Mike Rogero (羅邁凱）

I see this as a administrative vote which is to process a withdrawal that DRep's have previously approved. I do not believe in throwing monkey-wrenches into approved and planned for processes, and thus I vote yes so as not to obstruct progress and momentum, and to not undermine previous decisions.

I see this as a administrative vote which is to process a withdrawal that DRep's have previously approved. I do not believe in throwing monkey-wrenches into approved and planned for processes, and thus I vote yes so as not to obstruct progress and momentum, and to not undermine previous decisions.

I see this as a administrative vote which is to process a withdrawal that DRep's have previously approved. I do not believe in throwing monkey-wrenches into approved and planned for processes, and thus I vote yes so as not to obstruct progress and momentum, and to not undermine previous decisions.

I see this as a administrative vote which is to process a withdrawal that DRep's have previously approved. I do not believe in throwing monkey-wrenches into approved and planned for processes, and thus I vote yes so as not to obstruct progress and momentum, and to not undermine previous decisions.

I see this as a administrative vote which is to process a withdrawal that DRep's have previously approved. I do not believe in throwing monkey-wrenches into approved and planned for processes, and thus I vote yes so as not to obstruct progress and momentum, and to not undermine previous decisions.

I see this as a administrative vote which is to process a withdrawal that DRep's have previously approved. I do not believe in throwing monkey-wrenches into approved and planned for processes, and thus I vote yes so as not to obstruct progress and momentum, and to not undermine previous decisions.

I see this as a administrative vote which is to process a withdrawal that DRep's have previously approved. I do not believe in throwing monkey-wrenches into approved and planned for processes, and thus I vote yes so as not to obstruct progress and momentum, and to not undermine previous decisions.

I see this as a administrative vote which is to process a withdrawal that DRep's have previously approved. I do not believe in throwing monkey-wrenches into approved and planned for processes, and thus I vote yes so as not to obstruct progress and momentum, and to not undermine previous decisions.

This is another difficult decision. I agree with dori_coin, that Srike 2.0 is fundamentally moving themselves away from the Cardano ecosystem, and by choosing to fund this, we are using Cardano public money to fund expansion and focus to other ecosystems like Ethereum. There is clear logic well reasoned by Dori on what that doesn't make sense.

However, I am looking at this through the following lenses:

1. As an entrepreneur, the Cardano ecosystem during this bear market isn't self-sustaining. We should be focusing on supporting what works and Strike has been one of the most successful ecosystem projects we have. This expansion likely will increase their odds of survival and growth.

2. I use the Belt-and-Road model of China's development where the expansion while benefiting others in the short-term ultimately is likely to bring rewards back home.

3. I support using the treasury as a bank which provides loans to promising businesses over a grant-based model. I believe Strike is one of the most credit worthy businesses on Cardano and as a bank manager, I would approve funds as expansion capital to a growing business.

I see this as a second vote on something already approved. This process fundamentally increases the risk that good projects won't get through by making them jump two sets of hoops, which significantly raises the likelihood that projects will lose funding even though they were approved. That would be devastating for teams involved and likely will lead to more people getting disillusioned once their project lose funding months after approval.

Irrespective, I see Wirex filling a critical need in Cardano and continue to support it as a good use of treasury funds.

Clearly, we need to distinguish between the treasury process as a whole and the subsets that fall under that umbrella: a coordinated budgeting process and, beneath that, a robust procurement management process. These are separate concepts and should be treated as such. I applaud this proposal for raising the point that things are obviously broken.

We must bring a values-based discussion to the table about the role of the treasury as a whole and the constraints under which it should operate. Then we need a clear discussion about Cardano’s budgeting process, its timeline, and its constraints.

After that, we need to discuss procurement. Currently, we have vendors proposing whatever fees, hours, KPIs, and deliverables they wish, and we only have the option to vote yes or no. There is no mechanism for pushback, adjustment, negotiation, or evaluating how one project fits within a broader strategy or overall budget.

Proposals are ad hoc and one-off. Voting no leads to Twitter tirades and a minimum of 30 days lost to a slow governance cycle. This is a doomed process.

The fact that this system doesn’t work has led to the suboptimal outcome that only the largest vendors are receiving funding. I believe this is driven more by risk aversion than by optimal planning.

Let’s call things what they are. This first round of governance was not a success. While it was not a total failure, it has enough flaws that the future of the chain and its projects is threatened. I believe that was the core point of this non-binding Info Action: to raise a hand and say, “Can we at least agree that we have a problem?” That is the first step toward fixing things.

That, I have to support.

I really like Eternl, it is my first choice wallet. I would also like to fund this as a signal to other projects that treating the treasury as a loan-provider as opposed to a grant provider is the way to go.

However, as a CFE and CFA credential holder, I can not consider a Yes vote on a proposal where the recipient is also the auditor. Basic accounting concepts such as Separation of Duties, Conflict of Interest, Auditor Independence, and Self-Review Threat among others precludes accepting a proposal written this way irrespective of its other merits. This is a simple principles based decision.

As with every IO proposal this year - I DO NOT feel this went through a proper nor robust procurement process. There is not enough pushback on the vendor from experts looking at a wholistic budget with prioritization, comparative cost benchmarks and KPIs. We can not simply accept vendors submitting proposals direct to the treasury without oversight, pushback or inclusion in a total budget.

However, I see the key flaw as how governance was designed, and the processes which have been built. Blocking all progress on Cardano until that is done properly is not an option.

In looking at the proposal itself - I see many obvious problems in pricing, timing, KPIs, etc, due to the above - but I can not fix those by simply voting no. Hydra itself is critical core infrastructure for the Cardano I believe we need to compete in this competitive marketplace, and thus I must vote to continue to fund and expand its functionality, even with the problems in the process and pricing. I'm choosing the lesser evil by approving.

I'm excited to see these critical upgrades hit the net and see no reason to vote against it.

I simply do not believe this is a must-have during a year which needs austerity in spending. This event in my mind will mostly be playing to a Cardano bubble and will not help with mass adoption which is the key area I would support spending marketing on.

I'm using the lens of a career as an exec in one of the worlds largest advertising and event marketing firms, and through that lens I believe this will be unlikely to drive enough value during a period of austerity.

As with every IO submission this year I do NOT feel comfortable with the procurement process that this went through. We are basicially signing off on vendor proposal without appropriate validation of costs, push back on prices, timelines or KPIs as we only have a yes/no vote and no entity has done proper procurement processing before this vote. This is not an acceptable way to do governance.

However, I hope and believe this is part of the processes growing pains.

For the good of the chain, I do not want to disrupt these projects which I consider critical infrastructure and in the best interest of the chain itself because the governance process is immature and poorly designed.

I am choosing the lesser of two evils to approve that this year, but for processes that I will not accept into 2027.

I have previously voted that this was a good-faith action on the part of Ikigai while participating in governance which due to technical failures on the part of the chain, this ADA was lost to them. For that reason, I see it as the responsible thing to do to reimburse these fees, especially that they have substantially declined in value since that point. We are not making up for their opportunity cost due to declining price, but only reimbursing for lost funds. This seems fair and just.

Since this is already deemed unconstitutional, I'll simply show support here, and provide a final vote and rationale in the new submission.

Vote: Lean Approve

This proposal addresses a real and persistent problem: critical Cardano infrastructure is often maintained by a small number of individuals with limited succession planning and inconsistent funding. While the ecosystem benefits enormously from this work, market incentives alone frequently underfund maintenance compared to new development.

The strongest aspect of the proposal is treasury suitability. Open-source maintenance is a classic public-good problem where ecosystem-wide benefits exceed the ability of individual maintainers to capture value. This is one of the more defensible uses of treasury resources.

My primary concern is execution. The proposal is attempting to create a governance and operational structure that does not yet have a delivery history. The quality of maintainer selection, reporting, oversight, and budget discipline will determine whether this becomes durable ecosystem infrastructure or simply another funding program. More importantly this proposal is submitted by the person who makes himself the largest single beneficiary of the funding. The administration costs of the funding as a percentage of the ask are too high, and frankly this was almost a decision point for me. It is a worthwhile endeavour which looks to be treated as a cash-cow by the admin choice. To be blunt I don't want to see administration eating such a significant portion of any budget.

On balance, I believe the problem is real, the treasury rationale is strong, and the potential ecosystem benefits outweigh the risks. However, continued scrutiny of administrative costs, measurable outcomes, and treasury dependency will be necessary, and if it doesn't reduce as a percentage of budget I'll likely not approve on the next round.

This is not the highest-priority proposal competing for treasury capital, but it is a credible investment in ecosystem resilience and long-term sustainability.

This makes operational sense to me in our current environment and I don't see it needs a detailed context.

This proposal offers a framework to onboard 500,000 real-world identities and operationalize supply chain compliance on Cardano. While the 10,000,000 ADA budget represents a significant capital concentration, the project targets a genuine market failure by building an open-source, neutral data trust layer that private venture capital routinely underfunds. On balance, the clear alignment with looming global regulatory deadlines and the rigorous, smart-contract-gated milestone structure justify a cautious approval.

Strategic Assessment:
The proposal does not address a core blockchain infrastructure bottleneck, but it solves a critical real-world adoption bottleneck. Global supply chains face immediate disruption from strict new compliance frameworks like the European Union Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). By anchoring self-sovereign identities (DIDs) and satellite telemetry to Cardano, this initiative positions our network as a production-grade enterprise data layer. If left unfunded, this specific cross-border infrastructure will likely plateau, and the market will naturally default to centralized databases or permissioned corporate ledgers, permanently costing Cardano a high-value real-world asset (RWA) footprint.

Treasury Assessment:
Treasury funding is justified here because of a clear market failure: private capital is willing to fund proprietary, rent-seeking application layers, but it will not fund the foundational, neutral public identity rails for smallholder farmers in developing economies. The proposal establishes a clear division of labor—public treasury capital builds the open data rails, while private commercial partners must source their own lending and operational capital. Crucially, the inclusion of a constitutional clawback clause to return unspent or appreciated ADA back to the treasury sets an excellent, fiduciary-first precedent for large-scale treasury actions.

Risk Assessment:
The primary risk is execution complexity and precedent. Scaling an operational footprint 50x across India, Cambodia, and Kenya inside 18 months introduces massive cross-border logistical friction. Furthermore, front-loading 50% of the budget (5,000,000 ADA) at initial approval exposes public capital to significant early downside if execution stalls. There is also an inherent ecosystem distortion risk: by heavily subsidizing this consortium, the treasury may inadvertently grant the involved commercial entities an unfair competitive advantage over other bootstrapped teams building similar supply-chain solutions on Cardano. These risks are partially mitigated by the independent oversight committee and strictly gated smart-contract escrows.

Conclusion:
This proposal represents a strategic investment rather than an immediate protocol necessity. In an environment of capital scarcity, application-layer projects cannot command top priority over core ledger security. However, this initiative earns an above-average priority ranking to me because it delivers a credible runway to massive active wallet distribution and real-world network utility. The expected value of securing a dominant position in the global compliance sector justifies the capital outlay. My vote is a Lean Approve, dependent on the independent reviewers enforcing strict milestone verification before releasing subsequent tranches of public capital.

I intended to abstain on this vote as it combines too much into one proposal into a take-it-or-leave it yes/no vote. As with all of the other IO proposals I believe it is bloated and should be rejected because this process of vendor-designed direct treasury withdrawal is NOT an acceptable method of procurement. DReps are not in a position to negotiate, prioritize and validate the scope, the requirements, necessity or the price proposed in lumpsum omnibus bills like this.

Additionally, while I respect that research has been core to Cardano, only partway through a deep market downturn with distressed price ADA, this is not the time to be funding beyond what is critical and necessary, and I do not believe this compendium of research projects all fit that bill.

However, momentum is more valuable than absolute certainty and correctness, and if we reject this proposal, I believe Cardano's momentum would be seriously damaged. Also the price downturn over the past week essentially has significantly tightened the purse-strings for IOG, which in the end will end up forcing prioritization of the research, which was my ultimate goal.

I believe it was too broad, and hadn't received enough pushback on the vendor, but the market has basically done that work for the ecosystem over the last week, compensating for what governance is not able to do.

This should be a risk capital funded business.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Interesting idea, but this should clearly be a business and funded with risk capital. If the entities were asking for partial support, perhaps 20% with 80% backed by normal risk capital, and it was structured as a loan from the treasury, then I would have given it more consideration. As it is, this is an easy no, this should not be paid for with public funds.

Through the lens of my former career as a marketing exec, I do not see Token2049 as likely to significantly impact Cardano's main bottlenecks.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I do not currently view this as a high-priority treasury allocation relative to other ecosystem needs.

I understand the strategic rationale for maintaining a flagship Cardano summit presence, particularly in Singapore given its regional positioning, business environment, and relevance within the broader digital asset industry. Large ecosystem events can provide real value through coordination, relationship-building, visibility, and institutional signaling.

However, I believe treasury governance should distinguish carefully between strategically useful ecosystem activity and genuinely critical public infrastructure.

At the current stage of ecosystem development, Cardano’s more immediate bottlenecks remain concentrated around liquidity, application density, interoperability, developer adoption, and sustainable economic activity. A large conference may indirectly support some of those goals, but it does not address them directly in the way protocol, tooling, or infrastructure investments potentially can.

I am also cautious about normalizing ongoing treasury support for large ecosystem events because conference spending is inherently difficult to evaluate rigorously. Attribution of ecosystem growth, partnerships, or adoption to event activity is often speculative, and event proposals can easily drift toward weak accountability, prestige spending, and soft-power concentration around ecosystem institutions.

Additionally, flagship summits inevitably shape ecosystem narratives, visibility, and access structures, which makes them governance-relevant beyond simple event organization.

This does not mean the summit lacks value. It likely does provide ecosystem benefits. But treasury capital is finite, and I am not currently convinced this proposal represents sufficiently urgent or strategically indispensable infrastructure relative to other competing priorities.

As a former marketing exec, I don't see this as likely to significantly move the important needles for Cardano.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I do not currently view this as a high-priority treasury allocation relative to other ecosystem needs.

I understand the strategic rationale for maintaining a flagship Cardano summit presence, particularly in Singapore given its regional positioning, business environment, and relevance within the broader digital asset industry. Large ecosystem events can provide real value through coordination, relationship-building, visibility, and institutional signaling.

However, I believe treasury governance should distinguish carefully between strategically useful ecosystem activity and genuinely critical public infrastructure.

At the current stage of ecosystem development, Cardano’s more immediate bottlenecks remain concentrated around liquidity, application density, interoperability, developer adoption, and sustainable economic activity. A large conference may indirectly support some of those goals, but it does not address them directly in the way protocol, tooling, or infrastructure investments potentially can.

I am also cautious about normalizing ongoing treasury support for large ecosystem events because conference spending is inherently difficult to evaluate rigorously. Attribution of ecosystem growth, partnerships, or adoption to event activity is often speculative, and event proposals can easily drift toward weak accountability, prestige spending, and soft-power concentration around ecosystem institutions.

Additionally, flagship summits inevitably shape ecosystem narratives, visibility, and access structures, which makes them governance-relevant beyond simple event organization.

This does not mean the summit lacks value. It likely does provide ecosystem benefits. But treasury capital is finite, and I am not currently convinced this proposal represents sufficiently urgent or strategically indispensable infrastructure relative to other competing priorities.

We've been spending too much and I don't believe this will move the needle.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I do not currently view this as a high-priority treasury allocation relative to other ecosystem needs.

I understand the strategic rationale for maintaining a flagship Cardano summit presence, particularly in Singapore given its regional positioning, business environment, and relevance within the broader digital asset industry. Large ecosystem events can provide real value through coordination, relationship-building, visibility, and institutional signaling.

However, I believe treasury governance should distinguish carefully between strategically useful ecosystem activity and genuinely critical public infrastructure.

At the current stage of ecosystem development, Cardano’s more immediate bottlenecks remain concentrated around liquidity, application density, interoperability, developer adoption, and sustainable economic activity. A large conference may indirectly support some of those goals, but it does not address them directly in the way protocol, tooling, or infrastructure investments potentially can.

I am also cautious about normalizing ongoing treasury support for large ecosystem events because conference spending is inherently difficult to evaluate rigorously. Attribution of ecosystem growth, partnerships, or adoption to event activity is often speculative, and event proposals can easily drift toward weak accountability, prestige spending, and soft-power concentration around ecosystem institutions.

Additionally, flagship summits inevitably shape ecosystem narratives, visibility, and access structures, which makes them governance-relevant beyond simple event organization.

This does not mean the summit lacks value. It likely does provide ecosystem benefits. But treasury capital is finite, and I am not currently convinced this proposal represents sufficiently urgent or strategically indispensable infrastructure relative to other competing priorities.

I do not see this as significantly changing the main problems Cardano faces, and doesn't cross my line for value, or why this is needed now.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

While a technically sophisticated and strategically interesting proposal, I am less convinced about its urgency relative to some other treasury priorities.

The core thesis is legitimate: Cardano’s eUTXO architecture and relatively lightweight validation model create the possibility for a fully-validating in-browser node in ways that are structurally difficult for most other major chains. If successfully delivered, that would represent an architectural differentiator. But, how valuable would that be to the market?

I also believe the proposal’s broader research spillover effects are likely more important than the browser extension itself. Work around lightweight verification, succinct proofs, browser-hosted validation, and portable verifier infrastructure likely compounds into future bridge, L2, and decentralized application architectures across the ecosystem.

I appreciate that HLabs responded to community feedback by decomposing the original bundled proposal into independently votable components, improving governance precision and accountability. The milestone structure, escrow framework, oversight board, and refund mechanisms are also directionally healthier than the average treasury proposal.

That said, I don't support the proposal’s prioritization relative to more immediate ecosystem bottlenecks.

Cardano’s current constraints are still more heavily concentrated around liquidity, adoption, interoperability, developer ecosystem growth, and application density than browser-native validation capabilities specifically. While I believe the proposal has meaningful long-term option value, I am less convinced it represents urgent ecosystem infrastructure today.

More broadly, Cardano governance should remain careful not to systematically over-prioritize technically elegant infrastructure simply because it is architecturally impressive. Treasury capital is finite, and strategic prioritization matters.

The governance aspects of continuing to fund a commercial product through multiple rounds overrides the project value.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I do not currently support this proposal.

This is not because Blockfrost lacks technical competence or ecosystem usefulness. Reliable indexing and query infrastructure are clearly important components of the Cardano application stack, and Blockfrost has already demonstrated meaningful operational execution within the ecosystem.

My concerns are primarily institutional and governance-related.

The proposal combines maintenance, operational support, and next-generation infrastructure development into a single bundled request, reducing governance precision and making it difficult to evaluate which portions are genuine public-goods infrastructure versus ongoing platform subsidy.

More importantly, I am concerned about treasury-funded concentration around a commercially positioned middleware provider in an area where alternative providers and architectures already exist. Indexing infrastructure is a major hidden centralization surface across the crypto industry, and treasury funding risks unintentionally reinforcing dependency on a dominant ecosystem intermediary.

I was also not persuaded by framing around the free tier being funded “entirely on their own" as previous funding rounds were partially based on commitment to a free tier. Treasury funding remains fungible support for the broader organization and operational stack, and governance should evaluate the full economic effect of subsidy rather than isolated cost categories.

There is a legitimate argument that portions of Cardano’s infrastructure ecosystem remain under-monetized and that some shared infrastructure may require ecosystem support during ecosystem maturation. However, if treasury is to intervene in this area, I would strongly prefer approaches that emphasize open standards, interoperability, modular infrastructure, and competitive neutrality rather than reinforcing a specific provider position.

Overall, I believe the proposal raises too many concerns around vendor concentration, treasury appropriateness, and operational subsidy precedent relative to its current structure.

Plutus is both one of Cardano's biggest strengths, but also one of the items helping to block developer adoption. I see this project as worth the cost to help lower that barrier.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I support this proposal with reservations.

This is one of the stronger examples of legitimate treasury-funded public infrastructure in the current governance cycle. Plutus is effectively shared ecosystem substrate: improvements to execution efficiency, correctness infrastructure, and developer tooling compound across every smart-contract language and every DApp built on Cardano.

The proposal addresses several strategically important areas simultaneously:

• reducing execution costs,
• strengthening formal correctness and conformance testing,
• improving alternative-client reliability,
• and materially reducing developer onboarding friction.

I view the property-based conformance framework and formal specification work as particularly important for long-term node diversity and implementation resilience. Ecosystem decentralization requires more than governance distribution; it also requires multiple implementations to safely evolve against shared semantic expectations.

The developer experience workstream is also more important than many discussions acknowledge. Cardano’s tooling complexity and setup friction have been persistent ecosystem weaknesses, and reducing those barriers likely has ecosystem-wide compounding effects.

I also view the VacuumLabs co-venture directionally positively. Moving stewardship of critical infrastructure beyond a single organization is healthier than permanent concentration inside IO alone.

That said, I do not think the decentralization claims should be overstated. The proposal still centers heavily around IO-originated architecture, semantic authority, and roadmap direction. Governance should continue pushing for clearer long-term stewardship independence and operational ownership across the broader Plutus stack.

I also remain concerned about proposal bundling and procurement visibility. This proposal combines runtime evolution, compiler changes, audits, formal specification work, and developer tooling into a single governance action, reducing voting precision and accountability. Additionally, DReps still lack sufficient line-item transparency to confidently evaluate efficiency at treasury scale.

More broadly, proposals like this represent an important institutional transition: treasury is increasingly becoming a funding mechanism for ongoing protocol and smart-contract platform evolution. That may ultimately be appropriate, but governance frameworks and procurement oversight mechanisms are not yet fully mature for that responsibility.

Overall, however, I believe the strategic infrastructure value outweighs the governance concerns, and I support funding the work.

Valuable expansion to preserve Cardano's USP vs. other blockchains.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I support this proposal with reservations.

This is one of the more legitimate treasury public-goods proposals in the current round. Cardano’s differentiation around correctness and high-assurance development only matters if those capabilities become accessible ecosystem infrastructure rather than remaining specialized IO-only tooling.

The proposal addresses several real bottlenecks:

• formal verification accessibility,
• multi-language smart contract support,
• developer onboarding friction,
• and shared vulnerability tooling.

The expansion across Aiken, Scalus, Pebble, and Futura is strategically important because verification infrastructure should support the broader language ecosystem rather than reinforcing a single implementation path.

I also view the consortium structure positively relative to pure single-vendor delivery. Shared stewardship across multiple technically credible ecosystem teams is healthier than further concentration inside one organization.

That said, I have meaningful concerns.

The proposal is heavily bundled, reducing governance precision. Long-term maintenance economics and operational ownership are insufficiently defined, which is important because verification and developer tooling create ongoing support obligations rather than one-time deliverables.

I also do not believe DReps currently have sufficient procurement visibility to confidently assess cost efficiency at the line-item level. The proposal appears directionally reasonable for highly specialized formal methods engineering, but transparency remains weaker than ideal for treasury-scale capital allocation.

Finally, while this proposal improves ecosystem tooling diversity, the ecosystem should remain cautious about excessive dependence on IO-originated infrastructure and standards coordination over time.

Overall, I believe the strategic and public-infrastructure value outweighs the governance concerns, but those concerns remain material and should not be ignored in future treasury processes.

The necessity of L2 architecture to Cardano in the short term override my many concerns about the proposal and specifically the procurement process for it.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

This initiative addresses one of Cardano’s most strategically important long-term requirements: scalable transaction throughput with near-instant finality and extremely low transaction cost. I believe scalable L2 infrastructure is highly valuable and treasury appropriate as ecosystem infrastructure. If Cardano ultimately wants meaningful consumer-scale applications, gaming, payments, social systems, AI-agent transaction layers, or high-frequency activity, then scalable off-chain execution environments are not optional.

I also believe the timing is appropriate. Scalability infrastructure cannot be treated as something to begin only after ecosystem demand fully arrives. These systems require long research, engineering, testing, and ecosystem integration cycles. Waiting until scaling pressure becomes urgent would likely place the ecosystem years behind competitors.

The underlying strategic direction is valid and important.

My concerns are primarily around governance discipline, accountability, and proposal structure.

The largest issue for me is that Midgard Labs already received substantial prior treasury funding, reportedly approximately ₳2M, while significant milestones and ecosystem traction remain incomplete or unclear. Before additional funding is allocated, I believe governance should demand much stronger milestone transparency, delivery accounting, and demonstrated execution progress relative to prior commitments.

I am also concerned that the proposal lacks sufficient financial clarity regarding who is performing which portions of the work and how funding allocation is divided between IO, Midgard Labs, research activities, Hydra-related engineering, and operational functions. Treasury governance requires clearer attribution of responsibility, cost allocation, and accountability than what is currently presented.

The proposal structure itself further complicates evaluation. Bundling multiple distinct workstreams — including Midgard initiatives, broader L2 research, and Hydra-related efforts — makes it difficult to properly evaluate execution quality, ROI, milestone achievement, and value-per-ADA across the individual components. Governance works best when deliverables are separable and measurable.

I am additionally uncomfortable with the allocation of approximately ₳625k toward relatively unclear engagement and coordination functions without stronger specificity around deliverables, measurable outcomes, and operational necessity. Particularly in research-heavy initiatives, vague coordination categories can become areas where accountability weakens significantly.

Despite these concerns, I still believe scalable L2 infrastructure is strategically critical for Cardano’s future competitiveness and treasury appropriate as a long-term ecosystem investment. However, future proposals of this nature would benefit substantially from tighter milestone accountability, clearer vendor responsibility separation, more granular financial transparency, and less bundling of distinct workstreams under a single governance vote.

Critical maintenance function, but marred by incorrect and short term procurement and vendor management process.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

This proposal is for necessary maintenance and operational continuity work for the core Cardano ecosystem and is clearly treasury appropriate in principle. Maintenance of core infrastructure is a legitimate public good and cannot realistically be left to uncertain volunteer coordination or purely market-driven incentives. If the ecosystem expects reliability, security, and operational continuity, then ongoing maintenance funding is unavoidable.

I also believe the timing is appropriate. This is not optional future-facing work or speculative expansion. Maintenance is required for the system to continue functioning safely and reliably. Governance systems that underfund maintenance while prioritizing only visible innovation eventually accumulate systemic fragility and operational debt.

The underlying work itself appears legitimate and necessary.

My concerns are primarily structural and governance-related.

The current treasury process is poorly suited for evaluating and negotiating operational maintenance contracts of this nature. DReps are effectively being asked to approve or reject critical maintenance funding packages without having the institutional mechanisms, procurement tooling, or negotiation authority necessary to properly challenge assumptions, pricing, staffing allocation, or operational scope. In practice, this creates a dynamic where the treasury is partially held hostage by the necessity of the work itself.

I am particularly concerned that there appears to be insufficient independent line-item scrutiny and vendor negotiation before proposals reach the voting stage. Core maintenance proposals should ideally pass through some form of qualified operational or procurement review structure capable of challenging costs, validating assumptions, benchmarking rates, and negotiating on behalf of the ecosystem before escalation to governance voting.

The referenced analysis suggesting that a significant portion of the budget is Cardano-specific overhead also raises legitimate questions around allocation methodology and potential padding that should receive deeper scrutiny. Even if the work is necessary, governance should not normalize weak financial transparency or assume that all quoted operational costs are automatically efficient simply because the work is critical.

More importantly, this proposal highlights a structural weakness in the current treasury model. Direct DRep voting is not optimized or appropriate for operational procurement oversight at this level of complexity and necessity. Cardano immediately needs mature intermediary governance and procurement structures capable of handling maintenance contracting, vendor management, and financial review with greater rigor.

Despite these concerns, I believe the maintenance work itself is essential, treasury appropriate, and necessary for ecosystem continuity, which leads me to support the proposal while signaling serious reservations about the current procurement and governance process surrounding these types of operational funding requests.

Critical upgrade work, but still have reservations because of the inappropriateness of direct treasury withdrawals without a proper procurement process pushing back on IO as part of requisite vendor management.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

The Consensus Initiative addresses core protocol infrastructure and is clearly treasury appropriate. Consensus performance and scalability are foundational to Cardano’s long-term competitiveness and directly aligned with the roadmap. This is not discretionary ecosystem spending or market-facing experimentation; it is work on the core product itself.

I also believe the timing is appropriate. Throughput, latency, and overall network responsiveness remain one of Cardano’s major competitive weaknesses relative to other ecosystems. Whether fully fair or not, ecosystem perception around speed and responsiveness materially affects developer adoption, user retention, and broader market relevance. This is an area where Cardano cannot afford indefinite delay.

I view the underlying work as both valid and strategically necessary. Unlike some ecosystem initiatives where vendor ownership is more contestable, consensus-level engineering is one of the areas where IO’s historical knowledge and technical capability are genuinely difficult to replace in the near term. I do not believe this is realistically work that should be fragmented across multiple vendors at the current stage of ecosystem maturity.

My concerns are primarily around governance transparency and ecosystem impact analysis rather than the legitimacy of the initiative itself.

The financial allocation lacks sufficient granularity for a proposal of this size and importance. I would have preferred significantly clearer modeling around engineering allocation, milestone costing, operational assumptions, and expected resource utilization. Treasury governance should not normalize approving large protocol engineering budgets based primarily on institutional reputation.

I am also concerned that the proposal does not sufficiently disclose or model the potential downstream impact on SPOs. Consensus and performance changes can materially alter infrastructure requirements, hardware expectations, operational economics, and decentralization dynamics. Those tradeoffs should be explicitly analyzed and communicated as part of the governance process rather than treated as secondary considerations.

Overall, despite concerns around financial clarity and incomplete ecosystem impact modeling, I believe this initiative addresses a critical protocol weakness, is treasury appropriate, strategically necessary, and appropriately timed, which leads me to support it.

I believe this proposal is worth doing, but have significant reservations about the procurement process which is not suited for managing this type of project.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

The work proposed here is legitimate public infrastructure and aligned with Cardano’s medium-term roadmap needs. Features such as micro-transactions, Babel fees, and improved multi-currency fee capabilities are strategically important if Cardano wants to improve onboarding, usability, and support broader real-world application models. These are not speculative ecosystem experiments; they are core platform capabilities that strengthen the protocol itself.

I also believe the timing is appropriate. Several of these capabilities have moved from “future enhancements” into increasingly necessary infrastructure if Cardano is going to remain competitive from both a developer and user experience perspective.

My support is not without reservations.

The proposal should not have been bundled at this level. Bundling reduces governance precision and makes it difficult for DReps to independently evaluate cost, priority, and value across different workstreams. Some of these upgrades may have differing urgency, complexity, and ROI profiles, but governance is forced into accepting or rejecting the package as a whole.

I also remain concerned about the lack of financial clarity relative to the size of the request. For a ₳13.1M treasury proposal, I would have preferred significantly more granular breakdowns around staffing, engineering allocation, milestones, and cost assumptions. Treasury governance needs to mature beyond approving large opaque infrastructure packages based primarily on institutional trust.

More broadly, I believe work of this nature should eventually move toward a more formal RFP and competitive implementation model wherever realistically possible. That said, I recognize that some protocol-level engineering work is still difficult to fully commoditize given IO’s current concentration of historical and technical knowledge. I do give positive weight to the fact that much of this proposal appears driven by ecosystem CIPs rather than purely vendor-originated initiatives.

Overall, despite governance and procurement concerns, I believe the underlying work is strategically important, treasury appropriate, and directionally beneficial for the ecosystem, which leads me to support the proposal.

A valuable proposal which I am unable to support as all developer experience should not be under the IO umbrella, but needs to be under an independent organization. I would look differently on this if it was Cardano Foundation or Intersect.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

The underlying problem this proposal addresses is real. Cardano’s developer experience is not currently competitive, onboarding friction is too high, and the ecosystem does need significantly more builders and experimentation. DevEx improvements are a legitimate public good and treasury appropriate in principle. Timing is also reasonable, as the ecosystem cannot afford continued stagnation in developer growth.

However, after evaluating this proposal through the lenses of strategic fit, treasury suitability, governance impact, ecosystem incentives, and execution structure, I cannot support it in its current form.

My primary concern is institutional and governance related, not technical. IO should not become the canonical owner and standard setter for developer experience across the ecosystem while simultaneously being treated as one technology vendor among many. This proposal further concentrates ecosystem coordination, tooling direction, documentation ownership, and developer onboarding gravity into IO. Long term, that creates unhealthy dependency and weakens ecosystem decentralization.

There is also significant overlap with work that is more naturally suited to organizations such as the Cardano Foundation or Intersect, both of which are structurally better positioned to steward ecosystem-wide standards, coordination, and developer enablement functions. I do not believe treasury governance should reinforce the pattern where IO requests funding for every strategically useful initiative simply because it has the capability to execute it.

I also remain unconvinced by the evidentiary basis used to justify the scale and expected impact of the proposal. The proposal correctly identifies developer friction, but the supporting data and causal assumptions are relatively weak compared to the confidence of the projected outcomes.

For these reasons, while I believe the ecosystem problem is real and worthy of investment, I am voting against this specific proposal structure and ownership model.

The necessity and opportunity of pulling dormant BTC liquidity over to Cardano, as well as the value of moving the Treasury from only a issuer of grants toward a Sovereign Wealth Fund, overrides the structural and procurement problems I see with this proposal.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

I support this proposal with significant reservations, primarily because I believe attracting sidelined Bitcoin liquidity into Cardano is one of the most strategically important near-term opportunities available to the ecosystem.

Cardano needs credible pathways for external capital inflow beyond internal recycling of existing ADA-native liquidity. Bitcoin remains the largest underutilized capital pool in the industry, and I believe building useful, secure, and economically compelling BTC interoperability and credit infrastructure is one of the highest-upside strategic plays currently available to Cardano.

Unlike many speculative ecosystem proposals, this at least targets a market that clearly already exists. The demand for productive BTC capital deployment is real, even if the specific implementation approach still carries substantial uncertainty and execution risk.

I also believe treasury governance should evolve beyond a purely depleting grant model over time. In principle, I would prefer Cardano treasury to increasingly operate more like long-horizon sovereign capital allocation, where the ecosystem can participate in upside from successful ecosystem expansion rather than only distributing irreversible grants.

For that reason, I view the proposal’s attempt to structure funding around milestone-gated deployment and future treasury repayment as directionally positive, even though the current implementation remains institutionally immature.

That said, I want to be very clear that my support is not without major concerns.

The proposal represents a meaningful governance precedent shift toward treasury-funded venture-style investment rather than pure public infrastructure funding. I do not believe Cardano governance yet has sufficiently mature procurement systems, audit infrastructure, enforcement mechanisms, or investment oversight processes for this category of capital allocation.

The proposed EBITDA repayment structure also depends heavily on off-chain operational transparency and good-faith reporting. Treasury currently lacks strong mechanisms for independently auditing or enforcing those obligations in a robust way.

I am also cautious about the complexity and historical risk profile of Bitcoin bridge infrastructure generally. Bridges remain one of the highest-risk categories in the industry, and governance should not minimize those risks simply because the strategic opportunity is attractive.

Additionally, the proposal involves substantial vertical integration across bridge infrastructure, lending systems, and liquidity architecture, which raises long-term questions around ecosystem dependency and concentration if successful.

Despite those concerns, I ultimately believe the asymmetric strategic upside justifies taking measured risk here. Cardano governance will not mature into sophisticated sovereign capital allocation by avoiding all investment-style proposals entirely. Some degree of controlled experimentation is necessary if treasury governance is ever going to evolve beyond simple grant distribution.

Overall, I believe the combination of:

• strategic relevance of BTC liquidity,
• potential ecosystem expansion,
• differentiated market positioning,
• and the proposal’s attempt to introduce repayment mechanics rather than pure subsidy
  outweighs the current governance immaturity and execution risks, although those risks remain very real and should be monitored carefully.

This proposal is well-structured from a technical execution and financial control perspective, but it fails to establish a credible, evaluable return on investment (ROI) thesis.

As a result, the proposal cannot be properly valued. I will Abstain.

⸻

1. Strength: Technical and Operational Clarity

The proposal demonstrates competence in two areas:

a. Technical Definition
• Clear articulation of what is being built (Pebble, Gerolamo)
• Defined responsibilities and delivery structure
• Consideration of service-level expectations

b. Financial Controls
• Mechanisms to manage disbursement
• Attention to fraud mitigation and accountability

These are necessary conditions for funding—but not sufficient.

⸻

1. Core Deficiency: Absence of ROI Framework

The proposal emphasizes what will be built and how funds will be controlled, but does not adequately address:

What measurable value will be created for the ecosystem, and how that value justifies the cost.

Key gaps:
• No quantified or even directional estimate of ecosystem impact
• No clear articulation of who the end users are
• No evidence of demand (committed builders, partners, or adopters)
• No framework to measure success post-deployment

The result is that:
• The investment (“I”) is explicit
• The return (“R”) is undefined

⸻

1. Public Goods vs. Utility Validation

The proposal implicitly positions these tools as public-utility infrastructure.

That raises specific evaluation requirements:
• Are these tools actually needed?
• What friction do they remove in the developer or user workflow?
• How many projects are currently blocked or constrained by the absence of these tools?
• Are there credible teams prepared to build on top of them?

None of these questions are answered in a way that allows independent validation.

Without this, the “public good” framing becomes non-falsifiable—it cannot be tested, challenged, or benchmarked.

⸻

1. Pricing Without Value Anchoring

The proposal includes a substantial funding request.

However:
• There is no benchmark against comparable tooling efforts
• No linkage between cost and expected ecosystem impact
• No scenario analysis (e.g., low / base / high adoption cases)

This makes it impossible to determine whether the price is:
• Efficient
• Reasonable
• Excessive

Valuation requires both sides of the equation. Here, only cost is specified.

⸻

1. Decision Logic

I am not voting “No” because:
• The proposal does not demonstrate that the investment is negative EV
• The technical work may have merit

However, I cannot vote “Yes” because:
• The proposal does not demonstrate that the investment is positive EV
• The return cannot be independently assessed

Therefore, the only logically consistent position is:

Abstain due to insufficient information to evaluate ROI.

⸻

1. What Would Be Required for a “Yes”

A revised proposal would need to include:
• A clear ROI thesis (even if probabilistic)
• Defined target users and use cases
• Evidence of demand or committed adoption
• Measurable success metrics tied to ecosystem impact
• At least a directional value model (e.g., developer growth, transaction volume, TVL impact)

⸻

Conclusion

This proposal meets baseline standards for execution and control, but fails at the level that matters most for Treasury allocation: value creation clarity.

Until the return case is made explicit and testable, capital allocation cannot be justified.

I support transferring Catalyst to the Cardano Foundation.

Catalyst is fundamentally a Treasury capital allocation mechanism, and it should sit with an institution designed for long-term stewardship and neutrality. From a governance standpoint, this is a cleaner and more coherent structure than leaving it with Input Output Global, whose core role is protocol development, not capital allocation.

IOG’s historical role in operating Catalyst was necessary and valuable—particularly when the Foundation lacked the operational capacity to manage it. That constraint has now changed. The Foundation appears sufficiently mature to assume this responsibility.

However, this transition raises the bar significantly on fiduciary responsibility.

Catalyst must evolve into a disciplined capital allocator, not a broad grant distribution system. This requires:
• Clear separation between public goods funding and investment activity
• Defined, measurable ROI expectations for all capital deployed
• Strong capital restraint and prioritization
• Transparent reporting linking funding decisions to outcomes

Approval of this proposal is not just structural—it is a mandate for higher standards of capital discipline and accountability.

The Foundation now carries responsibility for maximizing long-term Treasury returns for the ecosystem.

I cannot support allocating this amount of ADA to fund attendance at Token2049 and the Cardano Summit 2026 under the current proposal structure.

Core Thesis

This proposal fails on three critical dimensions:
1. Misdiagnosis of Cardano’s current bottleneck
2. Lack of defined deliverables tied to measurable outcomes
3. Failure to justify incremental funding given prior capital allocations to the same entities

As a result, the expected return on treasury capital is low and poorly specified.

⸻

1. Misdiagnosis of the Problem

The proposal implicitly assumes that Cardano’s constraint is insufficient awareness within the crypto-native community.

This is incorrect.
• Attendees of Token2049 are, by definition, highly engaged crypto participants.
• Discovery of chains, protocols, and opportunities within this cohort is already efficient and digital-first.
• Incremental awareness generated through physical presence at such events is therefore marginal.

If the objective is ecosystem growth, the constraint is more likely:
• Product-market fit of applications
• Developer activity and tooling maturity
• Institutional-grade use cases
• Liquidity and user adoption dynamics

None of these are meaningfully advanced by generic conference presence.

⸻

1. Audience–Channel Mismatch

If the goal is to reach non-crypto-native decision-makers (tradfi, enterprise, real-world asset originators), then Token2049 is structurally the wrong venue.
• These actors do not primarily allocate time to crypto conferences.
• Their engagement occurs through:
• Industry-specific conferences
• Direct business development
• Targeted partnerships

Therefore:

If the target audience is crypto-native → marginal impact
If the target audience is non-crypto-native → wrong channel

Either way, the channel selection is weakly justified.

⸻

1. Absence of Deliverables (“Show vs. Substance”)

Effective conference participation requires a clear “show-and-tell payload”:
• Major protocol upgrades
• Product launches
• High-profile partnerships
• Demonstrable traction metrics

The proposal does not specify:
• What will be announced
• Which ecosystem projects will be showcased
• What narrative will be delivered to the market
• What success metrics will be tracked post-event

Instead, it emphasizes attendance and presence, which is not a sufficient basis for capital allocation.

The critical question remains unanswered:

Why now?

Without a defined message or milestone, timing appears arbitrary, particularly in a weak market environment where capital efficiency should be prioritized.

⸻

1. Treasury Allocation Discipline

This proposal must be evaluated in the context of prior resource distribution.

Both Cardano Foundation and Emurgo were originally funded with substantial allocations of genesis ADA to support:
• Ecosystem development
• Industry outreach
• Market positioning

Key issues:
• There is no clear accounting tying those historical allocations to measurable outcomes in these domains. [Unverified]
• This proposal does not include any co-investment from those existing resources.
• The request is therefore entirely incremental, despite prior capital designated for similar objectives.

This creates a governance concern:

Treasury funds are being requested for activities that fall squarely within the original mandate of entities already capitalized to perform them.

Absent transparency and co-investment, this sets a weak precedent for capital discipline.

⸻

1. Counterparty Performance and Governance Risk

I cannot support allocating additional ADA to Emurgo under current conditions.
• There is a multi-year track record of under-delivery relative to expectations.
• Reporting transparency on capital deployment and ROI has been limited despite many calls from the community.

Additionally:
• Governance influence linked to dark-ux design of Yoroi raises concerns about voting power concentration, user interface-driven bias and morals unaligned with decentralized governance.

These issues elevate counterparty risk and reduce confidence in efficient capital deployment.

⸻

Conclusion

This proposal does not meet the threshold required for treasury funding.

To be viable, a revised proposal would need:
1. Explicit deliverables
• Named announcements, projects, or partnerships
2. Defined success metrics
• Measurable post-event outcomes (users, deals, integrations)
3. Audience alignment
• Clear mapping between target stakeholders and event selection
4. Co-investment
• Meaningful financial contribution from CF and/or Emurgo
5. Transparency commitments
• Post-event reporting tied to pre-defined KPIs

Until these conditions are met, approving this allocation would represent poor capital discipline and weak governance standards.

⸻

I see this withdrawal as a continuation of a decision made by the community to prioritize this node over other options made previously. It is not a decision of this project vs. others, as that was already made previously, the decision is if this proposal is aligned with previous promises, and strategy.

I will use the same template that I used for rejecting the Dingo node which I see as a competitive and comparable proposal.

1. Does this proposal require comparison with alternative approaches?

• Yes.

Node implementations are among the most complex and mission-critical components of the Cardano protocol.

Cardano’s existing node—developed in Haskell—already follows rigorous engineering and review processes designed to maximize resilience and correctness. Even so, experts acknowledge that distributed systems at this scale are never completely risk-free.

Introducing additional node implementations increases the complexity of maintaining consensus across the network. Any divergence between clients could have severe consequences.

Because of this, alternative node implementations should not be evaluated in isolation. They must be assessed comparatively alongside other potential approaches, considering architecture, operational risk, and long-term maintenance implications.

This proposal therefore requires deep technical evaluation relative to competing designs, not a standalone yes/no vote.

However, that was done last year, and at this point, we are facing an ongoing project. Teams need continuity and from governance side, Cardano must complete projects and intentions baring some significant reason to change course. I do not see that at this point. Cardano would benefit from additional nodes and this project should continue forward and not be derailed.

1. Does this proposal require expert prioritization and trade-off analysis?

• Yes.

Proposals affecting protocol infrastructure involve trade-offs across multiple dimensions:

• network security
• engineering complexity
• ecosystem coordination
• long-term maintenance cost
• opportunity cost versus other protocol work

These decisions are best made through structured evaluation by domain experts who can compare alternatives and determine sequencing and priorities.

A global governance vote works well for many ecosystem initiatives, but core infrastructure decisions require coordinated technical review before they reach the treasury voting stage.

For Amaru, I see that as already completed previously. I see many of the team-members as best in the ecosystem, and the founding entities and steering committees have prioritized and highlighted the project over others.

1. Is it clear this team represents the strongest available option?

• I have no reservations on the quality and ethics of the team.

When funding protocol-level infrastructure, the burden of proof should be high. It passed my high-bar.

1. Should node development be funded as an isolated treasury withdrawal?

• No. However, I see it as previously approved.

Client diversity is not a standalone feature—it is a strategic infrastructure decision.

Multiple node implementations affect:
• protocol governance
• long-term maintenance obligations
• upgrade coordination
• security response processes

For these reasons, node development should emerge from a coordinated platform strategy, ideally guided by technical leadership evaluating multiple competing approaches.

Treasury funding may ultimately support such work—but only after a structured process determines which solution should be prioritized.

With Amaru, I see the ecosystem as having been previously completed this analysis, approved the project we are well along this path, so the rational choice is to complete it. It has passed those hurdles previously.

Conclusion: For these reasons, I support this proposal.

I vote yes on this proposal, and my rationale is straightforward.

Cardano currently lacks a meaningful price-discovery mechanism for funding proposals. Each proposal is submitted as a one-off with pricing defined by the team itself. Without negotiation or comparison among competing options, it is impossible to determine where limited treasury funds should be allocated for the best return.

Having worked closely with venture capital processes, I have seen how rigorous evaluation, comparison, and negotiation drive better investment outcomes. These processes are far more structured than what currently exists in the Cardano ecosystem, where DReps are often asked to evaluate proposals without negotiating terms, KPIs, or delivery milestones.

I have personally known and followed Tim Draper and his team for more than two decades. In my experience he is a visionary, ethical, and deeply experienced investor with a perspective that extends far beyond the Cardano ecosystem. That broader view is valuable when identifying projects with real long-term potential.

Ultimately, DReps will vote to allocate treasury funds. The key question is simple: are better outcomes more likely when proposal selection, training, mentoring, and negotiation are handled by professionals who have reviewed tens of thousands of proposals—or by anonymous DReps without comparable experience?

For me, the answer is clear.

While I recognize the potential value of additional Cardano node implementations—particularly one written in Go—and I respect the work this team has already done, I cannot support this proposal in its current form.

My decision follows a simple framework that I will apply consistently to similar proposals.

⸻

1. Does this proposal require comparison with alternative approaches?

Yes.

Node implementations are among the most complex and mission-critical components of the Cardano protocol.

Cardano’s existing node—developed in Haskell—already follows rigorous engineering and review processes designed to maximize resilience and correctness. Even so, experts acknowledge that distributed systems at this scale are never completely risk-free.

Introducing additional node implementations increases the complexity of maintaining consensus across the network. Any divergence between clients could have severe consequences.

Because of this, alternative node implementations should not be evaluated in isolation. They must be assessed comparatively alongside other potential approaches, considering architecture, operational risk, and long-term maintenance implications.

This proposal therefore requires deep technical evaluation relative to competing designs, not a standalone yes/no vote.

⸻

1. Does this proposal require expert prioritization and trade-off analysis?

Yes.

Proposals affecting protocol infrastructure involve trade-offs across multiple dimensions:
• network security
• engineering complexity
• ecosystem coordination
• long-term maintenance costs
• opportunity cost versus other protocol work

These decisions are best made through structured evaluation by domain experts who can compare alternatives and determine sequencing and priorities.

A global governance vote works well for many ecosystem initiatives, but core infrastructure decisions require coordinated technical review before they reach the treasury voting stage.

⸻

1. Is it clear this team represents the strongest available option?

I have reservations.

As part of my due diligence, I reviewed the professional backgrounds and public work and posts of the team members.

While I respect the effort that has gone into this proposal, the documentation does not demonstrate why this team or approach should be prioritized over other potential teams or architectures that might pursue a similar goal.

When funding protocol-level infrastructure, the burden of proof should be very high.

⸻

1. Should node development be funded as an isolated treasury withdrawal?

In my view, no.

Client diversity is not a standalone feature—it is a strategic infrastructure decision.

Multiple node implementations affect:
• protocol governance
• long-term maintenance obligations
• upgrade coordination
• security response processes

For these reasons, node development should emerge from a coordinated platform strategy, ideally guided by technical leadership evaluating multiple competing approaches.

Treasury funding may ultimately support such work—but only after a structured process determines which solution should be prioritized.

⸻

Conclusion

For these reasons, I cannot support this proposal in its current form.

My vote against this proposal should not be interpreted as opposition to additional node implementations. On the contrary, client diversity will certainly eventually become a critical part of Cardano’s long-term architecture.

However, decisions of this magnitude should arise from a coordinated technical strategy that compares alternatives and aligns incentives across the ecosystem—not from isolated vendor proposals presented directly to treasury voters based on the vendors own unilaterally defined KPIs, timeline, and cost.

I have reviewed these costs and what they will be spent for and find them inlign with market realities and costs. The proposal was already approved, so voting no would not be in the interest of the ecosystem, or our governance processes.

However, I do not believe that it is good governance to not have competing bids and believe the option of choosing the best of competing proposals would be an improvement. This is my expectation for 2026-2027 proposals, and hope this current method is only transitional.

I see the implications and follow-on impacts that this might have to be beyond my ability to independently assess. To make a sufficiently informed decision would take resources and modeling tools which I do not have, and thus while in principle I am supportive, I will abstain from this vote.

This is easy to support, acts to bring the community together and I do not see any downsides, thus I am in favor.

Makes sense and isn’t controversial in my mind.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Straightforward and needed.

This appears to me to be a rational change for a temporary real-world problem dealing with the vagaries of governance.

The overriding principle I have for the Treasury use is as a sovereign wealth fund which should grow over time and not depleted. This action puts a significant portion of that Treasury at risk by approving spending on undetailed expenses for a fuzzy deliverables list, which may or may not substantially impact the ecosystem. Thus there is a very high bar for approving this, especially since it is a blank-check with limited safeguards.

However, the Cardano ecosystem is substantially underperforming our peers. Lack of liquidity and interconnection are negatively impacting the ecosystem momentum. If market liquidity, DeFi use, as well as real world assets do not substantially change, Cardano risks being left behind. I see that outcome multiplied by its probability negatively impacting the Treasury value more than this withdrawal which offers the possibility of changing that outcome.

I have been a Cardano supporter since the first Cardano Summit in Miami in 2019, when I decided to back a leader and his team. I trusted them to with my money to get the necessary work done. At that time, the Cardano Foundation led by Michael Parsons was a negative force on the ecosystem, and Emergo was delivering very little value. I see this proposed organization as a combined team stronger than the one I originally supported in 2019.

I admit that I am taking a leap of faith that this is not a cash-grab by these entities and their own self-interest will align with the holders to deliver the proper systems at a reasonable price. I approve of this, with reservation, but see the potential value worth this risk.

This is an unfortunate situation which happened through proper and expected use of the chain who's underlying technology was changed without the users involvement. Since Ikigai was relying on the chain to function as it should and this didn't happen, not through simply being degraded, but through a bug which locked funds, this seems clearly to point to a failure of the system, and such a loss should be paid for by the system. I realize this raises the question of is this a good precedent to set, taking on losses for ecosystem participants as liability for the protocol itself. Such situations will each need to be evaluated on their own merit, but in this case, it seems that the losses would most justly be covered in full.

While I can certainly see value in a top-level domain, I do not think this is what we need to spend an estimated $3.7M or almost $10M ADA right now. I do not believe adoption would be seriously affected by the addition or not of domains, nor would transaction quantity or DeFi use. This clearly looks like a nice-to-have but unessential window-dressing project.

I don't believe that enterprises are going factor having a Cardano domain or not into their decision making, nor are governments. As a former corporate marketing guy, I believe both will use their own brands and would consider it diluting their own branding by mixing it with ".ada" or ".cardano".

Users might like the vanity addresses, but that won't make this a profitable investment for Cardano's Treasury, just a white elephant we will be committed to pay at least $700,000 per year to maintain.

With Cardano's current needs, this is an easy and obvious no from me.

Drep Vote: NO on Cardano Constitution 2.3

As a DRep, I have voted against the adoption of the Cardano Constitution 2.3 draft due to two major concerns and one minor, yet important, issue. I firmly believe ratifying this draft exposes the Cardano community to significant risks of treasury depletion and governance vulnerabilities.

1. Removal of Budget Requirement Threatens Fiscal Discipline and Strategic Governance

The draft notably removes the constitutional expectation and mechanism for a coordinated, approved ecosystem budget. While I acknowledge budget processes are complex, abandoning a holistic budget undermines essential governance principles. Without a unified budgeting framework, governance devolves into a series of disconnected treasury withdrawals lacking necessary coordination or strategic priority. This absence eliminates effective constraints that force difficult yet critical decisions about technological direction and resource allocation.

A budget compels the ecosystem to make hard choices among competing priorities, fostering accountability, minimizing waste, and guarding against grift. Removing budget mandates risks chaotic financial management, ultimately accelerating treasury depletion and diminished community trust. The crucial safeguard disallowing treasury withdrawals outside an approved budget is eliminated, which is dangerous especially in periods of low DRep participation, voting fatigue, or potential treasury capture. Such structural laxity amplifies vulnerabilities that could jeopardize the ecosystem’s financial sustainability.
[Reference: Sections removed from original Constitution from line 211]

1. Insufficient Transparency and Justification for Changes Weakens Legitimacy

The existing Constitution was the product of extensive, transparent, and democratic processes involving hundreds of elected representatives participating in line-by-line deliberations across multiple continents. The institutional knowledge, rationale, and debate records provide a robust foundation and legitimacy for each provision.

In stark contrast, the 2.3 draft introduces numerous extensive changes without adequately documenting the reasons behind each modification. This opacity falls short of the rigor necessary to override prior collective wisdom and undermines the community’s trust in governance continuity. Any constitutional transformation must meet the highest standards of transparency and justification, which this draft regrettably fails to uphold.

1. Narrowed Definition of Ada Holders Restricts Protections and Participation

The draft redefines “Ada Holders” as solely “persons,” potentially excluding organizations or entities that hold significant Ada stakes, including governments or institutions. While seemingly semantic, this change narrows the constitutional rights and protections within the ecosystem. It truncates the inclusiveness of governance protections and has cascading implications in several sections that dilute broader ecosystem rights guaranteed previously. This exclusion is misaligned with Cardano’s ethos of broad, community-wide participation and representation.

Conclusion

While stylistic improvements and minor clarifying amendments within the draft could offer some value, these are marginal compared to the profound risks and governance weaknesses introduced. The removal of the budget requirement, reduction of transparency on changes, and narrowing of protected stakeholders pose tangible, systemic threats to the Cardano community’s financial security, democratic integrity, and inclusiveness.

For these reasons, I cannot support ratification of the Cardano Constitution 2.3 draft in its current form.

I can not in good conscience vote yes on this withdrawal. As I have spent much of my career delivering software services to enterprises, I do not believe this system is worth this price based on what has been delivered so far, nor based on its roadmap of deliverables for the next 12 months.

However, I can not vote no because this has already received community approval by vote, and thus I do not believe that this is the place to undermine a previous democratic decision.

I do not believe that the team should have had to submit this request at all as proposal approval should imply rights to withdraw.

I won't vote Yes, as I can not in good conscience approve this, but I also won't use my vote to try to derail the process.

As per my previous 'No' vote on functionally the same proposal submitted by Snek - I do not believe this negligible interest rate is a financially rational compensation for the very high risk that as a CFA Charterholder I analyze Snek to demonstrate. I believe the downside risk is far more likely than Snek maintaining or increasing its value, and thus its ability to repay this loan is questionable. That functionally the same proposal is being resubmitted, implies to me gaming the immature voting process on Cardano and trying again hoping for a different outcome, which considering the low turnout of voting, is rational, but not in the best interest of the ecosystem. My other previous reasons for a No vote still stand.

There is no doubt that Snek has brought tremendous activity, energy, and value to the Cardano ecosystem. The list of their contributions is long and well-documented in posts by others, so I won’t repeat them here. They deserve recognition for everything they have achieved.

Strengths of the Proposal
1.Structuring the request as a loan rather than a grant is innovative and should inspire others.
2.The use case for funds is clear, with much allocated toward liquidity provision—closer to a treasury action than an expense.
3.Snek has already demonstrated commitment by self-funding exchange listings, showing they are willing to put skin in the game.

That said, after reviewing this proposal through the lenses of corporate finance, business operations, and anti-fraud practice, I cannot support it.

Concerns Leading to My No Vote
•Loan terms not appropriate: The proposed interest is equivalent to Cardano’s staking risk-free rate. In traditional finance, a corporation like Snek would borrow at risk-free + a significant premium (typically 5–8% above risk-free), and with collateral. An unsecured loan at a risk-free rate does not reflect market reality and would not be offered by any financial institution. Using public funds under these terms does not seem responsible.

•Overvaluation and repayment risk: From a financial analyst’s perspective, Snek’s market valuation appears far higher than its underlying business value and assets. Revenue streams are directly tied to token price, meaning that if the token drops significantly, repayment becomes much less likely. The downside risk here is more probable than the smooth repayment scenario described.

•Normal business expense: Exchange listings and liquidity provision are standard costs of doing business for any token project, especially meme-coins. Other projects in other ecosystems routinely budget for this. I see no clear reason why Snek should be treated differently.

•Externalities already being covered: Snek argues that their listings benefit the broader Cardano token ecosystem. While true in principle, other players—such as the Midnight Foundation—are already covering similar expenses for their own listings, generating the same ecosystem benefits without drawing on Treasury funds. This makes the argument for community financing less compelling.

Final Position

This was a difficult decision, and I took time to reflect and review a wide range of perspectives. In particular, the comments by @goofycrisp, @CardanoRami, @JaromirTesar, @Jane14457995, and @yuta_cryptox were especially helpful.

I respect the Snek team and community and acknowledge their positive impact on the Cardano ecosystem. However, I believe that a project as vibrant and successful as Snek should finance its own core business expenses. I can not support using public funds to finance this for them especially when the loan terms do not make financial sense from a risk-management perspective.

For these reasons, I voted No

Liquidity Committee Proposal — Voting Rationale

Cardano’s limited liquidity has long been a friction point in the ecosystem’s growth. It’s reasonable to assume that this shortfall has constrained adoption relative to what might have been possible had deep liquidity pools and large stablecoins been established earlier. The exact impact is uncertain — but likely substantial.

Now that Cardano has viable, home-grown stablecoins and sufficient treasury resources to seed liquidity pools as a shared ecosystem asset, this proposal is timely and strategically sound.

⸻

Risk Perspective

As a fraud examiner, my concerns are not about the intent of this proposal but about the risk transfer — specifically, moving public funds currently safeguarded in the treasury to a smaller, semi-autonomous committee.

The proposal’s built-in guardrails appear thoughtful and reasonably designed to mitigate misuse or concentration risk. On that basis, I support proceeding.

However, approval carries an ongoing obligation for DReps: to exercise active oversight of the Committee’s operations and to ensure that its members are individuals of high integrity, technical competence, and relevant financial experience appropriate to be managing 50 million ADA.

⸻

Potential Design Flaw - Picks winners

The proposal’s governance document outlines a rule that limits support to “no more than two recipients of liquidity per DeFi category” (e.g., 2 stablecoins, 2 DEXes, 2 lending protocols, etc.).

While the intent — to avoid excessive fragmentation — is understandable, this mechanism effectively designates category leaders and risks entrenching incumbents. A more open or rotational allocation framework might better maintain competitive neutrality while still ensuring efficient liquidity concentration.

⸻

Suggested Improvement

Risk could be further reduced through staged disbursement
Designing the Withdrawal Info Action to allow the Committee to draw funds in multiple tranches — rather than in a single withdrawal — without another vote, would enable early testing of contracts and operational processes under real-world conditions before scaling up.

Given that deployment will occur over time, tranching would not materially delay the program but would substantially reduce exposure to smart-contract or procedural failure, and minimize idle treasury funds awaiting allocation.

⸻

Conclusion

This proposal addresses a critical structural weakness in Cardano’s ecosystem and deserves support.
With proper governance, cautious rollout, and transparent oversight, it can help unlock the liquidity base that Cardano’s growth has long required — while maintaining the prudence expected of a decentralized public treasury.

⸻

Drep vote report: Snek Loan

There is no doubt that Snek has brought tremendous activity, energy, and value to the Cardano ecosystem. The list of their contributions is long and well-documented in posts by others, so I won’t repeat them here. They deserve recognition for everything they have achieved.

Strengths of the Proposal
1. Structuring the request as a loan rather than a grant is innovative and should inspire others.
2. The use case for funds is clear, with much allocated toward liquidity provision—closer to a treasury action than an expense.
3. Snek has already demonstrated commitment by self-funding exchange listings, showing they are willing to put skin in the game.

That said, after reviewing this proposal through the lenses of corporate finance, business operations, and anti-fraud practice, I cannot support it.

Concerns Leading to My No Vote
• Loan terms not appropriate: The proposed interest is equivalent to Cardano’s staking risk-free rate. In traditional finance, a corporation like Snek would borrow at risk-free + a significant premium (typically 5–8% above risk-free), and with collateral. An unsecured loan at a risk-free rate does not reflect market reality and would not be offered by any financial institution. Using public funds under these terms does not seem responsible.

•	Overvaluation and repayment risk: From a financial analyst’s perspective, Snek’s market valuation appears far higher than its underlying business value and assets. Revenue streams are directly tied to token price, meaning that if the token drops significantly, repayment becomes much less likely. The downside risk here is more probable than the smooth repayment scenario described.

•	Normal business expense: Exchange listings and liquidity provision are standard costs of doing business for any token project, especially meme-coins. Other projects in other ecosystems routinely budget for this. I see no clear reason why Snek should be treated differently.

•	Externalities already being covered: Snek argues that their listings benefit the broader Cardano token ecosystem. While true in principle, other players—such as the Midnight Foundation—are already covering similar expenses for their own listings, generating the same ecosystem benefits without drawing on Treasury funds. This makes the argument for community financing less compelling.

Final Position

This was a difficult decision, and I took time to reflect and review a wide range of perspectives. In particular, the comments by @goofycrisp, @CardanoRami, @JaromirTesar, @Jane14457995, and @yuta_cryptox were especially helpful.

I respect the Snek team and community and acknowledge their positive impact on the Cardano ecosystem. However, I believe that a project as vibrant and successful as Snek should finance its own core business expenses. I can not support using public funds to finance this for them especially when the loan terms do not make financial sense from a risk-management perspective.

For these reasons, I voted No.

The Cardano in Oceania governance proposal merits serious consideration and clearly would provide value. However, it aligns closely with many very similar Catalyst proposals in form, scope, and scale. Evaluating similar proposals concurrently allows for direct comparison, better prioritization, and more efficient use of funds. Letting each proposal go through its own direct vote weakens the cumulative knowledge and institutional continuity within the Catalyst framework, and will overload the direct voting process.

Because this proposal lies squarely in the domain that Catalyst was created for, I can not approve it directly as an end-run around that system and its checks and balances where it properly belongs.

Approval of previously ratified project

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Funding withdrawal of previously ratified project.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Approval for funding withdrawal of previously ratified project.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Approval of funding for previously ratified project.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Funding approval of previously ratified proposal

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Several of the changes significantly oversimplify and undermine the intent of the attendees of the Constitutional Convention.

Most importantly, the removal of the requirement to have a budget as a guardrail to spending, removes a protective layer to abuse of the Treasury which is one of the greater risks the ecosystem faces. Thus I can not support this submission.

While unsatisfied with Intersect’s administration of the Constitutional process, I have to agree that done is better than perfect.

Someone must step up to do this job, so if INTERSECT is the only volunteer it is better to support than impede this approved project so I must vote yes.

I am not comfortable with this proposal due to its large size, the move to stop funding an event previous justified as being part of their obligation from the interest earned on genesis ADA by the Cardano Foundation, and the additional funding for Emergo, which has not performed their duties expected with their Genesis ADA for expected similar tasks.

This would amount to picking winners of one among many with public funds. While Snek is a huge asset to the ecosystem, it is a commercial venture capable of standing on its own, and favoring it over others with public funds is inappropriate and should be unnecessary.

That the proposal is also unconstitutional was another reason to look askance at it.

This would amount to picking winners of one among many with public funds. While Snek is a huge asset to the ecosystem, it is a commercial venture capable of standing on its own, and favoring it over others with public funds is inappropriate and should be unnecessary.

That the proposal is also unconstitutional was another reason to look askance at it.

I am strongly in favor of improving the barriers to abuse and grifting the Catalyst project.

This was a valid election process and thus should be ratified , although the low turnout and low barrier for vote buying is a continuing problem which needs improvement.

I can not approve of this for the same reasons given on initial submission which is since it is almost assured that IOG will be the primary receiptient of public funds going forward, having IOG running the processes which will design how future funds will be allocated is litteraly the definition of “regulatory capture”. The project’s intentions are good, and IOG should participate, but not lead or be the primary influence on this project.

As the proposal submitter and Voltaire Team Lead has also resigned, I see that as another reason that we are not better off with IOG being the lead for this project.

I can not in good conscience approve this withdrawal as there are too many flags for me : 1) This appears to be an opportunistic move to Cardano only if they receive treasury funding, and the team is otherwise not committed to being here. 2) I question the validity of the product after using the current versions. 3) I believe this should be risk capital funded and not public treasury funds.

While this is a large withdrawal, the kpis for developer growth, and the previous track record of Cardano not being at enough global events leads me to support this withdrawal.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

I support IOG continuing to be the main contractor for Cardano, but I have reservations on this proposal.

A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

In general, I believe IOG has delivered on the roadmap it promised in Miami in 2019. The organization has acted in good faith, transforming an idea into the robust ecosystem we have today.

A great deal of credit goes to Charles Hoskinson for his vision, leadership, and the long-term goals he set to build a better world. These ideals have guided Cardano’s development to this point.

As such, I am strongly inclined to continue funding IOG’s work to improve and expand the Cardano chain. I continue to place trust in their technical expertise and overarching vision for the ecosystem.

That said, I found this proposal difficult to vote for. I do not believe IOG, as the de facto leader of the ecosystem, has set an appropriately high standard for how funding requests should be presented in the Voltaire era. We are in a transitional phase—from IOG-led development to a more open, multi-developer ecosystem. I had expected IOG to set the benchmark during this shift, and in this proposal, I believe they fell short.

Specifically:
• I agree with the Cardano Foundation’s abstention rationale: IOG failed to adequately address legitimate community concerns. Reasonable requests for clarity around milestones, timelines, and KPIs—particularly for a large, publicly funded proposal—were largely ignored. Rather than engaging constructively, Charles publicly characterized these requests as personal attacks.
• While IOG is a trusted actor, a proposal that boils down to “trust us, we’ll do it right” sets a poor precedent—not just for IOG, but for all future proposers. Cardano needs a competitive funding process that minimizes overbilling, gold-plating, and unnecessary complexity. This proposal did not embrace that standard. It bundled disparate components into one massive, non-negotiable package, limiting meaningful community oversight and feedback.
• By leveraging its role as the chain’s most critical developer to present the proposal as an “approve it as-is or we walk” ultimatum, IOG crossed a line. This was an inappropriate use of its position.
• Finally, Charles’s public threats on Twitter about the consequences of rejecting the proposal were harmful to the very public budgeting process he helped envision. Voltaire governance is meant to empower non-specialist DReps who are still learning how to evaluate complex proposals. It requires patience and a collaborative tone. Heavy-handed responses to scrutiny hindered the growth of this process rather than advancing it.

First, I believe this proposal began with positive and meritocratic intentions. However, as someone trained in investigating fraud, I am skeptical of how this will evolve over time—particularly the risk of it devolving into an “old boys’ club” siphoning public funds for the benefit of insiders. Unfortunately, that is the historical pattern in similar systems outside of blockchain.

That said, this concern is tempered by a fundamental question: how do we expect teams building critical infrastructure for what should ultimately become a public utility to survive today? Especially in a context where the market is immature, the funding environment unstable, and governance still finding its footing.

I’ve decided to vote in favor of this proposal in order to give it a chance to fulfill its stated goals. It is a bet on the economic viability of building on Cardano—while the broader ecosystem works toward long-term sustainability through real adoption and meaningful fee revenue. In that light, I view this as a form of public funding for development-stage research and tooling.

At the same time, I remain skeptical. I will be looking for measurable success and demonstrable value before supporting future budget requests. I do not believe indefinite draws from the treasury are viable. If this becomes a long-term subsidy model, it will erode the very ecosystem it’s trying to build. I would far prefer a market-based mechanism: teams should raise capital in exchange for future expected returns, as is done in venture funding.

For me, this proposal would be considered successful if this budget serves as a short-term bridge—one that is gradually phased out within 1–2 years. Over that time, I would like to see it evolve into a publicly seeded investment vehicle: one that funds builders with an expectation of returns, not a welfare model of indefinite grants.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

In general, I believe IOG has delivered on the roadmap it promised in Miami in 2019. The organization has acted in good faith, transforming an idea into the robust ecosystem we have today.

A great deal of credit goes to Charles Hoskinson for his vision, leadership, and the long-term goals he set to build a better world. These ideals have guided Cardano’s development to this point.

As such, I am strongly inclined to continue funding IOG’s work to improve and expand the Cardano chain. I continue to place trust in their technical expertise and overarching vision for the ecosystem.

That said, I found this proposal difficult to vote for. I do not believe IOG, as the de facto leader of the ecosystem, has set an appropriately high standard for how funding requests should be presented in the Voltaire era. We are in a transitional phase—from IOG-led development to a more open, multi-developer ecosystem. I had expected IOG to set the benchmark during this shift, and in this proposal, I believe they fell short.

Specifically:
• I agree with the Cardano Foundation’s abstention rationale: IOG failed to adequately address legitimate community concerns. Reasonable requests for clarity around milestones, timelines, and KPIs—particularly for a large, publicly funded proposal—were largely ignored. Rather than engaging constructively, Charles publicly characterized these requests as personal attacks.
• While IOG is a trusted actor, a proposal that boils down to “trust us, we’ll do it right” sets a poor precedent—not just for IOG, but for all future proposers. Cardano needs a competitive funding process that minimizes overbilling, gold-plating, and unnecessary complexity. This proposal did not embrace that standard. It bundled disparate components into one massive, non-negotiable package, limiting meaningful community oversight and feedback.
• By leveraging its role as the chain’s most critical developer to present the proposal as an “approve it as-is or we walk” ultimatum, IOG crossed a line. This was an inappropriate use of its position.
• Finally, Charles’s public threats on Twitter about the consequences of rejecting the proposal were harmful to the very public budgeting process he helped envision. Voltaire governance is meant to empower non-specialist DReps who are still learning how to evaluate complex proposals. It requires patience and a collaborative tone. Heavy-handed responses to scrutiny hindered the growth of this process rather than advancing it.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

⸻

Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

⸻

Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

⸻

Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals

The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.

⸻

Cardano: State of Play

The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.

The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.

Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.

However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.

⸻

Fiscal Philosophy

I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.

Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.

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Approach to the Budget Process

This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.

Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.

I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.

However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.

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Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source

Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.

Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.

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Additional Beliefs and Disclosures

I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.

I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.

Rationale for Supporting the 200M ADA NCL for 2025 as a Cardano DRep

As a Cardano Delegate Representative (DRep), I support the proposed 200M ADA Network Contribution Limit (NCL) for 2025. My decision is driven by a commitment to fiscal responsibility and the need for robust governance and vendor management processes to ensure the prudent use of public funds. At this stage, I believe the Cardano ecosystem’s governance mechanisms and organizational maturity are not sufficiently developed to responsibly manage the proposed 350M ADA allocation.

A key concern is the lack of rigorous oversight and pushback in vendor management, particularly with Input Output Global (IOG). For context, Charles Hoskinson, co-founder of IOG, has stated that he personally funded Cardano’s development at an estimated $450M USD over seven years, equating to an average annual run rate of approximately $64M. While costs may have surely escalated, the proposed 350M ADA allocation—funded by public treasury resources—represents a significant increase, nearly doubling his historical spending level when Charles himself bore the financial burden. Of course, this is also taking him at his word on almost half a billion in spending. Without thorough scrutiny, this escalation raises questions about necessity and efficiency.

In April 2025, IOG’s “take it or leave it” stance on funding proposals further underscores the need for stronger governance processes. The Cardano governance function has a fiduciary duty to rigorously evaluate vendor proposals to ensure they are justified and cost-effective. Currently, the absence of a robust, independent review process limits our ability to validate the reasonableness of the proposed budget.

While I assume good faith on the part of IOG and recognize their contributions as good actors in the ecosystem, public funds demand a higher standard of accountability. Until the Cardano governance framework develops more mature processes—such as expert-led reviews and competitive vendor evaluations—we must adopt a fiscally conservative approach to safeguard community resources.

A lower NCL of 200M ADA provides a prudent framework for 2025. It encourages negotiation with vendors, fosters competitive bidding, and incentivizes cost-effective solutions without compromising essential development. Importantly, the Cardano community retains the flexibility to vote for an NCL increase later if additional funding is demonstrably necessary and governance processes have matured to manage it.

Conversely, an overly generous NCL risks wasteful spending due to inadequate oversight, regulatory capture, or insufficient vendor scrutiny. Once public funds are misallocated, they cannot be recovered, potentially undermining trust in Cardano’s governance and hindering long-term ecosystem growth.

In conclusion, the 200M ADA NCL strikes a responsible balance, aligning spending with the current maturity of Cardano’s governance and vendor management processes. This conservative approach mitigates risks while preserving the ability to adapt as our ecosystem evolves. I urge my fellow DReps and the Cardano community to support this limit to ensure fiscal discipline and uphold our collective responsibility to steward public funds wisely.

As a DRep, I have voted no on the proposal to reduce the tau parameter and lower the transaction tax that funds the Cardano treasury. While there are appealing arguments for this change—such as increasing rewards and short-term liquidity for ADA holders or reducing user friction—these benefits are overshadowed by significant risks at this pivotal moment in Cardano’s development.

First, we are navigating a period of financial uncertainty. The shift to democratic governance has introduced an untested budgeting process, and we lack data on whether it will sustainably manage treasury outflows. We don’t yet know the baseline for spending or whether the treasury might face depletion. Reducing tau now, before we’ve established stability and accountability in budgeting and finalized key variables like maximum change limits, risks undermining our financial foundation. I’d rather see a proven track record of fiscal responsibility before adjusting inflows.

Secondly, a robust treasury is Cardano’s best safeguard for long-term success. By maintaining—and ideally growing—our reserves, we can build a sovereign wealth fund akin to those in Norway or Abu Dhabi. Such a fund would provide a steady cashflow stream, compounding over time to seize future opportunities or buffer against downturns on the road to mass adoption. Short-term spending gains pale in comparison to this vision. Cardano aspires to be a country-scale financial ecosystem, and that ambition demands prioritizing financial resilience over immediate outflows.

Finally, governance introduces a human risk: the tendency to treat the treasury as “other people’s money.” This mindset can bias DReps toward overspending, especially on justifiable projects, without feeling immediate consequences. Given that our governance system is new and many DReps may lack experience with large-scale treasury management, we need prove we can foster a culture of fiscal discipline. Reducing tau before we’ve demonstrated prudent budgeting amplifies this risk.

In closing, lowering tau now would be a premature gamble. Cardano should prioritize stability, prove the budgeting process works, and grow our treasury to secure Cardano’s future. I urge fellow DReps to vote no until we have the data and governance maturity to choose when and how much to reduce tau.

Hat-tip to @earncoinpool, @amw7, @Orbital_Lexicon and others for their clear reasoning why Tau should be reduced now. The arguments were compelling, but I believe the timing isn’t correct.

Also a hat-tip to @JaromirTesar, and @Hoskytoken for their strong arguments against the change. Both sides helped me form my opinion.

DRep Report: I Voted Yes on the Constitution
By Michael Rogero, Constitutional Delegate Representing the Taipei Cardano Community

I voted “yes” on the Constitution after careful consideration. While I have concerns about elements I believe are missing or malformed, the value of maintaining momentum towards decentralization, the Constitution’s valid reflection of the will of the people, and the fact that this is a significant step along the original roadmap override those concerns. I believe both the Cardano ecosystem and the wider world will be better off with this Constitution passed—even if it has some warts—so I cast my vote in favor.

The Constitution Reflects the Community Will

Cardano has always been a coalition of the willing. It was founded by people who aiming to fix fundamental flaws in the traditional financial system and other early blockchains. Many of us arrived later, inspired by that vision and eager to improve upon the initial framework while helping the ecosystem grow.

Since I joined 2018, I’ve seen a community of builders choosing this ecosystem to build in, in spite of the fact that most of these people could have earned more on other chains or in other industries. They stayed because they wanted to push forward the vision originally laid out by Charles, which has since grown and evolved to reflect the dreams and ideals of a broader global community.

This “created by the willing” spirit also shaped the Constitution. While a small team of professionals wrote the initial draft, people from around the world added to it, rewrote it, and picked apart every sentence, sharing their opinions on how well it reflected the will of their own communities and lived experience. Because of limited time and the large, diverse group—many without formal legal drafting experience—some things didn’t get as much scrutiny as we might have hoped. This Constitution may be an imperfect outcome, but still a big step forward toward the goal.

An alternative process would be something like the Cardano Foundation’s Constitution, which crafted by a smaller professional group in many ways is a cleaner document, but a centralized system isn’t what we set out to build. My hope is that the Community Constitution can be updated with better ideas in the future, but for this first step, starting with what the global community argued over, edited and ratified is the right choice.

The Constitution Reflects More Work Than Is Immediately Visible

My experience with the Constitution, beginning with the local 1694 workshop almost two years ago, going through DRep training, participating in the Constitutional Summits in Taipei and Nairobi, attending the Constitutional Convention in Buenos Aires, and joining many late-night sessions to finalize details like the definitions addendum—this process demanded countless hours of negotiation, argument, and refinement. Starting from that experience, I look around and see so many people who devoted many multiples of the time I did in order to get us here.

We shouldn’t overlook the extraordinary effort and coordination it took to form the initial drafts and get this document to its current form. This document represents a massive investment in human energy which shouldn’t be under valued, especially when it is likely more than sufficient structure for our ecosystem to function and evolve.

This Version Still Doesn’t Satisfy Me

I was elected as the representative from Taipei after promising that I’d push to add some clear moral standards in the document. Shortly before the Taipei Summit, there was an egregious incident in which multiple CNTs were minted using deep-fake nudes of various community members. While the action itself was obviously offensive and toxic, what bothered me more was that the Draft Constitution didn’t define any ethical codes which would address or even imply that such behavior was unconstitutional or even against community ethics.

The current text still doesn’t set out a moral standard similar to the Preamble of the U.S. Constitution. It does mention “our shared values” but then doesn’t specify what those are. I tried to include such principles in Nairobi and Buenos Aires but couldn’t convince a majority of the need. The fact that we don’t explicitly define lines that shouldn’t be crossed, or clarify an ethical code which unites us troubles me.

I Foresee Evolving This Document Will Be Hard

Getting this document across the finish line took significant will—and financial backing—from Charles, IOG and Intersect, who committed to completing this process even if some warts remained. As we heard repeatedly, done is better than endlessly striving for perfect. Getting to this point was essentially a case of herding a global community of cats that were engaged in endless debates. Post ratification, to improve on this work we will be facing a global ecosystem often communicating by tweets, Discord chats, and other impersonal asynchronous communication tools that work against fostering consensus or thoughtful debate. This is on top of the language, and culture barriers inherent in a global ecosystem. Democracy is messy, and decentralized democracy is exponentially hard.

I suspect that updating the Constitution will be tougher than many delegates assume. The approval threshold for amendments is high, and consensus will be tough to reach. Without Charles’s persistent will, and wallet, I’m not sure we’d have gotten here in the first place. I’m skeptical the community will find the drive and effort needed to keep this a truly “living document,” as stated in Section One.

Still, I believe this Constitution is solid enough that a democratic, decentralized financial ecosystem can grow under its framework. If it lets Cardano flourish, then despite any flaws, it deserves to pass. Passing it provides a framework to build upon and a starting point if we absolutely need to correct course.

Conclusion

While there are parts of the Constitution I wish were stronger, ratifying it now best serves Cardano’s future. It maintains momentum towards the goal, fairly reflects the will and voice of our diverse global community, and aligns with our decentralized and democratic principles. If we are serious about improving and clarifying it later, we have the foundation on which to build. For now, warts and all, it is sufficient and I voted “yes.”

This action is consistent with Cardano ethos and history of honoring members who notably contributed to the ecosystem but have recently passed. I see this as appropriate and inline with our goals, and principles.