Governance ReviewNo. 15Epochs 564 to 56913 Jun 2025 to 13 Jul 2025

Intersect's ₳275M ecosystem budget closes at 65.4%

Intersect's ₳275M budget for 39 proposals closed with 65.4% DRep support despite objections to deciding the package in one vote. Amaru then filed Cardano's first treasury withdrawal request under its separate node budget, asking for ₳1.5M to fund development.

₳1.5M

asked for by Amaru in epoch 566, the first treasury withdrawal request since on-chain governance began

65.4%

of DRep power behind Intersect's ₳275.3M budget for 39 proposals when it closed at the start of epoch 564

₳279.5M

less power delegated to DReps at epoch 565 than at epoch 564, when the total had reached ₳5.47B, its highest since epoch 508

₳311.1M

less power delegated to YUTA at epoch 569 than at epoch 563, while the total fell ₳104.9M

AdaStat, EMURGO and Yoroi vote yes on Intersect’s budget

Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 275M ada Administered by Intersect closed at the start of epoch 564 with 65.4% of DRep power behind it, on 193 yes votes to 63 no and 13 abstain, ₳3.51B of power for it against ₳0.71B. The budget, proposed on behalf of Intersect and the Cardano Budget Committee, lists 39 proposals worth ₳275,269,340 that all name Intersect as administrator, and each of them still needs a treasury withdrawal action of its own. Six committee members found the budget constitutional, and Input Output noted that its affiliate Input Output Engineering has a proposal in it. The Cardano Japan Council abstained, writing that Intersect is “both the recipient and the overseer of a significant portion” of the budget and that this limits oversight of the funds Intersect keeps.

AdaStat wrote that the step “mostly adds delays and confusion” and voted yes “to let projects move forward”. EMURGO called it “a constitutionally required checkpoint” whose passage is a prerequisite for any withdrawal, and Yoroi W₳llet pointed to the multisig wallets, milestone tracking and due diligence under Intersect as administrator. The review of epochs 557 to 560 quotes the earlier votes of YUTA, the Eternl DRep Committee, CardanoYoda and SASA.

Dave, Cerkoryn and hix_coffeepool vote no

Dave voted no, writing that the signalling vote was “not conducted fully on-chain” and that bundling 39 proposals “forces DReps into a binary, all-or-nothing choice”. Cerkoryn found ₳275M “large for a first cycle”, and hix_coffeepool☕️ wrote that large withdrawals in a short time could harm the value of ada.

Amaru asks for ₳1.5M under its node budget

Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2025 was filed in epoch 566 for ₳1.5M, the first treasury withdrawal request since on-chain governance began. It draws on the ₳1.5M budget for Amaru that closed at the start of epoch 563, covered in the review of epochs 561 to 563, and not on Intersect’s budget, which excludes every proposal that went on chain on its own. Amaru is a block producing node for Cardano under PRAGMA, and the request lists four members of its maintainer committee as authors, Matthias Benkort, Arnaud Bailly, Pi Lanningham and Damien Czapla.

It splits the sum across five contract addresses: ₳300,000 for the ledger and overall architecture, ₳300,000 for consensus and simulation testing, ₳500,000 for ad hoc work and middleware integrations, ₳100,000 for project management, public relations and marketing, and ₳300,000 as a contingency reserve, a quarter of the other four together. Its text says the scope owners themselves are paid from outside the withdrawal. Since contributor payroll would run out within weeks and the project’s own treasury contract was still being audited, the funds would first be held in a contract Sundae Labs developed, audited by MLabs and TxPipe.

YUTA voted yes in epoch 566, writing that the request “directly corresponds to the DRep-approved roadmap” and that its cost breakdown “appears efficient”. EMURGO voted yes in epoch 567, calling it “a groundbreaking milestone for funding an alternative node implementation”, and Yoroi in epoch 568, writing that an alternative node reduces reliance on a single Haskell-based node. TriangleForces voted no in epoch 567, finding pay of 200,000 dollars a year per full time equivalent “disproportionate when benchmarked against industry standards”.

GovTool and Tempo.Vote ask for maintenance budgets

Cardano GovTool Budget - 12 months full active maintenance and development, filed in epoch 567 by the Cardano Govtool Consortium, whose builders are ByronNetwork, WeDeliver, LidoNation and Dquadrant, asks for ₳1.15M for twelve months of work on the applications used to register as a DRep, delegate, submit proposals and vote. Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025, filed in epoch 569, asks for ₳380,000 over six months for Tempo.Vote, a voting app for phones that runs its own node and indexer, to be administered by Selfdriven. Voting ends at the start of epoch 574 on the first and at the start of epoch 576 on the second.

Delegation to DReps falls ₳279.5M in epoch 565

The power delegated to DReps reached ₳5.47B at epoch 564, the highest since epoch 508, and read ₳5.19B at epoch 565, ₳279.5M less. Across epochs 563 to 569 the total fell ₳104.9M, while the power delegated to YUTA fell ₳311.1M, from ₳714.4M to ₳403.3M, the largest decline for any DRep over those epochs. The readings give YUTA’s power only at those two epochs and do not show which delegations moved or where to. The ten largest DReps held 47.1% of the power at epoch 564 and 44.3% at epoch 565.

The power delegated to DReps, epochs 544 to 569

In billions of ada, the two default options excluded

Delegated power reached ₳5.47B at epoch 564, fell ₳279.5M in the next epoch and read ₳5.26B at epoch 569.

The treasury reaches ₳1.80B with no withdrawal paid

No action was open in epochs 564 and 565, and no vote was cast in either. Across the window DReps cast 316 votes, pools 10 and committee members 8, 334 in all with superseded votes included, and 194 distinct DReps cast a final vote. The treasury reading rose ₳21.1M to ₳1.80B by epoch 569, the highest since epoch 508, and none of the ₳350M the ceiling allows through the end of epoch 604 had been paid out.

Decided in this window

Action	Outcome	DRep yes
Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 275M ada Administered by Intersect	Closed 564	65.4%

Open at the close of the window

Action	Status	DRep yes
Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2025	Voting ends at the start of epoch 573	n/a
Cardano GovTool Budget - 12 months full active maintenance and development	Voting ends at the start of epoch 574	n/a
Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025	Voting ends at the start of epoch 576	n/a

n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 564: ₳5.47B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 569: ₳5.26B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included: 334
DReps whose final vote fell in the window: 194
Treasury, at the start of epoch 564: ₳1,781.9M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 569: ₳1,803.0M

DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. The committee votes on the budget are given as findings on its constitutionality.
What the budget lists, what Amaru's request pays for and what the GovTool and Tempo.Vote budgets ask for are read from their own documents, named under the sources below. That Amaru's request is the first treasury withdrawal request since on-chain governance began rests on the mainnet proposal list, which holds no earlier one. The reasons quoted are the published rationales of the voters named, cited under the sources below, and say nothing about voters who published none.
The 65.4% behind the budget is its final tally: its voting ended at the start of epoch 564 and every vote on it was cast before then. The three actions open at the close are decided after the window, so no share is given for them, and the votes quoted on Amaru's request carry the epoch they were cast in.
The delegation readings give the total per epoch and each DRep's power at epochs 563 and 569, not where individual delegations went, so no movement between DReps or to the default options is claimed. The figure excludes the predefined delegation options.
Votes cast is every vote of epochs 564 to 569 across all three roles, superseded votes included, and excludes votes without a block time. No treasury withdrawal had been enacted up to epoch 569.

Sources and further reading

23 sources, open the list

Yoroi voted yes on the aggregate budget, writing that it presents a clear structure for signalling support for 39 proposals while preserving accountability in how treasury funds are released, with multisig wallets, milestone tracking and due diligence under Intersect as administrator. the rationale of Yoroi on the aggregate budget
YUTA voted yes on the aggregate budget with conditions to be met before any withdrawal, writing that withdrawals must be performed in reasonably granular chunks, that any unreasonably aggregated withdrawal would be immediately voted no, that proposals should be reviewed by the relevant committee with the results attached, and that large multi part proposals should be broken down and put to a DRep vote item by item. the rationale of YUTA on the aggregate budget
EMURGO voted yes on the aggregate budget, calling it a constitutionally required checkpoint whose passage is a prerequisite for any treasury withdrawal, and noting Intersect's role as administrator with smart contract fund flows and audit requirements. the rationale of EMURGO on the aggregate budget
The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the aggregate budget, writing that the proposals on its list can potentially get funding, that each withdrawal will need 67%, which is restrictive enough, and that the budget action is just pro forma to further the process the constitution requires. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the aggregate budget
AdaStat voted yes on the aggregate budget, writing that the step mostly adds delays and confusion since 67% is already needed in the final vote, but that since it is part of the process now it votes yes to let projects move forward. the rationale of AdaStat on the aggregate budget
SASA voted no on the aggregate budget, writing that the spending ceiling should be defined first and proposals then submitted in smaller categorised groups so that DReps can vote responsibly on each, and that in this era how the community funds matters as much as what it funds. the rationale of SASA on the aggregate budget
CardanoYoda voted no on the aggregate budget, writing that it strongly opposes bundling all proposals into a single package, that in the off chain signalling it had supported 35 proposals, and that 14 projects it did not support were in the bundle, an imbalance that made the bundled approach unacceptable. the rationale of CardanoYoda on the aggregate budget
Dave voted no on the aggregate budget, writing that the total is too high, that the signalling vote was not conducted fully on chain, that bundling 39 proposals into one vote forces a binary all or nothing choice, and that the participation figures the proposal cites cannot be verified without on chain data. the rationale of Dave on the aggregate budget
hix_coffeepool☕️ voted no on the aggregate budget, writing that some proposals may bring value but that the amounts must be questioned, and that large withdrawals in a short timeframe could harm the value of ada, so allocations should be kept minimal. the rationale of hix_coffeepool☕️ on the aggregate budget
Tempo.Vote voted no on the aggregate budget, writing that DReps should vote on individual proposals rather than an omnibus, and that many of the proposals included do not reach the vote needed to cross the 50% voting power threshold. the rationale of Tempo.Vote on the aggregate budget
Cerkoryn voted no on the aggregate budget, writing that ₳275M feels large for a first cycle under a still maturing process, that 39 proposals in one budget add administrative overhead when several may struggle to reach the 67% withdrawal threshold, and that a more modest budget would allow the procedures to be refined. the rationale of Cerkoryn on the aggregate budget
The Cardano Japan Council abstained on the aggregate budget, writing that the proposal outlines oversight for funds disbursed to external organisations, but that Intersect is both the recipient and the overseer of a significant portion of the budget, which limits the oversight of funds it retains itself. the rationale of the Cardano Japan Council on the aggregate budget
Input Output, voting as a committee member in epoch 563, found the aggregate budget constitutional, writing that the procedure and aims it describes do not violate the constitution, and noted that its affiliate Input Output Engineering submitted a budget proposal included in it and would be eligible for treasury funding under a vendor contract. the rationale of Input Output as a committee member on the aggregate budget
YUTA voted yes on the node withdrawal request in epoch 566, writing that it directly corresponds to the DRep-approved roadmap, that the project had been socialised extensively with broad support, that it has the qualities of a public good, and that the cost breakdown is clear and appears efficient. the rationale of YUTA on the node withdrawal request
EMURGO voted yes on the node withdrawal request in epoch 567, calling it a groundbreaking milestone for funding an alternative node implementation through a transparent and auditable process, expressing confidence in the PRAGMA association behind it, and noting the inclusion of an independent auditor. the rationale of EMURGO on the node withdrawal request
Yoroi voted yes on the node withdrawal request in epoch 568, writing that an alternative node reduces reliance on a single Haskell-based node, that intermediary smart contracts and on chain metadata make the treasury transactions trackable and auditable, and that the budget is efficient and transparent. the rationale of Yoroi on the node withdrawal request
TriangleForces voted no on the node withdrawal request in epoch 567, writing that valuing a full time equivalent at 200,000 dollars a year is disproportionate when benchmarked against industry standards for comparable roles and projects an image of excess rather than stewardship. the rationale of TriangleForces on the node withdrawal request
The withdrawal request describes Amaru as a block producing node for Cardano under PRAGMA and is signed by the four scope owners of its maintainer committee, Matthias Benkort, Arnaud Bailly, Pi Lanningham and Damien Czapla. It asks for ₳1,500,000 split across five script addresses: ₳300,000 for the ledger and overall architecture, ₳300,000 for consensus and simulation testing, ₳500,000 for ad hoc work and middleware integrations, ₳100,000 for project management, public relations and marketing, and ₳300,000 held as a contingency reserve, 25% of the sum of the others. Its text notes that the scope owners themselves are paid from outside this withdrawal, and that the withdrawal follows the previously approved budget proposal for the node. On administration it says the project's own treasury contract is still being audited and that contributor payroll expires in the coming weeks, so it starts with a simplified setup on the solution developed by Sundae Labs, audited by MLabs and TxPipe, and migrates to its own once ready. the document behind the withdrawal request
The document behind the GovTool budget, from the Cardano Govtool Consortium, whose builders are ByronNetwork, WeDeliver, LidoNation and Dquadrant, describes GovTool as the open source set of applications that serves as the main interface for registering as a DRep, delegating, submitting proposals and voting, and asks for ₳1.15M for twelve months of maintenance and development. the document behind the GovTool budget
The document behind the Tempo.Vote budget describes a voting application aimed at phone users that runs its own Cardano node and indexer rather than relying on a third party, asks for ₳380,000 for six months, ₳200,000 of it infrastructure and ₳180,000 development, and names Selfdriven as the administrator of the budget and the withdrawal that would follow it. the document behind the Tempo.Vote budget
The aggregate budget is proposed on behalf of Intersect and the Cardano Budget Committee, asks for ₳275,269,340 across 39 proposals that all named Intersect as their administrator, says each withdrawal must be approved through a separate treasury withdrawal action, and states that proposals which proceeded directly on chain outside the bundle were excluded from it. the document behind the aggregate budget
The ceiling in force runs from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604 and caps withdrawals over that period at ₳350M. the document behind the ceiling in force
The mainnet proposal list of Koios, filtered to treasury withdrawal actions and ordered by block time, returns the Amaru withdrawal request, proposed in epoch 566, as the earliest, followed by requests proposed in epoch 570. the earliest treasury withdrawal actions in the Koios mainnet proposal list