jonahkoch

Voting YES. Mithril is live, open-source infrastructure enabling light clients and trustless state verification. Proven team transitioning from IOG to Treasury. Budget opacity and vague scope are real — underlying value isn't in question.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Voting yes. With some real concerns about how this proposal was packaged, concerns that are proportionate to the ask. A ₳3.8M treasury withdrawal deserves more than two budget line items, a volatility policy, visible milestones, and a defined scope of work. Those gaps are genuine, and I expect them to close in future funding rounds.
They don't change the underlying vote because Mithril's value is already demonstrable. This is working, open-source infrastructure. The repositories are public, the protocol is operational, and the decentralization benefits are already real: light clients can verify Cardano chain state without trusting centralized intermediaries, full nodes sync faster, and exchanges and wallets can operate with substantially lower infrastructure overhead. The proposal asks the Treasury to sustain and continue something that works and is integral to a competitive tech stack.
Teragone has years of demonstrated Mithril delivery through IOG collaboration. As part of the IOG-to-Treasury transition this is something I want to support because it is structurally correct: as Cardano matures, core protocol infrastructure should sit under community governance rather than single-entity funding. This proposal moves it in that direction.
The transparency gaps are failures of how the proposal was packaged, not failures of what the proposal is for. I vote yes with the expectation that future Teragone submissions include itemized budgets, a published milestone schedule, an ADA volatility policy, and a defined roadmap for the funded period.

Abstaining. Intersect performs functions Cardano genuinely needs governance coordination, incident response, technical stewardship. But ₳25.4M with minimal detail, self-funding structure, no published milestones is too large to approve on faith. Not rejection but a request for better information.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Intersect provides a function that Cardano genuinely needs: governance coordination, technical stewardship, incident response, and the operational backbone that translates community decisions into action. The November 2025 chain partition response demonstrated this value. A world without Intersect (or an equivalent) is a world where governance decisions sit unimplemented, security incidents go uncoordinated, and core repositories lack stewardship.
However, this proposal asks for ₳25.4 million with minimal budget detail, represents self-funding by the entity administering the funds, and would bring Intersect's total Treasury receipts to nearly ₳48 million in under two years. For an amount this large, I expect proportionate transparency. I do not find it here.
I cannot vote Yes in good conscience. But I also cannot vote No without first understanding whether the governance function would collapse without this funding. Abstain is not support. It is an acknowledgment that the question is too important to answer with the information available.
A No vote would reject the funding entirely. I am not prepared to do that because:

1. The function is genuinely important. Governance coordination does not happen spontaneously. Someone must do it.
2. I do not have a better alternative ready. If Intersect were defunded tomorrow, I cannot point to an entity ready to assume these responsibilities.
3. The operational track record exists. Intersect has delivered network upgrades, incident response, and committee coordination. This is not vaporware.
   But a Yes vote would endorse a ₳25.4M self-funded request with minimal detail, setting a precedent that I cannot support.
   Abstain is the honest position: I cannot judge this proposal reliably with the information provided. It is not support. It is not rejection. It is a demand for better information before I commit either way.
   Intersect performs a function that Cardano needs. The governance coordination, technical stewardship, and incident response capabilities are real and have been demonstrated. I do not dismiss the value of this work.
   But value does not justify any price, and self-funding does not justify opacity. For ₳25.4 million and nearly ₳48 million cumulative, I expect:

• A detailed budget, especially for the ₳18.8M "technical stewardship" line item
• An arms-length review before the ask reaches the chain
• A plan to reduce long-term dependency on a single entity
• An ADA volatility policy
• Published milestones with verification criteria
  None of these are present. I cannot vote Yes on faith any longer. And I will not vote No on a function the ecosystem genuinely needs without a clear alternative.
  Abstain is my vote. If Intersect resubmits with the transparency and structural improvements outlined above, I will evaluate it with fresh eyes and a genuinely open mind.

Voting YES. The TSC funds independent technical governance Cardano genuinely needs: parameter advice, CIP editorial coordination, hard fork planning, and a technical review program that helps DReps vote informed. ₳1.19M is modest for the function. Structural concerns noted but not blocking.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

This proposal funds the Technical Steering Committee (TSC) for 12 months, covering:

• WP1: Community-facing technical coordination (events, technical reports, expert attendance)
• WP2: Protocol governance and evolution (Parameter Committee, CIP editors, Hard Fork Working Group)
• WP3: Independent technical review program pilot
  The TSC performs a function that Cardano genuinely needs: independent technical governance. The Parameter Committee's evidence-based parameter recommendations, the CIP editorial process, and hard fork coordination are foundational infrastructure for a decentralized blockchain. Without them, protocol evolution becomes either stagnant or captured by single vendors.
  The ask at ₳1.19M is modest and proportionate. The technical review program (WP3) is especially valuable: it directly addresses the information asymmetry that makes DRep voting difficult.
  However, this proposal has the same structural issues I flag in every Intersect-administered ask: self-funding, thin budget detail, no ADA volatility policy, and invisible milestones. It is also contingent on the main Intersect MBO budget passing, if that fails, this may not execute even if ratified. These concerns temper my enthusiasm but do not block a Yes vote at this scale.
  The Technical Steering Committee performs governance infrastructure functions that Cardano genuinely needs: independent parameter advice, CIP editorial coordination, hard fork planning, and most valuably a technical review program that helps DReps make informed votes.
  The concerns I raise like self-funding structure, thin budget detail, no ADA volatility policy, and deepening Intersect dependency, are real and would be more severe at a larger amount. At ₳1.19M with specific, verifiable functions, they are manageable concerns, not blockers.
  I distinguish this proposal sharply from the main Intersect Ops ask (₳25.4M, Abstain). The TSC has a clear remit, modest price, and externally verifiable outputs. The main Intersect proposal is a massive, opaque operational catch-all. Scale and specificity matter.
  If the TSC resubmits in future with more granular budget detail, an ADA volatility policy, and a diversification roadmap, I would evaluate it even more favorably. As it stands, the public value justifies the vote.

Voting YES. Hardware-wallet maintenance is essential security infrastructure, broken Ledger or Trezor support means stranded funds and forced migrations. ₳1.31M for 12 months across both integrations is proportionate. Proven team, clear scope. Transparency gaps noted but not blocking.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

This proposal funds 12 months of maintenance for Cardano's hardware-wallet support: Ledger and Trezor compatibility updates, cardano-hw-cli and supporting libraries, developer support for ecosystem integrators, and vendor-required security audits.
Hardware wallets are not a luxury feature they are the primary security layer for serious Cardano users. If Ledger or Trezor firmware updates break Cardano support, users lose secure signing, large holders face forced migrations, and the ecosystem's credibility suffers. This is maintenance of existing, proven infrastructure.
The ask at ₳1.31M is proportionate for maintaining two major hardware-wallet integrations across a 12-month protocol evolution cycle. The team has prior funding and delivery history. The public value is clear and immediate.
Same transparency concerns as other Intersect proposals (thin budget, no ADA volatility policy, invisible milestones), but at this scale and for this function, they are manageable.
Hardware-wallet maintenance is not glamorous, but it is essential. Ledger and Trezor support is the primary security layer for serious Cardano users, and without continuous maintenance, it breaks as protocols and firmware evolve. The consequences like stranded funds, user attrition, reputational damage, and push toward centralized custody, are severe and avoidable.
This proposal asks for a modest amount (₳1.31M) to maintain proven infrastructure for 12 months. The team has a track record. The scope is disciplined. The public value is immediate and clear.
I note the same transparency gaps that appear across Intersect-administered proposals: thin budget detail, no ADA volatility policy, and invisible milestones. At this scale, they are concerns but not blockers. I also raise a longer-term sustainability question: hardware-wallet vendors should eventually bear more of this cost. But that transition is not today's problem. For now, the value justifies the vote.

Voting NO. Wirex is a capable company with a real vision, Cardano-native payments for 7M users. But ₳3.85M as a pure grant to a commercial entity with no return mechanism, no open-source specifics, and no budget transparency doesn't meet Treasury standards.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Wirex addresses a real and important gap in Cardano's ecosystem: the lack of integrated real-world payment rails. A regulated fintech with 7M users, 1.5M cards issued, and $20B+ in transaction volume building Cardano-native payments infrastructure is not a frivolous idea. The intent is genuine and the problem is worth solving.
However, this proposal asks the Treasury to fund a commercial company's infrastructure build with no return mechanism, no detailed open-source commitments, no evidence of productive ecosystem effects, and no transparency on how the budget is spent. The "public good" framing is thin, what Wirex keeps proprietary (banking rails, Visa network, compliance infrastructure, user relationships) is far more valuable than what they promise to open-source. And what they promise to open-source lacks specifics: no license, no repository, no architecture detail.
For ₳3.85M, I expect proportionate value capture. A commercial beneficiary with demonstrated revenue should share upside, not receive a pure grant. This proposal does not meet that standard.

Wirex is a capable company addressing a real problem. The vision of Cardano-powered real-world payments is compelling. But the structure of this proposal, a pure grant to a commercial entity with no return mechanism, no detailed open-source commitments, no productive ecosystem evidence, and no budget transparency, does not meet the standard for Treasury funding.
The Cardano Treasury is not a venture capital fund. It is public capital meant to create public goods, share upside with the ecosystem, and avoid creating private gatekeepers. This proposal fails on all three counts.
If Wirex resubmits with open-source specifics, a revenue-sharing or repayment mechanism, named downstream integrators, a detailed budget, an ADA volatility policy, and a co-funding commitment, I will evaluate it with a genuinely open mind. The problem is worth solving. This proposal, as structured, does not solve it fairly for the Treasury.

Voting YES. Blockfrost serves 71.5% of Cardano developers and submits 50%+ of all transactions. Transitioning it to a community-governed not-for-profit with full IP transfer is the right structure. Risk of losing this infrastructure outweighs transition uncertainty.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

This proposal transitions Blockfrost currently the most widely used Cardano API infrastructure, from IOG stewardship into a community-governed not-for-profit. Blockfrost currently serves 71.5% of Cardano developers, handles 1.84 billion API requests per month, and submits over 50% of all Cardano transactions in most epochs.
The funding covers an 18-month transition period to establish community governance, transfer all intellectual property (source code, trademarks, domains), and maintain operations while a sustainable long-term model is developed.
This proposal addresses the core objections to Blockfrost's earlier funding request. The governance structure is genuinely community-centric, the amount is proportionate to the infrastructure's importance, and the transparency mechanisms are robust. The sustainability question is real but appropriately deferred to the elected board rather than dictated upfront. The risk of not funding and losing or degrading the primary developer API serving 50%+ of network transactions, outweighs the uncertainty of the transition.

Yes

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Yes

Voting NO. I agree with the problem diagnosis that treasury governance is dysfunctional. But every proposed solution is an unenforceable social contract. Without ledger-level enforcement, this is "won't do harm" governance, not "can't do harm."

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

The problem statement has genuine merit, the funding impasse is real, domain-vs-domain competition is destructive, and DReps being asked to directly compare a consensus improvement against a marketing initiative is cognitively incoherent. AtlasHub is diagnosing real dysfunction. The issue is that every proposed remedy is a social contract dressed up as a governance structure.
The "strategic entity" in [h] can be appointed by vote, but DReps cannot be compelled to follow its budget recommendations, they will simply vote however they choose. The "expert commission" in [i] is advisory by design, which means it adds a bureaucratic layer without adding enforcement. The thematic budget structure with domain allocations in categories 1-8 is entirely aspirational, because there's no on-chain mechanism that rejects a treasury withdrawal do to it "overrunning” the Community & Marketing bucket or leaves Core Infrastructure underfunded. The 3-step treasury governance process requires DReps to voluntarily sequence their behavior in a specific way with no ledger-level consequence for deviating.
Structural constraints work because they make bad outcomes impossible, not because participants agree to avoid them. Everything in this info action relies on good-faith coordination among parties who have already demonstrated they can't coordinate. That's precisely the problem it's trying to solve.
Voting NO on this info action doesn't mean the problem statement is wrong, it means I’m declining to endorse these specific solutions as the direction for reform.

Voting YES. Unbundling resolved the prior objection. Hydra is Cardano's only production L2 with real users, Delta DeFi, Masumi agent commerce, both solving the pre-selection problem. Concerns on milestones and scope are covered in oversight, not a blockers to approval.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I vote yes. The community's rejection of the bundled Hydra+Midgard proposal was the right call, and IO's response, with the unbundling and resubmitting Hydra on its own merits, is equally the right outcome. The structural objection is resolved. What remains is a focused hardening proposal for Cardano's only production-grade L2, backed by live users who depend on the improvements being requested.
The core case I voted YES on in the combined proposal hasn't changed. Cardano has a pre-selection problem: L1 finality measured in hours and fees measured in fractions of a dollar degrades Cardano’s competitiveness before builders ever reach its genuine advantages. Hydra addresses this with live production proof, Delta DeFi has staked its entire perpetual DEX product on Hydra, Masumi is running live agent-to-agent commerce at sub-second finality, and the Midnight Glacier Drop validated the infrastructure at genuine scale. These are not demonstrations or proofs of concept; they are real businesses that would need to migrate to competing chains if this hardening doesn't happen.
The Masumi case in particular remains the clearest expression of why Hydra funding serves Cardano's long-term position. TradFi like Citi projects hundreds of billions in agent-driven transaction value by 2030. Circle launched Nanopayments on testnet in March 2026 specifically for this market with a centralized, custodial, USDC-only, payment-only solution. Masumi on Hydra is a full programmable commerce layer: escrow, dispute resolution, continuous micropayments, with Plutus contracts, completely non-custodial and on any asset. That's a differentiated position, a unique value proposition and it runs today. Declining to fund the infrastructure those builders depend on hands that position to a competitor with centralized alternatives.
The open concerns I carry into this, the milestone opacity, the wide performance target range, the missing personnel breakdown, and the question of whether this is a one-time hardening or the first installment of an ongoing maintenance baseline, can belong in the oversight and reporting process, not as blockers to this governance action. IO's track record, the production evidence, and the focused scope of this resubmission all clear the bar, making it better and leaner.

Voting "Abstain" as a DRep I feel confident in relying on SPOs to understand when to approve a HFC. That being said I'm want to support the action as a recognition of the naming of the Hard Fork as "van Rossem" honoring a great member of our community that we lost this year.

Voting NO. Lowering committeeMinSize from 7 to 5 reduces institutional pressure to maintain membership, introduces 6-member tie scenarios, and concentrates veto power. The fix belongs in CC succession planning and retention, not parameter adjustments.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting no on the committeeMinSize reduction, and the reasoning centers on a principle I raised in the proposal discussion at Dreptalk.com: governance resilience should come from structural constraints that make bad outcomes impossible, not from parameter adjustments that assume good outcomes from individual actors.
The proposal frames 7=7 (floor equals actual count) as a fragility. I'd frame it differently: it's a guarantee. When the floor equals the number of seated members, every individual's continued participation is load-bearing. That creates institutional pressure that no parameter tweak can replicate, it makes departure costly in a way that everyone involved understands before they accept the seat. Lowering the floor to 5 removes that pressure for any member serving on a 7-member committee, making marginal departures slightly more rational while simultaneously expanding the governance failure surface: 6-member tie scenarios become plausible where they weren't before, and the effective veto power of any two members on a 5-member committee increases meaningfully relative to the current 3-of-7 required to block.
I also don't think this proposal addresses the actual problem, which is that Cardano lacks a comprehensive CC succession mechanism, reserve seat program, or compensation model that makes long-term service sustainable. Those are process and resource problems. If the ecosystem can fund tens of millions of ADA toward nodes, tooling, and events in a single budget cycle, it can fund mechanisms to make CC membership viable and replace departing members promptly. That's the fix. Reducing the floor doesn't solve the recruitment problem, but rather it makes the consequences of the recruitment problem marginally less severe while introducing new governance pathways to impasse.
This governance action is reversible if the CC stays at 7 or above, and I note the reversion plan exists. But the appropriate time to address operational resilience in the CC is before a member departs and governance halts, through proactive elections, reserve memberships, and succession protocols, and not by adjusting the floor parameter after the fact.
Problem 1. The institutional pressure argument runs backward. Right now, the floor being set at 7 creates a powerful structural incentive to maintain full membership. Every CC member knows that their departure doesn't just reduce quorum, it breaks governance entirely. That's a feature, not a bug. It concentrates accountability. Lowering the floor to 5 doesn't just create a buffer; it reduces the institutional cost of resignation for any individual member, making departure marginally easier to rationalize.
Problem 2. The tie scenario is underweighted in the proposal. At 6 active CC members with a 2/3 threshold, a 3:3 split fails the threshold. No tiebreaker exists. A 6-member CC under this parameter regime would make 3:3 impasse a structurally plausible outcome for any governance action with genuine controversy.
Problem 3. The root cause is process, not parameters. Lowering the floor parameter papers over the recruitment and retention problem without solving it.
Problem 4. The precedent is real, not theoretical.
The guardrails allow committeeMinSize down to 3. Once 7→5 passes, the next "operational resilience" argument for 5→3 is structurally identical. The proposal says this isn't the intent, but intent and outcome diverge over time, especially as different governance participants cycle in.

Ask: ₳2,750,000 / Structure: Three budget buckets — Dev Gov Day 2026 ($280K), Rare Evo Title Mainstage + Livestream ($200K), Overhead/Audit/Tax/2027 Deposit ($180K) July 28–31, 2026, ARIA Las Vegas

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Rare Evo occupies a category I generally watch carefully, community events are easy to approve based on vibes and hard to evaluate based on measurable ecosystem return. The default is skepticism. The exception to that default is when an event has a demonstrated multi-year track record, a specific Cardano governance coordination function rather than just general visibility, and a team with operational infrastructure that would cost significantly more to replicate from scratch. Rare Evo clears all three bars convincingly with the events proposal this cycle.
The stronger argument here is actually Dev Gov Day, not Rare Evo itself. Convening DReps, SPOs, builders, and governance contributors for a full day of dedicated Cardano governance programming for free and publicly accessible, ahead of a major multi-chain conference is precisely the kind of on-the-ground infrastructure a functioning governance process needs. The inaugural 2025 event delivered 500+ attendees without treasury funding. Rare Network has demonstrated they can run this, and treasury backing for the 2026 edition expands what they can deliver.
I'm voting Conditional YES on the merits, with three open concerns I would like to see addressed in the post-event reporting and in any future cycle's ask. First, the KPI floor targets need to exist, next year's proposal should commit to specific minimums derived from 2025 actuals, not just describe metrics as categories. If Rare Evo 2026 attracted fewer Cardano projects than the 40+ in 2025, what's the accountability mechanism? There currently isn't one. Second, the sponsorship substitution clause is asking to be clarified before the vote closes, what Cardano gets shouldn't be a function of what commercial sponsors purchase first. Third, the 2027 venue deposit embedded in this ask is a funding structure the community should examine critically when the 2027 proposal arrives; it shouldn't be used as a mechanism to lock in and leverage continuity ahead of future evaluation.
The 20% VIP ticket revenue return to the treasury is recognized and appreciated, it's a genuine revenue share mechanism, unusual for events proposals, and signals alignment between Rare Network's commercial success and Cardano’s interest.

Resubmission, ₳18,263,496 / $4,565,874 at $0.25, 3 Reduction: 53% smaller, and the work package count dropped from 17 to 3. Peras v1 (cryptography, KillSwitch, mainnet readiness, support), History Expiry (partial-history nodes to cut SPO storage costs), Conformance Testing (both Peras and Leios).

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm switching to a yes because the structural problem that drove my no vote has been resolved, not just resized. My original concern wasn't about Tweag's competence on Cardano's core infrastructure, it's that 17 work packages submitted as a single pipeline prevented the kind of granular evaluation this treasury process exists to provide. That concern doesn't disappear by default just because a team resubmits; it disappears when the resubmission actually addresses it. Here, three work packages remain, and they're interdependent for a coherent reason rather than bundled for convenience: conformance testing is the correctness scaffolding that has to exist before Peras can be trusted on mainnet, and History Expiry exists specifically to absorb the storage cost consequences that Peras and Leios throughput increases create for SPOs. That's a single technical program with three components, not seventeen unrelated asks wearing one cover sheet.
Peras going to mainnet is the production-readiness step that makes Cardano's prior research investment in faster finality actually matter, dropping from roughly twelve minutes to roughly two minutes is the kind of improvement that changes what's buildable on Cardano, and it's complementary to, not duplicative of, the Leios research work I already voted to fund. History Expiry is the decentralization safeguard that has to exist alongside that throughput growth, because full-history storage requirements becoming economically prohibitive for smaller SPOs is exactly the kind of centralizing pressure that erodes the network from the bottom up rather than the top down.
Tweag's track record carries real weight here. This is a team that's been embedded in Cardano's consensus and ledger work since January 2018, built Ouroboros Genesis, and contributed directly to Peras's own design, they are not making a case for capability, they're continuing work they've already proven they can do. At ₳18,263,496, less than half the prior ask, with an explicit $176-per-hour engineering rate disclosed and a dual-review acceptance structure running through both IOG and an independent third-party assessor, this is a tighter, more accountable, and more honestly scoped proposal than what I voted no on. The prior no was a request for better structure, not a rejection of the work. Tweag has delivered a better structure.

₳10,000,000 (hard cap, no top-up if ADA falls) 18 months (M1 Month 6, M2 Month 12, M3 Month 18)Payment structure: ₳5,000,000 on approval (50%) / ₳2,000,000 on M1 (20%) / ₳3,000,000 on M2 (30%)

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes because this is a scale-up of something already operating on Mainnet, not a request to fund a hypothesis. Cardano's most persistent criticism is the gap between infrastructure capability and real-world transaction volume, and 5am.earth is one of the few proposals in front of me this cycle with independently verifiable evidence against that exact gap. Project Swaminathan is reportedly already ranking top 10-15 in on-chain activity on Cardano dot org leaderboard, registering real farmers at 500 a day with a 100% blockchain success rate through its pilot. That's IRL operating history a third party can check today.
The architecture is also right. A trust layer that lets AE certification, traceability compliance, and credit scoring all draw from the same verified farmer and farm record, instead of each application rebuilding identity verification from scratch, which is the correct answer to a fragmentation problem that genuinely exists in agricultural data systems, and it avoids concentrating that shared infrastructure in any single commercial actor's hands. The consortium backing it isn't speculative either: Syngenta Foundation India already reaches 2.6 million farmers through its existing AE network, and the Global AE Academy carries IFC, World Bank, and Corteva institutional weight behind the scaling plan. The EUDR compliance angle on the traceability path gives that work-stream a real regulatory use case and deadline rather than a manufactured one.
The fiscal structure has real gaps I want on the record. Fifty percent of the entire ask 5M ADA is dispersed on approval, before the Foundation that's supposed to steward this neutrally is even legally registered, into a contract held by two Swiss commercial co-promoters as a stopgap. That's the largest unconditioned front-load I've reviewed this cycle, and it deserves more incremental gating in future tranches of this kind of program. The proposal also doesn't disclose a revenue-share or repayment mechanism back to the treasury, despite projecting 16 to 20 million ADA in annual protocol revenue by 2030. And the proposal never explicitly confirms the trust-layer codebase itself is open-source, which is a commitment I hold non-negotiable and want clarified in reporting.
None of those gaps are disqualifying at this funding level, because the structure that does exist is sound: a hard cap with no price-driven top-up, milestone gating on the remaining half of the funds against farmer-count targets that are independently checkable on-chain, a five-entity Oversight Committee with real multi-signature thresholds, and a constitutional compliance disclosure that's more thorough than the norm for this cycle. The 47x scale multiplier across three countries in 18 months is aggressive, and Cambodia and Kenya carry execution risk India's track record doesn't fully cover. But the evidentiary bar at M1 and M2 is specific enough that if delivery stalls, the remaining 50% simply doesn't release. Real-world adoption at this scale, with this much independently verifiable groundwork already laid, is worth the front-load risk.

I voted YES on CCI V1, and I'm voting YES here, but with lower conviction and a direct flag to Intersect and the Steering Committee about what needs to improve in the eventuality of V3.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I voted YES on CCI V1, and I'm voting YES here, but with lower conviction and a direct flag to Intersect and the Steering Committee about what needs to improve in the eventuality of V3.
The core case for this proposal is simple and I accept it: infrastructure doesn't run for free. Circle USDCx requires attestor operations. LayerZero requires DVN and endpoint operations. Pyth requires oracle feed continuity. Dune requires schema maintenance. These are the operating costs of live integrations that Cardano dApps and users are already depending on. Letting them lapse to prove a fiscal point would be a significantly more expensive decision than the maintenance cost. The ₳70M invested in V1 doesn't become worthless on its own; it becomes worthless if the ecosystem stops paying to keep it running.
The Fireblocks addition is legitimately compelling. Institutional custody is one of the real structural barriers to regulated entities, exchanges, and large tokenization projects building on Cardano. Fireblocks runs custody and operations infrastructure for over 1,800 financial institutions globally. Native Cardano support including the technical foundations for ADA staking and governance delegation isn't just about institutional ADA holdings; it's about making it operationally practical for banks, fintechs, and tokenization projects to interact with Cardano's full feature set. This comes later than it should have, but that's another argument for voting yes now, not for waiting longer.
That said, two concerns go on the record explicitly. First, the 90% budget opacity is a structural problem at this scale. I understand that commercial contracts with Circle, LayerZero, Pyth, Fireblocks, and Dune contain confidentiality provisions and this is standard in enterprise software, but the community is being asked to approve ₳20.7M on the basis of a percentage allocation and a trust relationship with the Steering Committee. Intersect and the Pentad should work to negotiate maximum disclosure rights into V3 commercial agreements from the start, not retroactively. Second, the KPI framework needs to mature significantly. "Continuation of SLAs" is not a milestone; it's a definition. By the V2 bi-annual report, I expect to see specific uptime targets, transaction volume data, adoption metrics for each integration, and a concrete Fireblocks completion milestone. V3, when it comes, should be built on that evidentiary foundation. I'm voting yes on the infrastructure and the track record of the administrative structure. I'm putting Intersect on notice that the accountability framework needs to catch up to the ask.

Voting Abstain due to the proposal deemed as Unconstitutional by majority of the Constitutional Committee.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting Abstain due to the proposal deemed as Unconstitutional by majority of the Constitutional Committee. Eternl: Path to Sustainability 2026–2027 Treasury Withdrawal is unconstitutional in its present form because the proposal does not unambiguously establish periodic independent audits and oversight metrics as required by Article II, Section 7(4) It identifies a purpose, delivery period, budget, recipient, administrator, repayment conditions and mechanisms intended to make the use of funds publicly observable. This decision is therefore not a rejection of Eternl, its contribution to Cardano, or the merits of supporting sustainable wallet infrastructure.

Abstaining

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Abstaining

Ask: ₳32,916,667 Duration: 1 year (CV26 program) Team: 36 FTEs, 19.5 IOR (research) + 17.5 ARC (technology validation), across 9-partner consortium. ~$219.5K/FTE/year all-inclusive

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes on IO Research Cardano Vision 2026, and I want to be clear about why this is a different evaluation than the routine "IO has institutional depth, therefore yes" shortcut. The Cardano Vision program is Cardano's long-duration research pipeline, and CV26 is year two of a five-year initiative that CV2025 already demonstrated can deliver at the level claimed. IOR received ₳26.84 million last year, disbursed 100% of it, published 24 peer-reviewed papers against a 20-paper target, and handed Leios to the engineering team with a CIP and prototype. The distance from IOR's Ouroboros Peras and Leios work to the CBU proposals I approved earlier in this session is measurable and short. That's not a coincidence, it's the research pipeline functioning as designed, and it justifies continued investment.
The strategic case for CV26 rests on three things I can't get elsewhere. First, post-quantum security. Ed25519 and ECVRF, the cryptographic primitives Cardano relies on for leader election and block production are known to be quantum-vulnerable. Large-scale quantum computers don't exist today, but the migration pathway to quantum-secure replacements takes years to design, prove, and deploy safely. Varun Maram and this team are among the few researchers anywhere working on post-quantum VRF constructions that could replace ECVRF without breaking Cardano's performance guarantees. Starting this work now is the only responsible timeline. Second, adversarial analysis of Leios and Peras. Both protocols are approaching mainnet readiness, but formal adversarial analysis under degraded conditions, mempool attack scenarios, and MEV vectors in the eUTxO model is prerequisite safety work before activation and not optional academic overhead. The CBU engineering work approved this session depends on this safety scaffolding being done. Third, the Cavefish light client and decentralized query layer. Most Cardano wallets depend on centralized API providers to interact with the blockchain. Cavefish's intent-based protocol and the decentralized indexer design directly attack that centralization risk, this is "governance in wallets" infrastructure, and it aligns exactly with what I've said publicly I want to fund.
At ₳32.9M (~$7.9M at $0.24) for 36 FTEs across a 9-partner consortium and with IOG absorbing the WP7 program management cost entirely in-kind, the all-in rate of $219.5K/FTE is above my standard flag threshold but appropriate for a research organization carrying Edinburgh, Berkeley, Oxford, Buenos Aires, and Sydney as active academic partners. The actual researcher compensation is a subset of that all-in figure; the rest is subcontracts, infrastructure, travel, and dissemination. Four reporting-based milestone tranches provide reasonable disbursement pacing, and unspent funds return to the treasury. One concern worth naming: the "portfolio-based dynamic reallocation" language gives the program flexibility to shift resources between workstreams based on emerging insights, which is intellectually honest for research but reduces milestone specificity. The prior year's delivery record is the answer to that concern and this team has demonstrated it uses that flexibility productively, not as cover for scope drift.

Ask: ₳4,600,000 FTE cost: $200K/year Duration: Q2 2026 – Q1 2027 (12 months) Oversight board: Santiago Carmuega, Lucas Rosa, Chris Gianelloni Gerolamo is genuinely differentiated infrastructure. Cardano's eUTxO design

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes on Gerolamo for the same reason I voted yes on the combined proposal it was originally part of: a fully-validating browser node is something only Cardano can build without redesigning its base layer, and shipping it turns a latent architectural advantage into a competitive moat. Most Cardano wallets and dApps currently depend on centralized API providers to interact with the blockchain. That dependency reintroduces trust assumptions that decentralization is supposed to eliminate and it makes browser-based governance participation fragile in ways that matter to me directly. Gerolamo's browser extension, backed by its own validating node and exposing a CIP-30-style messaging API, removes that dependency at the application layer. A DRep with Gerolamo installed can verify chain state locally. A wallet can query UTxOs without asking Blockfrost. That's not a convenience feature; it's what "trustless" is supposed to mean in practice.
HLabs builds on its own production infrastructure here. The ouroboros-miniprotocols-ts library, the TypeScript implementation of Cardano's networking stack that Gerolamo's peer connectivity layer runs on is maintained by HLabs and in production use across the ecosystem. This team isn't learning how to implement mini-protocols in TypeScript; they wrote the library everyone else depends on. The browser-specific engineering challenges are real (IndexedDB performance, WebSocket proxy architecture, stable peer management across browser sessions) but these are solvable engineering problems, not open research questions. The M4 requirement of ≥15 stable peers maintained for ≥24 hours across ≥3 independent browser sessions with a non-Chromium screencast committed to the repo is a strong production-readiness bar.
At ₳4,600,000 (~$1.15M at $0.25), five FTEs at $200K annually with the best kickoff ratio in this batch (10% upfront, 90% against quarterly deliverables), the ask is appropriately scoped. The governance structure is the same dual-audited SundaeLabs escrow and same three-person oversight board with unilateral pause rights as the Pebble + tooling proposal. The public transaction journal and monthly status updates add a layer of transparency that exceeds anything else in this budget cycle. Separating Gerolamo from the combined proposal is better governance and it lets DReps evaluate each deliverable on its own merits and prevents a single component concern from blocking unrelated work. The merits here are clear.

Ask: ₳39,787,316 Duration: 2 years (2026–2028) Peras by reducing finality from twelve minutes to two is Cardano's most strategically important pending protocol upgrade and I want to see it on mainnet. This no vote is about the structure of the ask, not the team or the work.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting no on Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure 2026–2028, and this vote requires the same care I'd give any proposal involving work I genuinely want funded. Tweag has earned a place in Cardano's infrastructure story that cannot be manufactured quickly, eight years building Ouroboros Genesis, driving Peras design, and maintaining consensus-layer components that few teams in this ecosystem have the depth to touch. I voted yes on their prior ₳11M request. Peras by reducing finality from twelve minutes to two is Cardano's most strategically important pending protocol upgrade and I want to see it on mainnet. This no vote is about the structure of the ask, not the team or the work.
The primary problem is bundling. The proposal explicitly states it is "a single delivery pipeline, not a modular menu" the proposer's own framing for why 17 work packages cannot be separately evaluated. Peras v1 mainnet readiness, Peras v2 pre-agreement, History Expiry, Hard Fork Mempool Bridger, Conformance Testing, Adversarial Fork Testing, Canonical Ledger State, Plutus Script Re-Executor, Mutation Testing, Hoarding Node extended deployment, Block Cost Investigation, and ongoing maintenance are not the same strategic tier. Peras v1 is urgent, critical, and irreplaceable. Block Cost Investigation and Mutation Testing are valuable but not equivalently urgent. Bundling them as inseparable forces DReps into a binary decision on nearly ₳40M without the ability to prioritize. That's not a delivery efficiency, it's a governance problem transferred from the proposer to the community.
The two-year timeline compounds the issue. Most proposals in this cycle request one year of funding and return to governance for renewal, that structure preserves DRep discretion as priorities evolve, market conditions shift, and delivery evidence accumulates. Committing ₳39.8M across 2026–2028 in a single action removes that annual verification gate. The current NCL runs through mid-2027; a 2028 delivery horizon extends beyond it. Tweag's own rationale states that two years is needed to align Peras v2 with an HFC window and is an engineering reason, not a governance reason. The better structure is one year funded, delivered, then a return to governance for year two with Peras v1 results in hand.
The financial transparency is also insufficient for an ask at this scale. ₳39.8M supported by a blended hourly rate and a five-year ADA conversion average is not a budget, it's a price. There is no milestone-level cost allocation, no FTE count by workstream, no disclosed CBU/ARK subcontract amounts, no overhead breakdown. At $176/hour, the implied annual FTE cost runs approximately $365,000 per engineer, and well above the threshold I apply before expecting explicit cost justification. That rate may be appropriate for Tweag's consulting model, but without a labor category breakdown the community cannot independently verify whether the amount is appropriately scoped for the work. The prior ₳11M 2025 funding also needs a clean, independently auditable closeout before a new portfolio of this scale can be evaluated on its own merits, several 2025 workstreams are publicly noted as paused, and the current proposal does not distinguish between completing prior obligations, recovering a shortfall, and genuinely new scope.
Tweag knows what a resubmission should look like and the DRep community has stated it clearly and consistently across every substantive no vote on this action. Peras v1 mainnet readiness, minimum required safety scaffolding, and the hard-fork tooling that enables it, should be unbundled, one year, with milestone-level budget disclosure and a published 2025 closeout. That proposal gets evaluated on its own merits against a team with proven execution. I want to fund Peras. I need a structure that lets me do it responsibly. Vote no, with strong encouragement to resubmit on those terms.

Ask: ₳2,400,000 / Critical finding: CC ruled unconstitutional under Articles II.7.5 and II.7.6. The on-chain withdrawal structure routes funds directly to the proposer's own stake address

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting no on OriLife Alliance's durian traceability proposal, and the constitutional structure is where the analysis has to start. The Constitutional Committee has determined that the on-chain withdrawal action violates Articles II.7.5 and II.7.6 the funds flow directly to the proposer's own stake address, which is delegated to the proposer's own SPO pool. The proposal asserts Intersect-managed escrow throughout its narrative; the on-chain action does not implement it. This is not a textual oversight or a timing artifact, it inverts the constitutional separation between the project receiving treasury funds and the account holding those funds during the disbursement period. That separation exists specifically to prevent the delivery party from earning stake-derived rewards on treasury assets during the holding period. The structure fails that test at the point of withdrawal, and no downstream transfer can fix what the on-chain governance action already encodes.
Setting the constitutional failure aside, the strategic case for treasury funding doesn't clear the bar independently. At ₳2,400,000 (~$600,000 at $0.25), OriLife is asking the Cardano treasury to fund the production deployment of an agricultural traceability business serving Vietnamese durian exporters on a specific GACC-regulated export corridor to China. The technology is genuinely interesting, biological feature identification that eliminates the detachable-label fraud vector, eUTxO batching that achieves roughly 19,000× cost reduction over the prior TON-based per-fruit approach, and a regulatory mandate under Circular 11 creating real non-discretionary demand pull. But the regulatory mandate is the same reason this should attract agricultural-tech risk capital, not treasury subsidy. When legal obligation compels adoption at scale, private investors aligned with the business risk can capture returns. The treasury's comparative advantage is core protocol infrastructure and public goods that no single commercial entity would fund, developer tooling, consensus layer, governance primitives. A durian export compliance business in Đắk Lắk is not that.
The proposal is honest that direct fee returns imply an 84-year payback, and the reframe to four alternative return categories, 75,000 ADA permanently locked, 24,000 new Cardano users, first sovereign-government agricultural deployment, growing SDK extension has some intellectual integrity to it. But those returns are speculative at proposal stage. The PoC operates on preprod and farmer onboarding was done on TON, not on Cardano mainnet. The bridge from working demo to 180 million fruits per season at full scale is built primarily from off-chain execution, farmer compliance, GACC enforcement, regulatory continuity, provincial government coordination, that blockchain proves anchoring for but cannot guarantee. DReps cannot independently assess that execution risk, and the treasury shouldn't absorb it.
If OriLife returns with a properly structured withdrawal and the Intersect-controlled escrow actually implemented in the on-chain action, clean custody separation with no SPO delegation to the proposer's own pool, and a hybrid funding model that brings private agricultural-tech capital alongside a structured treasury contribution positioned as a loan or partial grant, then the conversation is worth having. The underlying technology merits a closer look in that context. As submitted, the constitutional violation is dispositive and the strategic case doesn't stand independently. Vote no.

This is the cleaner half of the original combined proposal. Gerolamo splitting out actually helps tighten the ask, more focused deliverables, and the FTE rate dropped from $225K to $200K

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes on HLabs Pebble and TypeScript tooling maintenance for the same reasons I voted yes on the combined proposal this work was originally part of. Separating Gerolamo into its own proposal sharpens the ask, this is a focused five-FTE investment in developer language infrastructure and protocol-synchronized tooling, and both components stand on their own merits.
Pebble fills a paradigm gap that Aiken structurally cannot close. Aiken is functional-first and the right language for developers thinking in Haskell or ML patterns, but the wrong on-ramp for the 17 million TypeScript and JavaScript developers who think imperatively. Pebble delivers an imperative-first surface syntax those developers already know, compiling to UPLC with published benchmark performance that matches or exceeds Aiken while remaining readable to engineers who have never touched a pure functional language. Requiring UPLC-CAPE submission as a milestone acceptance criterion is the right accountability mechanism, the performance claims are independently verifiable against a public benchmark suite, not self-reported. The TypeScript tooling component (cardano-ledger-ts, ouroboros-miniprotocols-ts, plutus-machine, uplc) is the quieter but equally important half of this ask. These libraries are load-bearing for Mesh, Lucid Evolution, and Midgard. When HLabs ships a hard-fork update, the TypeScript ecosystem ships with it. Hard-fork readiness as Milestone 1.B with CI-green acceptance on a Plutus V4 testnet snapshot as the verifiable criterion, this is exactly the kind of public goods maintenance the treasury should be funding.
At ₳4,600,000 (~$1.15M at $0.25), five FTEs at $200K annually lands right at the threshold I apply before flagging premium compensation and it's a step down from the $225K rate in the combined proposal, which I credit. The 15% contingency is labeled honestly as an optimism-bias buffer and is fully refundable if unused. Milestone 0 draws only 10% at kickoff; the remaining 90% releases quarterly on deliverables the oversight board must co-sign before funds move. The board with Carmuega, Rosa, Gianelloni, has no HLabs stake, and any single member can pause disbursement unilaterally. Same SundaeLabs escrow, same dual-audit framework already approved on Amaru and Dingo.
The structural concerns from the original vote remain: no explicit labor category breakdown, contingency allocated as a blanket buffer rather than against specific risks, and quarterly rather than monthly financial reporting. Those gaps don't change the vote. The milestone acceptance criteria are objective, the oversight board can enforce discipline, and the refundable contingency limits downside exposure. HLabs has a demonstrated track record maintaining this TypeScript stack in production. This is not speculative funding for unproven builders it is sustaining infrastructure already running in production that the ecosystem depends on.

I'm voting “No” on this proposal: I will not vote yes on EMURGO treasury withdrawals until the Yoroi wallet governance UI issue is properly remedied. That commitment runs through March 15, 2027. EMURGO has been aware of it. The commitment stands.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting no on this Title-level top-up for the TOKEN2049 Singapore.
The immediate reason for this particular vote is straightforward, Charles Hoskinson publicly committed, unprompted, using his own resources, to personally top up Cardano's TOKEN2049 presence to Title level. We get the mainstage keynote, and the Title-tier visibility without spending a single ADA from the treasury. Approving this withdrawal would be asking the community to pay for something the founder already volunteered to fund.
What this top-up buys over Platinum is 36 additional square meters of booth space, a 15-minute mainstage slot, a press release mention, and media introductions. Those are brand benefits for Cardano's institutional positioning, a legitimate use of public funds, but not when private capital has already stepped in to cover them. A standing commitment controls the vote. The founder's personal commitment makes it redundant on the merits. Vote no.

Resolve the Yoroi governance UI issue. The pathway back to treasury support is clear. This vote is a reaffirmation of that commitment, not a judgment on Singapore or TOKEN2049. Vote abstain.
EMURGO Ask: ₳3,303,750 Booth build $250,000 (31.5%), EMURGO 15% management fee $97,485

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting “Abstain” on this proposal, and the reason has nothing to do with TOKEN2049 being the wrong venue or EMURGO being the wrong operator. This no vote is the product of a standing commitment I made publicly and have maintained: I will not vote yes on EMURGO treasury withdrawals until the Yoroi wallet governance UI issue is properly remedied. That commitment runs through March 15, 2027. EMURGO has been aware of it. The commitment stands.
The proposal itself has real elements worth acknowledging. The builder substage format with 30 dedicated tickets, live ecosystem demos, lead scanning, and post-event lead routing to relevant projects is genuine public goods infrastructure for builders who couldn't afford this footprint independently. The co-location timing with the CF Summit creates a natural October 5–8 window where Cardano has sequential presence across both the community event and the institutional event, which is a coherent strategy. And I'll note that Charles Hoskinson has publicly committed to personally top up the TOKEN2049 sponsorship to Title level from his own resources, which means the ecosystem may get the full-tier presence regardless of this vote's outcome, without an additional treasury ask.
The merit concerns that would exist independent of the standing commitment are also worth documenting. EMURGO has operated a TOKEN2049 partnership privately for four years, from 2022 through 2025. A well-capitalized founding entity with a Singapore headquarters and that track record should be absorbing more of this cost before coming to the treasury. The 15% management fee on top of pass-through costs from the same entity executing the work is the kind of overhead that the treasury should not routinely fund for founding-level participants. On the merits alone, this would be a conditional yes with documented concerns, but the standing commitment does not permit that.
EMURGO knows what is required to earn a yes vote from me. Resolve the Yoroi governance UI issue. The pathway back to treasury support is clear. This abstain vote is a reaffirmation of that commitment, not a judgment on Singapore or TOKEN2049. Vote abstain.

This is a marketing spend with strategic specificity, positional for maximum impact during a bear cycle.
Cardano Foundation Ask: ₳7,800,000 CF internal contribution: $380,000, Public goods core (hackathon + developer workshops + governance sessions): ~$100–200K, or 5–9% of gross budget.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes on the Revised Cardano Summit 2026 in Singapore, and this vote requires an explanation more than most. Today this is presented as a different animal. Singapore in October 2026 is the only major financial center where tokenization regulatory frameworks, stablecoin licensing, and Project Guardian's 40-plus tier-one institutional participants are in attendance and simultaneously operational, by placing Cardano in front of the institutional audience that matters most at precisely the right moment is absolutely necessary. The TOKEN2049 co-location holds up as a genuine ROI argument, having 25,000 pre-qualified institutional delegates already in the market without the cost of flying them in is legitimate event economics for a flagship event at this scale. This is a marketing spend with strategic specificity, positional for maximum impact during a bear cycle.
CF has delivered four consecutive Summits, the Singapore venue is already secured from 2025 revenue, event planning is already underway, and the 2025 KPI tracking report is publicly visible. that's the commitment and CF has demonstrated they can deliver on what they are asking for. The 22% budget cut, EMURGO decoupling, and CF absorbing $380K in internal resources show genuine responsiveness to community feedback. 
Day 1 dedicating the full program to ecosystem builders, DReps, governance sessions, the Battle of the Builders hackathon, and masterclasses is substantive public goods content. Promoting ecosystem builders is paramount to the success of the network, coupled with governance education will ensure ecosystem participation increases.
The Sundae Labs smart contract framework with a four-entity Oversight Committee requiring 3-of-4 signatures for disbursement, dual audit reports, residual return to treasury, and a public dashboard is exactly the kind of accountability architecture needed for on a non-technical proposal.
There's also a momentum worth acknowledging here. Charles Hoskinson has publicly committed to attend the Cardano Summit in Singapore and “be on stage” ending a 3 year boycott of the seminal event. He's doing exactly what I want founding entities to do: show up with their own capital when the ecosystem needs it, and honoring that momentum matters.
The concerns on the proposal itself remain documented. Milestone 1 releases 80% of the withdrawal on ratification alone with no deliverable gate, and that structure should be tightened in future Summit proposals. The KPI framework mixes meaningful outcome metrics, like 250 enterprise MQLs, 50 strategic meetings within 45 days with soft brand metrics that have no published baselines. CF should establish those before the event opens so post-event reporting has something real to measure against. At ₳7.8M (~$1.95M net at $0.25), with strong accountability infrastructure, a proven delivery team, and a founder willing to pull together on stage alongside each other in a sign of and a commitment to continuity through unity.

Total ask: ₳11,877,575 / ~$2,850,618 at $0.24
Development ratio: ₳10,214,715 = 86%
Team size: 11 named engineers (4 DX / 4 UPLC capabilities / 3 formal methods)
Implied FTE cost: $2,451,532 development ÷ 11 engineers ÷ 12 months × 12 = ~$223K annualized
Unspent funds return: Explicit (Section 4.4)

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes because Plutus is the substrate that every Cardano smart contract runs on, and this proposal funds three interconnected improvements around execution efficiency, formal correctness, and developer onboarding which compound directly, the outcomes the ecosystem needs.
The deliverables that align most explicitly with priorities I've stated are in Workstreams 2 and 3. The property-based conformance testing framework, by extending the existing 1,982-test suite with randomly generated programs, it is a direct benefitting enabler of node diversity I've consistently voted to support. Amaru, Dingo, and Gerolamo all need a conformance framework that covers edge cases beyond handwritten tests; this proposal builds it. The Agda formalization of programmatic built-in types and functions extends the same rigorous specification methodology IO applied to the Leios and High Assurance proposals, consistent and cumulative, exactly the kind of infrastructure investment that compounds over time. On the developer experience side: no-Nix installation, source-level error messages, standalone compiler binaries, single-command setup. These are not conveniences. They are the difference between a developer's first Cardano project succeeding or failing. Every friction point that gets removed is a developer retained. The accessibility mandate runs through all three workstreams.
The VacuumLabs co-venture is worth naming explicitly. This isn't IO funding IO work with IO people. VacuumLabs is an independent specialist firm with deep Haskell and formal methods expertise contributing to Plutus as shared public infrastructure. That distributed ownership model supports multiple expert teams stewarding core infrastructure rather than a single organization. This is exactly the structural outcome a maturing ecosystem should be building toward and IO continues to show a mandate to distributing the workload. At ₳11,877,575 (~$2.85M at $0.24), with 86% allocated to development and unspent funds returned, the ask is proportionate for scope. The implied FTE cost runs slightly above my $200K annualized benchmark at roughly $223K per engineer; given that Agda formal methods specialists, GHC compiler engineers, and Haskell security auditors are genuinely scarce expertise, the rate is defensible.
The risks are honestly disclosed and well-contained. The scope check investigation delivers a CIP or a report regardless of outcome, we have a time-boxed deliverable either way. CIP-0168 isn't yet ratified, a real risk that the proposal tracks closely. The new UPLC features require the Dijkstra hard fork for mainnet activation, which is out of scope for this proposal but honestly stated. None of these change the vote.

Total ask: ₳13,078,578
Development: ₳11,247,577 = 86%
Workstream split: ₳10.1M Blaster / ₳2.97M CBDE
Team: IO + 6 partners (Lantr, Harmonic Labs, SAIB, Midgard Labs, TxPipe, No.Witness Labs)
FTE estimate: $2.7M dev ÷ ~10–12 specialists ÷ 10.5 months × 12 ≈ $257–308K/year

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes because this proposal makes Cardano's formal verification capability accessible and accessible is the operative word. Blaster already proved correctness properties for Djed and USDCx at production scale. The 2025/26 cycle demonstrated the core works. This cycle opens that tooling to the full ecosystem, extends it from single-contract to DApp-level verification, integrates it into four smart contract languages, and delivers it through a developer environment that replaces multi-day Nix configuration with a 60-second initialization.
At ₳13,078,578 (~$3.14M at $0.24) with 86% allocated to development across a nine-organization consortium consisting of IO, Lantr (Scalus), Harmonic Labs (Pebble), SAIB (Futura), Midgard Labs (Aiken), TxPipe, and No.Witness Labs each holding defined work packages, this is complex orchestration efficiently structured for its scope and duration and only possible by IO. Formal methods specialists with production-level Lean 4 depth are scarce; and therefore the implied FTE cost is appropriate. The workstream split (₳10.1M Blaster, ₳2.97M CBDE) is transparent.
Three deliverables align directly with priorities I hold and use to inform my decisions. The Container-Based Developer Environment converts the multi-day Nix setup barrier into a single command, this is the accessibility work that makes Cardano's high-assurance tooling available to developers who are building, not just the narrow cohort that can configure it. The Common Vulnerability Library containing pre-built property templates for Double Satisfaction, Large Value Attack, and Large Datum Attack, produced with auditing partners and open for contribution, democratizes security analysis that currently requires expensive specialist. The VS Code Extension V2 includes an LLM-friendly counterexample format for AI-assisted debugging, which is exactly the kind of AI/LLM integration that should be embedded in Cardano's developer tooling from the start rather than bolted on afterward and early alignment is critical.
The proposal is honest about the hard parts. Scaling from single-contract to multi-script DApp-level verification is rated "Medium" likelihood and "High" severity; the formal methods team is small and subject to IO reprioritization risk. It's equally honest about what's not funded: community outreach is a stated benefit dependency requiring coordination with the Developer Experience Initiative, while this proposal builds the tools, it’s not the distribution flywheel. Standard milestone-based Intersect governance keeps funding accountable.

Total ask: ₳62,134,630 | ~$14.9M at $0.24
Development: ₳45,979,626 = 74% Infrastructure: ₳6,213,463 = 10%
Team: Cross-functional spanning all nine areas.
FTE estimate: $11.03M dev ÷ ~50 specialists ÷ 9 months × 12 ≈ $294–441K/engineer/year

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Cardano's entire development pipeline depends on this proposal. Every feature that ships this cycle from Leios, Babel Fees, CIP-159, and the developer tooling I voted for earlier, moves through a release process, runs through a QA framework, gets hardened by security reviews, and operates on infrastructure that this maintenance envelope keeps alive. You cannot selectively defund maintenance. I'm voting yes.
At ₳62,134,630 (~$14.9M at $0.24), this is the largest single ask in the current IO CBU batch. The 74% development allocation is lower than IO's 86% on feature proposals but, is explained by the 10% infrastructure line: CI/CD pipelines, distributed benchmark clusters, testnet operations, and mainnet monitoring all at production scale carry real operating costs. Over nine months with a team spanning consensus, ledger, DevOps, QA, performance, security, documentation, and release management, the implied per-engineer cost lands in an expensive but, defensible range. Two things I'd strengthen in a future submission: explicit SLA targets (incident resolution times, uptime thresholds) in addition to the directional KPI alignment, and a disclosed budget split between IO and Ensurable Systems for a co-delivery of this scale.
Two elements align directly with priorities I've stated publicly. The Cardano Blueprint, the implementation-independent specifications covering consensus, network, ledger, and Plutus, is precisely the documentation that makes Amaru, Dingo, and Gerolamo viable. Alternative node clients need complete, authoritative specs to implement against; this is where those specs live. The guardrails and CC identity script maintenance is governance infrastructure I depend on directly as a DRep, and that work is non-discretionary.
The collaboration with Ensurable Systems is worth naming: IO is deliberately distributing infrastructure stewardship, reducing single-entity concentration risk over time. This is the right direction for the ecosystem. Standard milestone-based Intersect governance and I expect to see more diversification year over year as stated by IO. Vote yes.

Total ask: ₳27,714,342
Development: ₳23,834,334 = 86%
Team: Cross-functional IO engineering (consensus, ledger, networking, cryptography, formal methods, performance, comms) + ModusCreate + SundaeLabs
FTE estimate: $5.72M dev ÷ ~30 engineers ÷ 7.5 months × 12 ≈ $305–366K/engineer/year

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Leios is the protocol change that makes Cardano's 2030 transaction targets structurally achievable. Without it, scaling from 800K to 27M monthly transactions is impossible. I'm voting YES.
The financial case is sound, ₳27,714,342 ($6.65M at $0.24) with 86% allocated to development. For 6–9 months of consensus layer work, with a cross-functional team doing simultaneous rewrite of consensus components, Agda conformance testing against the formal specification, adversarial red-teaming, and full hard-fork ecosystem preparation, the implied engineering cost lands in the right range for this caliber of distributed systems work. This is high-difficulty protocol engineering, not commodity development.
This proposal builds on demonstrated delivery. The 2025/26 cycle produced CIP-164 (merged), an alpha feature-complete Leios implementation, and a public testnet deployment. The 26/27 cycle has a clear objective: progress from SRL 5 through SRL 8 to a mainnet-ready release candidate. Development tracker and monthly review meetings with public demos are established and ongoing.
What specifically resonates: The Agda formal specification conformance testing is the right level of rigor for a protocol change at this scale because, you don't want to make a consensus-layer-upgrade to Cardano without it. Leios enhances Praos rather than replacing it, preserving Cardano's security model and SPO economic viability while delivering a 10–65x throughput increase. The hard-fork enabling workstream explicitly includes preparation of updated guardrails and governance rationale documents, IO is scoping the full governance pathway, not just the engineering milestone.
Honest disclosure on known limitations: The Delta EB adversarial stake assumption has a ceiling at 25% adversarial stake, meaning maximum throughput parameters may not be achievable at day-one hard fork. Higher SPO operational costs are acknowledged. External dependencies, HFWG acceptance, third-party infrastructure readiness, governance timing, are explicitly out of IO's control, with success defined by completing the engineering activities, not by mainnet activation. This scoping is appropriate and honest.

Total: ₳13,103,039
Development: ₳11,268,614 (86%) WS1 (CIP-159 Micro Fees): ₳7,069,985 | WS2 (CPS-23 Multi-Asset Treasury): ₳2,356,662 | WS3 (Babel Fees): ₳3,676,392 Implied FTE cost: ~$2.7M development ÷ estimated 10–12 senior protocol specialists over 9 months ≈ $250–300K annualized per engineer.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes because these three workstreams collectively remove the economic constraints that limit what Cardano can do for wallets, DeFi protocols, and anyone arriving from Bitcoin or a stablecoin. CIP-159 Account Address Enhancement lifts the minUTxOValue barrier that has prevented Cardano wallets from collecting micro-fees at all, the average transaction costs ~0.39 ADA, but the minimum UTxO requirement forces wallets to charge at least 1 ADA in overhead, making micro-fee revenue economically indefensible. That single constraint suppresses wallet product-market fit, inflates DeFi batcher costs across the entire ecosystem, and blocks the L2 reserve patterns that scaling solutions need. Fixing it is protocol infrastructure, much more than a simply product enhancement.
Two of the three workstreams align directly with governance priorities I've stated publicly. CPS-23 Multi-Asset Treasury begins the design work that makes it possible for the Cardano Treasury to hold stablecoins, directly addressing the ADA price volatility problem that undermines every treasury-denominated governance proposal, including this one. Babel Fees takes the principle of meeting users where they are and applies it to DeFi onboarding: BTC holders and USDC users should be able to transact on Cardano the moment they arrive, without first acquiring ADA. That is the public-utility promise of this network made real for the next generation of users.
At ₳13,103,039 ($3.1M at the proposal's $0.24/ADA reference rate), with 86% of the budget allocated to development across three clearly separated workstream allocations, the cost structure is proportionate. Implied annualized cost per senior protocol engineer runs approximately $250–300K, within range for ledger-level specialists. The execution risks worth naming are honest ones: WS3 (Babel Fees) has a hard dependency on CIP-118 (Nested Transactions), which is separately funded and not yet on testnet, and the Babel Fees MVP launches as a single closed-network provider with the operating entity still an open decision because, permissionless multi-provider architecture arrives in a later iteration. Both are disclosed in the proposal's own risk table and are appropriately managed by the milestone structure rather than the vote.

Fiscal Responsibility Budget breakdown is 81% development and engineering, 1% legal, 1% infrastructure, 1% security/audits. Strategic Value & Ecosystem Fit, The problem is real and quantified: 550 Cardano developers growing at 82/year against Ethereum's 1,940/year

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes because developer experience is where Cardano's flywheel either starts or stalls — and right now it isn't starting. Cardano has 550 active developers growing at 82 per year while Ethereum adds 1,940 per year. That's not a protocol quality gap. It's a friction gap between "curious developer" and "deployed DApp," and this proposal attacks that friction with tools, documentation, and coordination that no single ecosystem entity would build on their own.
Three specific deliverables align directly with priorities I've stated publicly. The cardano-init CLI, it meets builders where they are and removes the first-hour barrier that turns away Web2 and EVM developers before they ever see what the eUTxO model can do. The ContractsLibrary, built open-source and explicitly designed to ground LLMs and AI coding assistants on Cardano-native patterns, advances the CIP and schema normalization work that makes the ecosystem machine-readable and future-proof. The Developer HUB restructuring is optimized for both human onboarding paths and LLM agent access, this is a standard for infrastructure I believe is prerequisite to any serious adoption curve.
At ₳3,601,926 (~$864K at the proposal's stated $0.24/ADA reference rate), with 81% allocated directly to development and engineering. The implied team cost runs roughly $140K–$200K annualized per specialist across the stated disciplines, expensive? Yes, but competitive without being at a premium. Unspent funds return to the treasury under standard milestone-based Intersect governance. The disclosed execution risk, in the team not yet fully assembled, TxPipe partnership still exploratory is real, but it's precisely the kind of risk the milestone structure is designed to catch and correct before full disbursement. The data-driven diagnosis behind this proposal, 109 developer surveys and GitHub activity analysis, gives me confidence the team knows what they're building and why.

Total ask: ₳12,290,000
Budget breakdown: Product, Engineering & R&D: ₳6,267,900 = 51%
Growth: ₳2,335,100 = 19% = $560,500
Security Audits: ₳1,597,700 = 13%
Legal & Compliance: ₳1,229,000 = 10%
Ops & Infrastructure: ₳860,300 = 7%
Revenue return: 20% of EBITDA quarterly until $2.95M, then 5%

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes because this is structured as an investment, not a grant. Pogun commits to returning 20% of quarterly EBITDA to the Cardano Treasury until the full $2.95M is repaid, followed by a 5% perpetual return drawn from on-chain protocol revenue that any community member can independently verify. The treasury isn't spending $2.95M, it's seeding a credit infrastructure protocol and receiving an equity-style return in exchange. If Cardano's treasury is going to move beyond grant dependency toward commercial sustainability, this is what that model looks like.
The strategic case stands on its own merits regardless of the return structure. The non-margin credit market concept was originally developed by Russell Shapiro (Fallen Icarus), whose peer-to-peer financial architecture I've supported as consistently superior to pool-based models that sacrifice borrower protection for liquidation mechanics. Pogun's implementation comes with an oracle-free, bilateral, collateral at risk only upon definitive default, structured exactly like the private credit markets that institutional capital actually uses and this is the on-chain realization of that thesis. The eUTxO architecture is not a marketing claim here: flash-loan self-liquidation in a single atomic transaction only works with Cardano's deterministic execution model. The "no MEV, no front-running" guarantee for collateral is structural, not aspirational. The BitVM bridge's 1-of-N security model, now institutions can self-custody as one of the N operators. This solves the precise trust problem that keeps serious Bitcoin capital out of DeFi. The Cardinal paper and Bitcoin 2025 mainnet demonstration show the BABE witness encryption architecture has been tested, not just theorized.
The legitimate concern is execution risk. Pogun has no prior Cardano treasury receipts. The Growth line at 19% ($560K) lacks the granular breakdown that would let the community verify it funds liquidity incentives rather than marketing overhead, that specificity should be published before first disbursement. The Phase 1 disburses 33% of total funding upon ratification, is a meaningful commitment before the credit market has launched. These concerns are real, and the milestone gate structure, where all subsequent tranches require verified delivery against explicit pass thresholds reviewed by an independent administrator is the right response to them. If Phase 1 gates don't pass, Phases 2 through 4 don't release. The refund clause covering technical infeasibility of the BitVM bridge is specifically written: bridge-specific funds return, credit market and yield DApp funds already spent on delivered work do not. That's an honest accounting I can get behind.

Total ask: ₳7,916,666 Product, Engineering & R&D: ₳3,333,333 = 42.1% Security Audits: ₳833,333 = 10.5% Ops & Infrastructure: ₳3,750,000 = 47.4% Hybrid proposal: $800K new development + ~$900K operational + $200K security audits.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes because Blockfrost is not aspirational infrastructure alone, it's operational infrastructure the ecosystem already depends on, serving approximately 90% of all free-tier API traffic since day one. Project Cayley addresses a real and compounding problem: as Leios scales Cardano throughput, full-chain indexing costs will grow exponentially, potentially pricing smaller operators out of data infrastructure entirely. Decentralized slice indexing is enabling SPOs to participate without bearing the full indexing cost. This is the architecturally correct response to that scaling constraint. That alone in my mind justifies this proposal.
Two concerns are worth naming. First, the "fair share" framing for the $900,000 operational subsidy is only partly accurate. The Blockfrost free tier was a deliberate commercial strategy to lower barriers, acquire developers, convert them to paid tiers and it worked. The treasury is being asked to retroactively subsidize what was also a customer acquisition investment. I don't think that disqualifies the ask, because the public goods component is real: 90% of ecosystem developers rely on this service, and continuity matters. But the framing should be honest about the dual nature rather than presenting it as pure ecosystem altruism. Second, the Bitcoin indexer in Milestone 5 is the least defensible component. Cardano treasury funds extending data infrastructure to Bitcoin expands Blockfrost's commercial addressable market more directly than it advances Cardano ecosystem priorities. The "unified data layer" argument exists, but it's thin justification for Cardano treasury expenditure. I'd rather see that scope bounded to Cardano-first deliverables.
At ₳7,916,666 (~$1.9M at $0.24), with standard milestone-based Intersect governance, a prior delivery record of 88% drawdown, and an operational subsidy that keeps critical free-tier access alive while Cayley matures, the ask is proportionate. The open-source status of the Cayley/Mandoline codebase is not stated and should be, SPO participation in data infrastructure is only meaningful if the architecture is open. That gap doesn't change my vote, but it should be addressed in the next submission or clarified publicly before mainnet launch.

Total ask: ₳10,425,871
Development: ₳8,966,249 = 86%
WS1 L2-Agnostic DA: ₳1,895,613 ($455K)
WS2 Hydra Production: ₳7,582,452 ($1.82M)
WS3 Midgard Mainnet: ₳947,806 (~$227K)
FTE estimate: $2.15M dev ÷ ~8–10 specialist L2 engineers ÷ 7.5 months × 12 ≈ $344–430K/year

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting yes because Cardano has a competitive gap that L1 upgrades alone won't close, and this proposal addresses it with solutions that already have live production commitments behind them.
The problem is precise: Cardano L1 delivers over two hours of finality at $0.17 per transaction. Competing platforms deliver sub-2-second finality at sub-cent fees. High-performance applications like DeFi, AI agent micropayments, and gaming don't evaluate Cardano's security model or eUTxO architecture because they've already self-eliminated before reaching that stage. This proposal builds the infrastructure that moves Cardano past that pre-selection filter. Hydra handles known-party, high-frequency environments; Midgard handles open, permissionless participation. These are different trust models serving different use cases, and the proposal makes a credible case that supporting only one leaves a meaningful gap.
At ₳10,425,871 (~$2.5M at $0.24) with 86% to development and transparent per-workstream budget allocation, this is competitive for what's being attempted. Three things align directly with my priorities, the L2-agnostic data availability strategy is shared infrastructure for every current and future Cardano L2, this is essential in solving the problem once rather than once per project. Masumi's machine-to-machine micropayment infrastructure on Hydra is exactly the kind of AI agent use case Cardano should be enabling, not ceding to Solana. And Midgard's architecture explicitly routes a portion of L2 sequencer revenue back to the Cardano treasury, this will be a non-speculative, ongoing revenue stream aligned with the long-term fiscal sustainability that a shrinking reserve makes necessary.
The risk table is honest about what's hard. Midgard's transition from single-sequencer testnet to multi-operator coordination is rated "High" likelihood and "High" severity, it's on the critical path, and full mainnet production is scoped to a subsequent proposal cycle. The DA architecture selection risk is real: a wrong architectural choice creates technical debt for all Cardano L2s. The Stage 1 evaluation before Stage 2 commitment, with community input required, is the right process discipline. These risks are accounted for in the phasing dispersal; and they don't change the vote. Confidence in their utilization of the standard milestone-based Intersect governance processes.

Strategic logic is sound but bundling Summit + TOKEN2049 in one vote prevents granular evaluation. Now that separate proposals exist, this version is superseded. Will vote on each individually. I Abstain for now.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I'm voting to abstain on this proposal because while I agree with the strategic logic of combining Cardano Summit 2026 with TOKEN2049 in Singapore, the bundled structure prevents the granular evaluation a 14 million ADA treasury withdrawal demands. Co-locating around TOKEN2049 is smart positioning, that Cardano needs institutional visibility in 2026, and Singapore during TOKEN2049 week is arguably the highest-leverage venue available. The strategic case is sound. My objection is structural, not philosophical.
The core problem is that this proposal asks DReps to cast a single vote on two fundamentally different expenditures with different risk profiles, different managing entities, and different accountability standards. The Cardano Summit is a CF-managed community and enterprise event with a track record spanning four years. The TOKEN2049 Title Sponsorship is an EMURGO-managed brand marketing spend at a third-party conference. These deserve independent evaluation. A DRep who supports the Summit but has concerns about a $700,000 title sponsorship fee, or who supports TOKEN2049 presence but questions CF's shift from self-funding to treasury dependence, has no mechanism to express that distinction under this bundled structure. Several No voters, including Cardanians and Chris Cata, identified this same concern, and I share it.
I also note that the proposal has since been split into two separate governance actions, which is exactly the structural improvement I wanted to see. That split makes this bundled version procedurally superseded. Voting yes on a bundled proposal when unbundled alternatives now exist would undermine the principle that DReps should have granular authority over treasury deployments. Voting no would misrepresent my position, I am not opposed to Cardano's presence at either event, and I recognize the legitimate concerns about timing constraints that motivated this submission outside the Intersect budget process.
An abstain vote here acknowledges the strategic merit of the dual-event concept while respecting the governance improvement that unbundling represents. I will evaluate each component on its own merits when voting on the individual proposals, applying my standard framework for accountability, fiscal discipline, and treasury fit. Abstain.

I'm voting yes on the HLabs Pebble + Gerolamo proposal because it addresses complementary infrastructure gaps that neither Amaru nor Dingo cover: a browser-native light node enabling dApps and wallets to escape centralized indexer dependency, an imperative smart contract language targeting the 17 million+ TypeScript/JavaScript developer pool, and sustained maintenance of foundational TypeScript tooling the ecosystem already depends on. While the proposal has legitimate administrative and cost-justification weaknesses, the strategic value of expanding Cardano's developer funnel and enabling trustless browser-based chain verification outweighs those concerns.
Gerolamo is not redundant to existing alternative node efforts, it's explicitly designed as a TypeScript light node for browsers, not a block-producing node. Most Cardano dApps currently rely on centralized indexers or third-party APIs, reintroducing trust assumptions that decentralization is meant to eliminate. A production-ready browser node lets dApps verify UTxO states locally without external services and enables light wallets to offer Daedalus-level security with light wallet UX. This is a full-node in the browser connecting users directly to the blockchain with no middleman, no APIs, no trusting wallet providers, truly needed for P2P DeFi. SPOs can also deploy Gerolamo as a relay alongside Haskell nodes, adding codebase diversity at the networking layer. This creates a different category of value from Amaru/Dingo's block-producing ambitions and directly addresses the platform's missing layer for browser-native chain access.
Pebble expands the developer funnel without fragmenting it. Pebble targets engineers fluent in TypeScript/JavaScript/Solidity-style imperative syntax which is the largest developer community globally. Haskell (Plutus) and Aiken are primarily functional languages, which can be complex for developers with only imperative language experience. Pebble uses an imperative-first paradigm with familiar syntax patterns, compiling to optimized UPLC like Aiken while lowering the barrier for Web2 and EVM developers. Cardano having multiple legitimate on-ramps that serve different mental models and experience backgrounds is essential This directly supports Cardano 2030 Pillar 2 (Adoption & Utility) by expanding the total addressable developer pool.
The hard-fork tooling maintenance component, 1.5 FTE for cardano-ledger-ts, ouroboros-miniprotocols-ts, plutus-machine, and uplc, is non-optional public good infrastructure. These TypeScript libraries are load-bearing for a substantial share of Cardano's developer ecosystem, often as transitive dependencies in SDKs, off-chain code, and tooling. When hard forks change protocol parameters, these libraries must be updated promptly or downstream projects face breaking changes and silent correctness bugs. Funding sustained maintenance is one of the highest-leverage line items in this proposal, ensuring continuity through protocol upgrades and reducing operational burden for developers building on this stack.
The governance structure matches the standard I've already endorsed for Amaru and Dingo. Funds are held in SundaeLabs treasury-contracts, the same audited escrow framework used by other alternative node implementations, audited by TxPipe and MLabs. The independent oversight board (Santiago Carmuega/TxPipe, Lucas Rosa/Aiken-Midnight, Chris Gianelloni/BlinkLabs-Dingo) has no stake in HLabs and carries direct technical credibility in Cardano infrastructure. Auto-abstain DRep delegation, no SPO delegation, failsafe sweep at contract expiration, same accountability mechanisms I've approved twice before.
That said, this proposal has structural weaknesses that institutional-grade treasury management should flag. The administrative and cost-justification layers lack the rigid structure expected for $2.25 million in expenditures over 12 months. The budget treats administrative operations as invisible overhead bundled into a flat $225,000 per FTE rate, hiding actual engineer costs versus company operating expenses. There's no dedicated project management role for a 12-month project with 10 FTEs, no breakdown of general and administrative costs (rent, legal, HR, accounting), and no explicit basis of estimate showing how much of that $225,000 is base salary versus fringe benefits versus overhead versus fee/profit.
The proposal also lacks clarity on human capital and hiring risk. The budget assumes 10 FTEs but doesn't specify if those people are currently on staff or need to be hired. There are no staffing milestones, no key personnel clauses protecting against critical team member departures, and no defined non-delivery recourse beyond the board's ability to pause funding. The 25% refundable contingency is a red flag—it's labeled as a buffer for "optimism bias" rather than allocated against specific identified risks with management reserve protocols. Standard contracts require monthly status reports and financial reporting; this proposal only commits to quarterly milestone demos.
I would prefer to see labor categories explicitly defined (2 senior systems architects, 6 software engineers, 2 QA/DevOps leads) rather than treating FTEs as interchangeable units, a formal basis of estimate with salary/benefits/overhead breakdown, staffing milestones with hiring timelines, monthly financial and progress reporting rather than quarterly demos, and risk-allocated contingency with management reserve protocols rather than a blanket 25% buffer. These administrative gaps create execution risk and make oversight harder for the board and the community.
Despite these concerns, I'm voting yes because the strategic value is clear and the technical deliverables are measurable. Quarterly completion evidence is publicly demonstrable: all HLabs libraries supporting the hard fork, Gerolamo syncing to tip on public testnet, multiple Pebble contracts compiled end-to-end to valid on-chain code, browser demo querying chain data without backend servers, IDE extension published with syntax highlighting and inline errors.
The administrative weaknesses are real, but they don't justify blocking foundational infrastructure that reduces operational risk, improves developer throughput, and makes Cardano more reliable for building real-world applications. HLabs has demonstrated execution through existing TypeScript tooling maintenance, they're not unproven builders asking for speculative funding. The oversight board can enforce milestone discipline, and the failsafe sweep returns unused funds. In tough market conditions where treasury resources are constrained, investing in core infrastructure that expands the developer base and enables browser-native trustless verification is higher leverage than waiting for perfect administrative polish.

I'm switching my vote to yes because while my governance concerns remain valid, they're outweighed by the strategic necessity of supporting proven builders who shipped before asking, the momentum of broad community consensus, and the reality that standing against widely-supported progress over process concerns is counterproductive governance. The Blink Labs team has earned this opportunity through execution, not promises.
My original no vote highlighted legitimate risks: governance concentration with only 2 named FTEs despite 5 budgeted, a 3-member developer-focused oversight board lacking financial/project management expertise, and 2-of-5 signature control over 6.9 million ADA. Those concerns haven't disappeared. But I'm revising my position because the context matters more than I initially weighted it. Blink Labs built Cardano's entire Golang ecosystem, infrastructure the network unknowingly depends on daily. That should be championed, not penalized with excessive bureaucratic hurdles. They demonstrated execution capacity as Dingo is already minting blocks on preview testnet, making it technically the furthest-along alternative node implementation. This isn't speculative funding for theoretical capacity; it's resourcing proven builders to finish what they started.
The ecosystem reality also shifted my calculus. All founding entities support Dingo, and the Constitutional Committee backs it unanimously. Cardano Foundation secured Amaru funding, IOG maintains the legacy Haskell node, both can request ongoing funding year over year and receive it as they should. A third node from an independent community team balances fairness on future asks and reduces reliance on founding entity monopolies. Node diversity isn't a luxury when Cardano's security model depends on distributed infrastructure resilience. We're in a decentralized ecosystem; if the Blink Labs team believes building a Go node is their highest-value contribution, I have to respect that self-assessment even if I'd prefer their talent deployed elsewhere. They could earn this compensation in other industries, they have the skill, location, and experience. Retaining top-tier talent requires competitive contracts, especially for infrastructure work that doesn't offer startup equity upside or future growth multiples.
The wage allocation still stings, $250,000 per FTE all-in is premium compensation higher than most Cardano teams, including NMKR's CEO in one of the world's most expensive countries. In times of depressed ADA prices and builder funding shortages, it's a bitter pill. But building a production-grade consensus node isn't comparable to startup equity gambling where you underpay early for potential big payouts later. This is contract infrastructure work requiring sustained expertise, and the market rate is what it is. If AI tooling amplifies productivity as the team suggests, we're paying for output velocity, not just headcount. The alternative is potentially losing this team to better-compensated opportunities, far more costly on the ecosystem than a single cycle budget optimization.
My preference for milestone-based treasury withdrawals with separate governance actions per tranche remains unchanged. The single 6.9 million ADA withdrawal with smart contract escrow and quarterly board reviews isn't ideal governance architecture. But the perfect shouldn't kill the good. The oversight board, Pi Lanningham, Santiago Carmuega, Lucas Rosa are respected community contributors, and while I'd still prefer domain-independent financial oversight, their technical judgment carries weight. The failsafe sweep returning unused funds to treasury after expiration provides backstop accountability even if it creates time pressure.
I also acknowledge that multiple alternative nodes (Amaru, Dingo, Gerolamo, potentially others) create coordination challenges and permanent maintenance commitments. The ecosystem hasn't agreed on how many implementations we need or how SPO adoption gets achieved. But waiting for perfect strategic consensus means indefinite paralysis. Dingo has momentum, community support across diverse stakeholder groups, and technical readiness. Voting no to force broader node diversity strategy discussions punishes the one team that actually shipped code while we debate frameworks.
The Blink Labs team stated they'll continue Dingo development without treasury approval, just with delayed timelines. That demonstrates commitment but also means blocking this proposal doesn't kill the project, but it just slows it and signals the treasury won't back independent builders who prove execution before asking. That's the wrong precedent. My original no vote was a negotiation request for stronger safeguards. The team didn't revise the proposal, but the community spoke: Constitutional Committee unanimous support, founding entity backing, broad DRep endorsement. Refusing to adapt my position in the face of that consensus makes me an obstacle, not a guardian of fiscal discipline.
Cardano needs this. Node diversity is existential for decentralization, and Blink Labs earned the right to finish what they started. My governance concerns are real, but they are process objections in the face of substantive progress. I'm switching to yes because supporting proven builders, respecting community consensus, and advancing critical infrastructure outweighs my preference for more conservative treasury deployment mechanics and oversight.

I'm voting no because this withdrawal allocates 800,000 ADA, roughly 83% of the total ask, to establishing a Cayman Islands legal entity and administrative overhead before deploying a single ADA into DeFi liquidity. That's backwards prioritization: legal structure consumes the budget while the actual liquidity problem remains unfunded. The proposal lacks named directors, explicit conflict-of-interest disclosures, hard fee caps on director compensation, and transparent justification for choosing the Cayman Islands over more cost-effective jurisdictions like Marshall Islands or BVI that deliver equivalent legal protection at significantly lower expense.
The committee structure concentrates meaningful control over treasury resources in a small group with 5-of-9 multisig authority but insufficient governance safeguards. Directors aren't identified before disbursement, their time commitments and responsibilities aren't clearly defined, and potential conflicts with Cardano projects that could benefit from liquidity allocation decisions aren't disclosed or managed. Without knowing who these individuals are, I can't evaluate whether $664,000 in legal setup costs are proportionate to their actual scope of work or ability to manage what may eventually become a much larger fund.
The proposal also doesn't provide a sufficiently concrete framework for how future liquidity deployment will generate measurable ecosystem benefits or create organic trading activity. I'm skeptical that treasury-subsidized inorganic liquidity provision with excessive overhead costs is the right strategy when we should be incentivizing organic liquidity through attractive yield opportunities that bring capital from other DeFi ecosystems, especially now that we have an official USDCx bridge. With ADA at low prices and the treasury under pressure, spending 800,000 ADA on legal formation and administrative setup without delivering immediate liquidity feels misaligned with current priorities.
I support building proper DeFi rails and acknowledge improvements in this version, like clearer audit processes, contract controls, and refund paths. But I can't approve a withdrawal where the majority of funds go to overhead before demonstrating practical impact. Finally, I believe Cardano's DeFi infrastructure needs fundamental architectural rethinking before we commit treasury capital to subsidizing liquidity in the current model. The DeFi Kernel, a suite of fully peer-to-peer protocols developed by fallen-icarus including Cardano-Swaps (order book settlement), Cardano-Loans (credit markets), Cardano-Options (options trading), and Cardano-Aftermarket (secondary markets), all demonstrate an alternative approach that preserves user custody, delegation control, and voting rights while enabling trustless composability across DeFi primitives. This architecture treats Layer 1 as a censorship-resistant settlement layer where deep liquidity gravitates naturally, with Layer 2 solutions handling high-throughput trading while tapping into shared L1 liquidity. The current proposal locks 800,000 ADA into legal overhead for a liquidity model that forces users to surrender delegation rights to pooled smart contracts, an existential threat to Cardano's proof-of-stake security and on-chain governance. Before funding inorganic liquidity provision through expensive legal entities, we should exhaust peer-to-peer, self-custodial alternatives that align with Cardano's architectural strengths and constitutional principles. The DeFi Kernel protocols are live on testnet, currently undergoing auditing, and offer a path to capital-efficient DeFi without the overhead, centralization risks, or delegation sacrifice this proposal requires.

I'm voting yes because the Orion Fund addresses Cardano's most critical growth bottleneck: the post-grant capital gap that leaves proven builders stranded between early experimentation and scalable businesses. This isn't another treasury handout, Orion Fund promises to be a professionally managed venture fund structured to return capital plus profits to the treasury while filling the institutional void that's kept Cardano chronically undercapitalized compared to competitors. We're voting only on Tranche One: 50 million ADA (~$15 million) to launch operations, with every future tranche requiring separate governance approval and DRep review. That staged structure gives us real veto power at every capital release point, turning this into a performance-gated deployment rather than blind faith in a $75 million commitment. Furthermore this establishes a precedent for future large scale staged expenditures over multiple cycles.
The economic alignment strongly favors the ecosystem. Roughly 90% of Tranche One funds ($13.65 million) deploy directly into ecosystem support: $10.75 million for direct equity investments in Cardano-native and Cardano-integrated startups, $1.9 million for growth capital (venture studio, exchange listings, technical integration support), and $1 million for equity-based accelerator programs and talent pipeline development. Only ~10% covers operational expenses, including a discounted management fee. Critically, Draper Dragon receives zero profit share until the treasury is fully repaid all capital deployed for ecosystem support and investments. The distribution waterfall ensures the General Partner only participates in upside after Arouet Holdings (the ownerless Cayman Islands foundation acting as LP with the sole objective of increasing the treasury) recovers the full $67.5 million of ecosystem-deployed capital. After that recovery, net profit splits 80/20 in favor of the treasury. If the fund hits its illustrative 3x target, the treasury receives approximately $175.5 million before expenses, that is ~2.6x net multiple on deployed capital.
This isn't just about money, it's also about establishing the institutional infrastructure Cardano has never built. Draper Dragon brings Tier 1 venture capital capabilities that would take us a decade to develop internally. Draper already has UTXO-specific technical expertise, a deep exchange integration network (Coinbase, Binance, OKX, Bybit, Bitget, Kucoin), institutional DeFi connections, and a global developer pipeline spanning 100+ countries through Draper University's 5,000+ alumni network. The venture studio component, led by a 5-member core team with deep Plutus and Aiken expertise, is designed to fully incubate 1-2 Cardano-native products annually and accelerate up to 8 existing portfolio companies with structured technical and commercial support, integration assistance, and investor introductions. This is hands-on product development, market validation, and execution guidance that addresses Cardano's chronic business development weakness.
The accelerator programs build on the successful Cardano Founders Residency Program run with Draper University in Q1 2025, which supported alumni companies like Fluid Tokens, DeltaDeFi, Sundial Protocol, Bodega Cardano, TxPipe, Vespr Wallet, Gero Wallet, Clarity DAO, Crashr, Claymates, GoRosen, and others.
The transparency and oversight mechanisms are robust. A public dashboard displays real-time ecosystem KPIs like TVL growth, on-chain usage, network revenue, user adoption and retention across portfolio projects, new strategic partnerships, developer onboarding, and open-source tooling contributions. Quarterly fund reports cover ecosystem metrics since inception, portfolio overviews, accelerator program updates, and strategic focus for the next quarter. Quarterly ecosystem roundtables and investment AMAs complement written disclosures. Arouet Holdings operates with three directors: one independent, one from Cardano Foundation (acting as constitutional administrator), and a Community Director selected through public nomination and voting process if the fund is funded. All directors receive the same rights, insights, and obligations, with NDAs protecting confidential deal terms while maintaining maximum public transparency on ecosystem-level results.
The risks are real but manageable. ADA price volatility is addressed through a 20% buffer on each tranche cap, if price fluctuations create surpluses, they reduce future tranche requirements; if they create shortfalls, the GP can submit top-up withdrawals, defer capital calls up to six months, or add shortfalls to subsequent tranches, all within hard ADA caps (175 million ADA aggregate cap across six years). If treasury withdrawals fail approval or become impossible due to NCL restrictions, the GP consults with Arouet Holdings, Cardano Foundation, and the community to restructure withdrawals, seek external LPs to close gaps, scale back deployment, or in extreme cases wind down operations in a controlled liquidation process focused on maximizing value to LPs including the treasury.
Cardano has historically operated with limited institutional VC involvement compared to ecosystems that leveraged professional capital partnerships for accelerated scaling, liquidity, and adoption. This creates a unique FOMO risk: passing on a professionally managed fund with Draper Dragon's network and track record means continuing to rely on fragmented, undercapitalized builder support while competitors compound institutional advantages. The proposal directly addresses business development, real-world adoption pathways, institutional attention, and the talent pipeline gaps that keep Cardano chronologically mature but commercially underdeveloped. With Catalyst suspended and builders vocally underfunded, this offers a completely different approach premised on equity ownership, repayment obligations, and measurable ecosystem KPIs rather than one-way grants.
The downside risk of losing $15 million if Tranche One underperforms, is manageable relative to the potential upside of successful investments driving compounding benefits through TVL growth (target $300 million to $3 billion+), on-chain activity, protocol revenue, and long-term treasury sustainability. Every future tranche remains subject to DRep veto based on transparent performance data. The terms aren't flawless, but rejecting professional VC partnership over imperfect proposals when we desperately need institutional infrastructure, exchange access, and builder support is a risk I'm not willing to take. I will Vote yes, watch the dashboard closely, and hold them accountable at every tranche review.

I'm voting yes because operational continuity for active builders outweighs the legitimate concerns I have about concentrating more power in the Cardano Foundation. This is pragmatic necessity, not enthusiastic endorsement as we're preventing operational failure, not rewarding excellence. Project Catalyst has funded over 2,200 projects with more than 500 still active, and ensuring milestone reviews and payments continue for teams delivering on Funds 10-14 is a matter of honoring commitments and maintaining trust with the builders doing the hard work. Without community approval of a new managing entity, Catalyst operations face an indefinite pause, leaving builders mid-project without administrative support or payment certainty. That disruption is avoidable, and avoiding it is the responsible choice. This is particularly relevant today as builders are faced with the additional burden of underfunded development work.
The transition from IOG to the Cardano Foundation also makes structural sense. Moving Catalyst management from a commercial entity to a non-profit whose mission is explicitly focused on long-term ecosystem stewardship aligns the program's governance with its public-goods purpose. This separation strengthens Cardano's decentralization posture from a regulatory perspective, now that the funding mechanism is no longer directed by a single private company. IOG's cooperation in this handover increases credibility, and CF's explicit commitment to return the previously approved allocations for Funds 15 and 16 directly to the Cardano Treasury demonstrates fiscal discipline. That recovery of unspent funds protects the treasury while honoring legacy obligations, which aligns with fiscal conservatism.
Cardano needs funding mechanisms beyond on-chain governance, something that suits smaller initiatives. Catalyst fills that gap, providing a decentralized grant program that onboards builders, funds tooling, and supports innovation at a scale Treasury Withdrawals and DAO funding can't efficiently replicate. On-chain governance is not suitable for evaluating hundreds of small proposals; Catalyst complements rather than competes with treasury processes. The pause on Funds 15 and 16 also signals operational maturity, rather than continuing deployment through a system undergoing structural transition, CF is choosing to stabilize operations first and redesign before committing new capital. That's responsible capital management, not recklessness.
That said, I remain cautious. The Cardano Foundation already holds significant influence both socially and in ADA governance weight, and operates with limited community influence. This yes vote is a concession, not a celebration. If CF later requests additional funding beyond existing Catalyst obligations, manages the program poorly, interferes with a heavy hand, or exerts too much influence DReps should withdraw support and force the project to take a different path. My support is conditional on CF demonstrating improved accountability, transparent milestone tracking, and a more rigorous approach to grantee oversight than Catalyst has historically shown. The transition creates opportunity to address long-standing criticisms around impact measurement, project accountability, and the need for independent audits. CF must seize that opportunity, or this vote becomes the last expression of community patience rather than the first expression of renewed confidence.

I'm voting no because this framework introduces structural vulnerabilities that amplify centralization risk and undermine governance precision, particularly through its reliance on "participating stake" thresholds in Ekklesia voting and bundled Treasury Withdrawal submissions. While the framework represents meaningful progress over 2025's ad hoc process, utilizing standardized templates, a strategic alignment with Vision 2030, KPI discipline, and improved feedback loops are all positive. The current design creates exploitable leverage points that concentrate power and reduce DRep decision-making quality.
The critical flaw is using "participating stake" in Ekklesia instead of live voting stake to determine which proposals advance to Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions. Given Cardano's current concentration of voting power, where a small number of large DReps control significant stake, low participation rates allow disproportionate influence. Several major DReps have already declared they will not actively participate in Ekklesia voting. Under the proposed 67% participating stake threshold, this means a handful of large voters can effectively shortlist proposals during low-turnout periods, bypassing broader DRep consensus. The framework must be resilient to big DRep dominance, and not quietly accept centralization of power as an operating assumption.
The bundling mechanism compounds this problem. The framework proposes consolidating approved proposals into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions based on support tiers (67-75% and 75-100%), forcing DReps to approve or reject packages rather than individual proposals. Many DReps strongly opposed bundling during 2025's budget discussions, preferring individual proposal submissions to maintain voting precision. Bundling forces DReps into impossible choices: approve an entire package containing proposals they oppose, or reject the bundle and block proposals they support. This reduces governance decision quality and creates pressure to vote yes on suboptimal allocations to avoid blocking the entire package. Combined with participating stake thresholds, bundling means large DReps influence which proposals get packaged together, then all DReps face binary accept/reject decisions on those pre-curated bundles.
The framework also assumes DReps will perform "deep review" to validate accuracy, compliance, and strategic alignment during Phase 2. This assumption is unsustainable and unreliable. The 2025 cycle showed review quality varies widely across DReps, with workload spikes leading to shortcuts. Many DReps don't consistently publish detailed rationales, and only a small subset performs systematic analysis at scale. In 2025, 194 proposals were submitted on Ekklesia. Expecting a large share of DReps to engage deeply with a large share of proposals under time pressure isn't realistic, it incentivizes shallow, high-speed voting or fails to advance items consistently. The framework increases standardization and volume management but doesn't address the incentive and capacity constraints that determine whether deep review actually happens. Bundling doesn't fix review overload; it hides it by forcing batch approvals rather than individual scrutiny.
I recognize the framework's core purpose is positive and necessary. A coordination layer for ecosystem budgeting tied to strategic reference frameworks like Vision 2030 fills a long-standing institutional gap. Standardization through work package-based budgeting and KPI targeting improves baseline proposal quality and comparability. But these improvements don't justify adopting a process with exploitable structural flaws that concentrate power, reduce voting precision, and create opportunities for governance capture. A no vote isn't rejecting coordination, it's demanding the framework be made more robust before becoming the reference process for Treasury allocation. At minimum, participating stake thresholds should use live voting stake, bundling should be eliminated in favor of individual proposal submissions, and Ekklesia voting mechanics should be fully specified with procedural safeguards against interpretation discretion.

I'm voting yes because Amaru addresses Cardano's most dangerous systemic risk: the absence of a viable alternative node implementation. This isn't a discretionary application-layer bet, it's load-bearing infrastructure work that directly strengthens network security, decentralization, and long-term resilience. Relying on a single Haskell-based node creates a single point of failure where any bug, design flaw, or operational incident can propagate across the entire ecosystem. Multiple independent implementations provide cross-verification, remove systemic bottlenecks, and ensure that protocol upgrades are battle-tested across different codebases before reaching mainnet. Amaru's work in 2025 already uncovered bugs that could have impacted mainnet, validating the need for this second implementation perspective.
The team demonstrated fiscal discipline by returning over 920,000 ADA in unused 2025 funds to the treasury rather than artificially spending down the allocation. Their use of audited smart contracts, public financial journals, milestone-based disbursement, and transparent contingency structures sets a benchmark for responsible treasury management that all funded projects should emulate. The 2026 roadmap represents a structured transition from foundational engineering to production readiness: relay node completion in Q1, block production capability in Q2, and external security audit before mainnet deployment. The budget breakdown is competitive enough at 8.5 FTEs plus $1.13 million in fixed costs (security audit, Antithesis testing infrastructure, node diversity workshops, bug bounty), with a contingency buffer designed to protect deliverability under adverse market conditions while being return-obligated to the treasury.
Amaru's Rust implementation prioritizes low hardware requirements and seamless user experience, reducing operational burden for SPOs as staking rewards decline and scaling upgrades like Leios increase node requirements. This supports continued participation from smaller operators and preserves decentralization in practice, not just theory. The proposal also emphasizes rigorous network-level testing, middleware integration with ecosystem tools (indexers, sync layers), and collaboration across stakeholders to ensure Amaru becomes operationally useful, and not just technically impressive. Node diversity is expensive and resource-intensive, but it's justified by the increased resilience and reduced monoculture risk it delivers. Withholding this vote means accepting permanent single-client risk incompatible with the Constitution's demands on security and decentralization.

I'm voting yes on the 300 million ADA Net Change Limit because fiscal discipline demands we start conservative, especially when ADA has dropped nearly 30% since the previous 350 million NCL proposal failed, now trading at 2021 levels around $0.25. The amount is grounded in demonstrable capacity: 2025 treasury inflows totaled 306,940,195 ADA, making 300 million a prudent cap slightly below realized income. Anchoring spending limits to historical inflow data prevents excessive expansion beyond what the network actually generates and ensures long-term sustainability without enabling unchecked treasury depletion.
The timing is critical. Without an approved NCL, no treasury withdrawals can proceed constitutionally after Epoch 612 (February 13, 2026), blocking legitimate ecosystem funding and creating governance paralysis. I voted yes on the 350 million NCL; this proposal is 50 million ADA lower, reflecting tighter fiscal posture in response to market conditions. At current prices, 300 million ADA represents approximately $75 million in purchasing power, $13 million less than the 350 million NCL would have provided. That reduction is acceptable and forces proposers to demonstrate genuine value rather than competing for easy access to inflated budgets. The NCL can be adjusted anytime via governance action if stronger needs or improved conditions justify it.
Establishing this clear, time-bound Net Change Limit provides predictability, discipline, and confidence that treasury spending will not expand without boundaries. Starting conservative with 300 million ADA, while spanning 505 days at roughly 594,000 ADA daily burn rate if fully utilized, balances protecting against selling pressure while preserving capacity for smart investments that support long-term growth.

I'm voting no because this proposal asks DReps to approve 500,000 ADA, roughly less $150,000 USD, to establish a Cayman Islands Foundation Company and legal infrastructure that represents a jarring pivot from decentralized, trust-minimized design toward CeFi-style execution with permanent administrative overhead. This is the wrong architecture, the wrong sequencing, and an unreasonable use of finite treasury resources when DeFi-native alternatives haven't been exhausted.
The cost breakdown reveals the problem: 400,000 ADA for legal structuring alone allocated to Cayman-based professional directors, registered office, supervisor services, regulatory filings, and transaction document reviews. We're paying a law firm to file paperwork and retain directors before a single unit of liquidity has actually served the ecosystem. This isn't innovation; this is overhead. In corporate finance, you establish foreign entities when revenue projections justify the operational expense. Here, we're burning half a million ADA on setup costs to create a centralized entity and this simply recreates the intermediaries we sought to disrupt.
I'm not opposed to the goal, Cardano desperately needs deeper stablecoin liquidity. My opposition is to the chosen path. If we're building DeFi, we should exhaust on-chain solutions first and invest treasury funds into code, protocols, and governance mechanisms, not import legacy legal layers as the starting point. Legal entities are necessary when interfacing with OTC desks, fiat rails, or direct stablecoin issuer minting, but it hasn't been convincingly demonstrated that this institutional path is cheaper or more efficient than trust-minimized, on-chain approaches once all costs are considered. When you add the fixed legal overhead of 400,000 ADA to OTC spreads, operational friction, and ongoing compliance, the institutional route may actually be more expensive than a phased DEX and bridge-based execution.
We already have a "pentad" of founding entities in the Cardano ecosystem, the Cardano Foundation, EMURGO, IOG, Intersect, and Midnight Network that are legal persons capable of holding assets and entering contracts. The Cardano Foundation has publicly indicated plans to use Genesis ADA to mint stablecoins. Have all existing options been explored? Have these entities explicitly declined participation? My impression is they don't wish to bear legal and operational risk for this program, which is understandable, but that alone doesn't justify establishing a new, treasury-funded legal structure without exhausting cooperation with existing entities. If a new legal entity must be established, it should be designed as a reusable, shared resource for future initiatives, not a single-purpose structure created solely for this proposal.
The proposal also lacks clarity on the legal entity's lifetime. Only Year 1 costs are budgeted (registered office, supervisor services, director fees), but there's no sunset clause, dissolution condition, or estimate of operating expenses for Years 2 and beyond. In practice, this means approving not just a one-time expense but the creation of a recurring cost center with no defined end. That makes it impossible to assess the true long-term commitment being made on behalf of the treasury.
I cannot responsibly approve this withdrawal in isolation without visibility into the full set of planned withdrawals. The entire project should be evaluated coherently, not piecemeal.
Finally, the fiscal reality this proposal assumes $0.40/ADA for cost conversion. At current prices around < $0.29, this withdrawal is significantly underfunded upon execution. I cannot justify this treasury spend when upcoming budgets demand fiscal responsibility and ADA price volatility makes cost projections unreliable.
Free markets identify product-market fit better than centralized decision-by-committee. DReps should not abdicate the power of the purse to a Cayman-based foundation with professional directors picking winners and losers in Cardano DeFi. There are viable paths to bootstrap USDM or USDA liquidity using DeFi-native mechanisms, like DEXs, bridges, phased deployment all without exposing individuals to off-chain liability or creating permanent administrative overhead. I encourage the team to explore an on-chain-first design, clarify the lifetime and cost of any legal entity, and present the full set of withdrawals together for coherent evaluation.

I'm voting yes on this parameter update because it delivers meaningful, zero-cost utility improvements to Cardano's developer ecosystem with rigorous technical validation backing every number. Increasing maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] by ~17.9% and maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] by ~16.1% isn't speculative optimization, it's measured, benchmarked headroom that already exists in the network, now being unlocked for DApp developers who've been working around artificial constraints.
The practical impact is straightforward: Plutus scripts can do more meaningful work within a single transaction, eliminating the forced complexity of splitting logic across multiple transactions to stay within memory limits. This reduces developer friction, simplifies smart contract architecture, and opens the door to more sophisticated DeFi, governance, and utility applications, all without touching fees, tokenomics, or security parameters.
The technical validation process here is exactly what responsible governance looks like. IOE's Performance and Tracing team benchmarked node versions 10.2 and 10.3, confirming that critical timing metrics, like Kernel RSS, CPU usage, and block diffusion, all remain stable and well within the 95% propagation target within 5 seconds. Equivalent changes were successfully deployed and tested on Preview testnet and PreProd testnet before this mainnet submission. Intersect's Parameter Committee recommended this change, ratified by the Technical Steering Committee, and with the off-chain proposal published July 2025 satisfying the mandatory three-month notice period required by PARAM-04a. Every Constitutional guardrail is met.
This is part one of a staged two-step increase totaling 25%, structured this way specifically because guardrail MTEU-M-04 limits increases to 2,500,000 units per epoch. That constraint is being respected, not circumvented. The staged approach is the right governance posture, and it doesn't pre-commit the ecosystem to the second increase, which must be independently evaluated and ratified.
I'll be honest about the limits of my own analysis here. The benefits are well-documented and the technical case is compelling. I've reviewed Parameter Committee meeting records, forum discussions, and available benchmarking data, and found no indications of critical drawbacks. There is a non-negligible developer/SPO minority expressing concern about the change that I want to recognize. The primary acknowledged risk, of irreversibility, is real. Once DApp developers build against higher memory limits, lowering them would break dependent smart contracts. But current limits are demonstrably conservative relative to actual network capacity, and the benchmarks prove it. Accepting measured, validated expansion of proven headroom is smart growth, not recklessness.
Intersect's Parameter Committee earned credit here for over a year of analysis, transparent process, and methodical compliance with every guardrail. This is how technical governance should work.

I'm voting yes because some things in governance aren't about budget or protocol mechanics, they're about people. Naming Protocol Version 11 the "van Rossem Hard Fork" honors a man who made Cardano's governance framework better by being exactly the kind of contributor every ecosystem needs, thoughtful, generous, precise, and genuinely committed to the people alongside him.
Max van Rossem's contributions were substantive and lasting. He was a primary driving force behind Article VIII in the Cardano Constitution, the provision that attempted to enshrines community discussion, openness, and participation as foundational principles. Max insisted it mattered enough to write into the network's DNA and that language was carelessly removed in epoch 608 by a majority of DReps, I was in the minority and the dissenting view in voting No for Cardano Constitution v2.4.
He served as a delegate representing the Dutch Cardano community at the Constitutional Convention in Buenos Aires, helped lead the Constitutional Committee Election Working Group, and served as a dedicated DRep within the Dutch DRep Collective to ensure his community's voice carried weight in governance decisions. These weren't ceremonial roles, they were the hard, careful, and deliberate work of building governance infrastructure that people could actually believe in.
Beyond formal contributions, Max understood something profound about blockchains, they are memory machines. AdaMoments, his project enabling ada holders to preserve images, videos, and personal history permanently on-chain, reflected a creative vision of Cardano as durable public infrastructure for human experience, not just financial transactions. He built connections, facilitated meetups, and reminded the ecosystem that governance is about people before it is about process.
Cardano has a principled tradition of naming hard forks after those who shaped the ecosystem, Vasil, Chang, Plomin. This continues that tradition coherently and with deep sincerity. Max's legacy is already written into Cardano's constitution and governance frameworks. The van Rossem Hard Fork simply makes it visible. This vote is cast with gratitude, respect, and remembrance.

I'm abstaining on this Net Change Limit proposal because while the underlying fiscal framework is reasonable and constitutionally necessary, the proposal's supporting text has been rendered inaccurate by the recent enactment of Constitution v2.4, creating a mismatch between what the proposal implies and what the current constitutional framework actually is.
The NCL itself, 350 million ADA spanning Epoch 613 to Epoch 713, is defensible on its merits. Establishing a valid Net Change Limit is a constitutional prerequisite for processing treasury withdrawals after Epoch 612, making this governance action operationally critical. The amount accounts for approximately 306 million ADA in 2025 treasury inflows plus the unspent 50 million ADA Stablecoin Liquidity budget approved by DReps, representing roughly 115% of realized net income. The extended 16.5 months long period realigns the budget cycle away from year-end holidays to mid-year, when governance participation is potentially higher and full-year treasury data is available for better modeling. These are sound fiscal and operational reasons to support the NCL's core parameters.
However, the proposal contains a critical textual error that undermines its accuracy. Under the "Application and Compliance" section, the proposal states: "This limit shall be applied in assessing treasury withdrawal actions to ensure compliance with Article IV of the Cardano Constitution and the Treasury Withdrawal Guardrails specified in Appendix I." Following Constitution v2.4's enactment, Article IV no longer governs "The Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget”, it now covers the "Amendment Process." The treasury withdrawal framework has been restructured under different constitutional provisions. This isn't a trivial technicality; it's a fundamental misstatement of which constitutional article governs the NCL's application.
This error once again demonstrates the collateral damage of enacting constitutional changes while governance proposals are in flight. The NCL was drafted when Article IV did cover treasury budgets. Constitution v2.4 passed mid-process, invalidating the proposal's reference framework without the proposers having opportunity to amend. The Cardano Budget Committee at Intersect submitted this in good faith, but the constitutional ground shifted beneath them.
An abstain vote acknowledges this procedural reality: the NCL amount and period are fiscally sound, but the proposal's supporting justification references a constitutional structure that no longer exists. Voting yes would ratify a proposal with inaccurate constitutional citations. Voting no would block necessary treasury operations over a technicality the proposers couldn't have anticipated. Abstaining signals that the NCL framework is acceptable in principle but requires resubmission with corrected constitutional references aligned to v2.4. This protects governance accuracy without punishing good-faith proposers caught in constitutional transition.

I'm abstaining on this Budget Info Action because it has been rendered procedurally obsolete by the recent enactment of Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4. Under the previous constitution, Budget Info Actions were mandatory prerequisites for Treasury Withdrawal proposals, a two-step governance process requiring DReps to first approve strategic budget frameworks before funds could be withdrawn. Constitution v2.4 eliminated this requirement entirely, collapsing treasury governance into single-step Treasury Withdrawal Actions that no longer reference or depend on prior Budget Info Actions.
This proposal was submitted under the old constitutional framework and represents genuine effort from the DeltaDeFi team, who invested time, resources, and the 100,000 ADA deposit to craft a detailed budget justification. That work is not in question. The problem is purely procedural: approving this Budget Info Action now serves no constitutional function. A subsequent Treasury Withdrawal Action can proceed directly to DRep vote without requiring this Info Action as a prerequisite, making this governance action redundant regardless of its merit.
This situation illustrates the collateral damage of enacting constitutional changes while proposals are in flight. DeltaDeFi submitted under rules that were active at the time but were superseded mid-process. The proposers are victims of governance timing, not governance failure. An abstain vote acknowledges this procedural reality without endorsing or rejecting the underlying budget request, which should be evaluated on its merits when submitted as a Treasury Withdrawal Action under the current constitutional framework.

I'm voting no because this proposal spent 750,000 ADA to produce a strategic vision document that lacks enforcement mechanisms, excludes critical stakeholder language, prematurely hard-codes narrow market focus, and introduces risky treasury management shifts without adequate governance safeguards. The fundamental problem is this document has no formal directive. It's described as a "community-vetted filter" for DReps to evaluate funding requests, but it's explicitly non-compulsory. Without a binding force, this becomes expensive signaling rather than governance infrastructure. The KPIs are directional but lack ownership, accountability, or consequence for missing targets. Who's responsible if TVL doesn't hit $3 billion by 2030? What happens if decentralization metrics stagnate? The proposal doesn't say.
The mission statement lists "builders, businesses, organizations, governments, and communities" but conspicuously omits individuals. Individuals are foundational to Cardano they became SPOs, builders, delegators, and evangelists because of self-sovereignty and sound-money principles. Excluding explicit mention of individuals risks institutional drift away from the demographic that sustained Cardano through bear markets and early adoption phases. If empowering ordinary people isn't explicitly part of the mission, the strategy subtly deprioritizes them.
Pillar 2 hard-codes "four high-value verticals" for adoption focus—DeFi, RWAs, payments, and identity. This is a premature trend capture, disguised as strategic focus. Picking four verticals in 2025 for a 2030 vision means all other use cases are implicitly classified as low-value, creating accidental exclusion. NFTs aren't mentioned despite being a significant ecosystem vertical. AI isn't mentioned despite the only large enterprise currently deploying millions on Cardano doing so for AI projects. The proposal claims "prioritization requires exclusion," but this level of specificity locks the ecosystem into 2025 assumptions about what matters in 2030. Markets evolve, ossifying vertical focus now guarantees strategic blindness later.
Pillar 5 introduces a "multi-asset treasury" with language around "managed treasury," "generate yields," "strategically deploy capital," and explicit "10%+ ROI" targets. This is a massive strategic shift with zero risk governance framework. The proposal doesn't address conflict-of-interest protections, custody and operational risk, failure modes and rollback plans, mandate boundaries (what's allowed versus forbidden), risk limits and drawdown tolerance, transparency and reporting standards, or governance accountability for losses. If we're moving the treasury from passive ADA holdings to active asset management chasing double-digit returns, we need explicit safeguards, not aspirational yield targets buried in strategy documents.
The decentralization section uses the word "keep" regarding stakepool operator distribution, signaling maintenance rather than improvement. Other focus areas use "improve," "refine," "incentivize," "evolve”, but decentralization gets "keep." That's settling for status quo when community efforts are actively pushing parameter changes to strengthen decentralization. This deserves pillar-level ambition, not passive preservation language.
Grassroots adoption, peer-to-peer networks, education, and outreach are missing entirely. The Product Committee conducted 700+ consultations but produced a framework that reads institution-first and enterprise-focused, without sufficient attention to organic, bottom-up growth mechanisms that built Cardano's early community. This isn't a unified vision, it's a consultant-driven document that cost 750K ADA and lacks binding power, individual-centric language, risk controls for treasury shifts, and strategic flexibility for emerging verticals. The budget was heavily weighted toward consultation 700+ interviews, surveys, focus groups, workshops, but the resulting document doesn't reflect proportional analytical rigor or synthesis quality. You can't interview your way to strategic clarity; at some point you need fewer voices and sharper thinking to distill signal from noise. The Product Committee appears to have prioritized breadth of input over depth of analysis, producing a framework that reads like aggregated bullet points rather than a cohesive strategic vision with hard trade-offs and clear reasoning. For three-quarters of a million ADA, we should expect not just extensive stakeholder engagement, but a document that demonstrates why certain choices were made, what alternatives were rejected, and how competing priorities were resolved, none of which this proposal adequately delivers.

I'm voting no on v2.4. I expressed my concerns at each iteration. I have received no feedback. I am speaking into the void. How is this debate or discussion on matters as critical as the Cardano Constitution. There is no inclusion of sentiment by governance merit, but rather strictly a pandering to voting power. The proposer has opening coordinated with peer top % DReps to ensure coordination of their cooperative needs from the document. This was done I assume without malice, but that makes it no less concerning. The vote has nearly passed and most likely will before expiration, I hope we don't live to regret removing the info_action requirement from Treasury Withdrawal Actions. This Constitutional Amendment removes critical financial safeguards without adequate justification, creating exploitable governance vulnerabilities that could drain the treasury. The elimination of the Budget Info Action mechanism isn't efficiency, it's recklessness disguised as simplification. Under the current constitution, treasury withdrawals require a two-step process: first an info_action to establish budget parameters and community review, then withdrawal actions tied to that approved framework. This creates mandatory deliberation time and forces proposers to demonstrate strategic alignment before touching funds. Constitution v2.3 scraps this entirely, collapsing treasury withdrawals into single-step actions with no binding budget coordination. Here's the mathematical problem: with the info_action requirement removed and assuming no Constitutional Committee dissent, or a CC size set to minimum threshold, a treasury withdrawal could be enacted in as little as six days, at the epoch boundary following the first full epoch where the action remains active, provided the 67% DRep threshold is met. Today, that means only 23 individuals, who control the sufficient voting stake could authorize withdrawals without strategic review, public vetting, or ecosystem-wide budget discipline. With the majority of ADA still undelegated, governance becomes an exploitable attack surface during low participation periods or voting fatigue. The removal of budget requirements eliminates the forcing function that makes hard choices about technological priorities and resource allocation. Without holistic budgeting, governance devolves into disconnected withdrawal requests lacking coordination, accountability, or protection against waste and capture. A budget framework compels the ecosystem to prioritize competing demands, by removing it you invite chaotic financial management that accelerates treasury depletion. The original constitution emerged from transparent, line-by-line deliberations across continents with hundreds of elected representatives. Constitution v2.3 introduces extensive changes without undergoing comparable community engagement. Additionally the primary author holds significant voting power and voted for their own draft showing some amount of self-interested motivation, which can be a concentration of influence that sets a dangerous precedent. This is not an iterative improvement it's weakening institutional safeguards in a misguided desire to streamline a process. The budget info_action with a threshold requirement of 100% provides a necessary safeguard against expedited treasury withdrawals, by ensuring at least one full gov_action lifetime is required for any treasury withdrawal.

I'm voting no, not as a rejection of Christina's qualifications, which are beyond dispute, but because this proposal bypasses necessary governance design discussion in favor of ad hoc committee expansion that introduces structural problems without resolving underlying concerns.
Christina has consistently demonstrated thoughtful, principled contributions to Cardano governance. Her capability and integrity are not in question. This vote reflects disagreement with the mechanism and timing of this action, not the candidate's merit. She would serve competently, but that doesn't make this the right process or the right moment to expand the Constitutional Committee.
The proposal frames itself as strengthening governance resilience by adding a member above the minCommitteeSize threshold of seven, reducing ratification delay risk if someone resigns. That's superficially reasonable, until you examine what it actually does. Moving from seven to eight Constitutional Committee members shifts from odd-numbered to even-numbered composition, introducing the possibility of tied votes. Tied outcomes complicate decision-making rather than strengthening it. An odd-numbered body ensures resolution; an even-numbered one creates deadlock scenarios requiring additional tiebreaker mechanisms that don't currently exist in our governance framework.
The snap election between Christina and Cardano Curia was indeed close, but Curia was selected through the established process. Revisiting that outcome via permissionless governance action sets precedent that close electoral results justify adding runner-up candidates post hoc. That's not resilience; it's governance drift that undermines electoral finality.
If the Constitutional Committee's minimum size is genuinely problematic, the solution is modifying the minCommitteeSize parameter through deliberate governance action with ecosystem-wide input, not incrementally expanding membership through individual Update Committee actions every time someone loses narrowly. This proposal conflates candidate merit with structural governance design, treating committee expansion as if it's purely additive when it fundamentally alters decision dynamics and precedent.

I am voting YES on the Cardano Critical Integrations Budget proposal.
While much has been debated about past decisions, missed opportunities, and the allocation of Genesis ADA, this proposal represents a turning point, not just for infrastructure, but for accountability. The formation of the Pentad (IOG, Cardano Foundation, EMURGO, Midnight Foundation, and Intersect) and their joint commitment to this initiative marks a new chapter. The questions of "who should have done this" and "why wasn't it done sooner" are now behind us. What matters is what happens next.
This 70M ADA is more than a budget request, it functions as a bond of accountability. The founding entities are now publicly and collectively tied to delivering measurable outcomes. We can establish fresh KPIs from this point forward and evaluate their performance against concrete deliverables: tier-one stable coin integration, institutional custody infrastructure, oracle services, and cross-chain interoperability. Success or failure will be visible to the entire community.
There is also strategic value in the momentum generated by the Pentad's formation. Unity among Cardano's key institutional actors is rare and should be leveraged while it exists. Fragmentation has historically slowed progress; coordination accelerates it. This proposal channels that coordination into action.
The milestone-based structure, oversight mechanisms, and commitment to return unused funds provide reasonable safeguards. I support this proposal as both a necessary infrastructure investment and as the beginning of a new accountability framework for Cardano's founding entities.

I am voting YES on the Cardano Critical Integrations Budget proposal.
While much has been debated about past decisions, missed opportunities, and the allocation of Genesis ADA, this proposal represents a turning point, not just for infrastructure, but for accountability. The formation of the Pentad (IOG, Cardano Foundation, EMURGO, Midnight Foundation, and Intersect) and their joint commitment to this initiative marks a new chapter. The questions of "who should have done this" and "why wasn't it done sooner" are now behind us. What matters is what happens next.
This 70M ADA is more than a budget request, it functions as a bond of accountability. The founding entities are now publicly and collectively tied to delivering measurable outcomes. We can establish fresh KPIs from this point forward and evaluate their performance against concrete deliverables: tier-one stable coin integration, institutional custody infrastructure, oracle services, and cross-chain interoperability. Success or failure will be visible to the entire community.
There is also strategic value in the momentum generated by the Pentad's formation. Unity among Cardano's key institutional actors is rare and should be leveraged while it exists. Fragmentation has historically slowed progress; coordination accelerates it. This proposal channels that coordination into action.
The milestone-based structure, oversight mechanisms, and commitment to return unused funds provide reasonable safeguards. I support this proposal as both a necessary infrastructure investment and as the beginning of a new accountability framework for Cardano's founding entities.

Must be done for continuity of governance.

I am voting in favor of extending the active 2025 NCL (Net Change Limit). The current NCL still has funds available for dispersement and there is no new NCL for 2026 approved. Continuity is a primary governance concern and therefrom funding must be extended until the 2025 NCL has been exhausted or a new 2026 NCL has been approved.

I'm voting yes because this is a loan, not a handout. 5 million ADA at 2.44% interest, repaid within five years from Snek's product revenues. The Snek Foundation already spent $4.5 million of its own money securing Kraken, Crypto.com, and Kucoin listings, the first three Tier 1 exchanges for any Cardano native token. They've proven execution, not promises. SNEK holds 42,000+ wallets and 2 billion ADA in all-time volume. It's the only CNT currently meeting Tier 1 requirements, making it the tactical wedge to crack open exchange infrastructure for the entire ecosystem.
Here's what this buys: ADA trading pair liquidity on major platforms, compliance frameworks that future tokens can reuse without rebuilding from scratch, and mainstream visibility where retail users actually enter crypto. Intersect administers it with bi-yearly reporting and independent audits. A board including Tal Cohen, Frederik Gregaard, Phillip Pon, and Fahmi Syed ensures alignment. This isn't about pumping one token, it's infrastructure investment that creates repeatable pathways for CNTs while the treasury gets repaid with interest. Risk-to-reward favors an abundance mindset.

I'm voting yes because this is a zero-cost, time-sensitive strategic move that secures critical digital infrastructure for the entire Cardano ecosystem. The Cardano Foundation is applying for .ada and .cardano generic top-level domains (gTLDs) during ICANN's Q1 2026 application window, the first new gTLD registration opportunity since 2012 and the first in the crypto era. This is a rare, closing window that won't reopen for years, and only the Foundation is positioned to act in time. This info action costs the treasury nothing. The Cardano Foundation is funding the entire ICANN application and ongoing management from its own resources. The vote simply gauges community support and provides formal endorsement for the application, a mechanism to demonstrate ecosystem alignment without spending a single ADA. That makes this the easiest yes vote imaginable: strategic upside with zero financial downside.
Securing .ada and .cardano domains protects Cardano's brand at the DNS level and unlocks innovation pathways bridging Web2 to Web3. Without these gTLDs, third parties could register them, fragmenting identity and creating confusion or exploitation. Owning them ensures the ecosystem controls its own digital namespace, users get .ada and .cardano domains like .org or .xyz, but tied to Cardano's infrastructure. This strengthens visibility, credibility, and adoption by giving the ecosystem recognizable, brandable internet real estate.
The Cardano Foundation is the right steward. They're already custodians of Cardano trademarks and have managed them openly, allowing free community use without gatekeeping. They commit to transparent reporting on gTLD operations and will establish a Community Advisory Group to guide development, ensuring the ecosystem retains influence over how these domains are deployed. This is accountable and community-aligned governance. The alternative is doing nothing while the window closes, leaving Cardano's digital identity vulnerable to capture or irrelevance. This is brand protection, infrastructure investment, and strategic positioning rolled into one, and at no treasury cost.

I'm voting yes because the Constitutional Committee is the institutional backbone preventing governance collapse and treasury capture. Without a functioning CC, there's no constitutional enforcement, no treasury execution, and no governance. The system is paralyzed or devolves into a SPO directed hard fork. Expecting this work to continue unpaid isn't principled frugality, it's negligence that guarantees a select few, only the wealthy, self-serving, or corrupt serve.
CC members carry real workload and legal liability. We should expect professionalism and accountability that protects the entire ecosystem from malicious actors and governance capture. The alternative to compensation is to compromise independence, invite corruption and risk stagnation.
This budget requests 1,000,000 ADA to compensate five of seven serving CC members for epochs 581-653. That's 200,000 ADA per seat, covering roughly 25 people total across multi-member councils. At current prices, this works out to under $20,000 USD per person annually far below market rate for equivalent legal and governance oversight in any comparable ecosystem. Two members (KtorZ and Phil_uplc) are declining compensation entirely, demonstrating this isn't a cash grab.
The Cardano Constitution explicitly mandates this in Article VII, Section 8: "Cardano Blockchain ecosystem budgets shall provide for periodic administrative costs of the Constitutional Committee." This isn't discretionary, it's constitutional obligation. Administration runs through Intersect's audited smart contract framework with transparent milestone tracking and community oversight. Refusing to fund the CC while demanding they protect treasury integrity and constitutional compliance is hypocrisy. You can't expect professional performance from volunteer labor under legal liability.

I'm voting no because Constitution v2.3 removes critical financial safeguards without adequate justification, creating exploitable governance vulnerabilities that could drain the treasury. The elimination of the Budget Info Action mechanism isn't efficiency, it's recklessness disguised as simplification. Under the current constitution, treasury withdrawals require a two-step process: first an info_action to establish budget parameters and community review, then withdrawal actions tied to that approved framework. This creates mandatory deliberation time and forces proposers to demonstrate strategic alignment before touching funds. Constitution v2.3 scraps this entirely, collapsing treasury withdrawals into single-step actions with no binding budget coordination. Here's the mathematical problem: with the info_action requirement removed and assuming no Constitutional Committee dissent, or a CC size set to minimum threshold, a treasury withdrawal could be enacted in as little as six days, at the epoch boundary following the first full epoch where the action remains active, provided the 67% DRep threshold is met. Today, that means only 23 individuals, who control the sufficient voting stake could authorize withdrawals without strategic review, public vetting, or ecosystem-wide budget discipline. With the majority of ADA still undelegated, governance becomes an exploitable attack surface during low participation periods or voting fatigue. The removal of budget requirements eliminates the forcing function that makes hard choices about technological priorities and resource allocation. Without holistic budgeting, governance devolves into disconnected withdrawal requests lacking coordination, accountability, or protection against waste and capture. A budget framework compels the ecosystem to prioritize competing demands, by removing it you invite chaotic financial management that accelerates treasury depletion. The original constitution emerged from transparent, line-by-line deliberations across continents with hundreds of elected representatives. Constitution v2.3 introduces extensive changes without undergoing comparable community engagement. Additionally the primary author holds significant voting power and voted for their own draft showing some amount of self-interested motivation, which can be a concentration of influence that sets a dangerous precedent. This is not an iterative improvement it's weakening institutional safeguards in a misguided desire to streamline a process. The budget info_action with a threshold requirement of 100% provides a necessary safeguard against expedited treasury withdrawals, by ensuring at least one full gov_action lifetime is required for any treasury withdrawal.

I'm voting yes because GovTool is the infrastructure that makes Cardano governance operational, in my mind this is not optional, but operational. Without an open-source, community-owned platform, governance fragments into proprietary tools controlled by private interests, and decentralization becomes theater. GovTool already serves 50,000+ users across 170 countries, processing thousands of governance transactions. It's the UX backbone that lets ADA holders register, delegate, propose, vote, and audit outcomes transparently. Letting it degrade or privatize would be governance malpractice.
The 1.15 million ADA funds 12 months of hosting, infrastructure maintenance, active development across all governance pillars, and contributor incentives distributed transparently via Andamio platform. This isn't bloat, it's staffing the operating system of on-chain democracy. The roadmap delivers group DRep support (coalition building to distribute voting power), DRep voting history (liquid democracy accountability), Constitutional Committee vote tracking, crowdfunded governance action deposits via CoSponsor, and expanded APIs for third-party builders. These aren't vanity features; they're critical infrastructure that lowers barriers and distributes participation.
Intersect administers funds through audited smart contracts with milestone-based disbursement and oversight from Sundae Labs, Cardano Foundation, Xerberus, and NMKR. All fund flows are publicly auditable at cardanotreasury.fi, and unused funds return to treasury. The GovTool Consortium of LidoNation, ByronNetwork, WeDeliver, Dquadrant have the experience of building this through SanchoNet, Voltaire, and Chang upgrades with open-source code and global contributors. This is a strategic investment in Cardano's democratic operating layer, not simply maintenance expense or just another one of many. There is only this one.

I'm voting yes because Cardano's DeFi ecosystem suffers from a fatal weakness: anemic stablecoin liquidity. This proposal deploys 50 million ADA to solve it, and not as a handout, but as infrastructure investment that generates 4% annual returns back to the treasury while cutting stablecoin slippage in half. The current 4-6% slippage on trades makes Cardano uncompetitive and chokes user onboarding. Deep stablecoin liquidity isn't optional; it's the difference between a viable financial layer and a ghost chain.
The structure mitigates risk: a nine-person committee (including CF, EMURGO, IOHK reps) manages deployment through a 5-of-9 multisig, while a treasury DAO composed of DReps holds veto power to freeze spending or shut down the fund entirely. All liquidity tokens sit on-chain in the governing contract, that is publicly auditable, no black boxes. The proposal phases work intelligently: 500K ADA covers legal setup, smart contract development, and audits before the remaining 49.5M touches DeFi protocols. ADA liquidation uses OTC desks and gradual sales to avoid price shock, ADA is spread across exchanges with 30M+ daily volume, the impact is negligible.
This isn't picking winners arbitrarily; protocols apply and demonstrate security, yield potential, and growth plans. The committee evaluates openly with tDAO oversight. Yes, there's centralization risk in a small committee, but the alternative is permanent liquidity stagnation, which guarantees failure. The legal framework and governance contracts become reusable public goods for future treasury initiatives. We learn, adapt, or shut it down if KPIs aren't met. Perfect is the enemy of good, and Cardano can't wait for flawless proposals while competitors eat our lunch. Let’s get it done.

I'm voting yes because this is a loan, not a handout. 5 million ADA at 2.44% interest, repaid within five years from Snek's product revenues. The Snek Foundation already spent $4.5 million of its own money securing Kraken, Crypto.com, and Kucoin listings, the first three Tier 1 exchanges for any Cardano native token. They've proven execution, not promises. SNEK holds 42,000+ wallets and 2 billion ADA in all-time volume. It's the only CNT currently meeting Tier 1 requirements, making it the tactical wedge to crack open exchange infrastructure for the entire ecosystem.
Here's what this buys: ADA trading pair liquidity on major platforms, compliance frameworks that future tokens can reuse without rebuilding from scratch, and mainstream visibility where retail users actually enter crypto. Intersect administers it with bi-yearly reporting and independent audits. A board including Tal Cohen, Frederik Gregaard, Phillip Pon, and Fahmi Syed ensures alignment. This isn't about pumping one token, it's infrastructure investment that creates repeatable pathways for CNTs while the treasury gets repaid with interest. Risk-to-reward favors an abundance mindset.

I'm voting yes because this proposal does what most don't: it names names, shows receipts, and puts money where measurable results live. Oceania gets 778,000 ada to build real adoption, infrastructure hackathons, business pilots, university partnerships, and a business-development track that trains local advocates and matches talent to opportunities. This isn't vague community building; it's a structured regional engine with milestone-based fund releases and public accountability through GitHub-tracked evidence.
Selfdriven Services administers it with transparent processes: milestone submissions, dispute resolution through DReps, and independent auditing, ensuring no governance manipulation or self-dealing. The team brings technical, legal, governance, and financial expertise diverse enough to execute, focused enough to deliver.
Cardano needs boots on the ground in underserved markets, not more centralized spending in saturated regions. This targets Oceania's unique mix of cultures and economies as a testbed for grassroots activation models that scale globally. It's lean, constitutional, and replicable. The git commit hash locks the proposal content, preventing bait-and-switch alterations. This is how you fund growth: measurable outcomes, clear accountability, no bureaucratic bloat. I’m voting yes to fund it.

I am voting NO on this constitutional amendment. While I agree the info budget governance action may be redundant, I have serious concerns about this proposal's process and substance.
Most importantly, this version has been presented without broad community input and discussion that such an important document requires. The original Cardano Constitution included over 65 workshops with approximately 1,800 participants ensuring genuine community engagement. This proposed update has seen minimal community discussion and reflects only the voice of a few motivated DReps, not the ecosystem at large. The removal of the budget info action eliminates necessary accountability mechanisms. Treasury withdrawals require off-chain processes to gather DRep sentiment before posting on-chain actions. These negotiations need immutable records and nonrepudiation to ensure transparency. The budget info action, although redundant, provided essential accountability that this proposal strips away without adequate replacement. The proposed roadmap function introduces undefined requirements that create more problems than solutions. TREASURY-04a mandates DRep approval of roadmaps via info actions with greater than 50% active voting stake, but this process remains completely undefined. Making roadmap approval mandatory while limiting expenditure scope could degrade blockchain advancement and appears unconstitutional. If roadmap requirements belong in the constitution, the process must be clearly described in the main text, not buried in guardrails. This proposal asks us to vote on undefined processes and removes accountability mechanisms without proper community consultation. Constitutional changes require careful deliberation, broad consensus, and clear definitions. This amendment fails all three standards. The constitution governs our entire ecosystem. Rushing changes without community input sets dangerous precedent for future governance. We need transparency, accountability, and inclusive decision-making, not hasty amendments driven by small groups. I support constitutional improvements, but only through proper process with broad community engagement and clearly defined mechanisms. This proposal falls short of those essential standards.

I am voting to abstain on this proposal, not from opposition to SNEK's mission, but from a commitment to strict principles in treasury management. As both a SNEK holder and Cardano ecosystem supporter, I believe in measuring, testing, and proving value before large-scale investment.
The time to test an investment is before you spend your money. SNEK has proven concept with $4M self-investment and successful major exchange listings, but we need controlled testing of smaller treasury allocations with measurable results before committing 5M ADA to unproven returns.
The only purpose of treasury investment is to generate ecosystem value. It is profitable or unprofitable according to its actual returns. What are the measurable benefits to the Cardano ecosystem per ADA invested? The current proposal lacks commitment to repay or share profits with the treasury. This fails the fundamental standard that public investments should generate quantifiable returns.
SNEK drives trading volume and user engagement, but it remains unproven whether 5M ADA investment yields proportional ecosystem benefits. We lack controlled data comparing exchange versus decentralized trading impact on Cardano fees. Never fund campaigns where the public takes all the risk while private interests take all the profits. Here, the treasury risks 5M ADA with no repayment clause while the SNEK team benefits from enhanced token liquidity, exchanges profit from listing fees and trading revenue, and ecosystem benefits remain indirect, unmeasured, and unguaranteed.
Instead of a 5M ADA grant, offer this as a loan repayable from listing success, with trading fee percentages returned to treasury, aligning private profits with public benefit.
Before any funding, establish baseline metrics for current Cardano transaction fees, trading volumes, and wallet creation. Define success through minimum ecosystem ROI thresholds and require monthly transparent impact reports with verifiable data. Answer the fundamental questions: What exact results do you expect per dollar spent? How will you measure success versus failure? What controlled test proves this works? Who profits from this investment?
I abstain because I believe in SNEK's potential but demand rigor in treasury allocation. The Cardano ecosystem deserves measured, tested, profitable investments, not hopeful gambles with public funds. Test small, measure carefully, prove value scientifically, then scale with confidence. This builds a sustainable, profitable ecosystem benefiting all stakeholders, not just token holders.
Apply scientific principles to treasury management. Protect the ecosystem while enabling genuine innovation to flourish through proven, measurable success. When investments generate verified returns, everyone profits. When they fail rigorous testing, everyone is protected.

I am voting to abstain on this proposal, not from opposition to SNEK's mission, but from a commitment to strict principles in treasury management. As both a SNEK holder and Cardano ecosystem supporter, I believe in measuring, testing, and proving value before large-scale investment.
The time to test an investment is before you spend your money. SNEK has proven concept with $4M self-investment and successful major exchange listings, but we need controlled testing of smaller treasury allocations with measurable results before committing 5M ADA to unproven returns.
The only purpose of treasury investment is to generate ecosystem value. It is profitable or unprofitable according to its actual returns. What are the measurable benefits to the Cardano ecosystem per ADA invested? The current proposal lacks commitment to repay or share profits with the treasury. This fails the fundamental standard that public investments should generate quantifiable returns.
SNEK drives trading volume and user engagement, but it remains unproven whether 5M ADA investment yields proportional ecosystem benefits. We lack controlled data comparing exchange versus decentralized trading impact on Cardano fees. Never fund campaigns where the public takes all the risk while private interests take all the profits. Here, the treasury risks 5M ADA with no repayment clause while the SNEK team benefits from enhanced token liquidity, exchanges profit from listing fees and trading revenue, and ecosystem benefits remain indirect, unmeasured, and unguaranteed.
Instead of a 5M ADA grant, offer this as a loan repayable from listing success, with trading fee percentages returned to treasury, aligning private profits with public benefit.
Before any funding, establish baseline metrics for current Cardano transaction fees, trading volumes, and wallet creation. Define success through minimum ecosystem ROI thresholds and require monthly transparent impact reports with verifiable data. Answer the fundamental questions: What exact results do you expect per dollar spent? How will you measure success versus failure? What controlled test proves this works? Who profits from this investment?
I abstain because I believe in SNEK's potential but demand rigor in treasury allocation. The Cardano ecosystem deserves measured, tested, profitable investments, not hopeful gambles with public funds. Test small, measure carefully, prove value scientifically, then scale with confidence. This builds a sustainable, profitable ecosystem benefiting all stakeholders, not just token holders.
Apply scientific principles to treasury management. Protect the ecosystem while enabling genuine innovation to flourish through proven, measurable success. When investments generate verified returns, everyone profits. When they fail rigorous testing, everyone is protected.

This proposal represents a use of treasury funds for a private commercial venture that lacks the infrastructure foundation, governance transparency, and ecosystem-wide benefits necessary to justify direct treasury withdrawal. The tokenized real estate concept, while potentially valuable, constitutes a single vertical use case that primarily benefits the proposing company rather than providing reusable infrastructure or tools for the broader Cardano community. The proposal fundamentally misaligns with treasury funding priorities by requesting subsidization of an unproven business model that carries significant strategic risks and more broadly, for the reputation of the Cardano ecosystem. Project Catalyst or post treasury funding allocation instruments like loans represents the appropriate mechanism for experimental initiatives requiring market validation, while direct treasury withdrawals should support proven, Cardano-aligned infrastructure that scales ecosystem capabilities rather than individual commercial ventures.
Critical technical prerequisites for real-world asset tokenization remain unaddressed, particularly the absence of decentralized Oracle infrastructure necessary for reliable property valuation and market data feeds. Without these foundational components, the proposal relies on centralized systems that contradict blockchain principles and create single points of failure that could compromise the entire platform. The governance structure lacks transparency regarding asset selection criteria, platform control mechanisms, and community participation pathways. The proposal offers no assurances of open access, decentralized oversight, or meaningful governance input from the Cardano community, creating a structurally centralized system that uses public funds to benefit private interests. The legal and regulatory framework remains insufficiently detailed despite claims of compliance readiness, particularly regarding cross-jurisdictional requirements for tokenized real estate trading across US, EU, and international markets. These complexities require extensive validation before treasury commitment rather than funding development of uncertain regulatory solutions. The proposal fails to demonstrate how the initiative creates lasting value for Cardano beyond attracting temporary TVL (Total Value Locked) that could migrate to other platforms. Without open-source components, reusable infrastructure, or developer tools that benefit the broader ecosystem, the investment primarily supports private commercial interests rather than public infrastructure development.
Treasury funds should prioritize proven initiatives that strengthen Cardano's foundational capabilities, support decentralized infrastructure development, and create reusable components that benefit multiple projects and developers. This proposal represents a private business venture seeking public funding for market validation that would be more appropriately pursued through alternative funding mechanisms or private investment channels. Furthermore, supporting this proposal would establish concerning precedents for treasury utilization that prioritizes private commercial ventures over public infrastructure development and ecosystem-wide benefits.

This proposal raises concerns about the appropriate use of treasury funds for market-making services and exchange listings that primarily benefit selected private commercial projects rather than the broader Cardano ecosystem. The fundamental issue lies in using public treasury resources to subsidize centralized exchange listings and market-making services that represent private commercial risks rather than public infrastructure investments. It has been demonstrated that Cardano native tokens can achieve tier-one exchange listings through strategic project execution, as evidenced by SNEK's successful Kraken listing without treasury intervention. This precedent suggests that viable projects with strong fundamentals can secure exchange partnerships through merit-based approaches rather than requiring subsidization from community funds. The allocation structure lacks transparency and community governance in token selection processes, creating a system where treasury funds support a limited number of predetermined projects without clear participation pathways for the broader developer community. This approach risks creating market distortions by selecting winners and losers rather than supporting infrastructure that benefits all ecosystem participants equally. The proposed budget allocation of up to one and a half million dollars for exchange listing fees represents substantial treasury expenditure with unclear return on investment or measurable ecosystem growth targets. Without specific key performance indicators, success measurements, or repayment mechanisms, these expenditures constitute grants to private commercial enterprises rather than strategic infrastructure investments. Treasury funds should prioritize reinforcing decentralized infrastructure, on-chain liquidity solutions, and reusable development tools that create lasting value for the entire ecosystem rather than subsidizing centralized services that primarily benefit individual token projects. Supporting market-making services for selected tokens does not materially contribute to protocol sustainability or broader network effects. The proposal lacks accountability mechanisms including treasury repayment plans, performance benchmarks, or community oversight of service allocation decisions. Public funds should not underwrite private commercial risks without corresponding public benefits and accountability structures that ensure responsible stewardship of community resources. A more appropriate approach would involve treasury loans with repayment expectations rather than outright grants, enabling support for promising projects while protecting community resources and establishing precedents for responsible treasury utilization. Supporting this proposal would set concerning precedents for treasury fund allocation that prioritizes private commercial interests over public infrastructure development and ecosystem-wide benefits.

This proposal addresses critical infrastructure gaps that currently limit Cardano's competitive positioning in the rapidly expanding stablecoin and digital payments market. The absence of institutional-grade custody solutions from major providers like BitGo and Fireblocks creates significant barriers to exchange listings, institutional adoption, and capital attraction for Cardano-native assets including USDA.
The initiative strategically targets four fundamental bottlenecks constraining ecosystem growth through expanding wallet and custodian support, increasing exchange and OTC desk availability, driving real-world utility beyond crypto trading, and building cost-effective fiat on/off-ramps in frontier markets. These interventions directly address the underrepresentation of Cardano's seven-hundred-million-dollar DeFi ecosystem in centralized exchange trading and institutional investment flows.
The focus on emerging markets aligns with Cardano's mission to provide financial infrastructure in underserved regions while leveraging the platform's low-fee structure for cross-border payments, remittances, and enterprise settlements. Current fiat ramps charging five to seven percent fees versus one percent for local bank transfers create substantial barriers that this proposal addresses through alternative payment rails across seventy-plus countries.
The team's combined fifty years of experience across leading financial institutions including Paxos, Western Union, Citibank, and major cryptocurrency exchanges provides proven capability in navigating regulatory requirements, building compliance frameworks, and scaling global payment networks. Their track record in stablecoin liquidity management and institutional adoption demonstrates competence essential for executing complex financial infrastructure projects.
Market expansion through USDA pairs on centralized exchanges, NEO banks, and OTC desks significantly enhances liquidity while creating trading opportunities that benefit the entire ecosystem. Integration with real estate developers, remittance companies, and payment processors expands utility beyond cryptocurrency trading into practical financial applications that drive mainstream adoption.
The governance framework including legally binding contracts, delivery milestones, external audits, and oversight by trusted entities ensures accountability while the vendor's commitment to reinvesting earnings into Cardano liquidity and adoption incentives aligns interests with long-term ecosystem success.
Supporting this proposal strengthens Cardano's position in the competitive stablecoin market while building essential financial infrastructure that enables broader participation in decentralized finance and real-world payment applications. The deliverables directly enhance utility for homegrown stablecoins like USDA and USDM, creating sustainable advantages that benefit users, developers, and the broader Cardano community through improved accessibility and market presence.

This proposal addresses a critical gap in Cardano's global marketing strategy by establishing unified, professional brand presence across key international markets through a coordinated series of regional tech events and a flagship European summit. Cardano has historically lacked centralized representation at major blockchain conferences, resulting in fragmented messaging and diminished brand recognition compared to competing Layer 1 platforms.
The strategic approach leverages trusted ecosystem partners including Cardano Foundation, EMURGO, Rare Evo, WADA, and ADA Solar to execute regionally focused events that maintain brand consistency while addressing local market needs. This consortium brings proven track records in large-scale event delivery, from the Cardano Foundation's three successful global summits to EMURGO's TOKEN2049 participation and regional partners' community engagement expertise.
The global campaign addresses multiple ecosystem challenges simultaneously through targeted developer onboarding via Dev Days and hackathons, enterprise education initiatives, real-world use case showcasing, and strategic partnership development. These activities directly combat the persistent narrative that building on Cardano is difficult while demonstrating tangible utility to mainstream audiences and potential enterprise adopters.
The investment scale enables meaningful impact across five major regions with attendee targets of 500-800 per event, creating sufficient market presence to compete effectively with other blockchain platforms' marketing efforts. Regional autonomy ensures cultural relevance while maintaining unified Cardano branding and messaging consistency.
Capital attraction, talent acquisition, and media coverage represent essential outcomes for ecosystem growth that require professional, large-scale marketing initiatives beyond community-driven efforts. The summit structure creates networking opportunities between developers, entrepreneurs, enterprises, and regulatory bodies that facilitate strategic partnerships and collaborative solutions to scaling challenges.
The governance framework provides appropriate oversight through audited smart contracts, multi-party committees, and milestone-based payments with third-party assurance, ensuring responsible treasury fund management while enabling professional event execution.
Supporting this proposal strengthens Cardano's competitive positioning in global markets through unified brand presence, developer engagement, and enterprise outreach that directly contributes to adoption acceleration and ecosystem growth. The combination of professional execution capability, strategic market coverage, and transparent governance makes this investment essential for maintaining Cardano's visibility and attractiveness in an increasingly competitive blockchain landscape.

This proposal represents essential infrastructure investment for maintaining Cardano's operational continuity and governance effectiveness during the critical transition period from founding organization control to fully decentralized community governance. Intersect serves as the neutral coordination layer that bridges on-chain voting mechanisms with practical ecosystem management, ensuring that constitutional frameworks translate into functional network operations.
Intersect's stewardship of core Haskell codebases powering Cardano nodes requires sustained technical expertise and institutional continuity that cannot be effectively replaced through ad-hoc arrangements. Their coordination of ecosystem-wide upgrades, including the successful Chang and Plomin hard forks, demonstrates proven capability in managing complex technical deployments that require alignment across infrastructure providers, stake pool operators, decentralized applications, and exchanges globally.
The Administrator role defined in the Constitution requires a reliable institutional counterparty capable of managing treasury-funded initiatives, providing contract oversight, ensuring compliance monitoring, and facilitating transparent delivery assurance. Intersect's established framework for proposal vetting, operational execution, and smart contract development provides essential infrastructure for responsible treasury fund management while supporting increased decentralization over time.
The facilitation of over thirty working groups and eight elected committees creates practical pathways for community participation in governance beyond simple voting mechanisms. These structures enable specialized expertise development, collaborative problem-solving, and informed recommendation generation that enhances the quality of on-chain decision-making while building governance capacity across the ecosystem.
Budget and roadmap coordination functions ensure strategic alignment between technical development priorities and community needs through transparent processes that enable informed treasury allocation decisions. The Product Committee's facilitation of long-term ecosystem vision development and the structured approach to future budget preparation provide essential planning infrastructure for sustainable growth.
The support for Constitutional Committee elections, DRep onboarding, and stakeholder coordination ensures that governance mechanisms function effectively while building institutional knowledge and operational capacity necessary for continued decentralization. Intersect's role in expanding ecosystem capacity through supporting new member-based organizations creates pathways for governance pluralization and reduced dependency on single institutions.
The interim leadership transition under Jack Briggs demonstrates commitment to lean, accountable operations focused on community service rather than institutional expansion. This approach aligns with Cardano's decentralization principles while maintaining operational effectiveness necessary for network stability and governance continuity.
Supporting this proposal ensures sustained coordination infrastructure essential for Cardano's governance maturation, technical development continuity, and community participation facilitation during the foundational period of decentralized network management.

This proposal introduces an innovative Extended Quadratic Funding mechanism that strategically complements Project Catalyst by addressing critical limitations in current blockchain funding approaches while operating at zero administrative cost. The model amplifies treasury impact by transforming traditional funding from sole treasury allocation to a multiplier effect where individual donations can increase available capital by fifty percent or more.
The democratized decision-making framework balances financial contribution with proven community impact through a sophisticated voting system combining donation amounts with reputation scores. This approach prevents wealth concentration from dominating funding decisions while maintaining meaningful participation incentives and implementing robust Sybil resistance through zero-knowledge proof KYC via Hyperledger Identus.
The proposal addresses known Catalyst pain points including concentrated voter power, inefficient milestone management, and inadequate impact reporting through standardized metrics tracking on-chain transactions, new wallet creation, and active user acquisition. This creates the first comprehensive dataset of innovation return on investment within the Cardano ecosystem, enabling data-driven optimization of future funding decisions.
The zero operational cost structure ensures one hundred percent of treasury funds reach projects directly, maximizing resource efficiency while introducing additional capital through individual donor participation. Tax-deductible donation options for qualified donors create unique incentives that extend funding reach beyond the traditional crypto ecosystem.
Socious brings proven expertise through extensive experience with Project Catalyst, SingularityNet's Deep Funding, and GitCoin platforms, combined with enterprise-grade identity solutions currently serving thirteen universities. Their team includes Cardano Ambassadors and Constitutional Committee members with deep ecosystem knowledge and technical capabilities.
The sustainable value capture mechanism establishes voluntary contribution systems where funded projects share ecosystem value through equity stakes, token allocations, or revenue sharing agreements. The ambitious but achievable target of five percent annual returns within ten years aligns with venture capital industry standards while building long-term treasury sustainability.
The streamlined milestone management system uses token incentives and financial penalties to encourage prompt, accurate reviewer decisions while implementing decentralized dispute resolution mechanisms. This particularly benefits smaller funding requests that often struggle with lengthy approval processes.
Supporting this proposal enhances Cardano's funding infrastructure through equitable resource distribution, increased participation, and transparent accountability mechanisms that complement existing structures while introducing innovative approaches to treasury impact maximization and ecosystem growth acceleration.

This proposal addresses a critical funding gap in Cardano's ecosystem by establishing dedicated support for live, user-facing applications that drive real adoption, transaction volume, and Total Value Locked on mainnet. While Project Catalyst effectively supports early-stage innovation and core development budgets maintain protocol advancement, no existing mechanism provides sustained financial backing for established decentralized applications that are already generating measurable on-chain activity and user engagement.
The Cardano Builder DAO creates a complementary funding structure that enables Project Catalyst to focus more effectively on experimentation and innovation by providing an alternative pathway for mature projects that have demonstrated market fit and user adoption. This strategic separation optimizes the entire ecosystem funding framework by matching project development stages with appropriate support mechanisms.
The proposal's metrics-first approach ensures accountability through transparent tracking of key performance indicators including transaction counts, active users, and Total Value Locked. This data-driven methodology enables the community to measure return on investment while ensuring funded projects contribute meaningfully to ecosystem growth and competitive positioning.
The team's proven track record with Clarity governance platform and Agora smart contracts provides confidence in execution capability. Their infrastructure has successfully governed over ten million dollars in TVL across four production DAOs, demonstrating operational competence in decentralized treasury management and member-based governance systems.
The multi-signature structure requiring approval from three of four scope leads plus leadership provides robust safeguards against misallocation while maintaining efficient decision-making processes. Combined with Intersect's administration and proven smart contract controls, this governance framework ensures responsible stewardship of treasury funds.
Supporting established projects with demonstrated user adoption and on-chain activity directly contributes to Cardano's competitive positioning by maintaining ecosystem momentum and preventing migration to platforms with better funding infrastructure. High-impact applications attract users, generate transaction volume, and create network effects that benefit the entire ecosystem.
The strategic value extends beyond individual project support to ecosystem-wide benefits including increased block space utilization, higher Total Value Locked, improved user retention, and enhanced visibility in the broader Web3 landscape. These outcomes strengthen Cardano's market position while creating sustainable foundations for continued growth.
This proposal represents essential infrastructure for maintaining and accelerating application-layer development that drives real-world adoption and utility, making it a strategic investment in Cardano's long-term competitive success.

This proposal addresses a critical gap in Cardano's global marketing strategy by establishing unified, professional brand presence across key international markets through a coordinated series of regional tech events and a flagship European summit. Cardano has historically lacked centralized representation at major blockchain conferences, resulting in fragmented messaging and diminished brand recognition compared to competing Layer 1 platforms.
The strategic approach leverages trusted ecosystem partners including Cardano Foundation, EMURGO, Rare Evo, WADA, and ADA Solar to execute regionally focused events that maintain brand consistency while addressing local market needs. This consortium brings proven track records in large-scale event delivery, from the Cardano Foundation's three successful global summits to EMURGO's TOKEN2049 participation and regional partners' community engagement expertise.
The global campaign addresses multiple ecosystem challenges simultaneously through targeted developer onboarding via Dev Days and hackathons, enterprise education initiatives, real-world use case showcasing, and strategic partnership development. These activities directly combat the persistent narrative that building on Cardano is difficult while demonstrating tangible utility to mainstream audiences and potential enterprise adopters.
The investment scale enables meaningful impact across five major regions with attendee targets of 500-800 per event, creating sufficient market presence to compete effectively with other blockchain platforms' marketing efforts. Regional autonomy ensures cultural relevance while maintaining unified Cardano branding and messaging consistency.
Capital attraction, talent acquisition, and media coverage represent essential outcomes for ecosystem growth that require professional, large-scale marketing initiatives beyond community-driven efforts. The summit structure creates networking opportunities between developers, entrepreneurs, enterprises, and regulatory bodies that facilitate strategic partnerships and collaborative solutions to scaling challenges.
The governance framework provides appropriate oversight through audited smart contracts, multi-party committees, and milestone-based payments with third-party assurance, ensuring responsible treasury fund management while enabling professional event execution.
Supporting this proposal strengthens Cardano's competitive positioning in global markets through unified brand presence, developer engagement, and enterprise outreach that directly contributes to adoption acceleration and ecosystem growth. The combination of professional execution capability, strategic market coverage, and transparent governance makes this investment essential for maintaining Cardano's visibility and attractiveness in an increasingly competitive blockchain landscape.

This proposal represents a strategic investment in Cardano's core technical infrastructure through a comprehensive suite of eleven specialized projects that address critical operational bottlenecks and long-term scalability requirements. Tweag's systematic approach targets essential components across the entire Cardano stack, from consensus mechanisms and ledger conformance to Plutus optimization and network synchronization improvements.
Tweag brings unparalleled expertise and institutional knowledge to these initiatives, having continuously collaborated with Input Output Global since 2018 on core protocol development including Ouroboros Genesis implementation, consensus and ledger team leadership, and Ouroboros Peras design contributions. Their deep understanding of Cardano's architecture, combined with over a decade of engineering excellence in critical infrastructure projects, positions them uniquely to deliver on highly specialized technical requirements.
The proposed projects collectively address fundamental infrastructure needs that underpin ecosystem growth and developer experience. Conformance testing initiatives ensure protocol correctness and future-proofing, while the Plutus Script Re-Executor and Block Cost Investigation provide essential tools for performance optimization that directly benefit decentralized application developers. Network-level improvements through Genesis Sync Accelerator and Hoarding Node development address bootstrap performance and reliability constraints.
The technical scope demonstrates strategic alignment with Cardano's evolution toward greater scalability, verifiability, and maintainability. Projects like Canonical Ledger State and Block Transaction Diffusion Codecs improve interoperability and consistency, while History Expiry and node emulator maintenance contribute to long-term sustainability and testing capabilities.
The return on investment extends across the entire ecosystem through faster network upgrades, reduced onboarding friction, improved protocol transparency, and more resilient infrastructure. These foundational improvements enable broader participation while strengthening the technical base supporting future innovations.
Tweag's partnership with Modus Create provides additional strategic consulting capabilities and global reach that complement their technical expertise. The transparent contract management framework, including independent third-party assurance and audited smart contract administration, ensures accountability and delivery confidence.
Supporting this proposal advances Cardano's mission to build a resilient, scalable, and verifiable blockchain ecosystem by investing in the fundamental infrastructure that enables continued innovation and growth. The combination of proven technical leadership, comprehensive project scope, and strategic alignment makes this investment essential for maintaining Cardano's competitive position and technological advancement.

This proposal represents a critical transition from provisional governance to a fully community-elected Constitutional Committee, marking a foundational moment in Cardano's decentralization journey. The Interim Constitutional Committee served its essential purpose as a temporary oversight body during the initial governance framework deployment, but its time-limited mandate must now give way to democratically elected representation.
The election process conducted between May and July 2025 demonstrated the maturity of Cardano's governance infrastructure through transparent, verifiable procedures that engaged DReps in selecting seven qualified committee members. This community-driven and independently audited selection process facilitated through an Intersect funded voting tool establishes legitimate democratic foundations for ongoing governance operations.
Ratification is operationally essential to prevent governance paralysis beyond Epoch 580. Without this transition, governance actions requiring Constitutional Committee approval would stall, undermining Cardano's decision-making capacity and platform evolution. The newly elected committee ensures continuity of critical oversight functions while representing authentic community mandate rather than institutional appointment.
The staggered term structure provides institutional stability through gradual renewal rather than complete replacement, demonstrating thoughtful governance design that balances continuity with democratic refreshment. Members serve either 146 or 73-epoch terms based on election results, ensuring operational knowledge transfer while enabling periodic community input.
The transition from founding entities to community-elected representatives fulfills Cardano's constitutional mandate for decentralized governance while maintaining operational competence through qualified, engaged committee members. This evolution demonstrates the platform's commitment to genuine decentralization beyond mere technical architecture.
The elected committee brings diverse geographical representation and community perspectives that enhance governance legitimacy and decision-making quality. The selection through active DRep participation validates the effectiveness of Cardano's unique governance model and builds confidence in future electoral processes.
Supporting this proposal affirms collective commitment to constitutional governance principles while ensuring operational continuity essential for platform development. The combination of democratic legitimacy, operational necessity, and constitutional compliance makes ratification both practically essential and philosophically aligned with Cardano's founding principles.
This governance action represents the successful maturation of experimental governance structures into permanent, community-controlled institutions that will guide Cardano's continued evolution through legitimate, accountable oversight mechanisms.

This proposal represents essential infrastructure investment to sustain and evolve Catalyst as Cardano's primary decentralized funding mechanism. With over four years of proven operation, the Catalyst team has successfully allocated ₳290 million across 2,091 projects in 114 countries, demonstrating reliable stewardship of treasury resources and ecosystem development.
The three-workstream approach addresses critical operational challenges while positioning Catalyst for long-term sustainability. Current manual processes create inefficiencies that this proposal aims to reduce by up to 50% through automation and improved tooling. The Hermes decentralized infrastructure replaces legacy systems with peer-to-peer architecture, aligning with Cardano's decentralization principles while improving resilience and scalability.
Catalyst serves as the ecosystem's innovation engine, providing funding pathways for hundreds of builders and startups that drive Cardano's growth. The proposed ₳61 million across three funding rounds, including Retroactive Public Goods Funding, ensures continued support for early-stage research, open-source development, and community initiatives that might otherwise lack funding sources.
The proposal addresses governance concerns through planned reforms including quadratic voting and improved delegation mechanisms that reduce voting power concentration and increase participation equity. Enhanced mobile-first interfaces lower barriers to participation, particularly important for global adoption and community engagement.
Operational improvements and interface development create a more accessible, scalable platform that can handle increased participation as the ecosystem grows. The investment in production-grade infrastructure ensures Catalyst can support larger funding volumes and more complex governance requirements without compromising performance or security.
The team's track record of processing over 3 million governance decisions and facilitating 12,000 individual payments demonstrates operational competence and financial integrity. Their commitment to transparency through on-chain tracking and community dashboards provides accountability for treasury fund usage.
Supporting this proposal ensures Catalyst's continued evolution from experimental funding platform to mature, efficient infrastructure capable of supporting Cardano's growing developer and entrepreneur community. The investment in sustainability and decentralization aligns with broader ecosystem goals while maintaining the innovation funding pipeline essential for continued growth and competitiveness.

This proposal represents a vital continuation of the research-driven approach that fundamentally defines Cardano's identity and competitive advantage in the blockchain landscape. Input Output Research has been instrumental in delivering Cardano's foundational architecture through rigorous, peer-reviewed methodology, producing over 200 academic papers that established the network's technical credibility and innovative solutions like Ouroboros consensus.
The structured funnel model connecting fundamental research to practical implementation ensures that Cardano maintains its position as a research leader while delivering tangible technological advances. The proposal's 20 research streams and 6 technology validation initiatives across critical areas including scalability, interoperability, and sustainability directly address the long-term challenges facing blockchain adoption and utility.
Cardano's research-first methodology distinguishes it from other Layer 1 platforms that often prioritize rapid deployment over thorough validation. This approach has delivered Cardano's unique architecture, including EUTxO, formal verification capabilities, and proven consensus mechanisms that provide security guarantees other networks cannot match. Abandoning this research foundation would undermine Cardano's core value proposition and competitive positioning.
The five-year Cardano Vision program demonstrates strategic thinking beyond immediate market demands, focusing on breakthrough technologies like quantum-resistant cryptography, advanced zero-knowledge proofs, and next-generation consensus protocols. These innovations require sustained investment and cannot be developed through short-term funding cycles or market-driven approaches alone.
IOR's track record provides strong confidence in delivery capability, with consistent publication output in increasingly competitive academic venues and successful translation of research into production implementations. The rigorous peer-review process ensures quality while building academic credibility that benefits the entire ecosystem.
The technology validation component bridges the gap between theoretical research and practical implementation, producing formal specifications, prototypes, and improvement proposals that enable the broader Cardano community to build upon research foundations. This systematic approach accelerates innovation while maintaining quality standards.
Continued research investment is essential for Cardano to address emerging challenges including quantum computing threats, cross-chain interoperability requirements, and sustainability concerns that will define the next generation of blockchain platforms. Without proactive research, Cardano risks losing its technological edge and narrative leadership.
The proposal's focus on long-horizon research and development ensures Cardano remains ahead of industry trends rather than reactive to market pressures. This strategic positioning enables the network to capture opportunities that require deep technical innovation rather than competing solely on immediate utility metrics.
Supporting this proposal maintains Cardano's research-driven identity while funding the foundational work necessary for continued technological leadership and ecosystem evolution.

This proposal represents a fundamental investment in Cardano's long-term sustainability and competitive positioning through the establishment of a comprehensive Paid Open Source Model. Cardano's success is intrinsically linked to the health and vitality of its open-source infrastructure, yet until now, critical projects have relied on fragmented funding or volunteer efforts that cannot sustain the ecosystem's growing demands.
The Open Source Committee's structured approach addresses critical gaps that threaten Cardano's developer ecosystem and network security. Without dedicated funding for maintainers, key repositories risk abandonment, experienced contributors migrate to better-funded ecosystems, and security vulnerabilities remain unaddressed. This proposal transforms ad-hoc support into a systematic, transparent funding mechanism that ensures continuity and growth of essential infrastructure.
The Maintainer Retainer Program creates sustainable career paths for developers maintaining critical repositories, directly addressing talent retention challenges that have plagued open-source development. By providing structured compensation for maintenance work, this initiative attracts and retains high-quality contributors who might otherwise pursue opportunities in ecosystems with clearer monetization pathways.
Security enhancements through dedicated bug bounty programs and incident response funding strengthen the entire ecosystem's resilience. Proactive vulnerability identification and rapid response capabilities protect not only individual projects but the broader network of applications and services built on Cardano's infrastructure. This security investment reduces systemic risk while building confidence among developers and users.
The incubation framework and developer advocacy programs create pathways for innovation and ecosystem expansion. By supporting promising projects from conception through commercialization, this model accelerates the development of tools and services that enhance Cardano's utility and adoption. Developer onboarding initiatives like Cardano Summer of Code ensure continuous talent pipeline development.
Intersect's coordination role provides necessary governance structure and accountability while maintaining the open, decentralized principles that define successful open-source communities. The transparent allocation process ensures funds reach projects with genuine impact and community support.
The strategic value of this investment extends beyond immediate project funding. A well-supported open-source ecosystem becomes a competitive advantage, attracting developers who value sustainable contribution opportunities and reliable infrastructure. This creates positive feedback loops where better tools attract more developers, leading to further innovation and ecosystem growth.
While the budget represents significant treasury allocation, the alternative costs of ecosystem stagnation, security incidents, or developer migration far exceed this investment. Other successful blockchain platforms demonstrate that structured open-source funding correlates directly with ecosystem health and adoption rates.
This proposal establishes Cardano as a leader in sustainable open-source development, creating a model that other ecosystems will likely emulate. Supporting this initiative ensures Cardano's foundational infrastructure remains robust, secure, and continuously improving, providing the stable base necessary for long-term ecosystem success and competitive differentiation.

This proposal represents a critical strategic investment in Cardano's future scalability and ecosystem growth through Midgard, a Layer 2 rollup solution that directly addresses the network's capacity limitations while strengthening its economic foundation. As blockchain adoption accelerates and transaction volumes increase, Cardano requires robust scaling infrastructure to maintain competitiveness and support the next generation of decentralized applications and services.
Midgard's economic model creates a virtuous cycle that benefits the entire Cardano ecosystem. Unlike other Layer 2 solutions that fragment economic activity away from the base layer, Midgard's design ensures that increased rollup usage translates directly to increased fee revenue for Cardano Layer 1. This alignment strengthens ADA's utility and value proposition while funding network security through enhanced staking rewards, creating sustainable long-term growth that benefits all stakeholders from individual users to stake pool operators.
The scaling capabilities provided by Midgard position Cardano to compete effectively in markets requiring high transaction throughput, such as decentralized finance, gaming, and micropayments. These use cases are currently constrained by Layer 1 capacity limitations, and Midgard removes these barriers while maintaining the security guarantees that distinguish Cardano from other platforms. This expanded capability opens new market opportunities and user segments that were previously inaccessible.
Midgard complements Cardano's existing scaling roadmap by filling a crucial gap in the ecosystem's scaling architecture. While Hydra addresses specific state channel use cases and partnerchains provide sidechain functionality, rollups serve different application requirements and user preferences. This comprehensive scaling approach ensures Cardano can support diverse applications and workloads, from high-frequency trading to social media platforms, without forcing developers into suboptimal scaling solutions.
The proposal's alignment with Cardano's decentralization principles ensures that scaling does not compromise the network's core values. By maintaining permissionless participation and inheriting Cardano's censorship resistance, Midgard scales the network's capacity while preserving its fundamental characteristics. This approach contrasts sharply with other ecosystems where scaling often requires accepting centralization trade-offs or security compromises.
From a competitive positioning perspective, Midgard provides Cardano with differentiated capabilities that other blockchain platforms cannot replicate. This technological moat creates sustainable competitive advantages in the Layer 2 market while positioning Cardano as the preferred platform for applications requiring both scalability and true decentralization. The uniqueness of this offering strengthens Cardano's market position and ecosystem attractiveness.
The timing of this investment aligns perfectly with broader market trends toward Layer 2 adoption. As institutional and enterprise users increasingly evaluate blockchain platforms for large-scale deployments, having proven, production-ready scaling solutions becomes essential for capturing these opportunities. Midgard ensures Cardano is positioned to compete for these high-value use cases rather than losing them to platforms with more mature scaling infrastructure.
Anastasia Labs' track record within the Cardano ecosystem provides confidence in successful delivery and long-term maintenance. Their extensive contributions to ecosystem development and active involvement in major applications demonstrate alignment with Cardano's success and capability to deliver production-ready infrastructure. The team's existing progress on Midgard development reduces execution risk while accelerating time to market.
The governance framework ensures responsible stewardship of treasury funds through established oversight mechanisms, milestone-based delivery, and transparent reporting. This structured approach protects community investment while enabling the innovation necessary to maintain Cardano's competitive position in the rapidly evolving blockchain landscape.
Supporting Midgard represents an essential investment in Cardano's ability to serve growing user demand, capture new market opportunities, and maintain technological leadership. The proposal addresses immediate scaling needs while positioning the ecosystem for long-term success in an increasingly competitive environment where scalability, security, and decentralization determine platform viability and adoption.

This proposal represents a strategically vital investment in Cardano's core infrastructure that addresses the ecosystem's most critical challenges for long-term viability and competitive positioning. The comprehensive technical scope spans fundamental improvements from consensus mechanisms to developer tooling, collectively positioning Cardano for large-scale adoption and real-world applications.
The scalability enhancements through Ouroboros Leios implementation and Hydra development directly tackle throughput limitations that constrain user experience during high network demand. These Layer 1 and Layer 2 solutions work synergistically to provide both immediate relief and long-term scaling capacity essential for ecosystem growth. Leios represents a significant advancement in blockchain throughput technology, while Hydra's state channels offer near-instant finality, creating a comprehensive scaling solution maintaining Cardano's security guarantees.
The Acropolis node architecture refresh demonstrates forward-thinking technical debt management and ecosystem participation. By transitioning to modular architecture, this initiative improves performance, reduces operational costs for stake pool operators, and creates pathways for broader community participation in core development. This architectural evolution supports Cardano's decentralization commitment by making the codebase more accessible to diverse development teams.
The Plutus High Assurance suite addresses critical gaps in smart contract development and security verification. Automatic formal verification, property-based testing, and static analysis provide developers with robust tooling for secure, reliable applications. These tools reduce development barriers while improving overall ecosystem security, with transaction monitoring and tiered pricing enhancing developer and user experience.
Infrastructure improvements through Ledger-HD, LSM integration, and UTXO-HD directly address operational concerns affecting network sustainability. By reducing memory requirements and improving disk-based state management, these enhancements make node operation more accessible and cost-effective, supporting broader network participation. The KES Agent adds crucial security enhancements for stake pool operators.
Innovative features like Nested Transactions enabling Babel Fees demonstrate Cardano's commitment to user experience improvements that differentiate it from other platforms. The ability to pay fees with native tokens removes significant friction points, potentially accelerating adoption across diverse use cases.
Input Output Engineering's proven track record spanning Cardano's entire development history provides strong execution confidence. Their involvement from Byron through Voltaire demonstrates consistent capability in research-driven development and production-ready implementation, with retained key personnel ensuring continuity of institutional knowledge.
The proposal's emphasis on knowledge sharing and supplier diversity aligns with Cardano's open-source ethos and sustainability goals. Creating pathways for broader community participation while maintaining technical standards supports the ecosystem's transition toward decentralized development.
This represents exactly the strategic, foundational investment Cardano requires to achieve its vision of supporting global-scale decentralized applications, making support essential for continued evolution as a leading blockchain platform.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not seriously consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 1,500,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this personal guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding or bundled together in MBO, DAO, or conglomerate entities. TWA (Treasury Withdrawal Actions) need be comprehensive and not ad hoc as that makes oversight more costly and inefficient.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 100,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I have voted in favor of this action to demonstrates my intention to execute without delays and move the treasury expenditure process forward. I also want to note that I will not consider individual requests from the treasury for less that 100,000 ADA moving forward. I reserve the right this round because I feel the process was not properly explained to proposers and DRep and it would be unfair to implement this guardrail at this time. Requests below that threshold are better suited for Catalyst funding.
A budget and all included line items has already been approved, and now is the time to disperse funding and enable further development of the Cardano network. The proposal was selected through a well-defined process, and I will fully support it out of respect for the will of the broader Cardano community and a belief in respecting the consensus we achieved together under the Intersect-administered budget process. The process reflects a coordinated, strategic approach to funding Cardano’s ecosystem-critical infrastructure. The community has thoroughly reviewed the proposal. I was actively involved in the entire process and the proposal presented represents development that provides a tangible benefit to our ecosystem. It would be a mistake to underfund our ecosystem’s development when we can sustainably provide the required funding with our available treasury reserves.
Furthermore there are exceptional oversight mechanisms in place to ensure a minimum amount of wast, fraud, and abuse of treasury expenditures, such as Intersect’s smart contract framework (audited by TxPipe and MLabs), Multi-party oversight (including Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, NMKR, etc.), A clear milestone-driven disbursement model, and full transparency via TRSC/PSSC dashboards.
These governance and assurance systems meet the constitutional standards for accountability and risk management and provide confidence in efficiency and execution.

I am voting yes on Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2025, funds are requested to develop Cardano’s node diversity. This is critical for decentralization and network resilience. When multiple independent teams build node software, it reduces reliance on a single entity or codebase. The Amaru project is of high strategic importance, directly aligning and strengthening the core principles of Cardano by creating a second node implementation to further enhance network resilience and decentralization. If a bug or vulnerability is present in one version, others may remain unaffected. Decentralization at the node-level is vital for Cardano’s future. Amaru delivers this critical client diversity, mitigating a key systemic risk. Amaru’s implementation is a Rust-based design is which is also a strategic asset that lowers the barrier for a new generation of developers to contribute to Cardano's core. As more developers build and maintain nodes, they contribute to refining the protocol specification, surfacing ambiguities, and improving long-term maintainability. The Amaru team's funding request is reasonable, the team includes respected developers from within the Cardano ecosystem. Furthermore the team’s administration process, which utilizes smart contracts and a public GitHub repository to ensure accountability and transparency is commendable on-chain accountability. Funding Amaru is a direct investment in a non-commercial, public good and represents a critical infrastructure investment for Cardano’s future.

I am voting yes on the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 275M ada Administered by Intersect. While I do not support each individual proposal encapsulated, I do understand the absolute urgency in moving the process forward and getting funds administered. The total amount requested (275 million ADA) is within the range set forth by the supported Net Change Limit Info Action. The proposals included in this budget were approved by the majority of voting power of DReps who participated in the Ekklesia off chain polling process. The funds are needed to continue important work which should not be delayed given this critical period in Cardano's development. The budget brings together 39 initiatives focused on development, infrastructure, and marketing, which all align with Cardano’s 2025 roadmap. Furthermore, this is not a direct request for funds but a recognition that the combined budget is approved so that future Treasury Withdrawals for each 39 project can be submitted and approved individually. In summary, the Intersect budget includes a broad set of proposals that are generally approved by the Cardano ecosystem, and while I may have reservations about some individual proposals, approving the budget doesn't automatically release funds, because DReps can re-evaluate specific items when the associated treasury withdrawal actions are submitted on chain. It is essential to not delay treasury expenditures any further.

I’m voting no on the 2025 Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 7.5M ₳ for community builders. This proposal is submitted by a third party without providing evidence of formal agreements with all the parties named to undertake the proposed commitments. It therefore does not satisfy the requirement for a specified administration partner. I also find this proposal flawed in that, it lacks transparency and I have concerns about how accurately the proposal reflects the intentions of the named contributors. Therefore I don't have confidence in the proposal’s ability to deliver on its goals effectively and responsibly.

I'm voting yes on the proposal to, Set a 300 million ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 563–635. Setting the NCL at 300 million ADA matches the expected annual treasury inflow, ensuring that we maintain fiscal responsibility while still enabling meaningful investment in Cardano’s continued growth. This figure strikes the right balance between prudent spending and supporting the ecosystem’s development needs. I also appreciate the structuring of this NCL to cover the remainder of 2025 as well as a significant portion of 2026, thus moving the budgetary cycle away from the calendar year end and holiday seasons. Moving key decision making processes to a summer fall cadence will make for more reliable participation. This approach also provides continuity for ongoing and upcoming budget proposals, many of which are designed around 12-month cycles.

I'm voting no on the 50 million for DeFi liquidity due to significant concerns regarding its financial scope, governance structure, and overall feasibility. The request for 50 million ada is exceptionally large, specifically with regards to the current active NCL (Net Change Limit) and community approved treasury expenditures. Such a substantial allocation of community funds is not justified by the proposal's contents, which lack clearly defined goals and key performance indicators (KPIs). Furthermore the reliance on a basic multi-sig wallet instead of a more secure and transparent smart contract-based solutions introduces too many fundamental weaknesses in its financial planning, oversight structure, and technical implementation.

This is all in addition to the most pressing issue of an accompanying invalid metadata anchor.

I voted yes on Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget: Amaru Node Development 2025.
Node diversity is critical for decentralization and network resilience. Having multiple node implementations increases the network’s robustness, performance, and developer access. The Amaru team's funding request is reasonable, perfectly presented and clearly outlined. Furthermore this initiative strengthens and represents a healthy evolution of the Cardano network.

I'm voting no on the NCL for 2025, covering the period from the start of Epoch 532 to the end of Epoch 604, set at 200M ada. My reasoning for the no vote is based on the projected expenditure of about 275 million ADA voted on by a majority of DReps during the 2025 Intersect budgeting and socialization process. To ask for greater funding than allocated in the NCL is irresponsible and would put undue constraints on development progress

I am voting no on this net change limit action because I believe it is too low of a treasury expenditure when faced with the current development requirements of the Cardano ecosystem. My primary focus in decision making currently revolves around increasing transactions in both volume and type. Cardano has not yet fully realized the original road map and still needs to fully implement Basho era advancements and upgrades. Current restrictions on speed and transaction volume are severely inhibiting adoption of the Cardano ecosystem and its overall marketshare of the crypto domain space. The Cardano treasury is projected to grow by about 320 million ADA in 2025, therefore setting a NCL of 300 million ADA is too conservative at this stage in Cardano's development.

While voting yes, I acknowledging that the document isn't perfect, but it represents the culmination of extensive consensus building within the global Cardano ecosystem. The current Interim Constitution, designed to be temporary, is limiting the network's growth and potential, making this transition necessary. Furthermore we're demonstrating to the world that decentralized on-chain governance isn't just theoretical – it's achievable.

I support naming the next hard fork in memory of Matthew Plomin. He embodied the spirit of the Cardano community through his willingness to help others, his innovative work on $USDM, and commitment to making blockchain technology more accessible. Matthew's journey from traditional finance to blockchain developer is exactly the kind of bridge-builders we need, and by naming this hard fork in his honor, we can ensure his legacy continues to inspire future contributors.

I'm voting no on this info action, because I don't believe K should be adjusted in isolation. This has been done before and did not achieve the desired results, futhermore without also addressing a0 and minPoolFee at the same time would not provide an efficient solution. K, a0, and minPoolCost work dynamically together to regulate nOpt (desired number of pools) and thus all prams effecting nOpt should be taken into account in the adjustment on one.

I support the idea of celebrating Cardano's "Ikigai" spirit.

I am voting no on the action proposing to name the next Cardano hard fork 'HOSKY' because it falls outside the established naming convention used to identify Cardano hard forks.