Governance ReviewNo. 22Epochs 588 to 59011 Oct 2025 to 26 Oct 2025
The ₳50M stablecoin liquidity budget closes at 73.7%, the Cardano 2030 strategy draft at 26.2%
DReps endorsed the ₳50M stablecoin liquidity budget with 73.7% support, and all seven committee members found it constitutional. Cardano's 2030 strategy draft closed at 26.2%, with Yoroi and EMURGO abstaining to wait for the product committee's own submission.
All seven committee members find the liquidity budget constitutional
Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget closed at the start of epoch 589 with 73.7% of DRep power behind it, on 199 yes votes to 23 no and 12 abstain, ₳3.91B of power for it against ₳0.17B, and all seven committee members voting yes.
Its author, Nick Schaub, who signs as Elder Millenial, is one of the nine people it names for the interim committee that would run the fund. The budget asks for ₳50M over twelve months for a fund of ada and fiat backed stablecoins to place with decentralised exchanges and lending protocols as liquidity. The fund’s smart contract would need five of the nine signatures to spend, and a treasury organisation whose members include DReps could remove committee members or shut the fund down and return the money. Each month 15% of what the deployed money earns would go back to the treasury. The money would be drawn in two withdrawals, up to ₳500,000 for the legal framework and the contract, then ₳49.5M, of which ₳500,000 for converting ada and minting stablecoins and ₳49M for liquidity, and the review of epochs 582 to 584 describes the document in more detail.
Yoroi W₳llet wrote that deeper stablecoin liquidity would “strengthen the reliability” of the protocols built on Cardano and that the oversight and audits give the community “clear visibility and control”. EMURGO called liquidity in fiat backed stablecoins “critical for onboarding new users” and wrote that, “as one of the interim committee members”, it would see the fund administered responsibly. The Cardano Foundation voted yes “at this time” and set separate requirements for the two withdrawals: for the ₳500,000 one a legal structure, a conflict of interest policy and published criteria for choosing stablecoins and protocols, for the ₳49.5M one a fully developed and published governance and contract framework, a risk framework and an asset management strategy. It also disclosed that its chief technology officer, Giorgio Zinetti, is a member of the fund’s committee.
The Eternl DRep Committee wrote that its yes came “only narrowly” out of an internal discussion, over doubts that “this small amount of liquidity” would significantly improve activity, over how much work the board members would put in, and over a five of nine multisig it called “not sufficiently secure” for the sum. Sebastien Guillemot セバ abstained as “not the best expert on this topic” and asked whom the fund is for, large entities looking for yield or everyday users doing nothing with their ada.
₳1.82B of delegated power abstains on the 2030 strategy draft
Defining the Cardano 2030 Vision & Strategy closed at the start of epoch 590 with 26.2% of DRep power behind it, on 55 yes votes, 39 no and 43 abstain. ₳1.00B of delegated power voted yes and ₳0.37B voted no, while ₳1.82B abstained, more than both sides together. YUTA, holding ₳498.4M of delegated power at epoch 590, voted yes, calling the draft provisional and writing that it would vote for a better version if the product committee or others filed one.
The vote on the strategy draft, in delegated ada
Bars show the votes cast, in delegated ada
The document behind the action lists no author. It says the product committee of Intersect wrote the content and that a community member, not the committee or any of its members, submitted the action to gather feedback on chain, where the committee had collected it off chain until then. Ace Alliance, voting yes on the committee, described the submitter as “an anonymous community member”, and SIDAN Lab voted no in part because “the lack of author” added ambiguity. Tingvard, abstaining on the committee, wrote that submitting a governance body’s material while disclaiming any association with it introduces “a potential risk vector for confusion, misrepresentation, or even fraudulent activity”.
Yoroi, EMURGO and the Cardano Foundation abstain to wait for the product committee’s own version
Yoroi wrote that “an official governance action is already planned for the end of October” and that voting now “could lead to voter fatigue”. EMURGO wrote the same, citing the product committee, and added that voting on the current version would mean overlapping actions and “potentially incomplete inputs”. The Cardano Foundation called its abstention “a commentary on the submission process, not the content” and wrote that it would vote on the product committee’s final draft once it was submitted. The Eternl DRep Committee abstained over the content: the document had “a whole lot of repetition”, and its call for an actively managed treasury “depends heavily on trust in whoever manages those funds”. At epoch 590 these four DReps held ₳1.39B of delegated power between them.
CardanoYoda, SASA, AdaStat and KtorZ oppose the strategy draft
The two DReps with the most power among the no votes, CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool) and SASA_nagamaru_ながまる, cast their votes in epoch 584, and the review of epochs 582 to 584 quotes them. CardanoYoda objected to approving the vision separately from the strategy, SASA to targets such as $200M of base layer revenue without a calculation method. In epoch 588 AdaStat voted no against “this kind of proposal in general” and asked where the figure of $200M came from. Cerkoryn voted no in epoch 589, writing that the targets had “no clear ownership or accountability”.
On the committee Ace Alliance and the Cardano Japan Council voted yes. KtorZ voted no in epoch 589, writing that the document “is too ambiguous in its intent”, halfway between a constitution and a budget proposal, and could later be “weaponized to justify budgets” that skip due diligence. The Cardano Atlantic Council, Tingvard and the Eastern Cardano Council abstained, each writing that the action proposes no change on chain. The seventh member did not vote.
Committee pay and the Snek Foundation loan are filed
Four proposals were filed in epochs 589 and 590. Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581-653 is a ₳1M budget to pay five of the seven committee members up to ₳200,000 each over the 73 epoch term, signed by those five, the Cardano Atlantic Council, Tingvard, the Eastern Cardano Council, Ace Alliance and the Cardano Japan Council. KtorZ and Phil_uplc sought no pay. Loan ₳5,000,000 to Expand Cardano’s Global Listings is the Snek Foundation’s withdrawal against the loan budget endorsed in the review of epochs 585 to 587, at 2.44% a year, to be repaid in full within five years of the payment.
Ikigai’s deposit reimbursement asks for ₳103,000: the ₳100,000 deposit on Ikigai, the note of thanks of September 2024, which its submitter could not recover because of a bug in the node software, plus ₳3,000 for rewards lost since. Securing Generic Top-Level Domains for the Cardano Ecosystem asks for no money, only support for the Cardano Foundation’s application to ICANN, the body that assigns internet names, for the domain endings .ada and .cardano.
GovTool’s withdrawal stands at 56.0% at the close
Withdraw ₳1,150,000 for GovTool 12 months active maintenance and development had its last epoch of voting in epoch 590. As of the close of epoch 590 it stood at 56.0% of DRep power, against the 67% a treasury withdrawal needs, with five committee members for it and the Eastern Cardano Council against.
Nothing is paid from the treasury, and ₳78.0M of the ₳350M ceiling stays unused
The window recorded 509 votes, 488 from DReps, 5 from pools and 16 from committee members, with final votes from 167 distinct DReps. Epoch 590 carried 300 of the DRep votes, more than epochs 588 and 589 together. The power delegated to DReps read ₳5.62B at epoch 590 across 859 DReps, the ten largest holding 49.1% of it. The treasury reading rose ₳8.2M to ₳1.62B. Nothing had been paid out of it since epoch 578, and ₳78.0M of the ₳350M ceiling, which runs to the end of epoch 604, remained unused.
Decided in this window
| Action | Outcome | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget | Closed 589 | 73.7% |
| Defining the Cardano 2030 Vision & Strategy | Closed 590 | 26.2% |
Open at the close of the window
| Action | Amount | Status | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581-653 | Voting ends at the start of epoch 596 | n/a | |
| Loan ₳5,000,000 to Expand Cardano's Global Listings | ₳5.0M | Voting ends at the start of epoch 597 | n/a |
| Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit. | Voting ends at the start of epoch 597 | n/a | |
| Securing Generic Top-Level Domains for the Cardano Ecosystem | Voting ends at the start of epoch 597 | n/a | |
| Withdraw ₳1,150,000 for GovTool 12 months active maintenance and development | ₳1.2M | Undecided at the close of epoch 590 | 56.0% |
| CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.3 | Voting ends at the start of epoch 593 | n/a |
n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 588
- ₳5.60B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 590
- ₳5.62B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 509
- DReps whose final vote fell in the window
- 167
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 588
- ₳1,609.6M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 590
- ₳1,617.8M
- DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out of the denominator, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
- An abstention is a cast position, not an absence and not a no. It removes weight from the denominator rather than adding it to either side, so a large block of abstaining power changes what a percentage is a share of. Nothing here treats it as opposition.
- The reasons quoted for votes are the published rationales of the DReps and committee members named, cited under the sources below, and say nothing about voters who published none.
- Power figures are rounded to two decimals of a billion, so the yes and no weights quoted do not add up to their own sum to the last digit. The power held by individual DReps is read at epoch 590 and may differ slightly from the snapshot the tallies were counted on.
- What the two decided proposals and the four new ones ask for, and who is named as their author, is read from their own documents, named under the sources below. The four new proposals are not decided here, so the record holds no share for them from inside this window. The share given for the GovTool withdrawal is its tally as of the close of epoch 590, the last epoch of its vote.
- Votes cast is every vote of epochs 588 to 590 across all three roles, superseded votes included. Per epoch DRep counts exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options. The ceiling in force runs to the end of epoch 604, which is not the end epoch the site registry carries today.
Sources and further reading
27 sources, open the list
- Yoroi voted yes on the liquidity budget, writing that deeper and more reliable stablecoin liquidity would strengthen decentralised finance on Cardano, and that oversight by a treasury organisation and DReps with regular audits gives the community visibility and control. the rationale of Yoroi on the liquidity budget
- EMURGO voted yes on the liquidity budget, writing that deep liquidity in fiat backed stablecoins is critical for onboarding new users, that the proposal balances revenue for the treasury, legal structures and oversight with DRep participation, and that as one of the interim committee members it is committed to the fund being administered responsibly. the rationale of EMURGO on the liquidity budget
- The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the liquidity budget at this time, writing that the proposal does not yet answer all key challenges on governance, security and operations, setting out separate requirements for the two withdrawals, for the first of 500,000 ada among them details of the legal structure, a conflict of interest policy and published criteria for selecting stablecoins and protocols, for the second of 49,500,000 ada a fully developed and published governance and contractual framework with projections, named advisers and service providers, a risk framework and an asset management strategy, and acknowledging that its chief technology officer Giorgio Zinetti is a member of the administrating committee. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the liquidity budget
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the liquidity budget, writing that the decision had been discussed internally at length and only narrowly came out as a yes, with concerns that a small amount of liquidity would not significantly improve activity, that it was unclear how much work the board members would contribute, and that a five of nine multisig was not secure enough for the sum. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the liquidity budget
- Sebastien Guillemot abstained on the liquidity budget, writing that he supports the project directionally but that it is not a technical proposal, and asking whether ₳50M of liquidity would convince large entities looking for yield to move onto Cardano or whether the target is everyday users doing nothing with their ada. the rationale of Sebastien Guillemot on the liquidity budget
- Yoroi abstained on the strategy draft, writing that an official governance action on the same topic was already planned for the end of October, that voting now risked voter fatigue and overlapping actions, and that attention should go to the finalised version. the rationale of Yoroi on the strategy draft
- EMURGO abstained on the strategy draft, writing that according to the product committee of Intersect an official governance action on the topic was scheduled for the end of October, and that voting on the current version would mean overlapping actions and potentially incomplete inputs. the rationale of EMURGO on the strategy draft
- The Cardano Foundation abstained on the strategy draft, writing that its vote was a commentary on the submission process and not the content, and that it would vote on the product committee's final draft once submitted. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the strategy draft
- The Eternl DRep Committee abstained on the strategy draft, writing that the document had a great deal of repetition, that its call for an actively managed treasury depends heavily on trust in whoever manages the funds, and that the transaction targets depend on external market conditions. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the strategy draft
- YUTA voted yes on the strategy draft, writing that it could serve as a provisional vision and strategy, that a vision should keep evolving, and that it would vote for a better version if the product committee or others submitted one. the rationale of YUTA on the strategy draft
- SASA voted no on the strategy draft, writing that targets such as 200 million dollars of base layer revenue lacked a calculation method or ada price assumptions, that the document read like a wishlist rather than a prioritised plan, and that an actively managed treasury is a significant strategic shift needing a governance and risk framework first. the rationale of SASA on the strategy draft
- CardanoYoda voted no on the strategy draft, writing that it generally liked the document but that separating the approval of the vision from the approval of the strategy was a mistake, since both should be reviewed together. the rationale of CardanoYoda on the strategy draft
- AdaStat voted no on the strategy draft, writing that it is against this kind of proposal in general rather than this one in particular, and asking where the 200M figure among its targets comes from. the rationale of AdaStat on the strategy draft
- Cerkoryn voted no on the strategy draft, writing that it liked the inclusion of measurable targets but that there is no clear ownership or accountability for them, and that further refinement is needed. the rationale of Cerkoryn on the strategy draft
- SIDAN Lab voted no on the strategy draft, writing that the document is too ambiguous and that the lack of an author on the documents added ambiguity and uncertainty. the rationale of SIDAN Lab on the strategy draft
- KtorZ voted no on the strategy draft, writing that the document is too ambiguous in its intent, halfway between a constitution and a budget proposal and neither, that approving it could let it be used later to justify budgets that skip due diligence, and that it appeared to have been proposed without prior agreement with the product committee. the rationale of KtorZ on the strategy draft
- Ace Alliance voted yes on the strategy draft on the committee, finding it constitutional, writing that it comments only on constitutionality and not on the referenced document, and that the poll was submitted by an anonymous community member rather than by the product committee of Intersect that is authoring the document. the rationale of Ace Alliance on the strategy draft
- Tingvard abstained on the strategy draft, writing that information actions record non-binding signals without enacting any change and are neither constitutional nor unconstitutional, and that submitting material authored by the product committee while explicitly disclaiming any association with it introduces a potential risk vector for confusion, misrepresentation or even fraudulent activity. the rationale of Tingvard on the strategy draft
- The Cardano Atlantic Council abstained on the strategy draft, writing that the action is purely informational, meant to collect feedback from DReps on a proposed vision and roadmap document, and does not propose substantive governance changes. the rationale of the Cardano Atlantic Council on the strategy draft
- The Eastern Cardano Council abstained on the strategy draft, writing that as an information action that neither proposes a budget nor gauges sentiment on another type of action that could be enacted on chain, it falls outside what the committee is empowered to assess. the rationale of the Eastern Cardano Council on the strategy draft
- The liquidity budget lists Elder Millenial as its author, who also appears as Nick Schaub among the nine members of the interim committee it names. It asks for 50,000,000 ada over twelve months to build a fund of ada and fiat backed stablecoins, to be placed with decentralised exchanges and lending protocols to seed liquidity, held in a smart contract that needs five of the nine committee signatures to spend, with a treasury organisation of DReps able to remove committee members or shut the fund down and return the money. Each month 15% of the revenue would go back to the treasury, and the money would be drawn in two withdrawals, up to 500,000 ada for the legal framework and the contract, then 49,500,000 ada, of which 500,000 ada for converting ada and minting stablecoins and 49,000,000 ada for deploying liquidity. the document behind the liquidity budget
- The document behind the strategy draft lists no author. It states that the product committee created the content but that the governance action was submitted independently by a community member, not the committee or its members, to help gather feedback on chain where the committee had so far relied on off chain collection. the document behind the strategy draft
- The ceiling in force caps paid withdrawals at ₳350M for the period from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604. the document behind the ceiling in force
- The document behind the committee pay budget asks for 1,000,000 ada to compensate committee members serving from epoch 581 to 653. It states that it was built from discussion among the seven serving members, lists as its authors the five it would pay, the Cardano Atlantic Council, Tingvard, the Eastern Cardano Council, Ace Alliance and the Cardano Japan Council, and names KtorZ and Phil_uplc as not seeking compensation. Each of the five may request up to 200,000 ada through a single later withdrawal, into a separate smart contract per member from which it may draw once every six epochs in proportion to its service over the 73 epoch term. The other four members may pause withdrawals if the member no longer serves, and funds left six epochs after the term return to the treasury. the document behind the committee pay budget
- The document behind the listing loan request lists the Snek Foundation and Intersect as authors, names the loan budget by its id as the budget it follows, and asks for 5,000,000 ada to list SNEK on centralised exchanges, retail brokers and trading platforms, as a loan at 2.44% a year, with principal repayment commencing no later than the last day of year three, an independent audit at that point, and principal and interest repaid in full within five years of disbursement, administered by Intersect through a treasury contract framework. It states that a detailed cost breakdown, which several DReps had requested, is intentionally withheld to protect negotiations with exchanges and service providers. the document behind the listing loan request
- The document behind the deposit refund lists no author and asks for a budget of 103,000 ada: 100,000 ada for the deposit on Ikigai, a symbolic information action of September 2024 thanking those who had helped Cardano to that point, which its submitter could not recover because a bug in the node software permitted an unregistered stake key to be used, plus 3,000 ada for staking rewards and other opportunities lost since. It notes that Cardano in Oceania had included this reimbursement in its own budget action, which was not approved. the document behind the deposit refund
- The document behind the domain plan, with the Cardano Foundation as author, states that the Foundation seeks community support to apply to ICANN for the .ada and .cardano top level domains in the next application window in the first quarter of 2026, using only its own financial resources, and that it would publish figures on the operation of the domains and establish a community advisory group. the document behind the domain plan