Governance ReviewNo. 16Epochs 570 to 57213 Jul 2025 to 28 Jul 2025
Amaru is paid ₳1.5M, and Intersect files 39 requests for ₳275.0M
Amaru received ₳1.5M in Cardano's first treasury withdrawal through on-chain governance. Intersect also submitted 39 requests totalling ₳275.0M, moving its ecosystem budget into a series of individual funding decisions. DReps cast 2,350 votes in epoch 571 as voting got under way.
Amaru’s ₳1.5M withdrawal is ratified and paid
Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2025 was ratified at the start of epoch 570, and at the start of epoch 571 the ledger paid its ₳1.5M out of the treasury, the first treasury withdrawal enacted since on-chain governance began. The stored tally shows 74.5% of DRep power behind it, on 198 yes votes to 6 no and 11 abstain, ₳3.98B of power for it against ₳21.1M, and it includes two yes votes cast in epoch 570, after the ratification. All seven committee members voted yes, two in epoch 568 and five in epoch 569.
The ₳1.5M went to five contract addresses of Amaru, an alternative block producing node for Cardano written mainly in Rust, which sits under PRAGMA, a not-for-profit association. Four hold the budgets of the scopes run by Matthias Benkort, Arnaud Bailly, Pi Lanningham and Damien Czapla, and the fifth a contingency reserve the four share. In the initial setup, which the project plans to replace once its own contract has finished its audit, paying ada out of a contract needs three of four authorizations until the end of 2025. After that date no ada can be paid out, and any ada holder can send what is left back to the treasury.
The review of epochs 564 to 569 sets out what each scope costs and quotes YUTA, EMURGO and Yoroi W₳llet, who voted yes, and TriangleForces, who voted no, all in epochs 566 to 568. SASA_nagamaru_ながまる voted yes in epoch 569, writing that the proposal rests on a budget already approved and that under PRAGMA several development teams have shared “responsibilities, code, and financial structures” in public. Agora, the DRep run by Rodrigo Pacini, abstained in the same epoch because the proposal sets no quantitative targets “such as test coverage percentage, SPO adoption, or blocks produced” and does not address documentation and onboarding for pool operators.
Intersect files 39 requests for ₳275.0M
In epoch 570 Intersect filed 39 treasury withdrawal requests for ₳275.0M, 37 of them in one transaction and two on their own, each with its own vote. They draw on the budget that closed at the start of epoch 564, which names Intersect as the administrator of all 39 proposals it lists. Together they come to less than the ₳275,269,340 that budget listed, because two were cut at their vendors’ request: the Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions request from ₳1,119,333 to ₳889,500, to avoid overlapping with other proposals, and the Input Output Research request from ₳26,848,000 to ₳26,840,000.
The largest are ₳96.8M for the core engineering request of Input Output Engineering, ₳69.5M for the community funding request, the Catalyst proposal by Input Output, ₳26.8M for Input Output Research and ₳15.8M for Intersect itself. The smallest is ₳45,217 for MLabs to maintain and enhance Cardano.nix.
The ten largest of the 39 withdrawal requests filed in epoch 570
In millions of ada requested
Each document sets the same delivery terms: a contract between the vendor and Cardano Development Holdings, administered by Intersect, fixes the milestones, acceptance criteria, payment amounts and delivery dates, and a third party assurer is expected to sign off each milestone. The withdrawn ada waits in a treasury reserve contract managed by Intersect until the legal contract is prepared and the vendor is ready. The transfer into the project’s own contract needs two of three Intersect admins, one of Intersect’s two leadership roles and two of the five outside entities on the oversight committee: Sundae Labs, the Cardano Foundation, Dquadrant, Xerberus and NMKR. A disbursement from the reserve contract itself needs two of three admins, both leadership roles and three of the five.
All 39 requests were still open at the close of epoch 572, with voting ending at the start of epoch 577 and 67% of DRep power needed for each. The committee had not cast a vote on any of them by then. YUTA voted yes on the core engineering request in epoch 571 and asked that next time bundled proposals get “a temperature check vote for each item”.
The GovTool and Tempo.Vote budgets stay open
Two info actions for governance tools were still open at the close, and each document says a treasury withdrawal would follow. Cardano GovTool Budget - 12 months full active maintenance and development asks for ₳1.15M for twelve months of maintenance and development by the Cardano Govtool Consortium, whose builders are ByronNetwork, WeDeliver, LidoNation and Dquadrant, with voting ending at the start of epoch 574. Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025 asks for ₳380,000 over six months for Tempo.Vote, a voting app for phones that runs its own node and indexer, to be administered by Selfdriven, with voting ending at the start of epoch 576.
DReps cast 2,350 votes in epoch 571
DReps cast 2,350 votes in epoch 571, the most in any epoch since epoch 508, and 1,413 in epoch 572, replaced votes included. Counting only the votes still standing at the close, epoch 571’s came from 140 distinct DReps, since a DRep voting on all 39 requests casts 39 votes. Across the window 200 distinct DReps cast a final vote, while 838 held delegated power at epoch 572, also the most since epoch 508. The count with a vote in the previous twelve epochs rose from 317 at epoch 570 to 332 at epoch 572.
The power delegated to DReps read ₳5.31B at epoch 570 and ₳5.26B at epoch 572, the ten largest holding 46.6% of it at the end. The treasury reading rose ₳6.8M to ₳1.81B across the window, its highest since epoch 508, although ₳1.5M left it at the start of epoch 571. ₳348.5M of the ₳350M ceiling for the period ending with epoch 604 was still unused, because a request counts against it only once it is paid.
Decided in this window
| Action | Amount | Outcome | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2025 | ₳1.5M | Enacted 571 | 74.5% |
Open at the close of the window
41 actions, open the full list
n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 570
- ₳5.31B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 572
- ₳5.26B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 3,995
- DReps whose final vote fell in the window
- 200
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 570
- ₳1,807.2M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 572
- ₳1,814.0M
- DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
- What Amaru's withdrawal pays for and how its contracts release money, the delivery terms the 39 requests share and why two of them are smaller than their budget lines, and what the two tool budgets ask for are read from their own documents, named under the sources below. The ceiling in force runs to the end of epoch 604, which is not the end epoch the site registry carries today: a later action extended the period.
- The stored tally on Amaru's withdrawal includes two yes votes cast in epoch 570, after the ratification, so it is not exactly the tally the ratification rested on. That the withdrawal is the first enacted since on-chain governance began rests on the site's withdrawal data, which starts at epoch 508.
- None of the 39 requests and neither tool budget is decided here, so this edition gives no share for them, and the table marks their tallies as read after the window closed. Amounts in the table are the withdrawal figures stored on chain. The reasons quoted are the published rationales of the voters named, cited under the sources below, and say nothing about voters who published none.
- A vote count is not a count of voters. The 2,350 votes of epoch 571 include superseded votes, and the 140 distinct DReps are those with a vote from that epoch still standing at the close, since a DRep voting on all 39 requests casts 39 votes. Per epoch DRep counts exclude votes without a block time.
- Consumption of the ceiling counts enacted withdrawals only. A ratified request that has not been paid yet has consumed nothing, which is why ₳348.5M of ₳350M remained at epoch 572 with ₳275.0M of requests pending. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options.
Sources and further reading
12 sources, open the list
- YUTA voted yes on the core engineering request in epoch 571, writing that the proposal charges a fair price, and asking that next time bundled proposals be subject to a temperature check vote for each item or be verified or created by entities, consortia or individuals the DReps select. the rationale of YUTA on the core engineering request
- SASA voted yes on the node withdrawal in epoch 569, writing that it rests on a previously approved budget, uses smart contract fund management with multi signature controls, and funds a modular, resource efficient node written in Rust under the PRAGMA framework, where several development teams share responsibilities, code and financial structures publicly. the rationale of SASA on the node withdrawal
- TriangleForces voted no on the node withdrawal in epoch 567, writing that valuing a full time equivalent at 200,000 dollars a year is disproportionate against industry benchmarks for comparable roles and projects an image of excess rather than stewardship. the rationale of TriangleForces on the node withdrawal
- Agora, the DRep run by Rodrigo Pacini, abstained on the node withdrawal in epoch 569, writing that the proposal lacks quantitative targets such as test coverage percentage, adoption by pool operators or blocks produced, and that documentation and onboarding for pool operators are not addressed. the rationale of Agora on the node withdrawal
- The paid withdrawal funds Amaru, an alternative block producing node for Cardano written mainly in Rust, which sits under PRAGMA, a not for profit association. It splits the ₳1.5M across five contract addresses: one for each scope run by Matthias Benkort, Arnaud Bailly, Pi Lanningham and Damien Czapla, and a contingency reserve the four share. In the initial setup, to be replaced once the project's own contract has finished its audit, a disbursement needs three of four authorizations until the end of 2025, no ada can be disbursed after that date, and from then any ada holder can sweep what is left back to the treasury. the document behind the paid withdrawal
- The 39 requests draw on the aggregate budget that closed at the start of epoch 564, which asked for ₳275,269,340 across 39 proposals, names Intersect as the administrator of all of them, and whose largest lines are for Input Output Engineering, the Catalyst proposal by Input Output, Input Output Research, Intersect itself, Cardano Builder DAO and Tweag. the document behind the aggregate budget
- Each of the 39 requests carries the same delivery terms: milestones, acceptance criteria, payment amounts and delivery dates set in a contract between the vendor and Cardano Development Holdings, administered by Intersect, a third party assurer expected to review and sign off each milestone, the same passage standing in the documents of all 39, and the withdrawn ada held in a treasury reserve contract managed by Intersect and moved into a project specific contract once the legal contract is prepared and the vendor is ready. The transfer into a project contract needs two of three Intersect admins, one of the two Intersect leadership roles and two of the five outside entities on its oversight committee, Sundae Labs, the Cardano Foundation, Dquadrant, Xerberus and NMKR, while a disbursement from the reserve contract needs two of three admins, both leadership roles and three of the five. the document behind one administered request, whose delivery terms the others repeat
- The exhibitions request was reduced before filing from the ₳1,119,333 the agreed budget listed to ₳889,500, which its document says was done at the vendor's request to avoid overlapping with other proposals before the community. the document behind the exhibitions request
- The research request was reduced before filing from the ₳26,848,000 the agreed budget listed to ₳26,840,000, at the vendor's request. the document behind the research request
- The ceiling in force caps withdrawals at ₳350M for the period from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604. the document behind the ceiling in force
- The document behind the GovTool budget, from the Cardano Govtool Consortium, whose builders are ByronNetwork, WeDeliver, LidoNation and Dquadrant alongside users of its code and individual contributors, asks for ₳1.15M for twelve months of active maintenance and development, says the funding the tool had was about to run out, and says a positive reception of this info action would be followed by a separate treasury withdrawal action. the document behind the GovTool budget
- The document behind the Tempo budget asks for ₳380,000 over six months for Tempo.Vote, a voting application aimed at mobile phones that runs its own Cardano node and indexer, ₳200,000 for infrastructure and ₳180,000 for development, and says the budget and the treasury withdrawal that would follow it are to be administered by Selfdriven. the document behind the Tempo budget