Governance ReviewNo. 12Epochs 554 to 55624 Apr 2025 to 9 May 2025
Intersect's ₳350M spending limit for Cardano closes at 73.4%
DReps endorsed a ₳350M treasury spending limit with 73.4% support, establishing Cardano's first limit under on-chain governance. SASA and AdaStat stressed that it was a maximum, while HOSKY opposed a figure it feared would become a target for spending.
Intersect’s ₳350M limit closes above its 50% bar
2025 Net Change Limit closed at the start of epoch 554 with 73.4% of DRep power behind it, on 201 yes votes, 123 no and 13 abstain. Yes votes carried ₳3.57B of power and no votes ₳0.92B. The action sets ₳350M as the most that treasury withdrawals may total from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604, the first such limit since on-chain governance began. By epoch 556 nothing had been withdrawn against it.
Intersect filed the action, and its document says the period was agreed with the Cardano Budget Committee. The document bases the amount on the treasury’s income of the previous year, ₳336.0M over epochs 459 to 531, and sets its own bar at more than 50% of the active voting DRep stake, the figure the constitution sets. The two year alternative, ₳300M for 2025 and ₳250M for 2026, had closed short of that bar at the start of epoch 553, as the review of epochs 548 to 553 sets out. Both proposals state that a budget request made before a limit is agreed is unconstitutional.
YUTA, SIPO and SASA vote yes, HOSKY no
SASA_nagamaru_ながまる voted yes, writing that the limit “is not a ‘must spend’ limit but a ‘can’t spend more than this’ limit” and that the budget proposed by Intersect came in below it. AdaStat voted yes because the sum “does not actually mean all this money will definitely be taken”, since DReps decide each withdrawal. The Eternl DRep Committee found ₳350M “higher than we would have preferred” and voted yes to get the budget process under way. EMURGO wrote that ₳350M gives the flexibility to respond to the business opportunities it expects regulatory developments to bring.
YUTA, the DRep with the most delegated power at epoch 556, voted yes in epoch 548 while preferring the two year alternative, because income in the current year is clearly lower than the year before. It wrote that no limit at all would be the worst outcome. SIPO had opposed ₳350M in favour of the same alternative and changed its vote to yes in epoch 553, writing that after that alternative fell short a second failure “would effectively halt all budget-related actions” for the year.
HOSKY voted no, writing that a limit equal to a whole year of treasury income “sends the wrong message” and “risks framing it as a target rather than a safeguard”. Cerkoryn voted no because a limit this high “risks incentivizing the community to withdraw funds up to the maximum”. InputEndorsers voted no, writing that ₳350M is roughly 14,000,000 ada above the previous year’s income and that a lower limit “would focus minds” in a first year when budget processes are at their weakest. hix_coffeepool☕️ abstained, writing that fewer withdrawals are better for decentralisation but that keeping unnecessary ada in the treasury is also unhealthy.
Intersect Constitutional Council finds the 73 epoch span unconstitutional
Five committee members found the limit constitutional, for a committee share of 83.3%. The Intersect Constitutional Council found it unconstitutional in epoch 553, because the text’s 72 epochs from the start of epoch 532 to the conclusion of epoch 604 are in fact 73 and run into the first week of the following year. The council wrote that the author at Intersect had confirmed a typing error, that choosing between the two readings was “outside of the Constitutional Committee power”, and that the proposal should be resubmitted. The Eastern Cardano Council abstained in epoch 551, writing that an information action that neither proposes a budget nor gauges sentiment on an action that could be enacted on chain is not one the committee may assess. The Cardano Japan Council voted yes in epoch 553 and recorded that three of its members held that a limit calls for a committee vote because it affects the budget, two would have abstained, and none found it unconstitutional.
DReps cast ₳1,894.0M of yes power in epoch 553
Yes votes cast in epoch 553, the last epoch of voting, carried ₳1,894.0M of DRep power, more than the ₳1,702.7M of those cast in epochs 547 to 552 together, superseded votes included. Six of the ten largest yes votes by delegated power at epoch 556 were cast in epoch 553: EMURGO, Yoroi W₳llet, CryptoCrow, Sebastien Guillemot セバ, SIPO and BTBF_XSP.
DRep power cast on the limit, by epoch of the vote
In millions of ada, superseded votes included
₳200M and ₳300M ceilings filed with three budgets
Five information actions filed in the window were still open at its close, one filed in epoch 554 with voting ending at the start of epoch 561 and four filed in epoch 556 with voting ending at the start of epoch 563. 2025 Cardano NCL, the one from epoch 554, asks for a ₳200M limit on withdrawals over the same period from epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604 and states that, in the event of conflict, it supersedes any earlier limit covering all or part of 2025. Set a 300 million ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 563 to 635 asks for ₳300M from the start of epoch 563 to the end of epoch 635, a period that shares epochs 563 to 604 with the ₳350M one, because budgets built on twelve month timelines run into 2026, and states that it would replace any previous limit.
Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget: Amaru Node Development 2025 asks for ₳1.5M for Amaru, a block producing node written mainly in Rust. The document at the link of Cardano Treasury DeFi Liquidity Budget asks for ₳50M over twelve months for stablecoin liquidity. 2025 Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 7.5M ₳ for community builders bundles the community proposals that cleared ₳2.69B of support in the off chain poll, leaving out those of the founding entities.
Power delegated to DReps passes ₳5B
The power delegated to DReps passed ₳5B at epoch 554 and read ₳5.10B at epoch 556, the highest up to then, held by 818 DReps, also the most up to then. The ten largest held 48.2% of it at epoch 554 and 48.1% at epoch 556. The window recorded 377 votes, superseded votes included, 338 from DReps and 39 from pools, with final votes from 191 DReps and 27 pools. The treasury read ₳1.75B at epoch 556, ₳8.7M above its epoch 554 reading and the highest up to then.
Decided in this window
| Action | Outcome | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Net Change Limit | Closed 554 | 73.3% |
Open at the close of the window
| Action | Status | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 Cardano NCL | Voting ends at the start of epoch 561 | n/a |
| Set a 300 million ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 563 to 635 | Voting ends at the start of epoch 563 | n/a |
| Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget: Amaru Node Development 2025 | Voting ends at the start of epoch 563 | n/a |
| Cardano Treasury DeFi Liquidity Budget | Voting ends at the start of epoch 563 | n/a |
| 2025 Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 7.5M ₳ for community builders | Voting ends at the start of epoch 563 | n/a |
n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 554
- ₳5.00B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 556
- ₳5.10B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 377
- DReps whose final vote fell in the window
- 191
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 554
- ₳1,739.0M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 556
- ₳1,747.7M
- DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
- The ₳350M limit comes from the site registry of spending periods, which lists this action as one of two that define it and holds no earlier period, the basis for calling it the first since on-chain governance began. Its end epoch there is 612, the effect of a later extension: the period this vote endorsed ran to the end of epoch 604, as the proposal itself states, and that is the figure used here. The document names no author and says the figure was agreed with the Cardano Budget Committee, so that Intersect filed it rests on the Lido Nation post cited below.
- Vote power per epoch is DRep power at the epoch of the vote, superseded votes included. It records when power was cast, not when support was won, and it does not reconcile to any final tally. The largest yes votes are ranked by delegated power at epoch 556.
- None of the five new proposals is decided here, so no share is given for any of them. What they ask for is read from their own documents, named under the sources below. The document at the liquidity budget's link ends with one line break more than the file whose hash was recorded on chain, and matches that hash without it. The reasons quoted are the published rationales of the voters named, cited under the sources below, and say nothing about voters who published none.
- Votes cast is every vote of epochs 554 to 556 across all three roles, superseded votes included. The DRep vote count per epoch excludes votes without a block time. Delegated power and the concentration figures exclude the predefined delegation options.
Sources and further reading
21 sources, open the list
- A Lido Nation post describes the ₳350M limit for 2025 as a governance action proposed by Intersect, a member based organization for the Cardano ecosystem, and the two year alternative as submitted by anonymous community members. Lido Nation, on who proposed the two limits
- YUTA voted yes on the limit in epoch 548, writing that it preferred the community led alternative of 300,000,000 ada for the year and 250,000,000 for the next, because income in the current year is clearly lower than the year before and a limit for the following year should be set at the same time, but that the worst outcome would be no limit at all, so it voted yes on both. the rationale of YUTA on the limit
- EMURGO voted yes on the limit, writing that the year is expected to bring significant regulatory developments and new business opportunities, and that ₳350M provides the flexibility to respond to them. the rationale of EMURGO on the limit
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the limit, writing that ₳350M is higher than it would have preferred for one year but that it is important to get the budget process under way to fund the teams working on Cardano. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the limit
- SASA voted yes on the limit, writing that it is set a little high but is a maximum withdrawal amount rather than an amount that must be spent, that the budget proposed by Intersect is below it, and that DReps decide each withdrawal separately. the rationale of SASA on the limit
- SIPO changed its vote on the limit to yes in epoch 553, writing that it had originally favoured the community alternative of 300,000,000 ada for the year and 250,000,000 for the next, but that after that proposal failed a second failure would leave no valid limit and halt all budget actions for the year. the rationale of SIPO on the limit
- AdaStat voted yes on the limit, writing that ₳350M is quite high but does not mean the money will be taken, since DReps decide each withdrawal, and that it is better to take an imperfect step than to stay stuck. the rationale of AdaStat on the limit
- HOSKY voted no on the limit, writing that a maximum equal to a whole year of treasury income is far too high without defined needs and sends the wrong message, that setting it this high risks framing it as a target rather than a safeguard, and that restraint should be signalled at the framework level. the rationale of HOSKY on the limit
- Cerkoryn voted no on the limit, writing that ₳350M is excessively high, that a limit at that level risks encouraging the community to withdraw up to the maximum, and that the governance process does not yet have the oversight to justify such withdrawals. the rationale of Cerkoryn on the limit
- InputEndorsers voted no on the limit, writing that the budgetary and governance processes are weakest and least efficient in the first year, that a lower limit would focus minds, and that the proposed ₳350M is roughly 14,000,000 ada higher than the treasury's actual income of 335,957,093 ada over the previous year. the rationale of InputEndorsers on the limit
- hix_coffeepool abstained on the limit, writing that minimising withdrawals is better for decentralisation but that keeping unnecessary ada in the treasury is also unhealthy, so neither yes nor no fit. the rationale of hix_coffeepool☕️ on the limit
- The Intersect Constitutional Council found the limit unconstitutional in epoch 553, writing that the proposal describes its period as 72 epochs from the start of epoch 532 to the conclusion of epoch 604, which is 73 epochs and runs into the first week of the following year, that the author of the proposal confirmed a typing error, and that resolving the ambiguity is outside the committee's power, so the proposal should be resubmitted without the error. the rationale of the Intersect Constitutional Council on the limit
- The Eastern Cardano Council abstained on the limit in epoch 551, writing that an information action that neither relates to a budget proposal nor gauges sentiment towards another type of governance action that could be enacted on chain is not one whose constitutionality the committee is empowered to assess. the rationale of the Eastern Cardano Council on the limit
- The Cardano Japan Council voted yes on the limit in epoch 553, writing that its members had first discussed whether an information action of this kind calls for a committee vote at all, that three members held it does because it affects the budget and two would have abstained, and that no member found it unconstitutional. the rationale of the Cardano Japan Council on the limit
- The endorsed proposal defines its period itself: ₳350M across what it describes as 72 epochs, from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604, which inclusive is 73 epochs, sized to the previous year of actual treasury income. It names no author, states that the period was agreed with the Cardano Budget Committee, that actual treasury income over epochs 459 to 531 was 335,957,093 ada, and that it counts as agreed at more than 50% of the active voting DRep stake, the figure the constitution sets. the document behind the endorsed limit
- The two year proposal states that the constitution requires a net change limit to be agreed before any budget request, and that a budget request made without one is unconstitutional. a limit proposal, on why a ceiling has to exist first
- The lower ceiling asks for ₳200M for the period from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604 and states that in the event of conflict it supersedes any prior limit covering all or part of 2025. It argues that the community should not set its first limit high while budget, audit and administration processes are still being worked out, and that a limit for the following year should be set once there is experience to go on. the document behind the lower ceiling
- The overlapping ceiling asks for ₳300M for the period from the start of epoch 563 to the end of epoch 635, on the reasoning that existing and pending limits only cover periods through the end of 2025 while many budget proposals run on twelve month timelines into 2026, and states that it would replace any previous limit if agreed. the document behind the overlapping ceiling
- The node development budget asks for ₳1.5M of additional funding for the second half of 2025 for Amaru, an open source block producing node written mainly in Rust and developed under a not for profit association of several Cardano companies. It names the project's maintainer committee as direct administrator of the budget, assisted by an on chain smart contract. the document behind the node development budget
- The document at the liquidity budget's anchor link asks for 50,000,000 ada over twelve months to increase stablecoin liquidity on Cardano, most of it to be disbursed to decentralized exchanges and lending protocols. the document at the liquidity budget's link
- The community builders budget bundles the community proposals that met a support bar of ₳2.69B in the off chain poll, which its authors read as the majority of active registered voting stake the constitution requires, and leaves out the proposals of the founding entities. It says it exists so that community builders who may not have the ₳100k deposit can get on chain approval. the document behind the community builders budget