Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)
160 DReps voted · 60 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes 592.3M ₳ Rationale
Summary
Yoroi DRep votes YES on the Net Change Limit (NCL) 2026 proposal, which sets a maximum treasury withdrawal limit of 350,000,000 ADA for the specified period. We support establishing a clear and well-defined limit to enable transparent and predictable governance for ADA holders.
Rationale
Purpose and Scope of the Net Change Limit
This proposal establishes the maximum amount that may be withdrawn from the treasury during the specified period. Approval of the NCL does not authorize spending, but instead defines the boundary within which individual treasury withdrawal proposals may be evaluated and voted on.
Clarity of Intent and Context for the Proposed Amount
The proposed limit takes into account a previously approved Budget Info Action, namely Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget. Acknowledging these prior approvals helps clarify that the proposed NCL is intended to accommodate known commitments, rather than signal automatic or unrestricted spending.
Timeline and Community Predictability
Aligning the NCL period with the mid-year budget cycle improves predictability around when treasury-related decisions are likely to occur. This makes it easier for the Cardano community to follow governance developments and engage with the process in a timely manner.
Conclusion
Yoroi supports this Info Action as a clear and reasonable guardrail that allows treasury governance to proceed in a predictable and accountable manner. We thank the Budget Committee for preparing this proposal and supporting the continuity of treasury governance.
- Yes 428.5M ₳ Rationale
I am voting YES for "Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)".
I don't understand the logic behind the 350M ada limit stated in the metadata for this governance action, but since the expenditure limit is set to be less than the inflow over an 18-month (17-month) period, I don't think it will destroy financial discipline.
私は「Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)」にYESを投票します。
このガバナンスアクションのメタデータに記載される350M ADAとなるロジックは理解できませんでしたが、18ヶ月（17ヶ月）の期間の流入額以下の支出額が設定されているため、財務規律を破壊するものではないと思います。
- Yes 297.4M ₳ Rationale
Summary
EMURGO as DRep votes YES on the Net Change Limit (NCL) 2026 governance action submitted by the Budget Committee with rationale below.
Rationale
The Cardano Constitution requires an agreed Net Change Limit before any treasury withdrawal actions can be considered constitutional. Establishing an NCL is therefore a structural requirement to allow treasury governance to function as intended, rather than an approval of future spending. The proposed limit of 350 million ADA is grounded in realized treasury inflows for 2025, supporting fiscal discipline and continuity with prior governance decisions.
EMURGO also considers the revised NCL duration to be a meaningful governance improvement. Realigning the cycle with the mid-year budget season reflects learnings from earlier governance rounds and improves participation and planning for treasury governance. This action defines a constitutional ceiling only, with all treasury withdrawals remaining subject to separate scrutiny, justification, and approval under the Constitution and applicable guardrails. For these reasons, EMURGO votes YES.
- Yes 221.8M ₳ Rationale
TL;DR: EDC voted YES on gov_action1m3xx08yv788vfxqh6nfvrjtvmqpwezsy0ggaczctkyjmttc2wmxsq4jsr7q;
As per constitution, we need an NCL in place to approve withdrawals. This proposal sets a 1.5 year limit / term. It's an upper limit and can be changed any time by submitting a new proposal.
- Yes 160.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 135.1M ₳ Rationale
The Cardano Foundation, as a DRep, votes YES. This Net Change Limit ensures operational continuity, strategically realigns the budget cycle to mid-year, and sets a 350 million ada ceiling.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We are supporting this proposal based on the following factors:
- Operational Continuity & Constitutional Necessity: Establishing a valid Net Change Limit (NCL) is a constitutional prerequisite for processing any treasury withdrawals. Without this ratification, legitimate funding for ecosystem maintenance and growth would be blocked after Epoch 612 (13 February 2026).
- Strategic Realignment of the Budget Cycle: We endorse extending the NCL period to July 2027 (approx. 16.5 months). This shift corrects the "governance calendar" friction, moving critical budget votes away from the end-of-year holiday season to a mid-year cycle where participation is naturally higher. This is a practical governance improvement.
- Fiscal Prudence & Continuity of Commitments: We accept the limit of 350 million ada as data-backed and responsible. This figure accounts for the ~306M ADA inflow observed in 2025 while effectively "carrying over" the authority for the previously approved, but unspent, 50M ada Stablecoin Liquidity budget. By incorporating these prior commitments, the NCL serves as a bridge that respects the DReps’ decision as expressed in 2025. Furthermore, extending the 350M cap over a longer 16.5-month period effectively reduces the annualized spending ceiling compared to the previous year.
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. Our support is based on maintaining the stability of the treasury and ensuring the continuity of ecosystem operations. We encourage the community and future proposers to view this NCL as a hard ceiling, not a spending goal, and to keep demanding thorough reporting on the effectiveness of all treasury withdrawals.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Yes 93.3M ₳ Rationale
As a DRep, I decided to vote YES for the proposal: Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)
Up to ₳350M can be withdrawn during the February 2026 –July 2027 NCL period. That cap was set higher specifically because there is an expected / previously approved ₳50M withdrawal originating from the 2025 decision.
The ₳50M budget is expected to be used to mint stablecoins. The Cardano ecosystem desperately needs this investment. If withdrawal is not approved, the ₳50M will remain available for something else.
The new NCL period is 500 days, or roughly 1 year and 4 months. On average, about ₳19M can be spent per month. The NCL for 2026 would be about 225M ADA.
According to my calculations, about ₳275M will be moved from the reserve to the treasury in 2026. In 2027, about ₳240M. Even if the maximum amount of ADA according to the NCL was withdrawn, ₳50M would remain in the treasury for the next years. That is reasonable.
The Cardano protocol earns about ₳50K per epoch, so in the calculation it is unfortunately a negligible amount for now.
I dare say that this NCL will push for cost reduction. Given that the teams will probably consider a lower price of ADA in 2026 than in 2025, most of the budget can be consumed by IOG, Catalyst and Intersect if they would request a similar budget.
As a reminder, in 2025 they requested:
- IOG core development: ₳96M
- IOG research: ₳27M
- Catalyst: ₳70M
- Intersect: ₳15M
That's a total of ₳208M. That would leave ₳17M for other proposals. Within this NCL, there is no room for another larger proposal of the scale of the Pentad proposal (₳70M) or the originally planned ₳100M for DeFi liquidity. I don't see much room for marketing proposals.
However, this is only a theoretical consideration at this point. No one can predict the market.
The NCL can be changed at any time. I believe that if there is a good reason, DReps would be willing to increase the NCL as needed.
At this point, it is wise to set the NCL to a low value. The proposed NCL of ₳300M + ₳50M is acceptable.
DReps should demand higher granularity of large proposals and carefully select only those items that Cardano really needs in 2026/2027.
With this NCL, it is not realistic to approve almost ₳100M budget for IOG without DReps having the opportunity to postpone less needed items to later. I want to believe that Intersect will play its role well in this.
It is obvious that proposals that will be submitted at the beginning of the NCL period will have a higher chance of approval. It can be assumed that most of the budget will be spent at the beginning and less will be left for later expenses.
DReps should be careful about the extended NCL period.
- Yes 92.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 89.8M ₳ Rationale
SIPO DRep – Vote: YES
Governance Action: Net Change Limit (Epoch 613–713)I, as SIPO DRep, am voting YES on this Net Change Limit (NCL) proposal.
This decision is based on a clear distinction between agreeing on a constitutional spending ceiling and approving actual treasury spending. My YES vote supports the former, not the latter.
- Why a YES vote is necessary
Under the Cardano Constitution, no treasury withdrawal can be considered constitutional unless a Net Change Limit has been formally agreed upon by DReps.
Without an approved NCL, all treasury withdrawal actions are effectively blocked, regardless of their quality or necessity.From a governance perspective, failing to establish an NCL would not represent fiscal prudence; it would represent a governance deadlock.
As a DRep who values long-term ecosystem sustainability, I believe it is essential that Cardano’s governance mechanisms remain operational.This proposal enables governance to function. That alone makes it necessary.
- This vote is NOT approval of spending
I want to be absolutely clear:
• This YES vote does not approve spending 350M ADA
• This YES vote does not pre-approve any treasury withdrawal
• This YES vote does not delegate blanket authority to future proposalsWhat it does approve is a hard upper bound:
“Even if withdrawals are approved, they must not exceed this total amount during the defined period.”
In other words, this proposal is a constraint, not an authorization.
Any individual treasury withdrawal proposal must still be evaluated on its own merits, and I will continue to assess each one independently and critically.
- Assessment of the proposed amount and period
The proposed Net Change Limit of 350 million ADA over approximately 16 months is grounded in real data and reasonable assumptions:
• It is based on actual treasury inflows from 2025
• It accounts for already-approved (but not yet withdrawn) budget commitments
• It aligns the NCL cycle with a mid-year budget rhythm, improving participation and planningImportantly, this is not an aggressive or expansionary ceiling.
It is a managed limit designed to preserve predictability while respecting prior DRep decisions.From a risk-management perspective, I find this approach reasonable and defensible.
- Why this matters beyond Cardano
From a broader blockchain perspective, Cardano is entering territory that very few ecosystems have reached:
• A constitutionally defined treasury framework
• A democratically agreed, time-bounded spending cap
• Clear separation between budget ceilings and budget executionMany blockchains still rely on discretionary foundations or opaque budget processes.
This proposal reinforces Cardano’s position as a governance-first, institution-grade public blockchain.Supporting this framework is consistent with Cardano’s long-term vision.
- Ongoing responsibility as a DRep
My YES vote here does not reduce my responsibility as a DRep.
On the contrary, it increases it.Going forward, I will continue to evaluate treasury withdrawal proposals based on:
• Public value and ecosystem-wide benefit
• Long-term sustainability rather than short-term popularity
• Transparency, accountability, and clarity of execution
• Alignment with Cardano’s constitutional principlesIf a proposal fails to meet these standards, I will not hesitate to vote NO, regardless of whether the NCL allows room for it.
- Closing statement
In summary:
• I support this Net Change Limit because it is constitutionally required
• I support it because it enables governance without enabling abuse
• I support it while maintaining strict scrutiny over all future spendingFor these reasons, SIPO DRep votes YES on this proposal.
SIPO DRep – 投票：Yes
ガバナンスアクション：Net Change Limit（Epoch 613–713）SIPO DRepとして、私は本提案に 「Yes」 を投じます。
この判断は、
「支出上限を憲法上で定めること」 と
「実際の支出を承認すること」
を明確に切り分けた上でのものです。- なぜ「Yes」が必要なのか
カルダノ憲法では、Net Change Limit（NCL）が合意されていない限り、
いかなるトレジャリー引き出しも違憲とされます。つまり、NCLが存在しなければ、
• 良い提案であっても
• 必要性の高い支出であっても制度上、すべてが停止してしまいます。
これは慎重さではなく、ガバナンスの停滞です。
SIPOは、カルダノが「動き続けるガバナンス」を持つことが重要だと考えており、その前提として、NCLの設定は不可欠だと判断しました。
- この「Yes」は支出承認ではありません
ここは特に強調したい点です。
• この「Yes」は 350M ADAを使うことへの賛成ではありません
• この「Yes」は 個別のトレジャリー引き出しの事前承認ではありません
• この「Yes」は 白紙委任ではありません本提案が定めるのは、
「この期間中、最大でも これ以上は使えない」
という 上限（ガードレール） です。
あくまで制約であり、許可証ではありません。
- 金額と期間についての評価
今回のNCLは、
• 2025年の実際のトレジャリー流入データに基づき
• すでにDRepで承認済みの予算（未引き出し分）を考慮し
• 約16か月という現実的な期間設定で構成されています。
過度に拡張的な数字ではなく、
管理された上限として、妥当性のある設計だと受け止めています。- ブロックチェーン全体から見た意義
多くのブロックチェーンでは、今なお、
• 財団裁量の予算執行
• 不透明な支出プロセスが主流です。
それに対してカルダノは、
• 憲法に基づき
• 期間と総量を事前に定め
• DRepが民主的に合意するという、非常に先進的な財政ガバナンスに踏み込んでいます。
この枠組みを支えること自体が、カルダノの価値だとSIPOは考えています。
- DRepとしての責任は続きます
今回「Yes」を投じたからといって、
SIPOの責任が軽くなることはありません。むしろ、
• 個別のトレジャリー引き出し提案について
• 公共性、長期性、説明責任
• エコシステム全体への波及効果を、これまで以上に厳しく見ていく必要があると考えています。
基準を満たさない提案には、NCLの枠が残っていても、私は「No」を投じます。
- まとめ
SIPO DRepとしての立場は明確です。
• NCLは 制度として必要
• しかし、それは 支出の自動承認ではない
• 今後も 個別提案は是々非々で判断する以上の理由から、
SIPO DRepは本Net Change Limit提案に「Yes」を投じます。 - Yes 74.7M ₳ No rationale
- No 71.3M ₳ Rationale
I am voting NO. 350M ADA is excessive. We must enforce strict fiscal discipline based on minimal treasury inflows. I advocate for a reduced limit of 200-250M ADA to force prioritization. After our initial heavy spending to plug gaps, we must now grow the treasury, not deplete it.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting NO. A 350M ADA limit is excessive. We must enforce strict fiscal discipline based on conservative, minimal inflow projections.
I advocate for a reduced Net Change Limit in the region of 200-250M ADA. This would force prioritization and ensure we operate within our means. Especially after our recent initial spending to plug significant infrastructure gaps, we should be growing the treasury rather than depleting it.
- Yes 68M ₳ Rationale
I vote YES on this Net Change Limit because it sets a clear and reasonable upper bound for treasury withdrawals for the 2026–2027 period. The ₳350M limit is grounded in historical treasury inflows and appropriately accounts for previously approved commitments, including the ₳50M allocation for stablecoin and DeFi liquidity approved in 2025.
The extended NCL period aligns better with the mid-year budgeting cycle and improves predictability for governance and planning. Based on current inflow projections, even if the full NCL amount were utilized, the treasury is expected to retain some flexibility for future periods, although this naturally depends on market conditions and the actual pace of spending.
By clearly defining an upper limit, this NCL helps prevent open-ended spending and encourages better prioritization and scrutiny of proposals. If circumstances materially change, the NCL can be adjusted through future governance actions, but establishing a clear baseline at this stage is a prudent and responsible approach.
僕は本Net Change LimitにYESを投票します。
本提案は、2026〜2027年の期間におけるトレジャリー引き出しに対して、明確かつ現実的な上限を設定しています。3.5億ADAという水準は、過去のトレジャリー流入実績に基づいており、2025年に承認されたステーブルコインおよびDeFi流動性向けの5,000万ADAも適切に考慮されています。また、NCL期間を年央の予算サイクルに合わせることで、ガバナンスおよび計画面での予測可能性が高まります。現時点の流入見通しに基づけば、仮に上限額が使用された場合でも、トレジャリーには将来に向けた一定の柔軟性が残ると考えられますが、これは市場環境や実際の支出ペースに左右される点には留意が必要です。
明確な上限を設定することで、支出が無制限に拡大することを防ぎ、提案内容の優先順位付けや精査を促します。状況が大きく変化した場合には、将来のガバナンスを通じて調整する余地を残しつつ、まずは明確な基準を設けることが妥当だと判断しました。
- Yes 65.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 62.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 53.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 49.8M ₳ Rationale
While I've heard many concerns about the relatively high overall cap of 350M, I prefer not to evaluate future proposals based solely on whether they fit within the total budget. Instead, each proposal should be assessed individually based on its quality, impact, and value for money. Having a higher maximum budget provides flexibility and helps avoid rejecting strong proposals simply due to an artificial overall limit.
- No 49.7M ₳ Rationale
I am voting No for Net Change Limit for E613 to 713. Cardano approved extremely big budget for 2025 and its outcome hasn't reviewed yet. To respect decentrisation of our ecosystem, I basically opposed to big spending from treasury for specific entities. 350M ADA is bigger NCL to previous limit. I recommend community for lowering it to 200M ADA or less.
- No 48.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 42.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 40M ₳ Rationale
Unfortunately due to low ADA prices I believe this limit is high but adequate. We need to spend to accelerate, otherwise ADA price will continue to drop & we will run out of options in the future.
- Yes 38.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 36.8M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 34.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 34.3M ₳ Rationale
Socious votes YES to “Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)” to ensure that ecosystem funding continues uninterrupted after February 2026, as a valid Net Change Limit is constitutionally required for treasury withdrawals. This proposal strategically shifts the budget cycle to mid-year, avoiding low participation during the holiday season. Furthermore, the 350 million ADA ceiling is fiscally responsible; it accommodates previous commitments (such as the unspent Stablecoin Liquidity budget) and, by spreading the amount over 16.5 months, effectively lowers the annualized spending limit compared to the previous year.
ソーシャスは、2026年2月以降もエコシステムへの資金提供を途切れさせないため、Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)に賛成します。財務省からの引き出しを行うには、憲法上、有効な純増減限度額（Net Change Limit）の設定が不可欠だからです。この提案は、予算サイクルを参加率が低下しやすい年末の休暇シーズンから年半ばへと戦略的に移行させるものです。さらに、3億5000万ADAという上限は以前のコミットメント（未消化のステーブルコイン流動性予算など）を考慮した責任ある数字であり、期間を16.5ヶ月に設定することで、実質的な年間支出上限は前年と比較して引き下げられます。
- Yes 31M ₳ Rationale
I’m supporting this Net Change Limit proposal for a few simple reasons:
- The proposed limit feels appropriate when compared with the treasury’s actual inflows, and it maintains a healthy balance for the ecosystem.
- The amount is in line with previous NCLs, which helps keep Cardano’s financial governance steady and predictable.
- The longer timeframe makes sense, as it aligns better with the mid‑year budgeting cycle and allows decisions to be based on complete annual data.
Overall, this NCL strikes a good balance between respecting past commitments and preparing for the development needs ahead.
- Yes 29.3M ₳ No rationale
- No 28.2M ₳ Rationale
After careful consideration I have chosen to vote NO on this NCL of 350M ADA for 100 epochs (505 days). While I appreciate that the lengthened timeline and the normalized reduction of about 27.72% from the previous NCL, I still think it is a bit too much for the Cardano ecosystem's current position. The reserve is dwindling and emissions have decreased since last year, the price of ADA currently at $0.33 gives us very little leverage against actual costs measured in USD, and the 2030 Vision/Strategy is not quite refined enough that I feel comfortable spending 350M ADA without a more promising ROI. For these reasons I am voting NO on this proposal.
- Yes 27.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 26.1M ₳ Rationale
This is what's called preparing for success and means a great deal to those currently grinding away behind a key board like myself to increase overall mkt activity and thereby increasing transaction volume onchain. This appears to be a good number for our Ncl and eco at the moment, considering the amount of work that is currently being done and what still lies ahead, its only prudent to keep the ball rolling in the right direction. There of course is always room to reevaluate each fiscal year but what I actually anticipate is that the Ncl will not be as much of a topic, as the over all revenue generation from proposals like the critical infrastructure and the liquidity fund coming online this year. This by itself will be a huge win for our blockchain and a huge win for the ada holder, here is to the future of Cardano!
- Yes 25.9M ₳ Rationale
Cardano’s spending should be primarily focused on DeFi and other application sectors that generate sustainable revenue for the treasury.
Spending strategies and funding proposals should be developed in close conjunction with builders, who are the most knowledgeable and directly connected to the realities of the Cardano ecosystem. A top-down approach driven by entities or individuals disconnected from on-the-ground development should be avoided.
I will support this budget; however, any future proposals that do not align with these principles will be rejected.
- Yes 25.2M ₳ Rationale
I am voting YES on Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713). It's YOLO time for the ecosystem - I beleive we will waste a bit but I also believe accountability will prevail
- Yes 22.7M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 22M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 22M ₳ Rationale
I am voting YES on establishing the Net Change Limit (NCL) of 350 million ADA for the upcoming ~16-month period.
While this proposed cap slightly exceeds the Treasury's recent net income, I view it as a necessary and strategic forward investment. Our primary goal should be to fund key, high-impact projects that drive real-world adoption of Cardano. Initiatives that successfully bring end-users onto our ecosystem will, in turn, increase transaction volume, generate more network fees, and ultimately bolster future Treasury inflows.
Furthermore, we must consider the current market conditions. The price of ADA is at a relatively low level, and it is reasonable to anticipate that this pricing environment may persist for a significant portion of the period this NCL is in effect. Approving a sufficient budget now ensures that critical development is not stifled by unfavorable market dynamics, allowing us to build robustly during this crucial phase.
Therefore, this NCL represents a well-reasoned balance between fiscal prudence and the strategic imperative to invest in growth. - Abstain 21.2M ₳ Rationale
I vote to ABSTAIN on the proposal for the “Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)” (gov_action1m3xx08yv788vfxqh6nfvrjtvmqpwezsy0ggaczctkyjmttc2wmxsq4jsr7q) as some of the proposal text now requires an amendment… following a constitutional amendment.
Under the rationale section titled “Application and Compliance”, the proposal states that “This limit shall be applied in assessing treasury withdrawal actions to ensure compliance with Article IV of the Cardano Constitution and the Treasury Withdrawal Guardrails specified in Appendix I.”. Following the recent enactment of the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4, this is no longer correct as “Article IV” now covers the “Amendment Process” and not “The Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget” as the previous Constitution did. This, once again, highlights the perils of introducing changes to such a central piece of the Cardano governance system without proper co-ordination or consultation of wider governance participants before submitting proposals live on mainnet.
Regarding the intention of the proposal, to set a new Net Change Limit (NCL) of 350 million ada for a period of approximately 16 months and 20 days, I have conflicting views currently. My voting history shows that I voted NO to proposals of a 300 million ada and a 350 million ada during the setting of the first NCL, while I did vote YES for the proposal for a 200 million ada NCL. My concerns then were justified, while the NCL was billed as a “spending cap, not a spending target”, it became just that. To the extent that we found ourselves in December 2025 frantically rushing governance, on a chain renowned for is methodical approach, just so that the founding entities could “hoover up” the remainder of the NCL before it expired. DReps approved a 70 million ada budget and withdrawal in record time, equating to 20% of the entire NCL for that period. Not only that, we even voted to extend the NCL in order to accommodate the resultant Treasury Withdrawal due to lack of foresight by the “Pentad” with the timing of their submissions.
Now, I am also a realist and I have to objectively assess my previous stance with present day reality. The first NCL was often quoted using an ada price of $0.50 and I judged it accordingly. If I use my basis of 200 million ada and account for a present-day price of $0.36 per ada, it would require 278 million ada to account for the decline in ada price. Secondly, accounting for this proposal being for 16 months and 20 days as opposed to one calendar year, that would equate to a total of 385 million ada. Therefore, a proposal of 350 million ada for this period does on paper translate to a reduction when stood up against the previous NCL.
With that said, I really do think that we should take a moment to reassess. We speed run governance in December 2025 with little pause for review following that frantic period. To just roll onto the next thing and exacerbate more spending when we’ve barely had chance to analyse the impact of the previous NCL cycle funding could be viewed as irresponsible. Yes, we have the Treasury Withdrawal votes to exercise that power but with the recent removal of the budget info action requirement from the Constitution, those lines too have just become a lot finer.
- Yes 21.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 21.1M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 20.3M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 19.9M ₳ Rationale
I approve a NCL of approximately 115% of the realized Net Income for the current budget cycle.
- Yes 18.2M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 17.4M ₳ No rationale
- No 17.1M ₳ Rationale
Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)
- Yes 16.7M ₳ Rationale
I support approving this NCL because it provides a clear, predictable spending ceiling while still allowing the ecosystem to keep funding builders and infrastructure that can grow real on-chain usage and, over time, increase the share of Cardano’s sustainability coming from transaction fees and economic activity.
The proposed cap is 350M ADA over ~100 epochs (~500 days / ~1 year 4 months). Under a conservative inflow path where treasury replenishment was ~3.9M ADA/epoch at end-2025 and continues declining at roughly the same rate observed through 2026 (~0.7M ADA/epoch per year), the expected treasury inflow across this window is roughly ~336M ADA. That implies the cap is near net neutral but slightly net negative in a worst-case scenario where the full cap is utilized (on the order of ~14M ADA), which is still within a tight band relative to the overall limit.
Importantly, this proposal does not inflate treasury outflows versus prior policy: the previous NCL was also 350M ADA, but set over roughly ~1 year. Spreading the same cap over ~1 year 4 months materially reduces the annualized spend rate, aligning with the reality that treasury inflows are trending downward.
My support is conditional on execution discipline: I expect greater granularity and accountability in future treasury withdrawals (clear scope, itemized budgets, milestones, and measurable KPIs). We should avoid approving tens of millions of ADA as a single “bundle” without concrete deliverables and performance measurement. NCL is the guardrail; sustainability still depends on funding high-quality, KPI-driven work that demonstrably expands adoption and usage.
- Yes 16.4M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 14.2M ₳ No rationale
- Abstain 13.3M ₳ Rationale
This Info action proposes setting a Net Change Limit (NCL) of 350 million ADA for Epochs 613–713 (approximately 16 months and 20 days).RCADA recognises that a Net Change Limit remains a constitutionally required guardrail under the current treasury withdrawal framework and that the proposer has attempted to provide a clear fiscal boundary following the recent enactment of Constitution v2.4. We also note the pragmatic attempt to adjust the previous NCL benchmark for the decline in ADA price and the longer period.However, RCADA must apply the same high-bar lens we have used for other significant governance actions: changes that affect treasury access and spending discipline must be both technically accurate and accompanied by demonstrable improvements in process quality, accountability, and decentralisation resilience.Three issues prevent us from endorsing this proposal as submitted:Constitutional inaccuracy
The “Application and Compliance” section still references compliance with “Article IV of the Cardano Constitution” for treasury withdrawal guardrails. Following the ratification of Constitution v2.4 (effective January 24, 2026), Article IV now addresses the Amendment Process. The treasury/budget provisions have moved. This is not a minor typo; it is a material error in a document that is intended to become a binding fiscal constraint. Submitting live governance actions with outdated constitutional references undermines the very legitimacy the Constitution is meant to protect.
Lessons from the previous NCL cycle
Our voting record shows we voted NO on the 300M and 350M proposals for the first NCL and YES only on the 200M proposal. Those concerns proved justified: the NCL was repeatedly treated as a spending target rather than a cap. We witnessed a frantic end-of-cycle rush in December 2025, a 70M ADA budget withdrawal approved in record time (≈20% of the entire NCL), and even an extension of the NCL itself to accommodate poor timing by key entities. RCADA believes we have not yet had sufficient time or structured review to analyse the real impact and lessons of that cycle before simply rolling into the next one.
Process and timing
The recent removal of the Budget Info Action requirement has already narrowed early-stage deliberation. Submitting a new NCL proposal that still contains constitutional inaccuracies, without prior community coordination or a pause for post-cycle analysis, risks repeating the same governance-speed-run pattern we saw at the end of 2025.RCADA has therefore chosen to ABSTAIN.This abstention is not a rejection of the need for a Net Change Limit, nor is it opposition to fiscal discipline. It is a constructive signal that any proposal that sets spending boundaries for the treasury must first be constitutionally accurate, grounded in a clear-eyed review of the previous cycle, and developed with the coordination that the Cardano community has repeatedly asked for.We would welcome a revised version that corrects the Article IV reference, includes a short post-cycle impact summary, and demonstrates that the 350M figure has been stress-tested against realistic spending scenarios under the new constitutional rules. Such a revision would materially increase our level of support.RCADA remains committed to thoughtful, disciplined treasury governance and to protecting the long-term resilience of the Cardano treasury.
- Yes 12.2M ₳ Rationale
As Wada DRep, we vote yes on the Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713) governance action and wish to explicitly acknowledge the proactive and deliberate work of the Cardano Budget Committee in compiling and presenting this proposal.
We view this Net Change Limit as a necessary governance instrument that restores predictability and continuity to treasury operations during a critical phase of Cardano’s on-chain governance evolution. By clearly defining a 350 million ADA ceiling over a well-considered 16-month window, the proposal provides the structural headroom required for governance to function, while still preserving the discretion of DReps to exercise restraint and rigor when assessing individual treasury withdrawal actions.
We particularly appreciate the technical care taken in deriving the NCL figure. Anchoring the limit to approximately 115 percent of realized net inflows, rather than speculative projections, reflects a data-informed approach. Importantly, the proposal transparently accounts for approximately 50 million ADA in approved but undrawn commitments from the prior financial year, notably the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget. Recognizing this carried-forward headroom avoids retroactively constraining initiatives that were already reviewed and supported in good faith, while also clarifying the effective discretionary space available under the new NCL.
The alignment of the NCL timeline with the mid-year budget cycle is another meaningful improvement. This adjustment addresses participation challenges observed in previous cycles and allows future NCL decisions to be informed by a complete set of treasury inflow data. As governance actors, we also acknowledge our shared responsibility in learning from earlier structural oversights, and we see this proposal as a constructive correction rather than a mere continuation.
Finally, we commend the Cardano Budget Committee for approaching this task with transparency, technical discipline, and an evident awareness of governance realities. Their work provides a clearer operating framework for DReps, proposers, and the wider ecosystem, reinforcing the NCL’s role as a fiscal guardrail rather than a spending directive.
- Yes 11M ₳ No rationale
- No 10.5M ₳ No rationale
- Yes 8.8M ₳ Rationale
約16か月20日という NCL期間は、ホリデーシーズンを避けて年央の予算サイクルに合わせるという明確な意図があり、ガバナンス参加や判断の質を高める観点から妥当であると評価します。金額についても、過去のトレジャリー流入実績や既存の承認済み予算を踏まえたものであり、現時点で不合理に過大であるとは考えていません。将来の見直し余地を残しつつも、本提案を承認し次のステップに進むべきと判断し、賛成します。\n\nI vote Yes, as the proposed NCL period of approximately 16 months is intentionally designed to avoid the holiday season and align with the mid-year budget cycle, thereby improving governance participation and decision quality. The proposed amount is also based on past treasury inflows and already approved budgets, and does not appear unreasonably excessive at this stage, while still allowing room for future revisions.