Governance ReviewNo. 18Epochs 576 to 57812 Aug 2025 to 27 Aug 2025
Socious and Haus treasury requests expire at 57.3% and 52.7%
Socious's ₳1.5M funding programme and Haus's ₳3M expansion request expired below the 67% DRep threshold, leaving 37 of the funding round's 39 requests paid. Some DReps wanted evidence from Catalyst's existing trial before funding Socious, and questioned why the treasury should finance Haus's move to Cardano.
Socious’s quadratic funding request expires at 57.3%
Socious’s quadratic funding request expired at the start of epoch 577 with 57.3% of DRep power behind it, on 124 yes votes to 81 no and 15 abstain, against the 67% a treasury withdrawal needs. On the votes cast alone, ₳3.06B of delegated power voted yes and ₳1.41B no, above 67% of the two together, and counting the power that did not vote as no put the share at 57.3%. All seven committee members found the request constitutional.
Its document, which Intersect filed on behalf of Socious, asked ₳1.5M for a funding programme beside Catalyst that weights each backer’s vote by the square root of the donation and a reputation score, and takes no operating costs out of the money. Yoroi W₳llet called it “a larger-scale testbed for governance innovation” and EMURGO “a timely contribution” to the infrastructure around Catalyst, and the Eternl DRep Committee and the Cardano Foundation voted yes too. The DRep Socious wrote that it voted yes on all 39 requests of the round. YUTA voted no on this request and on Haus’s.
Dave and Hephaestus Stake Pool voted no, both writing that Catalyst’s fourteenth funding round already included a quadratic voting proof of concept at its tallying stage and that its results should come first. HOSKY wrote that weighting donations by their square root and a reputation score moves influence away from proportional ada ownership, and that one ada should equal one vote. Tempo.Vote wrote that the cost was too high and that Catalyst’s own operating funding should cover it, and CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool) scored the request 4 out of 12 on its own scale, with 0 for value for money.
Haus’s tokenised property request expires at 52.7%
Haus’s tokenised property request expired at the same boundary with 52.7% of DRep power, on 93 yes votes to 113 no and 20 abstain, and all seven committee members found it constitutional. Fewer DReps voted yes than no, but with more delegated power: ₳2.54B for and ₳1.64B against, below 67% of the two even on the votes cast alone, with ₳0.78B abstaining. Its document, filed by Intersect on behalf of Haus, asked ₳3.0M to move Haus’s protocol for selling fractions of home equity from a private Ethereum blockchain, where it was prototyped, to Cardano and to launch HausCoin there.
Yoroi wrote that Haus has “a working product, a sizable waitlist” and regulatory groundwork under way, EMURGO that tokenising home equity “unlocks liquidity for homeowners”, and CryptoCrow that real world assets will “pick up the pace a lot between now and 2030”.
Dave wrote that the treasury is “for public goods, not to fund the expansion of a successful, for-profit company”, that the track record of the Haus team is the reason it should pay for its own move, and that the proposal “socializes their business risk while privatizing the profits”. HOSKY wrote that Haus had said it was “giving Cardano a chance” despite larger offers elsewhere, and read that as opportunism rather than commitment. Hephaestus Stake Pool called it a large ask for a relatively unknown project and found some supporting documents behind a request for an email address. Kyle Solomon moved to abstain after meeting Haus at Rare Evo, writing that Haus should still be a venture capital play or get retroactive funding rather than treasury money.
The Socious, Haus and Flowdesk requests, in delegated ada
Bars show delegated ada behind votes cast, labels the stored DRep share against the 67% a withdrawal needs
Flowdesk’s listing request passes at 67.4% and is paid
Flowdesk’s listing and market making request was ratified at the start of epoch 577 with 67.4% of DRep power, on 115 yes votes to 96 no and 12 abstain, and paid at the start of epoch 578. Its document splits the ₳3,126,000 into up to ₳3M for listing fees paid directly to exchanges that list Cardano native tokens and ₳126,000 for token projects to pay Flowdesk’s market making service. Six committee members found it constitutional, and the Eastern Cardano Council, by a split decision, found that it lacked sufficient rationale, calling the description of the service confusing and the listing fees it quotes unsupported by any verifiable basis.
YUTA and the Eternl DRep Committee, holding ₳462.0M and ₳240.2M of delegated power at epoch 578, changed their votes to yes in epoch 576, the last epoch of the vote, both writing that token projects applying for a listing now had to provide a repayment plan. HOSKY voted no although the document lists HOSKY among the tokens eligible for market making, writing that listing fees are “primarily a private benefit to the projects being listed”. Dave objected to the cost and to a potential dependency on DexHunter, and Hephaestus Stake Pool wrote that exchanges could come to demand the same funding for every future listing of a Cardano token.
Tempo.Vote’s budget closes at 41.0%
Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025 closed at the start of epoch 576 with 41.0% of DRep power, on 119 yes votes to 75 no and 22 abstain. It asked ₳380,000 for six months of running and developing the Tempo.Vote governance app, administered by Selfdriven, as the review of epochs 573 to 575 describes. Three committee members found it constitutional and four did not. The Eastern Cardano Council, by a split decision, found it constitutional because it names Selfdriven as administrator, the Cardano Atlantic Council found no process for overseeing the funds, and the Cardano Japan Council found that the receiving addresses were not disclosed, so their automatic abstention could not be checked.
Yoroi voted no, writing that it “values the spirit behind Tempo” but saw “limited visibility into the team behind the project” and no account of how Selfdriven would report on the funds. EMURGO voted no too, writing that a budget must meet “a higher threshold of clarity and accountability”. The Cardano Foundation voted yes, writing that the proposal “has flaws in its quality and detail” but that the risk of “a tooling monoculture” outweighs them, and SASA_nagamaru_ながまる that depending on a single governance interface “would undermine resilience and decentralization”.
The committee replacement and constitution v2.0 stay open
Replace Interim Constitutional Committee, CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.0 and the two listing requests, Withdraw ₳5M for Cardano’s Global Listing Expansion - Powered by Snek and Cardano Global Listing Expansion - Powered by Snek, were still open at the close of epoch 578.
34 withdrawals pay out ₳102.1M and ₳78.0M stays unused
The treasury paid 27 withdrawals at the start of epoch 576, two at epoch 577 and five at epoch 578, ₳102.1M together, so 37 of the round’s 39 requests were paid. Paid withdrawals under the ceiling came to ₳272.0M across 38 payments, leaving ₳78.0M of the ₳350M for the period that runs to the end of epoch 604.
The window recorded 921 votes, 646 from DReps, 260 from pools and 15 from committee members. The pool votes were all on the committee replacement, the only action open in these epochs that pools vote on. The power delegated to DReps read ₳5.48B at epoch 578, held by 848 DReps, the most up to then. The treasury reading fell ₳89.6M from epoch 575 to ₳1.57B at epoch 578, less than the ₳102.1M paid out because the treasury kept receiving income.
Decided in this window
37 actions, open the full list
Open at the close of the window
| Action | Amount | Status | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Withdraw ₳5M for Cardano's Global Listing Expansion - Powered by Snek | ₳5.0M | Voting ends at the start of epoch 580 | n/a |
| Replace Interim Constitutional Committee | Voting ends at the start of epoch 580 | n/a | |
| Cardano Global Listing Expansion - Powered by Snek | ₳5 | Voting ends at the start of epoch 580 | n/a |
| CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.0 | Voting ends at the start of epoch 581 | n/a |
n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 576
- ₳5.46B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 578
- ₳5.48B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 921
- DReps whose final vote fell in the window
- 171
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 576
- ₳1,584.2M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 578
- ₳1,568.5M
- DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. That is why a request can have more power voting for it than against and still fall short. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
- What the two failed requests, the listing request and the Tempo.Vote budget ask for, the vendors named for them, how the paid requests are handled once the ada has left the treasury, and what the two open changes to the rules propose, are read from their own documents, named under the sources below. The ceiling in force runs to the end of epoch 604, which is not the end epoch the site registry carries today, because a later action extended the period.
- The counts of payments in this edition are three different sets and are kept apart: 34 withdrawals were paid in these three epochs, 37 of the 39 requests of this round were paid in total, and 38 withdrawals had been paid since the first one at epoch 571. Consumption of the ceiling counts paid withdrawals only.
- The four proposals open at the close are decided after this window, so the record holds no share for any of them from inside it, only tallies read after they closed.
- Votes cast is every vote of epochs 576 to 578 across all three roles, superseded votes included. Per epoch DRep counts exclude votes without a block time. That the pool votes were cast on the committee replacement follows from the actions open in these epochs: it is the only one of them pools vote on. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options.
- The reasons quoted are the published rationales of the voters named, cited under the sources below, and say nothing about voters who published none. Socious and Tempo.Vote are quoted under their DRep names. Where a rationale gives a figure, such as a score, it is the voter's figure and is not checked here.
Sources and further reading
35 sources, open the list
- Yoroi voted yes on the quadratic funding request, writing that it leverages decentralised identity to match reviewers on merit, trials quadratic funding and identity based participation within Catalyst, and serves as a larger scale testbed for governance innovation. the rationale of Yoroi on the quadratic funding request
- EMURGO voted yes on the quadratic funding request, calling it a timely contribution toward refining the governance infrastructure around Catalyst, with reviewer and proposal pairing and structured impact reporting that could address long standing issues in quality control and resistance to fake identities. the rationale of EMURGO on the quadratic funding request
- Socious voted yes on the quadratic funding request, writing that it had voted in favour of all 39 treasury withdrawal proposals of the round out of respect for the process that selected them. the rationale of Socious on the quadratic funding request
- Dave voted no on the quadratic funding request, writing that Catalyst's fourteenth funding round already includes a quadratic voting proof of concept at the tallying stage and that it is more prudent to first analyse the data from that live experiment than to fund a separate initiative. the rationale of Dave on the quadratic funding request
- Hephaestus Stake Pool voted no on the quadratic funding request, quoting the launch materials of Catalyst's fourteenth round, which include generalised quadratic voting as a proof of concept at the tallying stage, and preferring to wait for its results. the rationale of Hephaestus Stake Pool on the quadratic funding request
- HOSKY voted no on the quadratic funding request, writing that the square root weighting of donations combined with reputation scores shifts governance influence away from proportional ada ownership, and that one ada should equal one vote. the rationale of HOSKY on the quadratic funding request
- CardanoYoda voted no on the quadratic funding request, scoring it 4 out of 12 on its own six category scale, with 0 for value for money. the rationale of CardanoYoda on the quadratic funding request
- Tempo.Vote voted no on the quadratic funding request, writing that the cost is too high for developing a quadratic voting implementation and that Catalyst's own operating funding should be able to cover it. the rationale of Tempo.Vote on the quadratic funding request
- Yoroi voted yes on the property request, writing that a stable asset backed investment option diversifies decentralised finance on Cardano, that the company behind it, Haus, has a working product, a sizable waitlist and regulatory groundwork in motion, and that its founders have track records. the rationale of Yoroi on the property request
- EMURGO voted yes on the property request, writing that by tokenising home equity Haus unlocks liquidity for homeowners, that the project is backed by an experienced team and a clear roadmap, and that it appreciates the open source approach and the commitment to donate back to the treasury. the rationale of EMURGO on the property request
- CryptoCrow voted yes on the property request, writing that real world assets will pick up pace between now and 2030 and that Cardano should be in front of it. the rationale of CryptoCrow on the property request
- Dave voted no on the property request, writing that the treasury is for public goods and not to fund the expansion of a successful for profit company, that the track record of the Haus team is the very reason it should self fund its move to Cardano, and that the proposal socialises business risk while privatising the profits. the rationale of Dave on the property request
- HOSKY voted no on the property request, writing that the Haus team had said it was giving Cardano a chance despite larger offers elsewhere, which signals an opportunistic approach rather than a committed partnership, and that treasury funds should not entice teams that may shift ecosystems based on funding size. the rationale of HOSKY on the property request
- Kyle Solomon abstained on the property request, writing that the vote was updated to abstain after meeting Haus at Rare Evo, that Haus should still be a venture capital play or receive retroactive funding rather than treasury money, and that treasury support for scaling would follow if Haus built on Cardano and showed auditable traction. the rationale of Kyle Solomon on the property request
- Hephaestus Stake Pool voted no on the property request, writing that it is a large ask for a relatively unknown project, that a pilot through a partners programme would be a better route, and that some of the supporting documentation sat behind a request for an email address. the rationale of Hephaestus Stake Pool on the property request
- YUTA changed its vote on the listing and market making request to yes, writing that baseline targets had been set and that projects asking for a listing withdrawal now have to commit to a full repayment plan. the rationale of YUTA on the listing and market making request
- The Eternl DRep Committee changed its vote on the listing and market making request from abstain to yes, writing that token projects now have to provide a repayment plan to be considered for a listing through the proposal. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the listing and market making request
- HOSKY voted no on the listing and market making request although the proposal lists HOSKY as a token eligible for market making, writing that listing fees and market making costs are primarily a private benefit to the projects listed and should be borne by those projects, their investors or their communities. the rationale of HOSKY on the listing and market making request
- Dave voted no on the listing and market making request over its cost and a potential dependency on a single project, DexHunter, for infrastructure, writing that a treasury funded service should be open to all native assets and use open standards such as Rosetta. the rationale of Dave on the listing and market making request
- Hephaestus Stake Pool voted no on the listing and market making request, writing that paying exchanges from the treasury could set a precedent in which exchanges demand the same funding for any future listing of a Cardano token. the rationale of Hephaestus Stake Pool on the listing and market making request
- The Eastern Cardano Council, by a split decision, found the listing and market making request unconstitutional for want of the sufficient rationale the constitution requires, writing that the description of the service of Flowdesk is confusing, that its claim that no Cardano native token is listed on top tier exchanges is false, and that the listing fees it quotes have no independently verifiable basis. the rationale of the Eastern Cardano Council on the listing and market making request
- Yoroi voted no on the tooling budget, writing that it values the spirit behind Tempo, its independent infrastructure and mobile first governance, but that the proposal offers limited visibility into the team, no accountability framework and no explanation of how Selfdriven would govern and report on the use of treasury funds. the rationale of Yoroi on the tooling budget
- EMURGO voted no on the tooling budget, writing that a budget action must meet a higher threshold of clarity and accountability, and that this one lacks a justification of the sum, a roadmap with milestones, details of the team and metrics for success. the rationale of EMURGO on the tooling budget
- The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the tooling budget, calling it a pragmatic decision: the proposal has flaws in quality and detail, but the risk of a tooling monoculture in governance interfaces outweighs them, and its support comes with expectations for future requests. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the tooling budget
- SASA voted yes on the tooling budget with conditions, writing that Cardano governance relies on only two active user interfaces, GovTool and Tempo, that depending on one would undermine resilience, and that the fund management structure and the roadmap remain unclear. the rationale of SASA on the tooling budget
- The Cardano Atlantic Council found the tooling budget unconstitutional because it provides no process for overseeing the use of funds, as the constitution requires of a budget. the rationale of the Cardano Atlantic Council on the tooling budget
- The Cardano Japan Council found the tooling budget unconstitutional because the constitution requires stake addresses receiving treasury funds to be set to abstain automatically, and the proposal does not disclose the addresses that would receive the funds. the rationale of the Cardano Japan Council on the tooling budget
- The Eastern Cardano Council, by a split decision, found the tooling budget constitutional because it designates Selfdriven as the administrator responsible for overseeing the use of funds. the rationale of the Eastern Cardano Council on the tooling budget
- The ₳1.5M request, submitted by Intersect on behalf of Socious, would have funded a funding programme meant to sit alongside Catalyst, weighting each backer's vote by the square root of the donation and a reputation score, and stating that it carries no operational costs so that every ada goes to projects. the document behind the quadratic funding request
- The ₳3.0M request, submitted by Intersect on behalf of Haus, would have funded moving the Haus protocol, through which homeowners sell fractions of their home equity and which its text says was prototyped on a private Ethereum blockchain, to Cardano, and launching HausCoin there. the document behind the tokenised property request
- The ₳3,126,000 request, submitted by Intersect on behalf of Flowdesk, funds a pool of up to 3M ada for listing fees paid directly to exchanges that list Cardano native tokens, and 126,000 ada for token projects to pay a monthly retainer for the market making service of Flowdesk, with HOSKY among the eligible tokens. the document behind the listing and market making request
- The Tempo.Vote budget asks for 380,000 ada for the six months from 1 August 2025 to 31 January 2026, 200,000 for infrastructure and 180,000 for development of the app, to be administered by Selfdriven. the document behind the tooling budget
- The ceiling in force caps paid withdrawals at ₳350M for the period from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604. the document behind the ceiling in force
- The document behind the committee replacement says the interim committee's term ends with epoch 580, and that the action seats the seven members chosen in an election held off chain, three for 146 epochs and four for 73 so that the seats are staggered, three of whom already sit on the interim committee. the document behind the committee replacement
- The document behind the revised constitution lists its changes as wording, definitions, the removal of unused provisions, and the removal of the requirement that a treasury withdrawal be preceded by a budget info action. the document behind the revised constitution