Tempo.Vote

Way too expensive

This process is too centralized and dependent on Intersect, with too much beaucracy which actually deters builders from getting access to funding but rather favour paper pushers to get funding to grift the Treasury.

Current CC selection process is not ideal, done offchain with limited DReps participation, so quality of CC members are not yet certified, hence reducing CC size now is not preferred. Constitutional changes should be slow and steady, and should not be optimized for efficiency and may cause mistakes

Without transparent reporting and analysis of Budget 2025, Cardano should not approve budget for 2026.

It is simply absurd for CC to ask for compensation when CC are not legally trained, not doing the hard work like DReps in analysing the benefit of proposal on Cardano.

While this is potentially useful and we appreciate the fact that CF is consulting DRep even if they are not required to.
However Cardano ecosystem is in dire need to support developer ecosystem, RWA and DeFi so CF should spend every single resource working on those to save Cardano from dying a slow death.

We desperately need a new constitution to streamline the budget process so DReps do not have voting fatigue!

We are supportive of this proposal but we would like to see further detailed guidelines of fund allocation into various DeFi protocol on Cardano. These guidelines should be cast in stone, and the committee should have to strictly follow this guideline, rather than leaving decision making to the committee members, which effectively create a centralized body picking winner & losers for Cardano DeFi.

We are supportive of the proposal given SNEK has been driving strong marketing and transaction for Cardano. However, we would like to see stronger control in terms of collaterals for the loan as well as interest rate to be adjustiale to a discount to market rate rather than a fixed low rate. Also disbursement should be stagger based on milestone.

We made a mistake assuming that projects can directly use IPFS or Iagon for this, but given that we ourselves having sporadic issues storing voting rationale on governance voting on IPFS, having a reliable middleware to abstract all the complexity of interacting with storage system will be useful. Hence we are changing vote to YES.

While this budget is on high side, Cardano does need to have a global unified marketing strategy. Ideally we would like to see Emurgo work with Cardano Foundation using CF allocation instead but for this year we would like to give Emurgo a chance to prove itself to Cardano community.

This constitution while not perfect is the first TRULY COMMUNITY DRIVEN constitution that was openly developed and discussed. This is also a significant improvement from the current Constitution which was hastily ratified due to time constraint. We vote YES for this and expect Constitution to be continued to improved further after each iteration!

Treasury already have enough marketing expense approved for withdrawal

The cost is too high for simply developing a quadratic voting implementation. Catalyst also receive significant funding for operation which should be able to cover this expense if necessary

Cardano without a decentralized Oracle is not ready for RWA. Further mỏe, 3M ADA is nothing in the real estate market

We believe Treasury Funding is better focused on Scaling, Developers experience and dapps that will drive more transactions on chain, these dapps will naturally produce high quality token which will then drive investors demand to be listed on CEX & market maker.

The budget to run this MBO is way too high

Cardano Summit cost is too high for the reach it gets, the money is better spent to sponsor booth at events like Token2049

While the NCL of 300M ADA is still higher than what we think Cardano should spend in 2025, it is lower than the currently approved 350M ADA. Also now that ADA price is significantly higher than $0.5, it makes sense to lower NCL from the current 350M ADA proposed when ADA price was $0.5

DReps should be given a chance to vote on individual budget proposal as much as possible, not lumped together in an omni-bus proposal like this. Many of proposals included here do NOT achieve the 2.6B ADA vote required to cross 50% voting power threshold.

These proposals are key components for Cardano to attrach more developers and improve UX for Cardano dapps, passed the temp check with more than 50% Dreps approval off-chain, and also come at very reasonable cost.

This is a good example of utilizing treasury fund for ecosystem grow, these fund are not spent but are kept to grow DeFi ecosystem, which can be recalled back to treasury anytime through an Info Governance Action.

Detailed proposal, reasonable cost for a team with strong track record

Given the nascent state of Cardano’s on-chain governance system, it is both prudent and strategic to begin with a conservative treasury allocation of 200 million ADA. This approach allows the community to gain critical experience with treasury management, funding mechanisms, and proposal evaluation under the new governance model without exposing the ecosystem to undue financial risk.

A gradual and measured increase in the treasury budget over time will enable the community to observe outcomes, identify inefficiencies, and refine processes. This learning period is essential to building a culture of accountability, transparency, and effectiveness in funding decisions. By starting with a smaller budget, Cardano can better ensure that early governance iterations are both high quality and low risk, thereby laying a solid foundation for long-term sustainability.

This cautious yet forward-thinking approach reflects a commitment to responsible decentralization and positions Cardano to evolve governance wisely as the ecosystem matures.

Current Cardano Constitution does not include adequate guardrails to prevent misuse, mismanagement, or corruption of the treasury, which is a crucial concern in any blockchain ecosystem. Due to the issues listed below, we believe it is better for Cardano Budget to be prudent and start first year budget with a small minimalist budget to focus on technological improvement and developer experience only.

1. Weak Oversight on Treasury Withdrawals (TREASURY-01 to TREASURY-04) The most glaring issue in the Constitution lies in its handling of Treasury Withdrawal actions. The Constitution specifies that any net change limit on the treasury's balance must be agreed upon by DReps (Delegated Representatives) through a governance action (TREASURY-01a), but this is far from a safeguard. There are several issues with this approach: Vague Governance Thresholds: The Constitution leaves the approval of treasury changes to an on-chain governance vote by DReps. While the threshold for approval is set at 50% of the active voting stake, this presents a potential for centralization. If the voting pool is manipulated or controlled by a few large stakeholders or entities, they could unilaterally decide how the treasury funds are allocated, leading to conflicts of interest or potential corruption. Without stricter rules to prevent the undue influence of a few powerful players, the treasury could easily become a tool for personal or factional gain. Lack of Specificity on Treasury Spending: The Constitution allows for the possibility of treasury withdrawals to be denominated in Ada (TREASURY-03a), which is standard, but it lacks more specific guidelines on how funds are to be allocated. The absence of clear, transparent spending criteria opens the door to poorly justified or even fraudulent expenditures. Insufficient Pre-Withdrawal Scrutiny: According to TREASURY-04a, treasury withdrawals are only permissible once there is an approved ecosystem budget, yet this "budget" could be as vague as the governance actions themselves. This creates an unnecessary layer of ambiguity, making it harder for stakeholders to track the movement of funds or to know if treasury withdrawals align with the Cardano blockchain’s long-term goals. The lack of stringent oversight means there is a potential for funds to be allocated to initiatives that serve the interests of the few, rather than the community at large.

2. No Mechanisms to Prevent Treasury Mismanagement or Corruption The Cardano Treasury is essentially the lifeblood of the ecosystem’s development and growth. However, the Constitution falls short in providing sufficient safeguards to prevent corruption, fraud, or simple mismanagement. Here are a few critical concerns: Potential for Conflict of Interest: Since treasury management can be influenced by DReps or other governing bodies, there is a risk of conflict of interest. DReps, especially those who are heavily invested in the ecosystem or who may have alliances with specific development projects, could prioritize personal or group interests over the interests of the broader Cardano community. Without a system of independent checks and balances—such as independent audits or decentralized oversight—there is little preventing these entities from using the treasury for their own benefit. No Protection Against Fraudulent or Misleading Proposals: While the Constitution requires treasury withdrawals to be tied to an approved budget, it does not outline how fraudulent or misleading proposals are to be detected and prevented. There is no mention of auditing mechanisms, third-party reviews, or community accountability mechanisms that would ensure proposed projects have proper oversight before being funded. This leaves room for individuals or entities to create false narratives around certain initiatives, directing funds toward nonviable projects, or worse, diverting funds for personal gain. Treasury Withdrawal Caps Are Too Lenient: The TREASURY-01a guideline, which mandates a net change limit agreed upon by the DReps, could be a source of great vulnerability. The Constitution's wording leaves this decision too open to the discretion of DReps, and the 50% voting threshold isn’t enough to deter the influence of large stakeholders who may push for excessive withdrawals or allocations. A stronger cap on how much can be withdrawn at any given time, with more robust accountability mechanisms in place, would create better safeguards against reckless spending.

3. Lack of Transparency in Treasury Actions One of the key pillars of decentralized governance is transparency, especially when it comes to the handling of public funds. The Cardano Constitution falls short in this regard: Opaque Treasury Management: While TREASURY-03a specifies that withdrawals must be denominated in Ada, it says little about how treasury management will be communicated to the broader community. How are the public to know that the funds are being allocated in an equitable and responsible manner? There is no clear roadmap for community members to review treasury decisions, track fund allocation, or participate in discussions about how the funds should be used. This lack of visibility invites suspicions of backroom deals or secretive funding decisions. No Public Disclosure of Entities Receiving Treasury Funds: The Constitution fails to address the lack of public disclosure about which entities or individuals are receiving treasury funds. Without mandated public transparency for all recipients of treasury funding, it becomes far too easy for funds to flow to projects or organizations with close ties to decision-makers or even entities that do not fully represent the interests of the broader community. Public disclosure of who receives treasury funds is a basic form of accountability that is crucial in preventing favoritism, corruption, or misappropriation of resources. The absence of such a provision in the Constitution signals a major oversight in terms of safeguarding the treasury from potential misuse. No Clear Roadmap for Transparency Mechanisms: The Constitution provides no detail on the process for tracking treasury withdrawals after approval, nor how public stakeholders can challenge or provide input on treasury spending. A transparent, community-driven platform for tracking the spending of treasury funds, perhaps akin to a public ledger or open-source project for Cardano treasury activities, would help to bolster confidence in the system and reduce fears of corruption. Without such mechanisms in place, the system risks creating an us-vs-them mentality, where community members feel left out of the decision-making process. Conclusion: A Call for Stronger Treasury Protections While the Cardano Constitution represents an ambitious attempt to create a decentralized governance framework for the blockchain ecosystem, it lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent mismanagement, corruption, and poor oversight of the treasury. In its current form, it opens the door for significant risks to the Cardano community’s financial resources, allowing for undue influence by powerful stakeholders, ambiguous withdrawal processes, and lack of transparency in treasury management. While the Constitution sets forth a number of Guardrails to protect the Cardano Blockchain from technical failure, it fails to apply a similar level of protection to the treasury. Without clearly defined repercussions for those who misuse the treasury, there is little incentive to ensure that funds are used ethically and responsibly. If the Cardano community is to truly thrive in a decentralized environment, it is essential that the Constitution be amended to include stronger guardrails and accountability measures around treasury management. Until such amendments are made, stakeholders should carefully reconsider supporting this Constitution in its present form, as it does not sufficiently protect the Cardano Blockchain Treasury from the risks of corruption and misallocation of funds

It is too early to set Net Change Limit to 2026

Any onchain governance action voting should be based on immutable content! Using a web2 website that proposer can update and change anytime as the basis to record onchain voting is faulty and unconstitutional!

This proposal to reduce the treasury cut from 20% to 10% is an important step toward optimizing the Cardano ecosystem’s long-term growth and sustainability. By lowering the treasury cut, the proposal enhances staking incentives, encouraging greater participation and strengthening decentralization. This, in turn, will improve the security and resilience of the network, ensuring its growth while maintaining a sustainable treasury.

The original 20% treasury cut was set arbitrarily at the start of Shelley and has never been revisited. With Cardano’s ecosystem now maturing, it’s time to fine-tune economic parameters to better align with the network’s evolving needs. A 10% treasury cut will result in a 12.5% increase in staking rewards, significantly benefiting stakeholders without compromising the treasury's health.

The Cardano Treasury is already sufficiently large to support the network's needs. In the future, if the treasury requires additional funds, we can always revisit and vote to increase the treasury cut again. This flexibility ensures that we can adapt to the ecosystem’s evolving needs without compromising current incentives.

The Cardano Constitution, despite its forward-thinking intentions for decentralized governance, raises significant concerns about the safety and oversight of the Cardano Blockchain treasury. While the Constitution establishes a framework for on-chain governance, it does not include adequate guardrails to prevent misuse, mismanagement, or corruption of the treasury, which is a crucial concern in any blockchain ecosystem. Let’s take a closer look at the issues surrounding the Cardano Treasury and the lack of effective protections.

1. Weak Oversight on Treasury Withdrawals (TREASURY-01 to TREASURY-04)
   The most glaring issue in the Constitution lies in its handling of Treasury Withdrawal actions. The Constitution specifies that any net change limit on the treasury's balance must be agreed upon by DReps (Delegated Representatives) through a governance action (TREASURY-01a), but this is far from a safeguard. There are several issues with this approach:
   Vague Governance Thresholds: The Constitution leaves the approval of treasury changes to an on-chain governance vote by DReps. While the threshold for approval is set at 50% of the active voting stake, this presents a potential for centralization. If the voting pool is manipulated or controlled by a few large stakeholders or entities, they could unilaterally decide how the treasury funds are allocated, leading to conflicts of interest or potential corruption. Without stricter rules to prevent the undue influence of a few powerful players, the treasury could easily become a tool for personal or factional gain.
   Lack of Specificity on Treasury Spending: The Constitution allows for the possibility of treasury withdrawals to be denominated in Ada (TREASURY-03a), which is standard, but it lacks more specific guidelines on how funds are to be allocated. The absence of clear, transparent spending criteria opens the door to poorly justified or even fraudulent expenditures.
   Insufficient Pre-Withdrawal Scrutiny: According to TREASURY-04a, treasury withdrawals are only permissible once there is an approved ecosystem budget, yet this "budget" could be as vague as the governance actions themselves. This creates an unnecessary layer of ambiguity, making it harder for stakeholders to track the movement of funds or to know if treasury withdrawals align with the Cardano blockchain’s long-term goals. The lack of stringent oversight means there is a potential for funds to be allocated to initiatives that serve the interests of the few, rather than the community at large.
2. No Mechanisms to Prevent Treasury Mismanagement or Corruption
   The Cardano Treasury is essentially the lifeblood of the ecosystem’s development and growth. However, the Constitution falls short in providing sufficient safeguards to prevent corruption, fraud, or simple mismanagement. Here are a few critical concerns:
   Potential for Conflict of Interest: Since treasury management can be influenced by DReps or other governing bodies, there is a risk of conflict of interest. DReps, especially those who are heavily invested in the ecosystem or who may have alliances with specific development projects, could prioritize personal or group interests over the interests of the broader Cardano community. Without a system of independent checks and balances—such as independent audits or decentralized oversight—there is little preventing these entities from using the treasury for their own benefit.
   No Protection Against Fraudulent or Misleading Proposals: While the Constitution requires treasury withdrawals to be tied to an approved budget, it does not outline how fraudulent or misleading proposals are to be detected and prevented. There is no mention of auditing mechanisms, third-party reviews, or community accountability mechanisms that would ensure proposed projects have proper oversight before being funded. This leaves room for individuals or entities to create false narratives around certain initiatives, directing funds toward nonviable projects, or worse, diverting funds for personal gain.
   Treasury Withdrawal Caps Are Too Lenient: The TREASURY-01a guideline, which mandates a net change limit agreed upon by the DReps, could be a source of great vulnerability. The Constitution's wording leaves this decision too open to the discretion of DReps, and the 50% voting threshold isn’t enough to deter the influence of large stakeholders who may push for excessive withdrawals or allocations. A stronger cap on how much can be withdrawn at any given time, with more robust accountability mechanisms in place, would create better safeguards against reckless spending.
3. Lack of Transparency in Treasury Actions
   One of the key pillars of decentralized governance is transparency, especially when it comes to the handling of public funds. The Cardano Constitution falls short in this regard:
   Opaque Treasury Management: While TREASURY-03a specifies that withdrawals must be denominated in Ada, it says little about how treasury management will be communicated to the broader community. How are the public to know that the funds are being allocated in an equitable and responsible manner? There is no clear roadmap for community members to review treasury decisions, track fund allocation, or participate in discussions about how the funds should be used. This lack of visibility invites suspicions of backroom deals or secretive funding decisions.
   No Public Disclosure of Entities Receiving Treasury Funds: The Constitution fails to address the lack of public disclosure about which entities or individuals are receiving treasury funds. Without mandated public transparency for all recipients of treasury funding, it becomes far too easy for funds to flow to projects or organizations with close ties to decision-makers or even entities that do not fully represent the interests of the broader community. Public disclosure of who receives treasury funds is a basic form of accountability that is crucial in preventing favoritism, corruption, or misappropriation of resources. The absence of such a provision in the Constitution signals a major oversight in terms of safeguarding the treasury from potential misuse.
   No Clear Roadmap for Transparency Mechanisms: The Constitution provides no detail on the process for tracking treasury withdrawals after approval, nor how public stakeholders can challenge or provide input on treasury spending. A transparent, community-driven platform for tracking the spending of treasury funds, perhaps akin to a public ledger or open-source project for Cardano treasury activities, would help to bolster confidence in the system and reduce fears of corruption. Without such mechanisms in place, the system risks creating an us-vs-them mentality, where community members feel left out of the decision-making process.

Conclusion: A Call for Stronger Treasury Protections
While the Cardano Constitution represents an ambitious attempt to create a decentralized governance framework for the blockchain ecosystem, it lacks the necessary safeguards to prevent mismanagement, corruption, and poor oversight of the treasury. In its current form, it opens the door for significant risks to the Cardano community’s financial resources, allowing for undue influence by powerful stakeholders, ambiguous withdrawal processes, and lack of transparency in treasury management.
While the Constitution sets forth a number of Guardrails to protect the Cardano Blockchain from technical failure, it fails to apply a similar level of protection to the treasury. Without clearly defined repercussions for those who misuse the treasury, there is little incentive to ensure that funds are used ethically and responsibly.
If the Cardano community is to truly thrive in a decentralized environment, it is essential that the Constitution be amended to include stronger guardrails and accountability measures around treasury management. Until such amendments are made, stakeholders should carefully reconsider supporting this Constitution in its present form, as it does not sufficiently protect the Cardano Blockchain Treasury from the risks of corruption and misallocation of funds.