Duc Tiger

I am voting NO on the Baseline 'Platinum' Sponsorship for TOKEN2049.

Let me be unequivocally clear: I strongly agree that Cardano must have a powerful, professional presence at TOKEN2049 Singapore. It is a critical hub for institutional adoption and RWA projects. However, the necessity of the event cannot be used to justify an exorbitant and inefficient budget.

We are being asked to approve a base cost of nearly $800,000 USD (₳3.3 Million) for a two-day event.

1. Unsustainable Budgeting: Allocating $250,000 USD purely for "Booth Build and Logistics" (on top of the $400,000 sponsorship fee) is astronomically high, even for Singapore standards. Furthermore, charging the Treasury a $97,000 (15%) "Management Fee" to coordinate an event that fundamentally serves EMURGO’s own
   strategic interests as a founding entity is an inappropriate extraction of community capital.

2. Poor ROI on KPIs: The projected metrics—such as 200 wallet sign-ups and 20 partnerships—do not mathematically justify a near-million-dollar expenditure. This equates to spending nearly $4,000 to acquire a single wallet sign-up. This is not marketing; this is capital destruction.

The Cardano Treasury is an investment vehicle, not a corporate marketing slush fund. I urge EMURGO to renegotiate with their vendors, eliminate the management fee markup, and submit a leaner, more capital-efficient proposal. Until the pricing reflects open-market realities, my vote is NO.

I am officially recording an ABSTAIN vote on this $3.65M USD (₳14M) proposal. I am abstaining to maintain absolute neutrality, as my alliance is currently submitting a separate, independent ecosystem initiative. However, as a steward of the Treasury, I must place my deep concerns regarding this proposal on the public record.

While I fully agree that Cardano needs a strong, professional presence in Asia, the structure and execution of this request are fundamentally flawed.

1. Poor Governance Hygiene (Double Funding Risk): This combined "Summit + TOKEN2049" GA was submitted on April 9th. Subsequently, on April 30th, EMURGO submitted two separate, modular GAs (Platinum & Title) for the exact same TOKEN2049 event, citing "community feedback." If the proposers decided to restructure their request, this original bundled GA should have been immediately withdrawn or cancelled. Leaving multiple, overlapping GAs active on-chain for the exact same event creates extreme confusion for dReps and poses a dangerous risk of the Treasury double-funding the TOKEN2049 sponsorship if voting results overlap. This is unacceptable governance hygiene from our founding entities.

2. Circumventing the 2026 Budget Framework: The authors explicitly state they are bypassing the formal Intersect 2026 Budget Process due to "timing constraints." It is highly concerning that the founding entities of Cardano are establishing a precedent of bypassing the very governance frameworks the rest of the community is rigorously expected to follow. If planning for October 2026 events requires bypassing rules in April 2026, it points to a failure in operational foresight.

3. Exorbitant "Per-Attendee" Metrics: The Cardano Foundation is requesting 2.5 Million USD for a Summit targeting 1,200 attendees. This equates to spending over 2,000 USD per attendee for a two-day event. In a capital-constrained market, this level of corporate vanity spending is unjustifiable. The Treasury should be funding real-world utility and builder infrastructure, not subsidizing hyper-inflated event management overheads.

I urge my fellow dReps to demand that future marketing budgets are subjected to

I am voting YES on this initial withdrawal. This proposal exemplifies a highly responsible and professional approach to managing significant Treasury funds.
Instead of requesting the full 50 million ADA at once, the proposers have prudently broken down the initiative into logical phases. This first withdrawal of 500,000 ADA is exclusively dedicated to establishing the critical legal and technical infrastructure required for the fund's secure operation. Allocating capital to establish a robust legal entity in the Cayman Islands and to conduct a comprehensive, independent security audit before any liquidity is deployed is not just good practice—it is the gold standard for fiduciary responsibility.
This phased, infrastructure-first methodology builds trust and ensures that every subsequent action is built upon a foundation of safety and legal compliance. It sets an excellent precedent for all large-scale Treasury-funded projects and demonstrates a clear commitment to protecting community assets. I fully endorse this cautious and methodical first step.

I am voting an emphatic NO on the Draper Dragon Orion Fund proposal.
While I fully support the strategic transition of the Cardano Treasury towards a professional, ROI-driven Venture Capital model, the financial structure of this specific proposal is fundamentally flawed and presents an unacceptable asymmetric risk to the Cardano ecosystem.
My rejection is based on the glaring absence of "Skin in the Game" from the General Partner (GP).

1. Zero Risk for the GP, 100% Risk for the Treasury:
   Draper Dragon is a highly respected venture firm, and their expertise in hunting and incubating projects would undoubtedly benefit our ecosystem. However, this proposal asks the Cardano Treasury to front 100% of the capital for Tranche One ($15M / 50M ADA) while the GP collects a guaranteed $1M management fee, regardless of performance. If the investments fail, the Treasury absorbs all losses; if they succeed, the GP takes 20% of the upside. This is not a partnership; it is a risk-free wealth transfer to the fund managers.
2. The Necessity of Co-Investment:
   In traditional venture capital, GPs are expected to commit their own capital (typically 1-5%) to align their financial fate with their Limited Partners (LPs). Given that this is an unproven model on Cardano, with no historical precedent of successful VC incubation at this scale within our specific UTXO architecture, the baseline standard must be much higher. I will not support an ecosystem fund where the managing entity does not bring significant external capital to the table—whether that is a 20%, 50%, or matching co-investment structure.
3. Unproven Execution on Cardano:
   While Draper's success in other ecosystems is notable, Cardano is unique. Until a fund manager can demonstrate the ability to successfully navigate our specific technical and community landscape, entrusting them with $15M of community funds with zero downside risk is fiscally irresponsible.
   I welcome Draper Dragon to participate in the Cardano ecosystem, but it must be on terms that reflect a true partnership. I urge the proposers to restructure this offering to include a substantial, upfront capital commitment from the GP or external LPs alongside the Treasury's contribution. Until the risk is shared, the Treasury's vault must remain closed.

I am voting YES on the implementation of the Cardano Budget Process Framework for 2026 facilitated by Intersect. Moving towards a more structured, data-driven, and milestone-based procurement model is a necessary step in the maturation of our ecosystem’s treasury management. I strongly support the integration of clear KPIs, standardized templates, and smart contract-based administration to ensure accountability.
However, while I fully support this framework as a primary vehicle for ecosystem funding, I vote YES with the explicit understanding that this process does not, and constitutionally cannot, supersede the fundamental right of any ada holder to submit a direct Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action.
The Intersect budget process is an excellent tool for consolidating broad ecosystem initiatives. Yet, we must acknowledge that innovation is often asymmetric and time-sensitive. High-impact, specialized projects—particularly those bridging Cardano to Real-World Assets (RWAs) or deploying critical physical infrastructure (DePIN)—may require agile funding timelines or customized administrative structures that a generalized, once-a-year consolidated budget cycle cannot easily accommodate.
Therefore, my support for this framework is coupled with the firm belief that the Cardano Constitution guarantees multiple, parallel pathways for treasury withdrawals. The community must remain open to evaluating direct, standalone Treasury Withdrawal GAs on their individual merits, independently of this consolidated process, provided they meet all rigorous constitutional guardrails and transparency requirements.
A healthy decentralized treasury requires both a structured annual budget process and the flexibility to seize immediate, high-value opportunities as they arise.

I am currently choosing to ABSTAIN/VOTE NO on the Dingo proposal. While I acknowledge the strategic importance of node diversity, I cannot reconcile the requested budget of 6.9 million ADA with the stated work scope and current ecosystem priorities.

1. Financial Disproportion: The proposal requests an investment of ~$2M USD (at $0.30/ADA) for a 12-month development cycle. The breakdown, which includes a $500,000 security audit, appears inflated. We must demand a more granular, line-item budget disclosure to ensure that we are not paying a 'decentralization premium' that exceeds the project's actual engineering value.
2. Lack of Comparative Analysis: The proposal fails to evaluate why a Go-based node is the most cost-effective path to network resilience. We have not seen a comparative analysis of other potential node implementations (e.g., Gerolamo) or a cost-benefit study against other infrastructure needs. In a capital-constrained environment, we must prioritize initiatives based on rigorous comparative data, not isolated vendor pitches.
3. Strategic Sequencing: We are currently in the midst of defining the 2026 Budget Framework via Intersect. I believe all infrastructure proposals of this magnitude should be channeled through this framework. This would allow dReps to evaluate the Dingo proposal alongside other infrastructure needs, ensuring that 6.9 million ADA is indeed our highest-ROI allocation.
   I invite the Blink Labs team to resubmit this proposal as part of the formal Intersect 2026 budget process. I am open to funding node diversity, but only through a transparent, comparative, and structured budgetary framework that proves its priority relative to the broader needs of our ecosystem."

I agree.

I agree.

I am voting YES to this parameter update. This proposal is a well-researched, data-driven, and necessary step to enhance the capabilities of the Cardano network.
Increasing the Plutus script memory limits directly addresses a significant pain point for dApp developers, enabling them to build more sophisticated applications and improve the scalability of existing ones. This is not a speculative change but a direct response to clear feedback from the builder community.
Crucially, the proposal is backed by comprehensive benchmarking from IOG's performance team and has been successfully tested on public testnets. This evidence provides strong assurance that the change can be implemented safely without compromising the network's stability or the security guarantees of the Praos consensus protocol.
The meticulous adherence to constitutional guardrails and the cautious, two-part approach further demonstrate the professionalism and diligence of the Parameter Committee. This is exactly the kind of incremental, evidence-based improvement that will ensure Cardano's long-term, sustainable growth.

I am total agree!
Naming protocol upgrades after significant contributors who have passed away is a worthy tradition within the Cardano ecosystem. It serves as a powerful reminder that behind the technology are people, and it is their dedication that builds our community.
Max van Rossem, through his tireless contributions to the Constitution, the dRep community, and the development of tools on Cardano, has left an indelible legacy. Etching his name into the history of the blockchain is a fitting and honorable tribute.
This vote is more than an agreement on a name; it is an affirmation of the community and human values that are at the core of Cardano.

I am voting YES on establishing the Net Change Limit (NCL) of 350 million ADA for the upcoming ~16-month period.
While this proposed cap slightly exceeds the Treasury's recent net income, I view it as a necessary and strategic forward investment. Our primary goal should be to fund key, high-impact projects that drive real-world adoption of Cardano. Initiatives that successfully bring end-users onto our ecosystem will, in turn, increase transaction volume, generate more network fees, and ultimately bolster future Treasury inflows.
Furthermore, we must consider the current market conditions. The price of ADA is at a relatively low level, and it is reasonable to anticipate that this pricing environment may persist for a significant portion of the period this NCL is in effect. Approving a sufficient budget now ensures that critical development is not stifled by unfavorable market dynamics, allowing us to build robustly during this crucial phase.
Therefore, this NCL represents a well-reasoned balance between fiscal prudence and the strategic imperative to invest in growth.

I am voting YES on the ratification of Constitution v2.4. This decision is a pragmatic one, balancing the pursuit of an ideal governance framework with the political reality of achieving consensus.

Version 2.4 retains the most critical improvements over v1.0 that were introduced in the previous iteration, v2.3. Specifically, it simplifies the governance process by removing the Budget Info Action and eliminates unenforceable "expectation" clauses. Most importantly, it still applies enhanced treasury safeguards to all withdrawal actions, a significant step forward for financial accountability.

However, I must acknowledge that this version is a compromise. The reversion of three clauses to their v1.0 wording, particularly the one concerning independent audits, is a notable step back from the stronger requirements proposed in v2.3. The original language in v2.3, which mandated the appointment of auditors and the delivery of reports, was superior to the v2.4 requirement of simply allocating a budget for audits.

This change was clearly made to secure the necessary consensus from major stakeholders like EMURGO, who voted against v2.3. In governance, progress is often incremental. A YES vote for v2.4 secures the vast majority of essential upgrades while acknowledging the need for broad alignment. It is a significant improvement over our current constitution and is preferable to a stalemate that leaves us with the outdated v1.0. We can, and should, seek to strengthen the audit requirements in a future amendment. For now, this is a necessary and positive step forward.

I am voting YES on this proposal. This version represents a significant improvement over its predecessor and demonstrates that a healthy governance feedback loop is working.
The previous proposal was rejected by the community for valid reasons, including unclear KPIs and a top-down approach. This revised framework, however, is the direct result of an extensive, community-led consultation process. It replaces vague financial targets with measurable, practical KPIs like TVL, MAU, and a revenue goal denominated in ADA. The new five-pillar structure provides a clear and actionable framework that dReps can use as a strategic filter when evaluating future funding requests.
Crucially, this document serves as a "measuring stick," not a constitutional mandate. It informs our voting but does not compel it, leaving our discretion as dReps fully intact.
While I maintain significant reservations about certain concepts, specifically the 'Managed Treasury,' approving this broader strategic framework is not an endorsement of that single element. Instead, it acknowledges it as a topic for future, rigorous debate. Any subsequent proposal to implement such a system will require a far higher standard of detail and scrutiny.
This YES vote is a vote for a better process. It rewards listening and iteration, and it provides our ecosystem with a much-needed, coherent direction without sacrificing our duty to critically evaluate every future proposal on its own merits.

While the underlying election and its subsequent audit appear to have been conducted with professionalism and transparency, this Governance Action asks the community to ratify the appointment of the second-place candidate, Christina Gianelloni, while completely disregarding the legitimate winner.
According to the official audit results provided, the candidate "Cardano Curia" won the election with a final, validated voting power of 1.679 billion ADA. Christina Gianelloni finished in second place with 1.402 billion ADA.
To ignore the clear outcome of a democratic election is an act that runs contrary to every core principle of Cardano and the Voltaire era. Our duty as dReps is to ratify the expressed will of the electorate, not to subvert it.
If there were legitimate reasons to disqualify the winning candidate, those reasons would need to be presented transparently and debated publicly in their own separate Governance Action. Until such a process occurs, proposing the runner-up for ratification is procedurally unacceptable.
This NO vote is cast to defend the integrity of the very governance process we are all charged with upholding.

After a comprehensive review of all associated documents—including the core proposal, the smart contract framework architecture, and the full audit reports from both MLabs and TxPipe—I am casting a YES vote for this treasury withdrawal. My decision is further informed by public communications from key stakeholders, including Input Output Global and the Cardano Foundation.

The request for ₳70,000,000 demands the highest level of scrutiny. And, with the evidence presented in the reports from MLab and TxPipe, this is not a request based on trust, but on a verifiable and robustly engineered system of accountability.

The Treasury Reserve Smart Contract framework, coupled with the multi-signature authority of the independent Oversight Committee, provides the necessary safeguards to address concerns about transparency. This on-chain mechanism ensures that funds are programmatically locked and disbursed only upon meeting verified milestones, a structure far superior to a simple off-chain legal agreement.

Furthermore, the dual security audits confirm that the underlying contracts have been rigorously tested and hardened. The proactive identification and resolution of critical vulnerabilities indicate a professional and security-conscious approach.

Cardano is at a pivotal moment. The strategic need to integrate tier-one infrastructure is undeniable for long-term growth and competitiveness. This proposal presents a well-structured, technically sound, and constitutionally compliant method to achieve these critical integrations while navigating real-world commercial confidentiality. It is a pragmatic and secure step forward for the ecosystem.

I am voting YES on this proposal, as it is a necessary administrative action to ensure the operational continuity of the Cardano Treasury. A failure to pass this extension would result in a complete halt of all treasury disbursements, an outcome that would be profoundly disruptive and irresponsible to the entire ecosystem.
However, it must be stated that this extension is clearly a short-term, stop-gap measure. The necessity of such a last-minute extension suggests a delay in the planning and proposal process for the full 2026 Net Change Limit.
My affirmative vote is therefore cast with the explicit expectation that the Cardano Budget Committee is working diligently to present a comprehensive NCL proposal for 2026 to the community in the very near future. This will ensure dReps have adequate time for review and deliberation, avoiding the need for further emergency extensions.
This vote is about maintaining function, not debating policy, and on that basis, it has my full support.

I totally agree with Charles Hoskinson's call.

My vote is a decisive YES for the ratification of Constitution v2.3.

This is a critical and necessary step in the maturation of our on-chain governance framework.

While the entire document represents an improvement in clarity and simplicity, one change stands above all others: the universal application of treasury safeguards to all withdrawal actions.

In my experience as a dRep, I have observed numerous well-crafted proposals for several hundred thousand ADA. While persuasive on the surface, they often fell into a grey area, lacking the rigorous financial oversight and mandatory audit requirements that were previously reserved only for multi-million ADA projects. This has been a significant and concerning loophole.

Version 2.3 closes this loophole decisively. By mandating that every treasury withdrawal, regardless of size, be subject to the highest standards of administration and independent auditing, we are fundamentally strengthening the security and integrity of our collective Treasury.

While the removal of the Budget Info Action is a notable change to our process, I view it as a more than acceptable trade-off. We are exchanging a procedural step for a foundational upgrade in accountability. This vote ensures that every single lovelace is treated with the same level of scrutiny, reinforcing trust and ensuring the long-term sustainability of our ecosystem.

This proposal presents a compelling and ambitious direction for Cardano, and the effort to unify the ecosystem around a long-term vision is commendable. It raises essential questions about our future, which deserve a thorough and thoughtful response.

For this vision to be truly actionable, a few key areas would benefit from greater clarity. The target of $200 million in annual L1 revenue is a powerful goal, but its dependency on the fluctuating price of ADA makes it a challenging benchmark. Clarifying the target in terms of ADA, or outlining the specific price assumptions used, would create a more stable and measurable objective for the community to track. Furthermore, understanding the concrete strategies, resource allocations, and key initiatives planned to achieve this revenue goal would transform it from an aspiration into a tangible roadmap.

The plan outlines many desirable outcomes, from enhancing UX to enterprise adoption. However, a true strategy often involves making difficult choices and prioritizing specific initiatives over others. The current document reads more like a comprehensive wishlist of everything we hope to achieve, rather than a focused plan detailing the necessary trade-offs.

Perhaps the most significant strategic shift proposed is the move towards an "Active, Managed Treasury." This concept carries profound implications for decentralization and risk management. Before the community can align with such a fundamental change, a more detailed proposal is needed to explore its governance, operational security, and the specific mechanisms that would protect our collective assets.

For these reasons, a NO vote seems the most constructive action at present. It is not a rejection of the 2030 vision itself, but an invitation for a more detailed, clarified, and debatable strategy that the entire community can confidently build upon together.

While the potential reward of this initiative is immense, our primary duty as dReps is the prudent management of Treasury risk. This proposal, in its current form, asks the community to accept an unnecessary level of risk upfront.

The fundamental issue is that we are being asked to fund the cargo (49.5M ADA) before the ship (the governance smart contract) has been built, inspected, and proven seaworthy. The security and functionality of that contract are not promises to be accepted, but deliverables to be verified.

A security-first approach requires us to sequence this differently. Let’s first commission the construction of the ship. We can fund the legal setup, development, and a rigorous, independent audit. Only when that secure vessel is delivered and ready should we vote on loading it with 49.5M ADA from our collective Treasury.

This NO is a vote for risk mitigation. It’s a call to proceed with this excellent idea in a manner that prioritizes the safety of community funds above all else.

I strongly disagree with any governance proposal that sets an annual budget spending limit that closely matches or exceeds the annual budget income. Such a policy would rapidly deplete the treasury, posing a significant risk to the long-term sustainability of the Cardano ecosystem. Setting a spending limit near this figure would create an unstable financial situation, undermining the community's resources.

In the previous governance action, transaction [transaction ID: https://cexplorer.io/tx/7f320409d9998712ff3a3cdf0c9439e1543f236a3d746766f78f1fdbe1e06bf8/governance#data], I voted 'No' for similar reasons, as that proposal also suggested an excessively high spending limit, inconsistent with sound financial management principles. My consistent 'No' votes in these instances underscore my unwavering commitment to protecting the community's financial resources and ensuring Cardano's sustainable growth.

Cardano's budget must be managed prudently, maintaining a healthy balance between income and expenditure. This approach safeguards the community's interests and fosters a stable environment for the ecosystem's future development.

I do not agree with allocating nearly the entire treasury inflow of the Treasury to the annual budget, as this poses significant financial risks in the long run for the Treasury.

If the Net-Change-Limit budget is 300 million ADA, we must clearly define how this amount will be allocated, ensure transparency in these expenditures, and, most importantly, assess whether they truly provide essential value to the ecosystem.

Before expanding the limit change budget, we need at least three fiscal years operating with a smaller budget to collect data and evaluate capital efficiency, and impact.

A larger portion of the budget should be allocated to supporting developer teams within the community in building their dApps. In fact, the total operational budget for Catalyst in 2025 (including F14, F15, and F16) has not even reached 100 million ADA.

I would vote YES with an annual budget expenditure that does not exceed 50% of the total inflow. A budget of 120 million ADA for each year of 2025 and 2026 is a reasonable and sustainable approach.

I total agree and will vote Yes for this GA. The Cardano community has long awaited an official constitution. After more than two years of discussions, both online and offline, across various levels and countries, this constitution has been carefully considered and truly reflects the collective spirit of the community.

I support renaming the Chang #2 Hard Fork to the Plomin Hard Fork, as it aligns with Cardano’s tradition of naming major network upgrades after individuals who have made significant contributions to the ecosystem’s development.

Choosing to name a milestone of the Cardano blockchain after Plomin is not only a recognition of his impactful contributions to the ecosystem but also a tribute to his positive and inspiring way of life.