Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)
160 DReps voted · 60 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No 791.4K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 765.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 733.1K ₳ Rationale
This proposal establishes a clear and necessary Net Change Limit, enabling constitutional treasury withdrawals with transparency and accountability. The timeframe and amount are reasonable, data-driven, and aligned with approved budgets and governance guardrails.
- Yes 717.1K ₳ No rationale
- No 670.2K ₳ Rationale
Simply Put, we must lower the Net Change Limit well below 350M Ada because we will deplete our treasury if we max out the NCL! We need protections for the treasury! How about 100M Ada? Price has to find new highs this year, so that will be a lot more money than it is now, and it would protect us into the future. We paid 70M Ada for USDCx so let us reap those rewards before spending more!
- Yes 654.5K ₳ Rationale
📌 CARDANO TREASURY — I VOTE YES FOR NCL
🏛️ Governance Action: Net Change Limit
Cardano sets a spending cap for the network treasury.
📅 Validity Period
• Start: Epoch 613 — February 13, 2026
• End: Epoch 713 — July 3, 2027💰 Treasury Limit
• 350,000,000 ADA
• Maximum amount allowed to be withdrawn from treasury
• Without NCL — treasury spending is forbidden by Cardano Constitution⚙️ Basis
• Treasury income for 2025: 306.9M ADA
• Limit = 115% of income
• Includes previously approved budget:
50M ADA for Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity🧠 Purpose
• Transparent treasury management
• Protection from uncontrolled spending
• Budget cycle synchronization
• Compliance with Cardano Constitution Article IV🗳️ Approval Conditions
• Requires >50% of active DRep stake voting YES
• After approval, funding proposals can be submitted
• Exceeding the limit is prohibited🧩 My position as DRep
I vote YES for the Net Change Limit.
This secures Cardano’s treasury
and strengthens long-term ecosystem sustainability.
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I have registered as a DRep and am ready to help shape the future of the ecosystem.
Optimistically focused on building the world’s largest digital community. 🖤
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More details: https://t.me/PROCENT666/338 - Abstain 624.8K ₳ Rationale
I'm abstaining on this Net Change Limit proposal because while the underlying fiscal framework is reasonable and constitutionally necessary, the proposal's supporting text has been rendered inaccurate by the recent enactment of Constitution v2.4, creating a mismatch between what the proposal implies and what the current constitutional framework actually is.
The NCL itself, 350 million ADA spanning Epoch 613 to Epoch 713, is defensible on its merits. Establishing a valid Net Change Limit is a constitutional prerequisite for processing treasury withdrawals after Epoch 612, making this governance action operationally critical. The amount accounts for approximately 306 million ADA in 2025 treasury inflows plus the unspent 50 million ADA Stablecoin Liquidity budget approved by DReps, representing roughly 115% of realized net income. The extended 16.5 months long period realigns the budget cycle away from year-end holidays to mid-year, when governance participation is potentially higher and full-year treasury data is available for better modeling. These are sound fiscal and operational reasons to support the NCL's core parameters.
However, the proposal contains a critical textual error that undermines its accuracy. Under the "Application and Compliance" section, the proposal states: "This limit shall be applied in assessing treasury withdrawal actions to ensure compliance with Article IV of the Cardano Constitution and the Treasury Withdrawal Guardrails specified in Appendix I." Following Constitution v2.4's enactment, Article IV no longer governs "The Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget”, it now covers the "Amendment Process." The treasury withdrawal framework has been restructured under different constitutional provisions. This isn't a trivial technicality; it's a fundamental misstatement of which constitutional article governs the NCL's application.
This error once again demonstrates the collateral damage of enacting constitutional changes while governance proposals are in flight. The NCL was drafted when Article IV did cover treasury budgets. Constitution v2.4 passed mid-process, invalidating the proposal's reference framework without the proposers having opportunity to amend. The Cardano Budget Committee at Intersect submitted this in good faith, but the constitutional ground shifted beneath them.
An abstain vote acknowledges this procedural reality: the NCL amount and period are fiscally sound, but the proposal's supporting justification references a constitutional structure that no longer exists. Voting yes would ratify a proposal with inaccurate constitutional citations. Voting no would block necessary treasury operations over a technicality the proposers couldn't have anticipated. Abstaining signals that the NCL framework is acceptable in principle but requires resubmission with corrected constitutional references aligned to v2.4. This protects governance accuracy without punishing good-faith proposers caught in constitutional transition. - Yes 589.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 587.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 534.3K ₳ Rationale
This is a Yes for me. These are the most important years for Cardano, Setting a limit doesn't mean we need to meet the cap and spend all available. I think in this 18 month window we need fire power when needed. Approving the NCL for this period does just that. That being said, NCL and treasury spending should always be very well spent. We'll make sure as DReps to do what's best for the growth and sustainability on the Cardano Network. Forward.
- Yes 502K ₳ Rationale
This proposal sets the treasury spending limit for the next period. The limit is 350 million ADA from February 2026 to July 2027.
At roughly $0.30 per ADA, that equals about $105 million. This is fiscally responsible, unless ada crashes even further then we're screwed i guess.A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This is the maximum the entire ecosystem can withdraw during that time. Every actual withdrawal will still require separate governance approval.
The number is based on last year’s real treasury inflows, about 307 million ADA, plus room to cover budgets that DReps have already approved. It keeps spending aligned with income and gives governance enough space to fund ongoing work without constantly hitting artificial limits.
Setting a clear cap creates discipline and predictability. It forces prioritization and prevents uncontrolled withdrawals.
This is basic financial planning for the network.
Voting Yes. - Yes 466.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 445.1K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 443.5K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 426.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 382.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 377.3K ₳ No rationale
- No 321.1K ₳ Rationale
Panda votes NO. Panda thinks is not the time to continue spending as if it has no consequences for CARDANO.
Panda was ok to spend that much the first year to bootstrap everything, but now Panda thinks it is a moment to slow down, recollect, verify what's the effect of the BIG BEAUTIFUL BILL of the past year and then go.
Panda thinks stability and TOP 10 marketing for Cardano is A MUST - Yes 314.4K ₳ Rationale
I'm voting YES on this Net Change Limit Info Action.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I decided to vote yes based on the following thoughts:
Yearly inflow is ~300M. This Net Change Limit extends beyond a year (roughly 1.5 years) so overall we're not spending more than what we earn.
50 million of the 350M are already voted by DReps before this Info Action submission but not withdrawn by the proposers.
We're still in an early critical period where we need to ship fast and stay competitive to remain relevant. Although I'm more inclined to be conservative with spending, some extraordinary spending might indeed be needed to advance our protocol—not just must-have items like security, but also highly desired ones like integrations. It's better to have that extra room.
Although experience tells me we tend to utilize 100% of budgets, it's not a mandate to use the whole amount of ADA. As far as I'm concerned, I'll vote based on items I think we absolutely need, without feeling we must hit 100% of that NCL.
- Abstain 313.1K ₳ Rationale
I vote to ABSTAIN on this proposal to set a new NCL(epoch 613-713) due to constitutional inconsistencies in the proposal text following the enactment of the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution V2.4.
Under "application and compliance" the proposal states the NCL shall be applied to ensure compliance with Article IV of the constitution, and therefore references an outdated constittutional structure and requires amendment to remain accurate. My vote is a highlight of an ongoing risk where proposals rely on on constitutional references without proper coordination after constitutional changes have taken effect. - Yes 298.6K ₳ Rationale
Seems like a reasonable NCL for this period of time. It's approximately in line with previous values.
- Yes 295.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 271.5K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 260K ₳ Rationale
Abstain. The limit is reasonable, but the 16-month period is too long and the projections remain uncertain. I may support future proposals that include stronger fiscal safeguards.
- No 258.6K ₳ Rationale
Governance Action Report (EN)
1. Introduction
This Governance Action proposes establishing a Net Change Limit (NCL) required by the Cardano Constitution, defining the maximum amount of lovelace that can be withdrawn from the treasury during a specified period. The proposed NCL starts at the beginning of Epoch 613 (13 February 2026) and ends at the close of Epoch 713 (3 July 2027), setting a cap of 350,000,000,000,000 lovelace (350M ADA) for total withdrawals across that window.
The NCL is intended to be applied when reviewing Treasury Withdrawal governance actions for compliance with Article IV of the Cardano Constitution and the Treasury Withdrawal Guardrails in Appendix I. The rationale defines 2025 “Net Income” as treasury inflows from Epoch 532 through Epoch 604, totaling 306,940,195 ADA, and sets the limit at 350M ADA (about 115% of that figure), driven in part by inclusion of a previously approved 50M ADA Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget. An adjustment to the period length is justified as a way to realign the NCL cycle with a mid-year budget season and ensure completed prior-year inflow data exists when setting the next NCL.
The voting threshold is stated as greater than 50% of active voting DRep stake, with Constitutional Committee members encouraged (but not required) to provide an opinion via rationale. An attached methodology states the action would be treated as ratified at expiry if 50% + 1 lovelace of active voting DRep stake supports it, using Koios’ Proposal Voting Summary as the reference where tooling diverges. [Source: A]
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
The Net Change Limit is not optional under the constitutional treasury framework. Without a formally agreed cap, Treasury Withdrawals become unconstitutional and blocked, creating operational stalemate and preventing execution of initiatives that depend on on-chain funding. Approving an NCL keeps the funding mechanism functional and avoids leaving treasury governance in limbo due to absence of a basic parameter.
Even with weak proposer framing, a technically favorable point remains: once annualized across the longer time window, the effective spend rate per unit of time tends to be lower than the prior active cap. Even where “115% of inflow” sounds negative at first glance, the longer period dilutes the cap and can represent tighter fiscal discipline on a time-adjusted basis.
The inclusion of spreadsheets and assumptions is treated as a positive. This does not resolve governance problems, but it meets a minimum acceptable baseline for auditability by enabling public scrutiny and verification instead of relying on an arbitrary figure.
Negative aspects
A procedural issue is raised as primary. The action was drafted while citing the prior Constitution’s structure and framing, in a context where a new Constitution was already being voted on with high likelihood of ratification. Even if the older Constitution was formally active at submission time, enough information existed to anticipate that the governing text could change during the voting process. Submitting the action on that timing, without aligning language to the document about to become operative, creates unnecessary confusion and normalizes referencing dated documents and “fixing” meaning later through interpretation.
Governance by over-interpretation follows directly. When a text is outdated or misaligned with the governing document, reliance shifts to context outside the text to justify what it “was supposed to mean.” On-chain governance requires auditable, self-contained text. Normalizing “the document says X, but it really means Y because everyone knows” moves governance into informal ambiguity shaped by convenience, and that precedent is not treated as acceptable.
A structural issue is identified in the rationale used to justify the cap. Incorporating a prior “signal” via an Info Action as justification to raise the NCL cap “to respect dReps’ will” inverts the purpose of the NCL. The NCL is meant to function as macro discipline that forces coordination and prioritization. Calibrating the cap to fit what has already been signaled stops it from functioning as a control mechanism and turns it into a stamp for demand, producing the expectation that if the cap gets in the way, the cap will be revisited. If normalized, this encourages a race to the treasury and erodes the meaning of the parameter.
Two chronic ecosystem issues are treated as amplifiers: absence of guardrails discouraging concentration by entity and absence of an anti-bundling standard. With the NCL functioning only as an aggregate limit and no minimally structured public guidance discouraging concentration or encouraging decomposition of requests, the predictable outcome is large actors consuming disproportionate fiscal space while community-led initiatives are squeezed. Without anti-bundling pressure, incentives persist to package heterogeneous work together, blending controversial items with “must-pass” items, forcing poor compromises and weakening decision quality.
Review cadence is also treated as weak as a norm. The prior cycle saw the NCL revised multiple times to accommodate changes and new demands. Flexibility and some emergency mechanism are not rejected in principle, but the current practice is treated as too malleable. Without minimum stability, predictability, and political restraint around revisions, incentives shift toward poor planning and coordination in favor of “playing the timing game,” destroying the NCL’s coordinating function and discouraging fiscal responsibility.
Methodological narrative problems are identified. The inflow description and rhetorical blending of fees and monetary expansion degrade institutional quality. Governance should not depend on a reader reconstructing intended meaning. More importantly, an explicit fiscal objective for the treasury is missing. Without stating whether the goal is preserving principal, spending aggressively for growth, or controlling drawdown through a treasury floor and contingencies, the NCL becomes a floating number supported by superficial heuristics like “don’t spend more than what comes in,” despite inflow being substantially monetary expansion that declines over time.
Risks and concerns
Unaddressed externalities are flagged: the relationship between withdrawals and sell pressure; incentives created by budgeting in USD and converting to ADA with large cushions in a bear market; and the risk of opportunistic behavior or abandonment when ADA price moves materially. An easy solution is not claimed, and on-chain hard-coding is not demanded. A minimally professional proposal is expected to acknowledge these dynamics and provide mitigation principles, even if only as off-chain guidance or best-practice expectations.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
A Net Change Limit is treated as necessary for constitutional treasury withdrawals, and approving an NCL is acknowledged as keeping the funding mechanism functional and avoiding governance deadlock. Technical merit is also acknowledged in the annualized interpretation of the longer window, and the presence of annexed spreadsheets and assumptions is treated as meeting a minimum baseline for auditability.
Despite those points, the document is treated as crossing an unacceptable line for governance precedent. The timing and drafting are treated as procedurally weak by anchoring language and framing in a constitution structure likely to change during the vote, increasing confusion and normalizing a practice of referencing dated documents and repairing meaning later through interpretation. That is directly linked to a broader risk: governance by over-interpretation, where context outside the on-chain text becomes the mechanism to justify meaning, undermining auditability and self-containment.
The rationale for expanding the cap is also treated as structurally inverted: using prior signaling to justify a higher limit turns the NCL from a discipline mechanism into a demand-fitting stamp, encouraging the expectation that the cap will be revisited whenever it becomes constraining. With weak or absent ecosystem norms around anti-concentration, anti-bundling, and restrained revision cadence, this pattern is treated as likely to accelerate a treasury race, weaken coordination, and erode the NCL’s coordinating function.
Methodological confusion and the absence of an explicit fiscal objective further undermine institutional quality, and externalities around sell pressure and price-based incentives are treated as insufficiently acknowledged. A revised Governance Action aligned to the operative constitution and grounded in coherent premises, with at least non-binding public guidance on coordination, concentration, and anti-bundling, is treated as the appropriate path rather than approving this version as written.
4. Conclusion
An NCL is treated as required to keep treasury withdrawals operational under the constitutional framework, and the annualized framing plus annexed data provide limited technical and auditability value. Even so, procedural weakness, reliance on interpretation outside the text, demand-fitting cap logic, and missing structural norms around concentration, bundling, and revision stability are treated as unacceptable precedent for fiscal governance, leading to rejection of this version.
Relatório de Ação de Governança (PT-BR)
1. Introdução
Esta Ação de Governança propõe estabelecer um Net Change Limit (NCL) exigido pela Constituição de Cardano, definindo o valor máximo de lovelace que pode ser retirado do tesouro durante um período especificado. O NCL proposto inicia no começo da Epoch 613 (13 de fevereiro de 2026) e termina no fim da Epoch 713 (3 de julho de 2027), fixando um teto de 350.000.000.000.000 lovelace (350M ADA) para o total de retiradas ao longo dessa janela.
O NCL deve ser aplicado na revisão de ações de governança de Treasury Withdrawal para verificação de conformidade com o Artigo IV da Constituição de Cardano e com os Treasury Withdrawal Guardrails do Apêndice I. A justificativa define “Net Income” de 2025 como a soma dos inflows do tesouro entre as Epochs 532 e 604, totalizando 306.940.195 ADA, e estabelece o limite em 350M ADA (cerca de 115% desse valor), impulsionado em parte pela inclusão de um orçamento de 50M ADA para Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity previamente aprovado. Um ajuste no comprimento do período é justificado como forma de realinhar o ciclo do NCL com a temporada orçamentária de meio de ano e assegurar que dados completos de inflow do ano anterior existam ao definir o próximo NCL.
O limiar de aprovação é apresentado como superior a 50% do stake ativo votante de DReps, com membros do Comitê Constitucional incentivados (mas não obrigados) a registrar opinião via rationale. Uma metodologia anexada afirma que a ação seria tratada como ratificada no vencimento se 50% + 1 lovelace do stake ativo votante de DReps apoiar a ação, usando o Proposal Voting Summary da Koios como referência quando houver divergência entre ferramentas. [Source: A]
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
O Net Change Limit não é opcional no framework constitucional do tesouro. Sem um teto formalmente acordado, Treasury Withdrawals tornam-se inconstitucionais e bloqueados, criando um impasse operacional e impedindo a execução de iniciativas que dependem de funding on-chain. Aprovar um NCL mantém o mecanismo de funding funcional e evita deixar a governança do tesouro em limbo pela ausência de um parâmetro básico.
Mesmo com um enquadramento fraco por parte do proponente, permanece um ponto tecnicamente favorável: ao anualizar o valor proposto na janela de tempo mais longa, a taxa efetiva de gasto por unidade de tempo tende a ser menor do que o teto ativo anterior. Mesmo quando “115% do inflow” soa ruim à primeira vista, o período mais longo dilui o teto e pode representar disciplina fiscal mais restrita em base ajustada ao tempo.
A inclusão de planilhas e premissas é tratada como positiva. Isso não resolve problemas de governança, mas atende a um mínimo aceitável de auditabilidade ao permitir escrutínio e verificação públicos, em vez de depender de um número arbitrário.
Aspectos negativos
Um problema procedimental é tratado como o mais importante. A ação foi redigida citando a estrutura e o enquadramento da Constituição anterior, em um contexto em que uma nova Constituição já estava sendo votada com alta probabilidade de ratificação. Mesmo que a Constituição antiga ainda fosse formalmente ativa no momento da submissão, havia informação suficiente para antecipar que o texto governante poderia mudar durante o processo de votação. Submeter a ação nesse timing, sem alinhar a linguagem ao documento prestes a se tornar operativo, cria confusão desnecessária e normaliza a prática de referenciar documentos datados e “consertar” o sentido depois via interpretação.
Governança por over-interpretation decorre diretamente disso. Quando um texto está desatualizado ou desalinhado com o documento governante, a comunidade passa a depender de contexto fora do texto para justificar o que “deveria significar”. Governança on-chain precisa ser auditável e autocontida. Normalizar “o documento diz X, mas na verdade significa Y porque todo mundo sabe” desloca a governança para ambiguidade informal moldada por conveniência, e esse precedente não é tratado como aceitável.
Um problema estrutural também é apontado na justificativa usada para o teto. Incorporar um “sinal” prévio via Info Action como justificativa para elevar o teto do NCL “para respeitar a vontade dos dReps” inverte o propósito do NCL. O NCL deveria funcionar como disciplina macro que força coordenação e priorização. Calibrar o teto para caber o que já foi sinalizado faz com que ele deixe de ser um mecanismo de controle e vire um carimbo de demanda, produzindo a expectativa de que, se o teto atrapalhar, o teto será revisado. Se isso virar norma, incentiva corrida ao tesouro e erosão do significado do parâmetro.
Dois problemas crônicos do ecossistema são tratados como agravantes: ausência de guardrails contra concentração e ausência de qualquer padrão anti-bundling. Com o NCL funcionando apenas como limite agregado e sem orientação pública minimamente estruturada para desencorajar concentração por entidade ou pressionar decomposição de pedidos, o resultado previsível é o já observado: grandes atores consumindo parcela desproporcional do espaço fiscal enquanto iniciativas lideradas pela comunidade são comprimidas. Sem pressão anti-bundling, persistem incentivos para empacotar trabalhos heterogêneos, misturando itens controversos com itens “que precisam passar”, forçando maus compromissos e enfraquecendo a qualidade decisória.
A cadência de revisão também é tratada como fraca como norma. No ciclo anterior, o NCL foi revisitado múltiplas vezes para acomodar mudanças e novas demandas. Flexibilidade e algum mecanismo de emergência não são rejeitados em princípio, mas a prática atual é tratada como excessivamente maleável. Sem estabilidade mínima, previsibilidade e contenção política em revisões, o ecossistema aprende o comportamento errado: não planejar e coordenar, mas “jogar o jogo do timing”, destruindo a função coordenadora do NCL e desincentivando responsabilidade fiscal.
Problemas na narrativa metodológica são destacados. A forma como inflows são descritos e a mistura retórica entre fees e monetary expansion degradam a qualidade institucional. Governança não deveria depender de o leitor reconstruir a lógica pretendida. Mais importante, falta uma discussão explícita sobre o objetivo fiscal do tesouro. Sem declarar se o objetivo é preservar principal, gastar agressivamente para crescimento, ou controlar drawdown por meio de um piso do tesouro e contingências, o NCL vira um número flutuante sustentado por heurísticas superficiais como “não gastar mais do que entra”, em um contexto em que grande parte do inflow é monetary expansion e essa expansão declina ao longo do tempo.
Riscos e preocupações
Externalidades não endereçadas são apontadas: a relação entre retiradas e sell pressure; os incentivos criados por orçamentação em USD e conversão para ADA com grandes colchões em bear market; e o risco real de comportamento oportunista ou abandono quando o preço de ADA muda materialmente. Uma solução fácil não é alegada, e hard-code on-chain não é exigido. Uma proposta minimamente profissional deveria ao menos reconhecer esses pontos e apresentar princípios de mitigação, ainda que apenas como orientação off-chain ou expectativas de best practice.
3. Voto e Fundamentação
Voto: NÃO
Um Net Change Limit é tratado como necessário para retiradas constitucionais do tesouro, e o valor funcional de aprovar um NCL é reconhecido por manter o mecanismo de funding operacional e evitar deadlock de governança. Também é reconhecido mérito técnico na leitura anualizada do período mais longo, e a presença de planilhas e premissas anexadas é tratada como atendendo a um mínimo de auditabilidade.
Apesar desses pontos, o documento é tratado como ultrapassando uma linha inaceitável de precedente de governança. O timing e a redação são tratados como procedimentalmente fracos ao ancorar linguagem e enquadramento em uma estrutura constitucional com alta chance de mudar durante a votação, ampliando confusão e normalizando a prática de referenciar documentos datados e reparar o sentido depois via interpretação. Isso é ligado diretamente a um risco mais amplo: governança por over-interpretation, onde contexto fora do texto on-chain vira o mecanismo para justificar significado, minando auditabilidade e autocontenção.
A justificativa para expandir o teto também é tratada como estruturalmente invertida: usar sinalização prévia para justificar um limite maior transforma o NCL de mecanismo de disciplina em carimbo que se ajusta à demanda, incentivando a expectativa de que o teto será revisado sempre que virar restritivo. Com normas fracas ou ausentes no ecossistema sobre anti-concentração, anti-bundling e contenção em revisões, esse padrão é tratado como propenso a acelerar corrida ao tesouro, enfraquecer coordenação e erodir a função coordenadora do NCL.
Confusão metodológica e ausência de objetivo fiscal explícito reduzem ainda mais a qualidade institucional, e externalidades sobre sell pressure e incentivos baseados em preço são tratadas como insuficientemente reconhecidas. Em vez de aprovar esta versão como está, o caminho adequado é tratado como submeter uma nova Ação de Governança alinhada à constituição operativa e baseada em premissas coerentes, com ao menos orientação pública não vinculante sobre coordenação, concentração e anti-bundling, para que o NCL deixe de ser um número performativo e passe a ser um instrumento real de governança fiscal.
4. Conclusão
Um NCL é tratado como necessário para manter retiradas do tesouro operacionais sob o framework constitucional, e a leitura anualizada mais dados anexados oferecem valor técnico e de auditabilidade limitado. Mesmo assim, fraqueza procedimental, dependência de interpretação fora do texto, lógica de teto ajustada à demanda e ausência de normas estruturais sobre concentração, bundling e estabilidade de revisão são tratados como precedente inaceitável, levando à rejeição desta versão.
- No 257K ₳ Rationale
I support the need for a Net Change Limit for Epochs 613–713, but I do not support setting it at 350M ADA on the basis of the analysis provided. The proposed cap is chosen top‑down from past inflows and the previous NCL (≈306.9M ADA net income uplifted to 350M ≈115%), largely to accommodate an undrawn 50M DeFi Liquidity Budget, without a bottom‑up view of category‑level forecasts, a treasury sustainability trajectory, or ROI‑style reporting on how the last NCL’s spending actually performed. This falls short of responsible, program‑driven budgeting.
In practice, the prior 350M NCL has already been treated as a soft spending target, with an extension passed once the cap was approached, rather than as a rigorously justified ceiling. Re‑adopting the same headline number, again without clear forward planning or outcome analysis, risks normalizing that behavior. I am therefore voting NO on this 350M ADA NCL and would prefer a future NCL that is set at a more conservative level and explicitly grounded in transparent forecasts and retrospective impact reporting.
- No 245K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 238.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 215.5K ₳ Rationale
I support the Net Change Limit because it helps keep stake movements gradual and avoids sudden shocks to the network. For smaller and independent pools, this kind of stability matters. It gives operators time to adapt and helps prevent stake from concentrating too quickly in a few large players. Overall, I believe this is better for decentralization and long-term network health.
- No 208.6K ₳ Rationale
The proposed cap allows excessive treasury spend velocity over the next ~16–17 months, especially with current ADA price action making large withdrawals riskier in terms of market impact, sell pressure narrative, and long-term sustainability. We must prioritize fiscal discipline and conserve funds during this transitional phase. I advocate for a reduced 200–250M ADA limit to enforce better prioritization and alignment with conservative inflow projections. That said, I'm optimistic: Midnight's privacy features and potential Clarity Act passage in the US could drive real adoption, higher fees, and treasury growth soon. Let's position ourselves strongly for that turnaround by protecting reserves now.
- Yes 190.2K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 180.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 137.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 131.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 111.7K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 108K ₳ No rationale
- No 69.8K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 65.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 61.9K ₳ No rationale
- No 60.1K ₳ No rationale
- No 55.9K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 53K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 52.9K ₳ No rationale
- No 49.3K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 48.6K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 48.5K ₳ No rationale
- No 48.4K ₳ No rationale
- Yes 45.8K ₳ No rationale
- No 45.2K ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 33.9K ₳ No rationale