I don't see why not to approve this NCL. I know some worry that it's too high but I don't even see the need for an NCL. I'd much rather we simply fund projects that we believe deserve funding and don't fund projects that don't deserve funding. Deserving funding should mean that the expected positive impact and benefits of delivery of said projects is higher (comparatively and ideally quantitatively, via KPIs) than the cost.

I think 5 constitutional committee members is plenty. If we can achieve further decentralization by incorporating more committee members, better even, however and considering that some members are groups rather than individuals, I think all things considered we have a fairly decentralized committee, and more important even, made up of members that deserve to serve on the committee.

I very much agree with Pi Lanningham's take on this protocol parameter change. Increasing block mem units is a great way to increase Plutus smart contract transaction throughput for the Cardano ledger without risking an eventual later change (back to a lower value) breaking dApps and protocols that depend on higher tx limits. This will also give us an idea of whether tx limits can and should be changed at a later stage.

As much as I have my concerns, which I previously expressed during the info action vote, I support the Cardano DeFi liquidity budget under the terms described in the info action. I have no say on constitutionality of the proposal as I do not serve on the CC and therefor as much as I both acknowledge and agree with the concerns brought up by both CC members who've voted on this proposal (Tingvard and Cardano Japan Council), they do not influence my opinion on whether this proposal should pass or not (from the perspective of an independent DRep not serving on the CC).

Respecting the tradition and Cardano culture of naming hard forks after community members who contributed to the development and growth of Cardano (in one way or another) who have unfortunately recently deceased is a beautiful way to show respect to those very individuals, their families and friends.

Summary

I support this proposal because Cardano urgently needs deeper liquidity and stronger stablecoin infrastructure to compete in the DeFi landscape. Deploying treasury ADA to bootstrap liquidity on decentralized exchanges and lending protocols has the potential to strengthen the entire ecosystem by:

• Reducing slippage and improving market efficiency.
• Supporting stablecoin adoption and stability.
• Attracting developers, traders, and institutional participants who require liquidity to build and operate.

This initiative aligns with Cardano’s long-term goals of fostering sustainable decentralized finance activity and creating real utility for ADA.

Concerns and Caveats

While I endorse the concept, I remain concerned about the current governance and execution model:

1. Committee Structure & Legitimacy: The multisig committee is composed of well-known ecosystem actors, but they were not selected by dReps or via any decentralized community mandate. This creates a legitimacy gap around decision-making power over a very large treasury allocation.
2. Conflict of Interest Risks: Several committee members have ties to particular DeFi projects. Even if acting in good faith, there is a risk of unconscious bias toward deploying funds to affiliated platforms rather than objectively stronger alternatives, which could harm competition and reduce effectiveness.
3. Risk Management & Professional Oversight: The absence of a professional fund manager or entity with proven expertise in liquidity deployment and risk controls is concerning, especially when 50 million ADA is at stake. Mismanagement could lead to significant treasury losses.

Mid-Term Expectations

I am casting a YES vote to enable the immediate opportunity this proposal offers, but my support assumes that this venture will evolve over the mid-term toward:

• Stronger accountability mechanisms, including transparent reporting and meaningful oversight from dReps.
• Clear conflict-of-interest policies and recusal rules for committee members.
• Incorporation of professional fund management expertise, either directly or via advisors, to strengthen risk management.

These improvements do not need to be in place at launch, but the trajectory of this venture should clearly move in that direction if it is to maintain broad community trust.

Conclusion

Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem needs liquidity and stablecoin depth now, and this proposal represents a bold step forward. I am voting YES to seize the opportunity, while holding the expectation that governance, accountability, and professional risk management will be strengthened in the mid-term to ensure the treasury’s resources are deployed responsibly and without favoritism.

I concur with Philip DiSarro's vote and rationale on this proposal:

To be honest, this isn't ideal from my perspective. The scope of changes proposed is too large. In the future I would prefer constitutional amendments to be extremely focused, ie. to change a single item. It's very hard to get community consensus on a bundle of proposed changes (ie. some voters might like one change, but dislike another and thus choose not to vote for it). The only way we can get rapid iteration is via many proposals that have small scope (if the change proposed is about a single item, and the majority of stake agrees with the single item change then it will be accepted).
Future amendments must be made considerably smaller and must focus on specific parts and sections of the constitution:

1. To avoid the situation Phil mentions where people will vote against the proposal even though they agree with some of the proposed changes due to other proposed changes they do not support
2. And to minimize the content to review in one single proposal, enabling DReps to focus and formulate more complete opinions on the material being voted on.

That said, redundancy in the current situation is so unbelievably bad (budget & withdrawals being separate proposals) and is wasting an immense amount of money & time for the ecosystem, that I am compelled to vote for this proposal simply because it removes the concept of budget info actions from the constitution.
Once more I agree with Phil here. The current budget process is overly complicated. Yes, separate information and withdrawal proposals should be a tool in our arsenal; No, they should not be forced on proposers. This causes considerably friction and delay in an otherwise already complex and bureaucratic process.

I do not believe this project (Haus) has a well enough established track record that supports a withdrawal of this size. I'd much prefer to see Haus launch a less ambitious pilot project on Cardano to prove and convince the community that they come in good faith and are truly capable of building what they claim and growing it to a level that strongly supports Cardano growth.

I believe Catalyst is and has been a critical funding vehicle for early stage projects and companies building on and for Cardano. This proposal extends and iterates on Catalyst in a manner that I believe is beneficial and supports the growth of Cardano as an ecosystem.

I do not support the GovTool budget proposal in its current form for the following reasons:

• I think the budget is too high for the complexity of the project
• I think some of the things that are being proposed in the budget do not justify their cost
• I believe the GovTool team's past performance and that of their competition (namely Tempo.vote) demonstrates that there are more competitive teams out there capable of building more stable and usable alternatives at a lower cost for Cardano.