Governance ReviewNo. 13Epochs 557 to 5609 May 2025 to 29 May 2025
Intersect files a ₳275.3M budget of 39 proposals
Intersect submitted a ₳275.3M budget combining 39 proposals into a single vote. CardanoYoda and SASA objected to the bundle, while YUTA supported it on conditions that included breaking subsequent withdrawals into smaller amounts so DReps could assess the payments separately.
The budget bundles 39 proposals from an off chain DRep poll
Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 275M ada Administered by Intersect, filed in epoch 557 on behalf of Intersect and the Cardano Budget Committee, asks for ₳275,269,340 for 73 epochs from the close of its vote. It bundles 39 proposals into one decision. The four largest are ₳96.8M for core development by Input Output Engineering, ₳69.5M for Input Output’s Catalyst proposal for community innovation funding, ₳26.8M for Input Output Research and ₳15.8M for Intersect, which would administer the budget. The other 35 include maintenance, marketing, events, developer tooling and governance work. Its deadline was the start of epoch 564.
The document cites the roadmap information action of March 30, covered in the review of epochs 548 to 553, as the foundation the budget was built to deliver. A total of 194 proposals were submitted, and DReps voted on them in an off chain poll with their live stake, more than ₳3.8B of it, which the document puts at over 70% of actively delegated stake. Of the 40 proposals that cleared 50% of the participating stake, 39 named Intersect as administrator and went into the bundle. The bundle leaves out proposals filed on chain on their own.
The budget pays nobody by itself: each payment needs its own treasury withdrawal action, and every withdrawal has to fit within the ceiling in force at the time. Before a withdrawal is filed, each proposer has to pass identity, business and sanctions checks, and Intersect may decline the administrator role for a proposal that fails them. Payments from the escrow contract can be paused if contractual terms are breached.
CardanoYoda and SASA vote no, YUTA votes yes on conditions
Votes cast in epoch 557, the budget’s first epoch, carried ₳208.0M of DRep power against it and ₳82.3M for it. CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool) voted no that epoch, writing that it had supported 35 proposals in the off chain poll but that 14 proposals in the bundle were ones it had not supported, which made the package “unacceptable”. Tempo.Vote, voting no the same epoch, wrote that many of the bundled proposals had not drawn the ₳2.6B of voting power needed to cross 50%. SASA_nagamaru_ながまる voted no in epoch 558, writing that the ceiling should come first and proposals then “in smaller, categorized groups”, and that “it’s not just about what we fund” but how.
Votes cast in epoch 558 carried ₳1,378.2M for the budget and ₳87.0M against. YUTA, the DRep with the most delegated power at epoch 560, voted yes in epoch 558 with conditions for the withdrawals to follow: they “must be performed in reasonably granular chunks”, and large proposals with several parts should be broken down and put to a DRep vote item by item. The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes the same epoch and called the budget “just pro forma”, since each withdrawal would still need 67%.
The ₳200M ceiling stands at 43.9% at the close
2025 Cardano NCL, filed in epoch 554 in a document that names no author, asks that treasury withdrawals from epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604 total no more than ₳200M. That is the period of the ₳350M ceiling covered in the review of epochs 554 to 556, and the document states that in a conflict it supersedes any earlier ceiling covering the same year. It argues that the first ceiling should be low while budget and audit processes are still being worked out and the effect of selling that much ada is untested, and that a limit for the following year can be set once there is experience. As of the close of epoch 560, its last epoch of voting, it stood at 43.9% of DRep power, against the more than 50% of active voting DRep stake its document names as the bar.
Votes cast on the ₳200M ceiling in epochs 554 to 556 had carried ₳1.94B of DRep power for it and ₳0.64B against, and those cast in epochs 557 to 560 ₳0.39B for it and ₳1.54B against, superseded votes included. Six committee members found it constitutional, and the Eastern Cardano Council abstained in epoch 558.
The five largest no votes by delegated power at epoch 560 were all cast in these four epochs: Yoroi W₳llet in epoch 557, the Eternl DRep Committee and SIPO in epoch 558, EMURGO and the Cardano Foundation in epoch 560. EMURGO wrote that repeated attempts to redefine the cap risk critical funding not reaching projects, and that the ₳350M is a maximum, “not a fixed amount that must be fully utilized”. The Eternl DRep Committee wrote that ₳200M for the rest of the year “would delay fund allocation for projects other than IOG’s”. SIPO wrote that its no was grounded in enabling the ₳275M budget, which it described as already supported by a majority of DReps.
A ₳300M ceiling and three budgets stay open
Four information actions filed in epoch 556 stayed open, with voting ending at the start of epoch 563: Set a 300 million ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 563 to 635, Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget: Amaru Node Development 2025, 2025 Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 7.5M ₳ for community builders and Cardano Treasury DeFi Liquidity Budget. Hephaestus Stake Pool voted no on the liquidity budget in epoch 560 because its document did not match the hash filed on chain, writing that a corrected action would be submitted once this one expired.
687 votes on six open proposals, nothing paid
Across the four epochs DReps cast 609 votes, pools 69 and committee members 9, 687 in all with superseded votes included, and 199 distinct DReps cast a final vote.
DRep votes cast per epoch, epochs 537 to 560
With superseded votes included, across every proposal open in each epoch
The count of DReps with a vote in the previous twelve epochs stayed between 360 and 367, below the 409 of epoch 548. The power delegated to DReps rose ₳193.7M to ₳5.33B at epoch 560, held by 823 DReps, both the highest readings up to then. The treasury reading rose ₳12.9M to ₳1.76B, and no withdrawal had been paid against the ₳350M ceiling.
Open at the close of the window
| Action | Status | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 275M ada Administered by Intersect | Voting ends at the start of epoch 564 | n/a |
| 2025 Cardano NCL | Undecided at the close of epoch 560 | 43.9% |
| Set a 300 million ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 563 to 635 | Voting ends at the start of epoch 563 | n/a |
| Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget: Amaru Node Development 2025 | Voting ends at the start of epoch 563 | n/a |
| Cardano Treasury DeFi Liquidity Budget | Voting ends at the start of epoch 563 | n/a |
| 2025 Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 7.5M ₳ for community builders | Voting ends at the start of epoch 563 | n/a |
n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 557
- ₳5.14B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 560
- ₳5.33B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 687
- DReps whose final vote fell in the window
- 199
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 557
- ₳1,752.0M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 560
- ₳1,764.9M
- DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
- What the budget contains, how it was assembled and what the ₳200M ceiling argues are read from their own documents, named under the sources below. The site registry gives the endorsed ceiling an end epoch of 612, which is the effect of a later extension: the period both proposals describe runs to the end of epoch 604, and that is the figure used here.
- The ₳200M ceiling closes at the boundary that ends this window, so its stored tally is the state at the close of epoch 560 and nothing later. It is quoted without an outcome. The five other open rows are decided after this window, so no share is given for them from inside it.
- Vote power per epoch is DRep power at the epoch of the vote, superseded votes included. It records when power was cast, not how much support stood behind a proposal at any moment, and it is not a tally. The largest no votes are ranked by delegated power at epoch 560. The reasons quoted are the published rationales of the voters named, cited under the sources below, and say nothing about voters who published none. A DRep may change a vote until the deadline.
- Votes cast is every vote of epochs 557 to 560 across all three roles, superseded votes included, spread over six open proposals rather than one. DRep vote counts per epoch and the count of recently voting DReps exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options.
Sources and further reading
16 sources, open the list
- YUTA voted yes on the aggregate budget in epoch 558 with conditions to be met before any withdrawal, writing that withdrawals must come in reasonably granular chunks, that any unreasonably aggregated withdrawal would get a no, and that large multi part proposals should be broken down and put to a DRep vote item by item. the rationale of YUTA on the aggregate budget
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the aggregate budget in epoch 558, writing that the proposals on its list can potentially get funding, that each withdrawal will need 67%, which is restrictive enough, and that the budget action is pro forma to further the process the constitution requires. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the aggregate budget
- SASA voted no on the aggregate budget in epoch 558, writing that the spending ceiling should be defined first and proposals then submitted in smaller categorised groups so that DReps can vote responsibly on each, and that how the community funds matters as much as what it funds. the rationale of SASA on the aggregate budget
- CardanoYoda voted no on the aggregate budget in epoch 557, writing that it strongly opposes bundling all proposals into a single package, that in the off chain signalling it had supported 35 proposals, and that 14 projects it did not support were in the bundle, which made the bundled approach unacceptable. the rationale of CardanoYoda on the aggregate budget
- Tempo.Vote voted no on the aggregate budget in epoch 557, writing that DReps should be able to vote on individual budget proposals rather than an omnibus, and that many of the proposals included did not reach the 2.6B ada needed to cross the 50% voting power threshold. the rationale of Tempo.Vote on the aggregate budget
- EMURGO voted no on the lower ceiling in epoch 560, writing that repeated attempts to redefine the cap may delay governance processes and risk critical funding not reaching the projects that need it, and that the ₳350M already approved is the maximum that can be withdrawn, not a fixed amount that must be fully utilized. the rationale of EMURGO on the lower ceiling
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted no on the lower ceiling in epoch 558, writing that a ₳200M ceiling for the remainder of the year would delay fund allocation for projects other than those of IOG. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the lower ceiling
- SIPO voted no on the lower ceiling in epoch 558, writing that its position is grounded in enabling the ₳275M unified budget submitted by Intersect, which it described as already supported by a majority of DReps, that reducing the ratified ₳350M limit would undermine governance predictability, and that the limit is an upper ceiling rather than a spending requirement. the rationale of SIPO on the lower ceiling
- Hephaestus Stake Pool voted no on the liquidity budget in epoch 560, writing that an error in the submission meant the hash of the submitted proposal and of the accessible file did not match, and that the proposer had stated the intention to resubmit it once this action expired and the deposit was returned. the rationale of Hephaestus Stake Pool on the liquidity budget
- The budget is filed on behalf of Intersect and the Cardano Budget Committee and asks for ₳275,269,340 across 39 proposals, for a period of 73 epochs beginning when its voting closes, and names Intersect as the administrator who would oversee disbursement, where possible through a smart contract framework with a multi signature oversight body. Every individual payment still needs its own treasury withdrawal action and has to fit inside an active ceiling. Every proposer must pass identity, business and sanctions checks before any withdrawal action, Intersect reserves the right to decline or withdraw its administrator role if a proposal fails them, and an audit and pause payment capability allows funds to be paused if contractual terms are breached. the document behind the aggregate budget
- The same document records how the bundle was assembled: 194 proposals were submitted, DReps were polled off chain with their live stake, more than ₳3.8B of voting stake took part, over 70% of actively delegated stake, 40 proposals cleared 50% support and 39 of those named Intersect as administrator. It opens by citing the roadmap information action the community approved on March 30 as the foundation the budget was built to deliver, and it states that proposals which proceeded directly on chain outside the bundle were excluded from it. Its item list includes Midgard and zkFold. the aggregate budget, on how it was assembled
- The overlapping ceiling asks for ₳300M for the period from the start of epoch 563 to the end of epoch 635, on the reasoning that existing and pending limits only cover periods through the end of 2025 while many budget proposals run on twelve month timelines into 2026. the document behind the overlapping ceiling
- The node development budget asks for ₳1.5M of additional funding for the second half of 2025 for Amaru, a new block producing node for Cardano, and names the project's own maintainer committee as direct administrator, assisted by an on chain smart contract. the document behind the node development budget
- The community builders budget bundles the community proposals that met a support bar of ₳2.69B in the off chain poll, which its authors compute as a majority of the active registered voting stake rather than of the stake that voted, leaving out the founding entities. Its own item table lists Midgard and zkFold among them. the document behind the community builders budget
- The four largest items in the bundle are ₳96.8M for the Input Output Engineering core development proposal, ₳69.5M for the Catalyst proposal by Input Output for community innovation funding, ₳26.8M for Input Output Research and ₳15.8M for Intersect, the member organisation that would administer the budget, with the rest spread across maintenance, marketing, events, tooling and governance work. the aggregate budget, on its largest items
- The ₳200M ceiling names no author. It asks for ₳200M for the period from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604 and counts as agreed with more than 50% of the active voting DRep stake. It argues that models putting the previous year of treasury income near ₳350M are beside the point, that the community should not set its first ceiling high, that this is the first budget experiment, that budget and audit processes are still being worked out and the effect of selling that much ada in a short period is untested, and that a limit for the following year should be set once there is experience to go on. It also states that it supersedes any earlier ceiling covering the same year. the document behind the ₳200M ceiling