Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1
186 DReps voted · 62 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 592.3M ₳ Rationale
Summary
Yoroi DRep votes YES on Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1, recognizing it as an initial step toward establishing the foundations for a treasury-backed DeFi liquidity initiative.
Rationale
• Phased execution design
The proposal limits this withdrawal to foundational components, prioritizing legal setup, audit readiness, and contract infrastructure before any capital deployment. This sequencing ensures key structures are in place prior to scaling.
Defined scope with ecosystem participation
The 800,000 ADA request is tied to specific deliverables, including legal entity formation, audit execution, and multisig contract deployment. Smart contract development is being contributed by ecosystem teams without direct funding, indicating alignment and shared commitment to the initiative.
• Controlled fund management framework
Use of a 5-of-9 multisignature Amaru contract introduces distributed oversight and enforces collective authorization, supporting secure and transparent handling of funds.
Conclusion
Yoroi supports proceeding with this initial withdrawal as a setup step. Progressing beyond this stage should be paired with clearer frameworks for capital deployment, improved transparency on performance, well-defined governance processes, and stronger accountability mechanisms. - Yes 428.5M ₳ Rationale
I will vote YES for [Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1] unless a governance action with better terms is submitted.
This is for the same reasons I voted for the Budget Information action. If there is a team capable of better implementation, please submit another governance action before the voting deadline for this governance action. If it is better, I will change my vote.
While providing liquidity won't solve everything, it could potentially alleviate some concerns.
私は[Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1]に、より良い条件のガバナンスアクションが提出されない限り、YESを投票します。
Budget情報アクションに投票したのと同様の理由です。 より良い実行ができるチームがいましたら、このガバナンスアクションの投票期限までに、別のガバナンスアクションを提出してください。それがより良い内容であれば、投票を変更します。
流動性の供給が全てのを解決するわけではありませんが、一定の懸念の軽減が進む可能性があります。
- Yes 297.4M ₳ Rationale
Summary
EMURGO, as a DRep, votes YES on the Treasury Withdrawal titled “Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1,” with the rationale outlined below.
Rationale
This withdrawal funds the foundational infrastructure required to responsibly manage treasury funds for the proposed DeFi liquidity initiative, including legal setup, smart contract audit, and Amaru multisig deployment.
We view the staged approach as a prudent step, allowing legal and technical guardrails to be established before any larger allocation.
The proposal includes governance and security safeguards, including a 5-of-9 multisignature Amaru contract and an independent audit by Invariant0 LLC. Smart contract development is contributed at no cost, reducing treasury exposure.
This withdrawal is consistent with EMURGO’s prior support for this initiative and represents an operational step toward implementation. As this is an initial setup phase, we expect subsequent withdrawals to provide clearer detail on deployment approach, transparency mechanisms, and governance processes.
Given the defined scope and oversight mechanisms, we view this as a reasonable setup step prior to any future liquidity deployment. For these reasons, EMURGO votes YES. - Yes 240.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 221.8M ₳ Rationale
TL;DR: EDC votes YES on gov_action1uhzd06a26qavzflvrx3gvcz6rzxkl6su2ns8t3seef5e8dl6nlgsqcgtufg;
In line with our decision to vote YES on this budget (gov_action1u4jrcvlkppjzuv5j9z5ksacwtvv77h6glu0knpcjut8gvjjfu0cqqt3alsy) we also vote YES on the first withdrawal. We acknowledge that costs are higher than previously, but they need to start somewhere.
- Abstain 174.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 160.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 135.1M ₳ Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. We support this legal and technical setup and commend the staged budgeting. However, we strongly urge the resolution of outstanding transparency, operational, and security concerns prior to the subsequent 50M ada withdrawal.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Our support for this Treasury Withdrawal is based on the following factors:
Staged Approach & Fiscal Prudence: We appreciate the proposers for staging this withdrawal. Requesting a smaller initial tranche (800,000 ada) to establish the necessary legal and technical guardrails before managing a 50,000,000 ada budget is a responsible approach to treasury management.
Legal Appropriateness: Establishing a Cayman Islands Foundation Company is viewed as an appropriate and justified setup for this type of ecosystem initiative. Budget Accuracy & Adjustments: We appreciate that the proposers have adjusted the requested ada amount to reflect a more realistic market exchange rate ($0.25/ADA) compared to the high rate ($0.40/ADA) used in previous budget projections.
Ecosystem Collaboration: Securing the development of the smart contract interface at no cost from UTxO Company and Sidan Labs demonstrates strong ecosystem alignment and "skin in the game."
While the proposers have delivered what they outlined for this preliminary step, we reiterate the outstanding requirements and recommendations established during our review of the initial Budget Info Action and previous withdrawal attempts. We request that the proposers address the following either within or before submitting the subsequent, larger treasury withdrawal:
Transparency & Reporting: We strongly advocate implementing a public dashboard to track rewards and liquidity positions in real-time.
Deployment Selection Criteria: Further information and clarity are needed regarding the specific deployment selection criteria and strategy for the 50M ada.
Conflict of Interest (COI): The COI policy should be expanded to include the Directors of the legal vehicle (the Cayman Foundation Company).
Relevant disclosures and committee decisions (redacted for personal information) must be available to the community.Operational Clarity: Further definition is needed regarding committee election mechanisms, rotation, and definitive wind-down plans for un-allocating the funds.
Fiscal Accountability: The committee compensation model requires adjustment to ensure "Proof of Contribution" rather than fixed sum salaries.
Security & Audits: While we approve the 111,000 ada allocation for the Invariant0 LLC audit, we believe it is prudent that the committee pursue a secondary, independent smart contract audit funded from the operational budget of Withdrawal 2. Given the substantial amount of treasury funds (50,000,000 ada) this contract will eventually manage, an additional layer of security review is highly appropriate.
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. We view this withdrawal as a suitable step to responsibly activate the DeFi Liquidity Budget, while emphasizing the need for future withdrawals to include enhanced transparency, refined eligibility criteria, and robust reporting standards.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - No 93.3M ₳ Rationale
As a DRep, I decided to vote NO on the proposal: Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1
My rationale:
I appreciate the intention behind this proposal. However, in its current form, I am not able to support it. The reasons are similar to those for rejecting the previous proposal:
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In my opinion, the Cardano Treasury should serve as a source of liquidity for the ecosystem. The direction is right.
I still believe that establishing a legal entity in the Cayman Islands is unnecessarily costly. In my opinion, there are cheaper alternatives. The team wants to push this option. They are actively trying to explain it. Even if I accepted it, the costs of directors and supervisors seem high to me.
My primary concern relates to the proportionality between the proposed costs and the expected scope of responsibilities.
The proposal does not clearly define the exact role, responsibilities, or time commitment of the directors. In my understanding, the DAO is responsible for making decisions related to stablecoins and allocation, while the legal entity and its directors would act primarily as the formal structure executing those decisions, especially regarding off-chain interactions.
If this interpretation is correct, the directors would not be independently managing a complex investment strategy, but rather acting as a governance and legal execution layer on top of decisions made elsewhere. In that case, their role appears primarily supervisory and operational from a legal standpoint, rather than involving active portfolio management or continuous strategic decision-making.
The financial operations associated with minting stablecoins and allocation to DeFi are relatively straightforward.
In such a setup, a director's compensation of around $50,000 per year seems difficult to justify. This level of compensation is more typical for hedge fund structures, where directors oversee complex investment strategies, active trading, and significant regulatory exposure. Here, the structure appears simpler and more delegated. Based on comparable roles, a more appropriate compensation range would likely be in the range of $10,000 to $25,000 per director. If the intention is for directors to take on a more active or strategic role, this should be clearly specified and justified, including the expected scope of decision-making, liability, and time commitment.
Another important issue is the lack of transparency regarding the directors themselves. The proposal does not disclose their names, which makes it impossible to properly assess their competence, experience, or suitability for the role. This is particularly relevant given that there are no strict legal requirements in the Cayman Islands regarding formal education, licensing, or specific qualifications for directors. As a result, the quality of governance depends heavily on the individuals appointed. Without knowing who they are, it is difficult to evaluate whether the proposed compensation is appropriate.
I also attempted to identify the candidates based on the descriptions provided. While I was able to form a reasonable assumption about the first candidate, this remains unconfirmed, and I do not consider it appropriate to rely on inference alone. If my assumption is correct, there are aspects of this individual's past business history that would merit clarification. For this reason, I believe the proposal should explicitly disclose the individual's identity and address any relevant history openly, so that voters can make an informed decision.
In the case of the second candidate, I was not able to identify the person with confidence. However, the description suggests involvement in a DeFi market-making entity. Given that this proposal involves deploying stablecoin liquidity to the Cardano ecosystem, this creates a potential conflict of interest. A director in such a position could influence decisions regarding which platforms receive liquidity or how stablecoins are allocated, potentially favoring entities they are already connected with. This does not imply wrongdoing, but it is a material governance risk that should be transparently disclosed and properly managed, for example, through clear conflict-of-interest policies.
If the candidates have active financial or operational ties to Cardano projects that could benefit from the DAO’s decisions, this creates a potential conflict of interest that must be clearly disclosed and properly managed.
For these reasons, I am not comfortable approving the proposal as it stands. This is not a rejection of the idea itself, but rather a request for stronger governance standards, clearer definition of roles (including the relationship between the DAO and the directors), greater transparency, and a more proportionate cost structure.
I am willing to support a revised version of this proposal if the directors are clearly identified, their responsibilities and compensation are justified in relation to the actual scope of work, the interaction between the DAO and the legal entity is clearly defined, and potential conflicts of interest are transparently disclosed and appropriately managed.
I would like to emphasize that if this proposal is approved, I will decide on the 50M ADA withdrawal independently of this one. I will assess it on its own merits, structure, safeguards, and overall value to the ecosystem.
- Yes 92.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 89.8M ₳ Rationale
SIPO DRep votes YES on Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1.
SIPO previously voted YES on an earlier version of this proposal (January 2026), evaluating it as the first institutional design cost for Cardano's transition from an experimental DAO ecosystem to a public blockchain capable of engaging with states and institutions. This resubmission substantially improves on the prior version with detailed cost breakdowns, explicit refund conditions, and comprehensive constitutional compliance checks. SIPO's position remains consistent and is reinforced by these improvements.
Why SIPO votes YES
Consistent with SIPO's prior evaluation
In January 2026, SIPO voted YES on the earlier version, framing it as foundational institutional infrastructure rather than a short-term DeFi growth initiative. That assessment remains unchanged. This Withdrawal establishes the legal entity, audited smart contract, and governance mechanisms required before the broader 50M ADA liquidity deployment can proceed responsibly. The 800,000 ADA is a setup cost — a prerequisite, not an end in itself.Substantially improved transparency over the prior submission
This resubmission addresses concerns about the previous version's level of detail: complete USD-denominated cost breakdown with ADA conversion at $0.25/ADA, six explicit refund scenarios, article-by-article constitutional compliance checklist, director candidate profiles disclosed, and a 6-month delivery deadline with mandatory return of unspent funds.Cayman Islands Foundation Company is the established industry standard
MakerDAO, dYdX, Uniswap Foundation, and ENS all use the same Cayman FC structure. The memberless, director-led design aligns with decentralized governance principles while providing legal personality, limited liability, and counterparty capability. The selection of Walkers LLP provides dedicated regulatory staff — a prudent choice for long-term operation.Smart contract development contributed at zero cost
The administrating smart contract system is being built free of charge by UTxO Company and Sidan Labs. The 111,000 ADA audit by Invariant0 LLC covers design review, code audit, fix re-audit, and public reporting — appropriate scope for a contract managing public treasury funds.Governance structure reflects Cardano's principles
The 5-of-9 multisig Interim Committee, tDAO oversight with DRep impeachment authority, mandatory monthly reporting, SPO delegation prohibition, and auto-abstain DRep delegation collectively implement the principle that treasury assets are public funds, not discretionary capital.Proportionate scale
At 800,000 ADA (0.23% of the 350M ADA NCL), this is a measured expenditure for institutional groundwork covering Year 1 legal costs only.
Expectations
SIPO's YES vote on this Withdrawal does not constitute automatic support for Withdrawal 2 (the 50M ADA liquidity deployment). The two must be evaluated independently.
- Withdrawal 2 requires separate, rigorous scrutiny: The 50M ADA deployment into DeFi protocols carries fundamentally different risks — smart contract exploits, impermanent loss, counterparty risk, and treasury principal market exposure.
- Director and Supervisor appointment transparency: Full public disclosure of appointed directors and Supervisor, including potential conflicts of interest, before fund disbursement.
- Legal cost actuals vs. budget: Monthly reporting on actual USD invoices paid, ADA conversion rates used, and any variance from budget.
- Audit report publication: The Invariant0 audit report must be published in full with all critical findings remediated before managing Withdrawal 2 funds.
- 6-month deadline enforcement: Strict adherence to the delivery window with mandatory return of remaining funds if incomplete.
- Interim Committee member accountability: All nine members should maintain public accountability commensurate with their fiduciary role over public funds.
SIPO's assessment has not changed since January 2026. This resubmission is a stronger version — more detailed, more transparent, and more constitutionally rigorous. The 800,000 ADA is not a DeFi investment. It is the cost of building the institutional foundation that makes responsible DeFi investment possible.
For these reasons, SIPO DRep votes YES.
SIPODRepとして、本提案「Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1」に賛成（YES）を投じます。
SIPOは2026年1月に本提案の初回バージョンにYESを投じており、「Cardanoが実験的DAOから、国家や機関と接続可能な公共ブロックチェーンへ移行するための最初の制度設計コスト」と評価しました。今回の再提出は、詳細な費用内訳、明示的な返金条件、包括的な憲法準拠チェックにより、前回バージョンを大幅に改善しています。SIPOの立場は一貫しており、これらの改善によって強化されています。
SIPOがYESと判断する理由
SIPOの過去評価との一貫性
2026年1月、SIPOは本提案の初回バージョンに対し、短期的なDeFi成長施策ではなく基盤的な制度インフラとしてYESを投じました。この評価は変わりません。本Withdrawalは、50M ADA流動性展開を責任を持って進めるために必要な法人、監査済みSmart Contract、ガバナンスメカニズムを確立するものです。800,000 ADAはセットアップコストであり、前提条件です。前回提出からの大幅な透明性向上
今回の再提出は前回の詳細不足に対応しています：全法的サービスのUSD建てコスト内訳（$0.25/ADA変換率明示）、6つの返金シナリオ、憲法逐条準拠チェック、取締役候補プロファイル開示、6ヶ月納品期限と未使用資金の返還義務です。Cayman Islands Foundation Companyは確立された業界標準
MakerDAO、dYdX、Uniswap Foundation、ENSが同じCayman FC構造を採用。メンバーレス・ディレクター主導設計は分散型ガバナンスと整合しつつ、法的人格と有限責任を提供します。Walkers LLPは専任規制対応スタッフを有し、長期運用に合理的です。Smart Contract開発がゼロコストで貢献
UTxO CompanyとSidan Labsによる無償開発。Invariant0 LLCの111,000 ADA監査は公的Treasury資金管理コントラクトとして適切な範囲です。ガバナンス構造がCardanoの原則を体現
5-of-9マルチシグ、tDAO監督、DRep罷免権限、月次報告義務、SPO委任禁止、auto-abstain委任。Treasury資産は公共資金であり裁量的資本ではないという原則を具体化しています。適切な規模感
800,000 ADA（NCLの0.23%）はYear 1法的費用のみをカバーする均衡のとれた支出です。
期待事項
本Withdrawalへの賛成はWithdrawal 2（50M ADA）の自動的支持を意味しません。
- Withdrawal 2は別途厳格に精査：DeFiプロトコルへの50M ADA展開はSmart Contract脆弱性、インパーマネントロス、カウンターパーティリスク等、根本的に異なるリスクを伴います。
- 取締役・Supervisor選任の透明性：資金支出前に完全な公開開示を期待します。
- 法的費用の実績報告：USD請求額、ADA変換レート、予算差異の月次報告を求めます。
- 監査レポートの完全公開：重大所見はWithdrawal 2資金管理前に是正が必要です。
- 6ヶ月期限の厳守：未完了分は規定通り返還されるべきです。
- 全Committee memberの公開的説明責任の維持を期待します。
SIPOの評価は2026年1月以来変わっていません。今回の再提出はより詳細で透明で憲法的に厳密なバージョンです。800,000 ADAはDeFi投資ではなく、責任あるDeFi投資を可能にする制度的基盤の構築コストです。
以上の理由により、SIPO DRepとして本提案に賛成（YES）を投じます。
- No 89.3M ₳ Rationale
My thoughts haven't changed. I will quote my previous vote rationale from 19January2026: "I voted "NO" on the related Info Action and I am voting "NO" on this withdrawal. Please see my X post related to the info action https://x.com/ArmyofSpies/status/1977565495302996409. I do not believe the DReps should be abdicating the power of the purse. Since we already have a "pentad" of founding entities in the greater Cardano Ecosystem, I also question the wisdom of creating yet another foundation entity (this time a "Cayman Islands Foundation Company" that will feature at least "2 Cayman-based professional directors who manage the FC's business and affairs"). We do not need to increase the entity count to a "Hextad". We have enough centralized entity drama as it is given that a decentralized ecosystem should really be...well...decentralized. I also do not believe this is currently the best use of treasury funds when the Cardano Treasury is already trending toward zero within a decade and there are significant questions around yet another centralized foundation entity picking winners and losers when "[c]rypto is filled with failed liquidity incentives" as Sebastian Guillemot succinctly put it in his abstention rationale as to the Info Action. The free markets always do a better job of identifying the best cases of product-market fit than centralized decision-by-committee. Adam Smith taught us this lesson 250 years ago in his 1776 work 'The Wealth of Nations'."
- Yes 89.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 77.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 76.1M ₳ Rationale
I believe PoL is less capital efficient than subsidizing yield if the goal is to increase stablecoin liquidity on Cardano, however, PoL serves a secondary purpose of diversifying the treasury which I believe is the primary value proposition here.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I believe PoL is less capital efficient than subsidizing yield if the goal is to increase stablecoin liquidity on Cardano, however, PoL serves a secondary purpose of diversifying the treasury which I believe is the primary value proposition here.
- Yes 75.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 74.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 71.3M ₳ Rationale
I vote YES. Credit to the team for improving this proposal. Fragmented liquidity forces USDCx swaps via NIGHT, compounding LP fees for users. By funding deep ADA/stable pairs, we fix this routing friction, drastically reducing slippage and driving on-chain growth alongside the CF's moves
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting YES on this Treasury Withdrawal. While the administrative and legal setup costs are high, they are a necessary step to safely execute the upcoming 50M ADA liquidity deployment. This aligns perfectly with the Cardano Foundation’s recent eight-figure ADA deployment via Flowdesk, proving that deepening stablecoin markets is a coordinated ecosystem priority.
Despite our stablecoin market cap reaching $48.88m (with USDCx commanding over 35% dominance), we face a severe routing problem. Because deep ADA/stablecoin pairs are lacking, massive USDCx liquidity is concentrated in non-ADA pairs like Minswap's NIGHT/USDCx pool (~$5.89M TVL). This fragmentation forces multi-hop routes, penalizing users with compounded swap (LP) fees just to move between core assets.
By executing this proposal's mandate to aggressively fund ADA-to-stablecoin pairs, we will establish ADA as the highly efficient, deep-liquidity hub it needs to be. This eliminates the reliance on current fragmented pairs like NIGHT, drastically reducing slippage and ensuring efficient swaps without unnecessary multi-hop LP fees, which benefits our ecosystem users.
Finally, credit to the team for taking tough community feedback and drastically improving this proposal. While core infrastructure is undeniably important, deep liquidity is equally vital to allow sustainable growth, build user confidence, and spur the on-chain activity required for our projects to truly thrive. I am confident in the teams ability to execute on this commitment.
- Yes 68M ₳ Rationale
I support the direction of this proposal, as strengthening liquidity within the Cardano ecosystem is a critical step toward enabling growth and expanding DeFi activity.
At the same time, from a general governance perspective, I believe that the proportionality of costs related to the legal structure, as well as potential conflicts of interest in decision-making and fund allocation, are important considerations. These aspects should be carefully managed and improved over time through greater transparency and clear operational practices.
However, I do not believe that these concerns alone justify delaying progress. Given the current state of the ecosystem, where liquidity and DeFi development remain limited, waiting for a perfectly optimized structure may result in missed opportunities and slower growth. It is important to move forward while recognizing and managing risks.
I also view positively that this proposal represents a preliminary step before a larger capital deployment, with mechanisms such as multisig control, defined refund conditions, and auditing processes in place to mitigate risks.
Taking these factors into account, I believe this proposal represents a necessary and pragmatic step forward, even with areas that can be improved, and I therefore support it.
本提案の方向性については、Cardanoエコシステムにおける流動性強化という観点から非常に重要であり、支持します。
一方で、法的構造に関するコストの妥当性や、意思決定および資金配分に関わる利益相反の可能性については、一般的な観点からも慎重に考慮すべき論点であると認識しています。これらは今後の運用や設計の中で、透明性を高めながら適切に整理・改善されていくことが望まれます。
しかしながら、こうした懸念のみを理由に本提案を見送ることは、現状のエコシステムが抱える流動性不足やDeFiの成長機会をさらに遅らせる可能性があると考えています。すべての条件が完全に整うまで待つのではなく、一定のリスクを認識した上で前に進むことも重要であると考えます。
また、本提案は大規模な資金投入の前段階としての基盤整備であり、段階的なアプローチが取られている点も評価できます。返金条件やマルチシグ管理など、一定の安全性と透明性を担保する仕組みも組み込まれており、リスクを抑えながら前進する設計になっていると考えています。
以上を踏まえ、本提案は改善の余地を残しつつも、エコシステムの成長に向けた現実的かつ必要なステップであると判断し、支持します。
- Yes 65.7M ₳ Rationale
withdrawal of already approved treasury action.
- Yes 62.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 53.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 51.1M ₳ Rationale
Same rationale as the Info Action. We need to deploy capital towards Cardano DeFi as soon as possible.
- Abstain 49.8M ₳ Rationale
I am voting Abstain on the 'Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget' treasury withdrawal, not because of the proposal itself, but due to concerns about the overall voting process.
At the moment, there is an approved total budget (350M), yet funding requests are being submitted independently as separate governance actions. This creates a fragmented and unclear landscape: it's difficult to understand the total number of proposals, the combined requested amount, or how close we are to exceeding the available budget.
Without this broader context, it becomes challenging to properly prioritize proposals, assess trade-offs, or compare similar initiatives. If the total requested funds exceed the budget, there is no clear framework for how decisions should be made across competing proposals.
For these reasons, I believe the current process lacks the structure needed for effective decision-making, and I am abstaining on that basis rather than on the merits of this specific proposal.
- No 49.7M ₳ Rationale
I am voting No on the treasury withdrawal proposal "Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1." This withdrawal funds the legal and technical infrastructure for a proposed 50,000,000 ADA DeFi liquidity deployment. The merits of this preparation are determined by the merits of its ultimate purpose: the liquidity deployment itself. DeFi liquidity provision should fundamentally be supplied through market principles, not treasury funds. Liquidity deployment at this scale should be provided by external investors and private capital as investment seeking commercial returns, with projects subject to rigorous return-on-investment scrutiny from those investors. The near-absence of private investment in Cardano DeFi is a signal that warrants serious attention. If genuine demand existed, market participants would move first. We acknowledge that factors beyond demand, such as limited marketing and the barriers to developer and dApp adoption posed by EVM incompatibility, may also be contributing to low TVL. However, the fact that private capital has not engaged even as these challenges are gradually being addressed suggests a structural problem on the demand side. This is not a problem to be resolved through treasury intervention. The counter-argument that supply must precede demand has some merit. However, Cardano DeFi protocols and liquidity pools already exist, and the minimum conditions for supply-side infrastructure are in place. Given that TVL remains low and user activity limited despite this, demand deficiency is at present the more probable root cause. Deploying treasury funds at scale before demand has been established is an investment decision that would not pass scrutiny under private capital standards. I am opposed to transferring risk that should be borne by private investors onto all ADA holders. Since I oppose the liquidity deployment itself, I also oppose this withdrawal as its preparatory funding. [Japanese version follows] 私は、トレジャリー出金提案「Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1」に対し、反対票を投じます。本引き出しは、5,000万ADAのDeFi流動性供給を目的とした法人設立・技術インフラ整備のための費用ですが、この準備コストの是非は、最終的な目的である流動性供給そのものの是非によって決まります。基本的に、DeFi流動性の供給は市場原理に基づいて提供される資金であり、トレジャリーが担う領域ではないと考えます。この規模の流動性展開は、外部投資家や民間資金が、営業利益という結果を出すための投資として提供されるべきもので、運営は投資家による厳格な投資対効果の審査を受けながらプロジェクトを進めることが必要です。Cardano DeFiへの民間投資が実質的に存在しないという現状は、注視すべきシグナルです。真の需要が存在するなら、市場参加者が先に動くはずです。もちろん、マーケティングの弱さやEVM非互換による開発者・dAppの流入障壁など、需要以外の要因も低TVLに影響している可能性は否定しません。しかし、それらの課題が解決されつつある現在もなお民間資金が動いていない事実は、需要側に構造的な問題がある可能性を示唆しています。トレジャリー介入によって解決すべき問題ではないと判断します。「供給がなければ需要が生まれない」という反論には一定の理があります。ただし、Cardano DeFiのプロトコルと流動性プールはすでに存在しており、インフラとしての最低限の供給条件は整っています。それでもTVLが低水準にとどまり、ユーザー活動が限定的である以上、現時点では需要不足が主因である蓋然性が高いと考えます。需要の存在が確認されていない段階でトレジャリー資金を大規模投入することは、民間投資であれば通過できない投資判断です。本来民間投資家が負うべきリスクをADAホルダー全体に転嫁することには反対します。流動性供給の是非について反対である以上、その準備資金である本引き出しについても反対とします。
- Yes 48.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 42.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 40M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 38.1M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 36.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 34.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 34.3M ₳ Rationale
Dingo represents the third independent node implementation for Cardano (after the Haskell cardano-node and the Rust-based Amaru), written in Go – one of the most widely used systems programming languages in the world. Go’s popularity among infrastructure engineers, cloud-native developers, and DevOps professionals means Dingo dramatically expands the potential contributor base for Cardano’s core node software. This is essential for long-term ecosystem sustainability.
Having three independent node implementations across three different programming languages (Haskell, Rust, Go) provides exceptional resilience against implementation-specific bugs, supply-chain attacks, and compiler vulnerabilities. If a critical bug affects one implementation, the network can continue to operate through the others. This multi-implementation model is proven in mature blockchain ecosystems like Ethereum (Geth, Nethermind, Besu, Erigon).
Blink Labs has a strong track record in the Cardano ecosystem, having built and maintained numerous open-source Go libraries and tools including gouroboros (Ouroboros protocol implementation in Go), Adder, Bursa, and others. Their deep familiarity with Cardano’s protocol internals from the Go perspective gives confidence in their ability to deliver a production-grade node. Dingo already supports full chain sync, 41 UTXO validation rules, Plutus execution across all versions, block production, and multiple API interfaces.
Dingo’s built-in API servers (Blockfrost-compatible, UTxO RPC) and native Mithril bootstrap support make it especially attractive for infrastructure operators and application developers who want a single binary that serves both consensus and data access needs. This integrated approach reduces operational complexity compared to running separate node and indexer stacks.
Some community voices, such as SnekArmy, have raised concerns about whether Cardano needs more infrastructure spending in current market conditions. However, node diversity is a long-term strategic investment that cannot be paused and resumed easily – the teams, knowledge, and codebases require sustained investment. Voting YES ensures continuity of a critical infrastructure project that strengthens Cardano’s competitive position against multi-client ecosystems. - Yes 32.3M ₳ Rationale
Upgrading to Yes. Resubmission addresses prior constitutional concerns: compliant with Art I Sec 6-7, 0.23% NCL, 5-of-9 multisig, explicit refund triggers, monthly transparency reports, and tDAO override. Legal infrastructure for DeFi liquidity initiative.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Upgrading to Yes on this resubmission. My prior abstain explicitly stated I would support a version "resubmitted in full compliance with the required governance and constitutional standards." This version delivers on that condition:
- Constitutional Compliance: Section 5 documents compliance with Article I, Section 6 (Governance Action Standards) and Article I, Section 7 (Treasury Withdrawals 7(1)–7(6)). NCL impact 0.23% - well within limits. Funds delegated to auto-abstain per 7(6).
- Economic Sustainability: Tight scope (legal entity setup + audit + multisig contract). Walkers (Cayman) LLP for the Foundation Company, Invariant0 for the smart-contract audit, Sundae Labs for Amaru contract setup. Smart contract development contributed at no cost by UTxO Company and Sidan Labs.
- Governance Transparency: 9-person Interim Committee with 5-of-9 multisig. Six explicit refund triggers (non-performance, cost savings, legal/technical impossibility, governance changes, completion remainder). Monthly transparency reports. Cost-denominated-in-USD discipline so excess ADA returns to treasury.
- Adoption: Bootstraps the legal infrastructure for the broader stablecoin DeFi liquidity initiative previously approved (>67% support under prior constitution).
- Decentralization: Memberless Cayman FC with tDAO override (DReps can impeach committee, disable contract).
The structural concerns from my prior abstain have been addressed. Yes.
- Yes 31M ₳ Rationale
I am voting YES because this withdrawal establishes the essential foundation—legal structure, independent audit, and multisig contract—needed for Cardano’s DeFi growth. The proposal includes strict refund conditions and strong transparency requirements, ensuring unused funds return to the Treasury. Going forward, the community must continue to closely monitor how all funds are used, especially as we move toward the larger liquidity deployment.
- Yes 30.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 28.2M ₳ Rationale
I have voted in favor of this proposal numerous times as I believe that the liquidity boost will help stimulate Cardano DeFi substantially. Also, this is not a spend by the treasury, this is a managed fund that has the potential to also generate returns for the treasury, making it inherently an EV-positive play (minus risk). I hope that this proposal can finally be put forward after being stymied multiple times by governance drama and technicalities.
- Yes 27.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 27.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 26.1M ₳ Rationale
Thesis
I support this treasury withdrawal because it addresses a clear ecosystem weakness: insufficient ADA-stablecoin liquidity, which contributes to poor trade execution, higher slippage, and weaker DeFi usability across Cardano. A community-governed liquidity program with measurable deployment rules is a legitimate treasury use when it is narrowly scoped, transparent, and designed to improve market function rather than reward insiders.
Constitutional and governance basis
This proposal is more credible because it is framed around community oversight, constrained mandate, and transparent administration rather than discretionary control by any 1 dominant institution. Treasury resources should be deployed for ecosystem-wide public benefit in a way that is reviewable, auditable, and accountable to governance. A structure that reduces dependence on IOG, Emurgo, Cardano Foundation, or any similar concentrated center of influence is directionally consistent with community stewardship and healthier long-term governance.
Expected benefits
Deeper ADA-stable coin liquidity should reduce slippage and improve execution quality for users.
Better execution should help attract greater trading activity and improve overall market efficiency.
A gradual and adaptive rollout lowers the risk of disruptive market shocks from oversized deployment.
A transparent liquidity program gives the community a measurable way to evaluate whether treasury capital is improving real on-chain conditions.
If managed properly, productive deployment can support ecosystem growth while building a path for treasury return rather than acting as a pure subsidy.
Key strengths
The mandate is narrow and understandable, focused on ADA-stable coin pairs rather than broad discretionary market making.
The proposal emphasizes measurable outcomes, transparency, and adaptation to market conditions.
The deployment logic is incremental, which is materially better than immediate large-scale allocation.
The governance framing gives the community a more direct role in capital stewardship.
- Yes 25.9M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 25.2M ₳ Rationale
I am voting YES on Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1. I think deepening liquidity is important as well as strengthenig the footing of our home players. We will learn a lot from this initiative both on executiona and in revenue.
- Yes 22.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 22M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 22M ₳ Rationale
I am voting YES on this initial withdrawal. This proposal exemplifies a highly responsible and professional approach to managing significant Treasury funds.
Instead of requesting the full 50 million ADA at once, the proposers have prudently broken down the initiative into logical phases. This first withdrawal of 500,000 ADA is exclusively dedicated to establishing the critical legal and technical infrastructure required for the fund's secure operation. Allocating capital to establish a robust legal entity in the Cayman Islands and to conduct a comprehensive, independent security audit before any liquidity is deployed is not just good practice—it is the gold standard for fiduciary responsibility.
This phased, infrastructure-first methodology builds trust and ensures that every subsequent action is built upon a foundation of safety and legal compliance. It sets an excellent precedent for all large-scale Treasury-funded projects and demonstrates a clear commitment to protecting community assets. I fully endorse this cautious and methodical first step. - Abstain 21.2M ₳ Rationale
I vote ABSTAIN on the Treasury Withdrawal action titled “Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1” (e5c4d7ebaad03ac127ec19a286605a188d6fea1c54e075c619ca6993b7fa9fd1#0).
I previously voted abstain on the original budget info action submitted for this project in 2025 under the previous NCL. I opted to abstain that time because although the intention behind it means well and sounds good, I was unconvinced that it would ultimately have the impact that it desired to have. This coupled with the fact that there are far more educated people on the topic than myself I did not feel comfortable voting no outright from a position that may not fully understand all the intricacies of the DeFi market.
I still can’t help but be reminded of the Cardano Summit 2024 panel “Does Liquidity Bring Users Or Do Users Bring Liquidity” where one of the members of the panel said that in order to bring attention to Cardano, it was “not a marketing issue but a perception issue”. (https://youtu.be/z1nw7munfXY) My concern remains that we could end up deploying Treasury funds to boost stable coin liquidity on Cardano “from within” but if the overall perception of Cardano across the wider crypto space remains, those users still are not going to come.
Cardano Whale was right, it is far stronger to fight from a position in the top 10-15 on Coinmarketcap than it is from 20-25+ and if we keep travelling on this trajectory, we could have all the liquidity in the world and it would still be irrelevant without the users. I chose to put my money on Cardano for its’ robustness and security, built on formal methods research. I remain here because I still believe that it has the best foundations. I have not lost funds to extortionate fees, I appreciate the determinism of transactions, I have not lost funds countless hacks. It’s a system open enough that someone like me, 5 years ago, with no Linux knowledge was able to build a stake pool on a testnet and grow along with this ecosystem. I have learned skills I never thought possible of myself since 2018, I couldn’t imagine achieving this in another ecosystem. It is frustrating to continue to see these positives not taken seriously from the outside, or frankly even marketed that much from the inside these days. It’s good to see the Cardano 2030 Vision finally highlight “Cardano is the most secure, reliable and censorship-resistant blockchain for mission critical applications to power economies and societies of the future”. This is the perception we need and I fear simply increasing liquidity at the detriment to our own Treasury will still be viewed as an attempt at “faking the numbers” by those from outside the ecosystem, not bring the desired users and leave us worse off than had we deployed that capital into other ventures.
In conclusion, I choose to continue to vote ABSTAIN because as much as I would like this project have the impact that it wants to have, I ultimately don’t believe it will, and so am unable to commit to a yes or a no vote at this time.
- Yes 21.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 21.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 20.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 19.9M ₳ Rationale
After careful review, I decided to approve this first step of our community sovereign wealth fund. We need to invest into our own ecosystem, DeFi liquidity is critical.
- No 17.4M ₳ No rationale