Governance ReviewNo. 32Epochs 621 to 62325 Mar 2026 to 9 Apr 2026

Two members of Cardano's constitutional committee vote against the budget framework

The Cardano Budget Process Framework, an information action describing how treasury budgets are to be collected, reviewed and paid out, closed with 68.4% of DRep power behind it and two of seven committee members against. KtorZ wrote that it makes a member organisation the one route to the treasury, the Eastern Cardano Council that DReps would likely reject proposals filed outside it. In the epoch the vote closed, a ₳14.1M request for two conferences was filed outside that process, saying it would pay too late.

68.4%
of counted DRep power behind the budget process framework
71.4%
the committee reading on it, five yes against two no, the only committee no votes on anything decided in the window
₳10.1M
paid to Amaru at the start of epoch 621, the first draw of the spending period from epoch 613
₳50M
ratified for the Orion Fund at the start of epoch 623

A framework, and two votes against it

Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect) asks for no money. What it asks for is agreement on how money will be asked for in future, and it is specific about the level of agreement it wants: its own text seeks a minimum of 51% of stake from DReps to run the process it describes.

The process runs in five stages: strategic planning, where a vision, the framework itself and a net change limit have to be approved on chain before a budget cycle starts, then collection of proposals, review, consolidation into a budget and execution through withdrawals with milestone reporting. The ceiling for epochs 613 to 713 was settled two windows earlier, in the review of epochs 612 to 614. Any change to the framework has to come as a fresh information action, so the version in force is always the one on chain.

Voting closed at the start of epoch 623 with 68.4% of DRep power behind it, on 138 yes ballots, 32 no and 7 abstain, past the 51% it asked for. The shares in this edition are the yes power as a share of all counted power, with abstaining power left out and power that cast no ballot counted as no. Among the twelve largest DReps on its ballot list, ranked by delegated power at epoch 623, nine voted yes, one abstained and two voted no. The pools recorded 23 yes ballots, 1 no and 1 abstain, a yes stake share of 6.0%.

YUTA backed the revised voting threshold, writing that “the biggest problem with the previous Budget process was that the threshold was simply calculated far too low”, and that this time a proposal needs 67% of participating stake, with every DRep that voted yes or no on it counted. That 67% applies to the proposals inside the process, the 51% to the framework itself. The Eternl DRep Committee called the process “going in the right direction”, noted that a 1,000 ada fee to take part as a vendor “is a lot” for smaller teams in the current market, and disclosed that Eternl had received funding through the previous year’s process and would likely file again. Army of Spies objected to bundling proposals, CardanoYoda to the workload the process expects of DReps. Army of Spies wrote that it hates “the bundling of proposals”: it did not want to vote yes on a withdrawal for a bundle when it strongly disfavours some components and favours others. CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool) voted no to ask for changes, writing that the framework “sets unrealistic expectations regarding the workload of DReps”: around 200 proposals came in the previous year, and a DRep with two hours a day for governance and four hours per proposal “can process only about ten proposals per month”. One stake pool wrote that “monopolizing the budget is a terrible idea”.

Why two committee members called it unconstitutional

Five committee members found the framework constitutional and two did not, a reading of 71.4% with all seven voting. It is the only one of the three actions decided in these epochs whose committee tally holds a no vote, and the two objections are arguments about what an information action does rather than about the process itself.

KtorZ wrote that the framework is in the committee’s scope because it refers to a type of governance action, and that its document proposes an Intersect facilitated process “as the only process permitting access to the Cardano treasury”. Intersect is a member organisation, and the constitution says that no formal membership shall be required to use, take part in and benefit from the chain. Underneath it all, he wrote, the budget “is framed as a Cardano budget framework, whereas it is in fact an Intersect budget framework”. The Eastern Cardano Council took the framework’s own motivation at its word: publishing it “ensures that all governance participants” work from one reference, so DReps “will likely reject proposals that do not follow it”, even though the protocol permits anyone to file directly. It cited DReps who had already appealed to the strategy information action when rejecting proposals “rather than rejecting it on its merits”.

In epoch 623, Cardano Summit 2026 and TOKEN2049 Singapore was submitted outside the Intersect process, ₳14.1M for a two day summit hosted by the Cardano Foundation and a title sponsorship at TOKEN2049, managed by EMURGO. Its own text says the choice was made on purpose: payments through that process were projected for August or September at the earliest, and both events are in October 2026. Whether DReps treat a request that skips the process on its merits is exactly what the objection is about, and that request’s vote runs past this window.

The committee’s objections could not block the information action, which triggers no automatic change on chain and is never ratified.

The committee reading on the three actions decided here

Yes votes over active members minus abstainers, against the two thirds the committee needs on a withdrawal

Framework, no bar appliesFramework, no bar applies: 71.4%71.4%AmaruAmaru: 83.3%83.3%Orion FundOrion Fund: 100.0%100.0%66.7% bar
The dashed line is the two thirds a treasury withdrawal needs from the committee. It applies to the two withdrawals and not to the framework, which is an information action and has no committee bar at all, so its bar is greyed rather than measured.

Amaru receives ₳10.1M

Amaru received ₳10.1M at the start of epoch 621, the window’s only treasury withdrawal and the first charged against the net change limit for the spending period that began at epoch 613. It had been ratified at the start of epoch 620, before this window, on 70.9% of DRep power, a vote the review of epochs 615 to 620 covers. The proposal describes Amaru as a block producing node designed for low hardware requirements, and calls this its second treasury withdrawal.

After the payment the treasury balance stood ₳6.3M below its epoch 620 reading. It recovered to ₳1.66B by epoch 623.

₳50M ratified for Orion, over objections about oversight

Cardano x Draper Dragon: Orion Fund was ratified at the start of epoch 623 on 74.9% of DRep power, 109 yes ballots, 37 no and 10 abstain, with all seven committee members in favour.

It is not a grant and not a loan. The proposal sets up a limited partnership with Draper Dragon as general partner, which would invest in companies building on or integrating with Cardano, and it asks the DReps to approve only the first tranche, ₳50M, which it puts at roughly fifteen million dollars at an assumed ada price of thirty cents. The net proceeds of the direct investments are to be returned to the treasury on a repayment schedule set out in the proposal, and each further tranche needs its own vote. The long term plan it lays out is a fund of at least eighty million dollars, seventy five million of it from the treasury over three tranches, this first one included, with total withdrawals capped at ₳175M, and only the first tranche is approved by this vote.

Yoroi W₳llet voted yes because “excessive caution can also slow ecosystem progress”, and because the fund is an investment vehicle approved for a first stage only rather than “a one-way grant”. The no votes were about who decides once the money is out. hix_coffeepool☕️ wrote that investment decisions are left to the general partner’s “sole discretion”, that portfolio information is designated confidential, that “no independent auditor is named”, and that approving the first tranche opens a path to ₳175M “without transparency in place”. Army of Spies called it “another abdication of the power of the purse by the dReps”. CardanoYoda voted no as feedback rather than as an absolute no, asking for the fund to commit to the numeric targets of the 2030 strategy. The ₳50M is due one epoch later, in the review of epochs 624 to 626. For the treasury, the window ended with ₳10.1M drawn against the new limit and ₳50M more ratified against it.

Dingo and the liquidity budget at their deadline, as of the close of epoch 623

Two more withdrawals reached their voting deadline at the start of epoch 624, the window’s closing boundary: Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1 at 74.1% of DRep power as of that close, ₳800,000 to set up the legal entity, the audit and the multisig the stablecoin liquidity budget needs, and Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs at 70.3%, ₳6.9M for twelve months of work on a block producing node written in Go. The liquidity request lists the circumstances under which funds return to the treasury and discloses that the recipient has received no treasury ada in the previous two years, the two things a committee rationale had found missing from the ₳500,000 request on the same budget that the review of epochs 612 to 614 covers.

Two new requests were submitted inside the window and still open at its close: the ₳14.1M conference bundle above, and Pebble + Gerolamo - HLabs 2026 Budget for ₳8.0M, twelve months of work on TypeScript tooling, a light node and a smart contract language, with a 25% refundable contingency on its base budget.

The window recorded 563 ballots, superseded votes included: 518 from DReps, 19 from committee members and 26 from stake pools. Final ballots came from 166 DReps and 21 pools.

Decided in this window

Open at the close of the window

ActionStatusDRep yes
Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1Undecided at the close of epoch 62374.1%
Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink LabsUndecided at the close of epoch 62370.3%
Approve Cardano Foundation as New Managing Entity of Project CatalystVoting ends at the start of epoch 626n/a

n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 621
₳5.79B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 623
₳5.82B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
563
DReps whose final ballot fell in the window
166
Treasury, at the start of epoch 621
₳1,655.5M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 623
₳1,663.5M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that cast no ballot and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Stake pool shares on an information action are the share of stake behind yes ballots.
  • Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained. A member who casts no ballot at all is not an abstainer and lowers the share.
  • The Amaru withdrawal was ratified in the window before this one and paid in this one, so its row carries the payment. The Orion Fund was ratified in epoch 623 and its payment falls outside the window.
  • Two withdrawals had their voting deadline exactly at the closing boundary. Their tallies are quoted as they stood at that close, without an outcome.
  • What the framework and the Amaru project are is read from the metadata the proposals themselves carry, not from the data pack.
  • Votes cast is every ballot of epochs 621 to 623 across all three roles, superseded votes included.

Sources and further reading

18 sources, open the list
  • KtorZ voted no on the framework, writing that it is in scope for the committee because it refers to withdrawals, that the document proposes an Intersect facilitated process as the only process permitting access to the treasury, that Intersect being a member organisation contradicts the constitution's guarantee that no formal membership is required, and that it is in fact an Intersect budget framework rather than a Cardano one. the rationale of KtorZ on the framework
  • The Eastern Cardano Council voted no on the framework, writing that its motivation implies all withdrawals should go through it, that DReps will likely reject proposals that do not follow it even though the protocol permits bypassing it, and citing DReps who had appealed to the strategy information action when rejecting proposals rather than judging them on their merits. the rationale of the Eastern Cardano Council on the framework
  • YUTA voted yes on the framework, writing that the biggest problem with the previous budget process was a threshold calculated far too low, and that this time the threshold is 67% with every DRep that voted yes or no counted in the participating stake, a stricter approach. the rationale of YUTA on the framework
  • The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the framework, writing that the process was going in the right direction, that a 1,000 ada fee to take part as a vendor is a lot for smaller teams in the current market, that teams can still file withdrawals on their own, and that Eternl had received funding through the previous year's process and would likely file a new proposal. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the framework
  • Army of Spies voted no on the framework, writing that it hates the bundling of proposals and does not want to vote yes on a withdrawal for a bundle when it strongly disfavours some components and favours others. the rationale of Army of Spies on the framework
  • CardanoYoda voted no on the framework to signal a request for changes, writing that it sets unrealistic expectations of DRep workload: around 200 proposals were submitted the previous year, and a DRep spending two hours a day on governance and four hours per proposal can process about ten a month. the rationale of CardanoYoda on the framework
  • One stake pool voted no on the framework, writing that monopolising the budget is a terrible idea, as it was the previous time. the rationale of a stake pool on the framework
  • Yoroi voted yes on the Orion Fund, writing that while treasury funds should be used carefully, excessive caution can also slow ecosystem progress, and that the fund is an investment vehicle rather than a one way grant, approved for a first stage only. the rationale of Yoroi on the Orion Fund
  • CardanoYoda voted no on the Orion Fund, writing that it was not an absolute no but feedback, and that a proposal of this scale should commit to the numeric targets of the 2030 strategy instead of vague and qualitative ones. the rationale of CardanoYoda on the Orion Fund
  • Army of Spies voted no on the Orion Fund, writing that it felt like another abdication of the power of the purse by the DReps, and asking what kinds of projects would be funded with the community's money. the rationale of Army of Spies on the Orion Fund
  • hix_coffeepool voted no on the Orion Fund, writing that individual investment decisions are left to the general partner's sole discretion, that portfolio information is designated confidential, that no independent auditor is named, and that approving the first tranche opens a path to ₳175M without transparency in place. the rationale of hix_coffeepool on the Orion Fund
  • The framework describes itself as the formal description of the budget process for the 2026 cycle and future ones, administered by Intersect, and seeks a minimum of 51% by stake support from DReps to run the process it sets out. It runs in five stages, from a strategic planning stage whose three pieces, a vision and strategy, an approved framework and a defined net change limit, have to be approved on chain before a cycle begins, through collection, review and consolidation of proposals to execution with milestone reporting, and it requires any future amendment to be filed as a new information action reproducing the text. the document behind the framework
  • A published committee rationale gives the reason for a no vote on the framework: its own motivation says that publishing it ensures all governance participants work from a shared authoritative reference, which the rationale reads as making the process effectively mandatory even though the protocol permits bypassing it, since DReps will reject proposals that do not follow it. It cites DReps appealing to the strategy vote to reject proposals rather than judging them on their merits, and sets this against the constitutional guarantee that no formal membership is required to take part. the published rationale of one committee no vote
  • The Orion proposal describes a multi year, tranche based investment fund set up as a limited partnership with an external general partner, investing in Cardano native and Cardano integrated companies. It asks for a first tranche of ₳50M, about fifteen million dollars at an assumed ada price of thirty cents, with net proceeds from the direct investments to be returned to the treasury on a repayment schedule, and treasury exposure described as incremental, capped and governed. It puts the long term target at a fund of at least eighty million dollars, seventy five million of it from the treasury over three tranches including the first, across six years, each needing a separate vote, with total withdrawals capped at ₳175M. the document behind the Orion fund
  • The conference bundle asks ₳14.1M for a two day summit hosted by the Cardano Foundation and a title sponsorship at TOKEN2049 in Singapore managed by EMURGO, both in October 2026, and says it was submitted outside the Intersect budget process because payments through that process were projected for August or September at the earliest, too late for events that need a year of advance planning. the document behind the conference bundle
  • The HLabs request asks ₳8.0M for twelve months of work with three headline deliveries, maintenance of its TypeScript tooling through an upcoming hard fork, a production ready light node and a production ready imperative smart contract language, including a 25% refundable contingency on its base budget, and prices ada at thirty five cents. the document behind the HLabs request
  • The first liquidity withdrawal asks ₳800,000 to set up a legal entity, audit the contract and stand up the multisig the stablecoin liquidity budget needs, to be delivered within six months, and it lists the circumstances under which funds return to the treasury and discloses that the recipient has received no treasury ada in the previous two years. the document behind the first liquidity withdrawal
  • The Go node request asks ₳6.9M for twelve months of engineering on a block producing node written in Go, priced at thirty cents per ada, paid in one withdrawal into an escrow contract that releases funds against milestones and returns unused ada to the treasury at the end of its term. the document behind the Go node request