Tony Boersma

I'm not sure why I'm even being allowed to vote. Did I miss something? Didn't this proposal already expire?

Again - too small a window of time to justify my spending any time evaluating this proposal.

Submitted on 2026-05-04 and due on 2026-05-09? I don't think so. I don't want to spend any time trying to evaluate if this proposal is even serious.

I am voting Yes on Revised Cardano Summit 2026 Singapore. I appreciate that the proposal substantially reduces costs and decouples the Summit from the broader TOKEN2049 package, resulting in a more focused and disciplined request. Promoting Cardano remains important for ecosystem growth and visibility, and this revised structure represents a more measured and fiscally responsible approach while still supporting meaningful outreach and engagement.

I am voting Yes on funding Cardano Summit 2026 and TOKEN2049 Singapore. While it is difficult to justify large expenditures during a period of lower market valuation, I believe strategic promotion and visibility are critical to long-term ecosystem growth. High-profile events like these provide important opportunities to attract developers, partners, and capital, and to ensure Cardano remains competitive with other ecosystems that are actively investing in their presence. In this context, continued outreach and brand-building are necessary to support adoption and future demand, even if the timing requires careful consideration of costs.

I am voting No on Pebble + Gerolamo – HLabs 2026 Budget. While I recognize the value of maintaining critical infrastructure and see some potential in Gerolamo, this proposal bundles essential maintenance with nice-to-have initiatives, making it difficult to justify the full ₳8M request. The cost structure, including high per-FTE compensation and contingency, appears disproportionate relative to the demonstrated needs and current adoption levels. Neither Gerolamo nor Pebble show sufficient evidence of immediate demand or ecosystem priority to warrant this level of investment at this time. Introducing additional node implementations and a new smart contract language also raises concerns about fragmentation and duplication of effort when existing tools are still maturing. I would be more supportive of a narrower, clearly scoped proposal focused on essential maintenance and proven needs, with expansion efforts evaluated independently and held to a higher standard of validation.

I am voting Yes on this proposal. While I have concerns about how well the Cardano Foundation reflects the best interests of Cardano, Project Catalyst is too important and shouldn't be disrupted.

I am voting No on Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1 after careful consideration of concerns raised by CardanoYoda, particularly regarding the anonymity of directors overseeing the initiative. While I recognize the potential value of improving DeFi liquidity on Cardano, the lack of transparency around key decision-makers introduces accountability and governance risks that are difficult to justify at this funding level. Treasury-funded initiatives should meet a high standard for openness and verifiability, especially when entrusted with significant capital. Until clearer disclosure and accountability mechanisms are in place, I do not believe this proposal meets the bar required for responsible Treasury allocation.

I am voting No on Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs because, in fairness and to maintain consistency, proposals of this scale should be evaluated within the newly adopted Cardano Budget Process Framework. Applying the framework uniformly helps ensure transparent prioritization, comparability across proposals, and disciplined Treasury allocation. This decision should not be taken as a rejection of the underlying work—I am generally supportive of the effort and see its potential value—but I believe it is more appropriate to assess and fund it through the standard budgeting process going forward.

I am voting Yes on the Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect) because establishing a clear, structured, and repeatable budgeting process is essential for effective and transparent Treasury governance. This framework provides the coordination, timelines, and accountability needed to evaluate and prioritize funding decisions at scale, reducing fragmentation and improving overall decision quality. While it can continue to evolve, adopting a formal process now is a necessary step toward more disciplined, predictable, and credible governance.

I am voting NO on the DeltaDeFi: Hydra Trading Infrastructure Budget because projects funded by the Treasury should demonstrate clear, durable, ecosystem-wide benefits. While the proposal is ambitious and technically interesting, the benefits appear to accrue primarily to a specific team and product rather than to the broader Cardano ecosystem in a neutral, public-goods sense. The proposal does not yet make a sufficiently strong case that the resulting infrastructure would be widely reusable, permissionless, and adopted beyond this single implementation. At this funding level, I expect clearer guarantees of open access, shared utility, and long-term ecosystem value before committing Treasury resources.

I am voting YES on the Net Change Limit for Epochs 613–713 because it strikes a sensible balance between fiscal prudence and operational flexibility for governance. Setting a clear spending cap protects the long-term sustainability of the Treasury while still allowing room to fund high-quality proposals that advance the ecosystem. A defined Net Change Limit also provides predictability and discipline to the budgeting process, helping DReps, SPOs, and the community evaluate proposals within a coherent financial framework rather than on an ad hoc basis. Overall, this parameter supports responsible stewardship of Treasury funds and strengthens confidence in Cardano’s evolving governance system.

YES — Supporting this name honors the legacy and contributions of van Rossem to the Cardano ecosystem, and is a respectful recognition of the impact they had on the community and the project.

I am voting YES on this governance action because increasing transaction and block memory units is a practical, low-risk improvement that directly enhances Cardano’s smart contract capacity and developer experience. This change supports more expressive and efficient Plutus applications, reduces current technical constraints faced by builders, and helps the ecosystem scale in line with growing usage. The proposal is grounded in benchmarking and careful parameter adjustment, making it a sensible incremental upgrade rather than a disruptive shift. Approving this step signals that governance can respond constructively to technical needs and supports Cardano’s competitiveness by enabling faster progress for applications already being built today.

I am voting YES on this Withdrawal 1 because it responsibly funds the essential infrastructure—smart contracts, UI, audits, and legal work—to safely administer the broader DeFi liquidity initiative that aims to deepen stablecoin and market liquidity on Cardano and reduce slippage for users.  While I share the view that more of the system functions and oversight could ultimately be on-chain rather than off-chain, the design includes a multisig contract and public RFPs that provide governance visibility and accountability.  Given the urgency of improving DeFi market depth to better compete with other ecosystems and provide tangible utility for users and protocols, moving quickly on these foundational elements is prudent.  Approving this first tranche allows the community to validate execution early, limiting risk before committing the larger budget in Withdrawal 2. 

I'm voting YES on the ₳70M Critical Integrations Budget. This coalition effort from all five major Cardano entities addresses long-standing infrastructure gaps that limit institutional adoption and DeFi growth. The five pillars—tier-one stablecoins, institutional custody, cross-chain bridges, pricing oracles, and analytics—are essential infrastructure that Cardano should have prioritized earlier, and Intersect's administrative oversight with milestone-based funding provides appropriate accountability for this scale of treasury deployment.

I'm voting NO on this CC compensation proposal despite supporting compensation in principle. The inconsistency of some members accepting funds while others decline creates an inequitable and confusing precedent. Either all CC members should receive compensation for their governance work, or none should—this mixed approach undermines the fairness principle and makes it unclear whether CC service is voluntary or compensated labor. We should pass a compensation framework where all members are treated equally, even if individuals choose to donate their compensation back to the treasury.

I'm voting YES because this protects Cardano's brand at zero cost to the treasury. The Foundation is self-funding this effort while the rare ICANN application window is open. Securing these domains prevents misuse and enables future innovations in user experience and identity.

I'm voting NO. I agree with others that funding from the Treasury sets a bad precedent. Agree with others voting no, there should be an insurance fund and/or a bug bounty fund for this.

I'm voting YES on the Snek Foundation's ₳5M loan proposal for global exchange listings. While I voted NO on their earlier "Budget: ₳5M Loan for Cardano's Global Listing Expansion - Powered by Snek" governance action, this resubmission addresses my primary concerns about safeguards and governance accountability.
The key improvement is the designation of Intersect as the administrator of budget funds, which provides institutional oversight that was absent in the original proposal. This administrative layer adds a crucial safeguard by ensuring an established governance entity manages fund disbursement rather than direct treasury-to-foundation transfers. Additionally, the loan structure itself—with 2.44% APR (2.37% staking rate + 0.07%) compounded yearly and repayment over 3-5 years from Snek product revenues—demonstrates responsible treasury capital deployment while setting a precedent for future project financing.
While an on-chain smart contract would still be my preferred enforcement mechanism, the combination of Intersect administration, defined repayment terms with audit verification requirements, and the broader ecosystem benefit of increased Cardano visibility through major exchange listings makes this proposal worth supporting. The loan model is fundamentally sound and represents innovative treasury utilization that could benefit the entire Cardano Native Token (CNT) ecosystem through expanded retail market access.

I’m voting NO on Constitution v2.3 because I have some serious concerns about how it affects governance and whether it’s still a fair and strong document. The fact that we’re taking away the Constitutional Committee code of conduct requirement (Article VII, Section 6) is concerning. It suggests that if governance bodies don’t follow the rules, we just get rid of the requirement instead of making sure they do. This kind of thinking means constitutional rules are just suggestions when things get tough, which is not good for the document’s authority. Instead of just taking away the requirement, we should have looked at how to make sure everyone is following the rules through better governance. Maybe we could have had CC members replaced, clearer rules, or even gotten the community involved. A constitution that lets people not follow the rules is like a constitution that doesn’t really matter anymore.

Also, the new definition of “Stake Pool Operator” as “the entity controlling cold keys” is a bit confusing. It could cause problems in multi-party SPO operations where the person in charge of cold keys might not actually be the person managing the pool. This could lead to confusion about who gets to vote and how they’re involved in the governance of collaborative SPO arrangements, which are becoming more and more common. I do agree that the improvements in how we handle treasury accountability with universal audit requirements are good, but they don’t make up for the fact that removing obligations instead of enforcing them weakens the constitution.

I like how Snek Foundation approached this proposal in framing it as a loan instead of a grant. However, I’m voting no because the proposal doesn’t have enough safeguards. An on-chain contract would make me more comfortable. Also, a 2.44% APR seems low for an unsecured loan, and it might set a precedent that’s not sustainable.

This is a significant change for Cardano, and the proposal feels more aspirational than concrete. More work is needed for such a significant change, particularly forming a full fledged governance framework for the fund.

I have some concerns about GovTool as expressed in other votes, but this is simply to release already approved funds which will be administered through a smart contract.

I am voting No. The requested amount is excessively high, and exchange listings—especially for specific tokens—should occur organically through demonstrated market demand, not be subsidized with large Treasury outlays. Funding listings for a single meme coin sets a concerning precedent and offers limited long-term ecosystem value. Treasury resources should prioritize public goods and foundational infrastructure that benefit the broader Cardano community, not individual asset promotion.

I am voting Yes. The Interim Committee played an important role in getting the governance process off the ground, but Cardano must now transition to a more accountable, community-aligned structure. Replacing the interim members with those selected through transparent, participatory processes strengthens the legitimacy of on-chain governance and aligns with the principles outlined in the Cardano Constitution. This is a necessary and timely step toward a decentralized and representative governance model.

I am voting No. The requested amount is excessively high, and exchange listings—especially for specific tokens—should occur organically through demonstrated market demand, not be subsidized with large Treasury outlays. Funding listings for a single meme coin sets a concerning precedent and offers limited long-term ecosystem value.

I am voting No. While the proposal addresses a real gap in Cardano’s on-chain cryptographic capabilities, it fails to clearly demonstrate why existing libraries, standards, or ongoing initiatives cannot be extended to meet these needs. The proposal is only to build a proof-of-concept, without a explanation of differentiation or integration with current efforts, risks duplicating work and fragmenting tooling.

I am voting No. The proposal comes at a high cost and appears to duplicate existing outreach and marketing efforts already covered in other proposals. Without a clear justification for the scale of spending or a strategy to coordinate with ongoing initiatives, this funding request lacks efficiency and strategic clarity. Treasury funds should be deployed with greater focus and consolidation to maximize impact.

I am voting no. While improving liquidity and accessibility is important, exchange listings should occur organically based on genuine market demand—not be driven by large Treasury subsidies. The requested amount is excessively high, and the proposal lacks clear, measurable outcomes to justify the cost.

I am voting No. While stablecoins are important for ecosystem utility, this proposal appears to primarily benefit a single company. Treasury funds should be used to build public goods and open systems that serve the entire ecosystem—not to subsidize the growth of individual businesses.

I am voting No. While PyCardano is a valuable library for Python developers in the Cardano ecosystem, the nature and scale of the work—focused on continued development and maintenance—make it better suited for Project Catalyst. Catalyst offers a more targeted, iterative funding environment for tools like this, where community feedback and demand can guide development priorities. Treasury funding should prioritize foundational infrastructure and initiatives with broad, strategic impact—this proposal does not meet that threshold.

I am voting No. While I support efforts to critically examine and improve Cardano’s governance, this proposal lacks sufficient external, independent input. The team—comprised largely of those already involved in shaping the current governance model—risks reinforcing existing assumptions rather than delivering an objective evaluation. Without meaningful outside expertise, this initiative reads as self-assessing and inward-facing. I would support a future version that brings in diverse, external voices, but this version does not meet that standard.

I am voting No. While infrastructure to support asset delivery can benefit the ecosystem, this proposal is not open-source, which limits transparency, community contribution, and long-term sustainability. Treasury-funded infrastructure should be openly accessible and collaboratively maintained to align with Cardano’s values of decentralization and openness. Without open-source licensing or clear governance, I cannot support this funding request.

I am voting Yes. This initiative introduces a more inclusive, mathematically grounded funding model that can complement and extend Catalyst by better capturing community preferences and reducing funding concentration. Quadratic funding has proven effective in other ecosystems for empowering smaller voices and encouraging grassroots participation. With a strong theoretical foundation and practical relevance, this proposal offers a meaningful way to diversify Cardano’s funding mechanisms and improve community-driven resource allocation. The potential upside justifies the investment.

I am voting Yes. Python is one of the most widely used programming languages globally, and supporting it lowers the barrier to entry for a vast pool of developers unfamiliar with Haskell or functional DSLs. The proposal demonstrates strong technical grounding and ecosystem alignment. At a modest cost, this initiative offers high potential impact by expanding Cardano’s developer base and fostering broader innovation.

I am voting No. While the goal of improving developer onboarding is valid, this proposal does not demonstrate how it meaningfully complements or improves upon existing tools like Plutus, Marlowe, or ongoing SDK and Layer 2 efforts. The strategic focus on Scala may appeal to a niche audience, but without a proven need or ecosystem integration plan, the value proposition does not justify the requested budget.

I am voting No. While strategic planning and long-term vision are important, this proposal is premature. Cardano’s governance tools and processes are still maturing, and introducing a formal product committee and roadmap at this stage risks misalignment and inefficiency. A more effective approach would be to revisit this concept once the governance framework is more mature and capable of fully integrating such efforts.

I am voting Yes. While I have concerns about the fragmented ownership of the project four separate entities—which may pose coordination and accountability challenges—the strategic importance of a unified, professional marketing effort for Cardano is too great to ignore. Effective global outreach is critical to drive adoption, strengthen the brand, and support ecosystem growth. With proper oversight and clear deliverables, this initiative has the potential to deliver high-impact results worthy of Treasury investment.

I am voting No. Does this really need Treasury funding? Could it not be funded privately? There’s no clarity on the regulatory framework, nor jurisdictional compliance. The risks—legal, financial, and reputational—are high, and liability is unclear.

I am voting Yes. This proposal spans multiple critical initiatives that directly support Cardano’s long-term robustness and innovation at the protocol level. The work is transparent, well-scoped, and aligned with the ecosystem’s strategic direction. In contrast to many high-cost proposals, this one demonstrates clear technical value, accountability, and ecosystem alignment. It is exactly the kind of work the Treasury should be supporting at scale.

I am voting No. While the idea of a Builder DAO has merit in supporting long-term innovation, this proposal lacks the foundational elements necessary for responsible Treasury funding—there is no clear governance structure, member selection process, or sustainable funding model. It does not explain how builders will be evaluated or how this initiative would complement rather than duplicate Catalyst and other funding pathways. The top-down approach and lack of community-led decision-making raise concerns about decentralization and transparency. Given the extremely high budget request and absence of concrete operational detail, I cannot support this initiative.

I am voting Yes. These tools provide vital support for Java developers working with Cardano, enabling broader language accessibility and fostering integration across enterprise and backend systems. Continued maintenance and improvements will help ensure long-term stability and usability for a growing segment of the developer community. Given the modest cost and high utility, this proposal is a sensible and strategic investment in Cardano’s multi-language development ecosystem.

I am voting No. While Eternl is a popular wallet, this proposal primarily funds operational costs rather than development or innovation, raising concerns about whether Treasury resources are being used sustainably. Additionally, Eternl is not open-source, limiting transparency, community contribution, and long-term decentralization. Treasury funds should prioritize open, collaborative infrastructure and foundational tooling that directly supports ecosystem growth—this proposal does not meet that standard.

I am voting Yes. Plutarch plays a valuable role in advancing Cardano’s smart contract ecosystem. Continued maintenance and enhancement of this tool will benefit developers working on high-assurance applications and support innovation in smart contract design.

I am voting yes. The scope and ambition of this project—if successful—could significantly expand the value of Cardano. Given the potential upside, I believe this is a calculated risk worth taking with Treasury funds.

I am voting No. While I support the goal of increased node diversity, I was swayed by the concerns raised by another dRep: the proposer currently has nine active projects in Catalyst, including three related to this TypeScript node in Fund 11, which have already received ₳376,000 out of ₳800,000 requested. With substantial funding still pending or in progress through Catalyst, it is difficult to justify an additional large Treasury allocation at this time.

I am voting No. The ecosystem already benefits from multiple well-maintained explorers—some of which operate without Treasury support. Funding AdaStat risks creating unfair advantages and distorting healthy competition in a decentralized ecosystem. Treasury funds should be reserved for uniquely strategic or underserved infrastructure—this proposal does not meet that threshold.

I am voting No. This proposal lacks sufficient detail to justify the cost and does not clearly explain why a full rewrite is necessary. There is limited transparency around deliverables, timelines, or how this effort aligns with existing work funded through other proposals or by Ledger itself. Given the high cost and the absence of a compelling, community-reviewed technical rationale, I do not believe this proposal meets the standard for responsible Treasury funding.

I am voting No. This proposal adds to an already fragmented landscape of node implementations without clearly articulating how it uniquely serves the ecosystem. Developers already face confusion about which node to use, and introducing another specialized option risks further fragmentation. The narrow scope and lack of clear differentiation do not justify the ₳220k ask, especially when this kind of focused development would be more appropriately funded through Project Catalyst. The Treasury should prioritize high-impact, scalable infrastructure with clear ecosystem alignment—this proposal does not meet that bar.

I am voting No. While Intersect was founded to support decentralized governance, it has not meaningfully represented the DRep community or demonstrated adequate transparency or accountability. Key governance decisions have lacked legitimacy. The proposal’s budget remains vague, particularly around staffing and board-related expenses, and fails to justify its scale. Until Intersect undergoes structural reform—including on-chain board elections and a clear, community-aligned mandate—I cannot support full community funding for its operations.

I am voting Yes. The Summit is a flagship event for the ecosystem—critical for global visibility, community engagement, and cross-sector collaboration. However, the proposal’s inclusion of “regional tech events” lacks sufficient detail, making it difficult to assess scope, impact, or cost-effectiveness. Additionally, for a request of this magnitude, clearer milestones and accountability structures are necessary to ensure responsible execution. Despite these concerns, the strategic importance of the Summit itself justifies support, with the expectation that future proposals will deliver greater transparency and specificity.

I am voting Yes. Lucid is a widely adopted JavaScript/TypeScript library that enables seamless interaction with Cardano smart contracts and wallets, making it a key tool for developers building dApps on the platform. Continued maintenance and evolution of Lucid are essential to support compatibility, improve functionality, and keep pace with protocol upgrades. Administering the effort through Intersect adds a layer of governance and transparency, helping to ensure accountability. Given Lucid’s importance to the developer ecosystem and the reasonable cost of the proposal, this is a well-justified investment of Treasury funds.

I am voting No. While supporting open-source contributors is a worthy goal, this proposal lacks a focused and transparent strategy for long-term sustainability. It does not clearly define how funding decisions will be made, how work will be prioritized, or how outcomes will align with Cardano’s evolving needs. The vague structure risks dispersing funds without measurable impact or accountability, and the centralization of funding authority in a small committee undermines principles of decentralization and community governance. At ₳5.88 million, this is one of the largest single requests to date, yet it offers minimal detail on oversight or deliverables. I cannot support such a high-cost proposal without a rigorous, transparent framework that ensures responsible use of Treasury resources.

I am voting Yes, with hesitation. While the proposed work is undeniably important and aligned with Cardano’s long-term goals—particularly in areas of protocol evolution, scalability, and governance—the scale and structure of the request raise concerns. Multi-year budgets reduce flexibility and oversight, and the sheer size of the funding allocation must be weighed carefully against the finite nature of the Treasury. That said, IOR’s proven track record and the strategic importance of sustained research to Cardano’s roadmap justify support. I expect future iterations of such proposals to emphasize modularity, milestone-based funding, and closer integration with transparent community review.

I am voting Yes on the proposal to withdraw ₳424,800 for Hardware Wallets Maintenance, administered by Intersect. Hardware wallets are a critical component of Cardano’s security and user sovereignty, providing a safe and trusted way to interact with the blockchain. This proposal ensures the continued maintenance, compatibility, and improvement of hardware wallet support across key platforms.

I am voting Yes on the proposal to withdraw ₳220,914 for “Pallas: Sustaining Critical Rust Tooling for Cardano.” Pallas is an essential piece of foundational infrastructure that enables developers to interact with the Cardano protocol using the Rust programming language. Maintaining and improving this tooling is crucial for supporting a diverse and resilient developer ecosystem, especially as Rust continues to gain popularity for blockchain development. This proposal helps ensure long-term stability, accessibility, and growth of the Cardano ecosystem through well-maintained, open, and performant core tooling. I view this as a strategically important and well-justified investment.

I am voting Yes on the proposal to withdraw ₳220,914 for “UTxO RPC: Sustaining Cardano Blockchain Integration.” This project addresses a critical infrastructure gap by providing a reliable and scalable RPC layer tailored to Cardano’s eUTxO model. It improves accessibility for developers and integrators who are familiar with conventional RPC interfaces, thereby lowering the onboarding barrier and fostering broader ecosystem adoption. The requested budget is reasonable relative to the value delivered, and the proposal outlines a clear path toward sustainability and impact. Supporting this initiative will enhance interoperability and usability for a wide range of applications.

I am voting Yes on the proposal to withdraw ₳1,161,000 for the zkFold ZK Rollup, administered by Intersect. This project represents a meaningful step toward scaling Cardano through zero-knowledge rollups, a technology that can significantly increase throughput while preserving decentralization and security. The proposal is well-structured, aligned with the broader strategic goal of Layer 2 expansion, and backed by credible contributors. Administering the project through Intersect provides a governance anchor within the ecosystem, helping ensure accountability and transparency. Given the potential impact on network scalability and developer usability, I view this as a high-value use of Treasury funds.

I am voting Yes on the proposal to withdraw ₳1,300,000 to fund the Blockfrost Platform community budget. Blockfrost provides critical infrastructure that enables developers to build on Cardano without having to run and maintain their own nodes, significantly lowering the barrier to entry and accelerating ecosystem growth. This proposal outlines a broad commitment to making the service freely available to the community, which directly supports decentralized application development and experimentation. Given its proven utility, wide adoption, and the potential to amplify developer activity across the ecosystem, I believe this funding represents a high-leverage investment of Treasury resources.

I am voting No on the proposal to withdraw funds for “Tempo for Cardano Governance – Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025.” While governance tooling is important, this proposal presents an overly high operational budget without sufficient justification or demonstrated cost-efficiency. It raises a broader concern about whether ongoing operational expenses—like hosting, maintenance, and staffing—should be funded by the Treasury at all, rather than focusing Treasury resources on ecosystem development and innovation. Additionally, the proposal lacks a clear, enforceable commitment to open-source licensing and transparency, which are essential for community governance tools. Without strong guarantees around accessibility, reuse, and decentralization of the platform, I cannot support this request.

I am voting No on the proposal to withdraw ₳45,217 from the Treasury for MLabs’ maintenance and enhancement of Cardano.nix. While I recognize the importance of infrastructure tooling like Cardano.nix, this proposal lacks the strategic urgency or ecosystem-wide justification to merit direct Treasury funding. The requested work—focused on maintenance, enhancements, and documentation—is valuable but better suited for Project Catalyst, where iterative tooling improvements can be more directly aligned with developer needs and community feedback. Treasury funds should be reserved for initiatives with broad, long-term protocol impact and clear governance alignment. This proposal, while well-intentioned, does not meet that threshold at this time.

I am voting No on the proposal to withdraw ₳700,000 from the Cardano Treasury to fund a ZK bridge administered by Intersect. While the development of zero-knowledge interoperability is conceptually aligned with Cardano’s long-term goals, this proposal appears premature and potentially duplicative of ongoing efforts by Input Output Global (IOG). Without clear differentiation or coordination with IOG’s roadmap, this initiative risks fragmentation and wasteful overlap. Furthermore, the proposal does not establish a compelling or time-sensitive justification for immediate funding, nor does it outline transparent governance, execution milestones, or long-term maintenance plans. Given the Treasury’s finite lifespan, large discretionary outlays must meet a high bar of strategic clarity and ecosystem consensus. I am not opposed to supporting a ZK bridge in the future, but it should follow a clearer demonstration of need, coordination, and timing. For now, this proposal does not warrant approval.

Deliverables are vague. Not fully open source.

While I deeply value the intention behind sustaining and expanding open-source governance infrastructure for Cardano, I am voting No on this proposal primarily because it fails to meaningfully integrate or harmonize with the development of Tempo.vote.

Tempo.vote has emerged as a lightweight, efficient, and highly usable interface for ADA holders and DReps alike. It demonstrates clearer design, improved delegation flows (particularly for hardware wallet users), and a stronger focus on transparency and accessibility for end-users. Despite this, the GovTool proposal does not recognize Tempo.vote as a foundational pillar in the broader governance UX ecosystem, nor does it propose coordinated development pathways or shared architecture.

Cardano’s governance tooling should be modular, interoperable, and responsive to actual community usage patterns. A continued siloed approach—where parallel tools are developed independently without shared planning, funding, or architectural coherence—risks fragmentation, wasted treasury spending, and stagnation in UX innovation.

Until proposals like this actively align with promising ecosystem tools like Tempo.vote and build toward an interoperable, composable governance UX stack, I believe treasury funding should be withheld. I strongly encourage a revised proposal that recognizes Tempo.vote not just as a dependent or adjacent application, but as a core strategic component of Cardano’s governance infrastructure.

This proposal advances Cardano’s decentralization and resilience by funding Amaru—an open-source, Rust-based, modular block-producing node. The requested ₳1.5M aligns with a previously approved budget, is transparently managed via audited smart contracts, and adheres to constitutional and financial guardrails. Supporting Amaru strengthens node diversity, ecosystem neutrality, and long-term infrastructure sustainability.

Although 350k seems high to me, I think it important not to hold up the ability for Cardno budget requests. I could see there maybe being an emergency, like a security issue, where having a buffer of funds may be helpful.

Although 300k seems high to me, I think it important not to hold up the ability for Cardno budget requests. I could see there maybe being an emergency, like a security issue, where having a buffer of funds may be helpful.

While I'm supportive of the idea of making staking more profitable, I think it is too early to reduce the treasure tax. I think if the proposal had been to reduce to 15% instead of 20% I may have been supportive. For now I think it is more important to have a well-funded treasury.

It gives me great satisfaction to cast my vote on behalf of those who delegated to me in favor of adopting the Cardano Constitution. An enormous amount of work by countless people went into creating this document and it marks a very important milestone for the Cardano ecosystem. May it serve well for decades and centuries.