atlantic Council and the Eastern Cardano Council.
  • The share of the ten largest DReps and the Gini figure measure the spread of delegated power across the DReps that hold some, not across ada holders. Neither says which individual delegations grew or shrank, and no such movement is claimed here. Highs and lows up to then compare the readings since epoch 508, when on-chain governance began.
  • Votes cast is every vote of epochs 542 to 544 across all three roles, superseded votes included. DRep vote counts per epoch and the count of DReps with a recent vote exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power and the concentration measures exclude the predefined delegation options.

Sources and further reading

16 sources, open the list
  • The interim constitution already carried written guardrails for the share of rewards the treasury takes, permitting a value between 10% and 30%. the interim constitution, on the treasury cut guardrails
  • The document behind the treasury cut proposal names no author, asks to reduce the treasury cut from 20% to 10%, and states that the new constitution permits a treasury cut between 10% and 30%. the document behind the treasury cut proposal, on the permitted range
  • The constitution proposal records that the term of the interim committee members expires in September 2025, at epoch 580, and that the community will then be able to elect a new constitutional committee. the constitution proposal, on the committee term
  • The document behind the roadmap names Samuel Leathers, chair of the product committee of Intersect, as its author. It states that the roadmap was developed by the product committee of Intersect with consultation from key technical stakeholders, that the DRep vote is meant to inform the budget proposals Intersect develops, including the budget conversations current at the time, that the product committee would revise the roadmap during the action based on DRep feedback, that DReps are encouraged to attach rationales to their votes for the committee to review and to vote again across versions, and that a yes signals support for the roadmap, a no a lack of support, and an abstention neither. the document behind the 2025 roadmap
  • The roadmap put to the DReps was produced by the product committee of Intersect out of community survey results, and sets out priorities including scaling the main chain with parallel block production through Leios, bringing liquidity in from other chains, expanding layer two, improving what developers have to work with, programmable assets, and running several independent node implementations. the product committee on the 2025 vision and roadmap
  • YUTA voted yes on the 2025 roadmap in epoch 543, writing that all the items on the roadmap would hopefully help Cardano grow into a platform for billions of people, that it had heard cautious opinions on Hydra, nested transactions and partner chains, and that it might change its vote during the voting period after hearing honest opposing opinions from developers and researchers. the rationale of YUTA on the 2025 roadmap
  • CardanoYoda voted yes on the 2025 roadmap in epoch 543, writing that the emphasis on scaling both layers is right, that scalability is addressed from three sides at once, which might be unnecessary, and that the community should perhaps focus on two things rather than chase too many at once. the rationale of CardanoYoda on the 2025 roadmap
  • Martin Lang voted yes on the 2025 roadmap in epoch 543, writing that the roadmap sounds solid, that the comments about parallelisation matter because the node was never optimised for modern processors, that development of several nodes should not be overdone, and that it would have liked a mention of post quantum research, although that is out of scope for a 2025 roadmap. the rationale of Martin Lang on the 2025 roadmap
  • William Doyle voted no on the 2025 roadmap in epoch 543, calling the vote tentative, suggesting three additions to the roadmap with post quantum research among them, and writing that including post quantum research would be enough to change the vote to yes. the rationale of William Doyle on the 2025 roadmap
  • CryptoCrow voted yes on the treasury cut proposal in epoch 542, writing that the treasury is already substantial, that higher staking rewards would help offset expenses in a bear market and encourage more nodes, and that attention to Cardano as a source of passive revenue would help the ecosystem grow. the rationale of CryptoCrow on the treasury cut proposal
  • SIPO voted yes on the treasury cut proposal in epoch 542, writing that lowering the tax would raise staking rewards by approximately 12.5%, that the 20% rate was set arbitrarily at launch and never reassessed, and that higher rewards would encourage delegation and strengthen decentralisation. the rationale of SIPO on the treasury cut proposal
  • Martin Lang voted yes on the treasury cut proposal in epoch 544, writing that setting the rate at 20% at the start had been wise and had built a massive treasury, that the cut is within the guardrails, that it would put pressure on the expenses planned for the next year, and that the rate can be raised again. the rationale of Martin Lang on the treasury cut proposal
  • Socious voted no on the treasury cut proposal in epoch 544, writing that continuous investment in research and a stable treasury are essential, and that the proposal relies on the uncertain assumption that the price of ada will rise. the rationale of Socious on the treasury cut proposal
  • Wada DRep voted no on the treasury cut proposal in epoch 544, writing that it would be more prudent to see how the new governance structures manage existing priorities and funding for at least 12 months, and that a later adjustment including the required reversion plan, key milestones and review phases, possibly a narrower or staged reduction, could be introduced more safely. the rationale of Wada DRep on the treasury cut proposal
  • The Eastern Cardano Council found the treasury cut proposal unconstitutional in epoch 544 by a split decision, citing the reversion plan the constitution requires for each parameter change, insufficient technical review and staking reward figures it called potentially misleading. the rationale of the Eastern Cardano Council on the treasury cut proposal
  • The Cardano Atlantic Council found the treasury cut proposal constitutional in epoch 544, checking it against the participatory governance requirements of the constitution and the treasury cut guardrails. the rationale of the Cardano Atlantic Council on the treasury cut proposal