Cardano's constitution v2.3 expires at 64.85%, GovTool's withdrawal at 56.0%

Constitution v2.3 expires at 64.85%

CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.3 expired at the start of epoch 593 with 64.85% of DRep power behind it, on 173 yes votes, 29 no and 10 abstain. A new constitution needs 75%.

One of its changes repeats CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.0, which had expired at the start of epoch 581 with 55.6%: removing the budget information action as a separate step before a treasury withdrawal. The constitution in force permits no withdrawal that is not made under a budget then in effect. As the review of epochs 579 to 581 describes, all seven committee members had found two requests to list SNEK on exchanges unconstitutional, six of them because no budget in effect covered them, the Cardano Japan Council over missing provisions for independent audits and a budget breakdown.

Against the constitution in force, v2.3 would also drop provisions its document calls aspirational or advisory, among them the codes of conduct for DReps and stake pool operators, and the obligation for the committee to adopt a code of conduct, which it calls an operational detail. It would add definitions for terms such as active voting stake and net change limit, and require a proposal’s documents to stay immutable after submission. Compared with v2.0, which set these duties only for withdrawals above ₳1M in a two year period, v2.3 would require independent auditors, annual reports, named administrators and separate auditable accounts for every withdrawal. The same comparison with v2.0 lists the explicit requirement to budget for audit costs as removed.

YUTA backs v2.3, Yoroi and EMURGO object to its audit wording

YUTA, whom Yoroi and EMURGO both thanked for leading the revision, voted yes, writing that it removes “non-binding expectations”, the budget information action and mandatory committee conduct rules. The Eternl DRep Committee thanked Yuta “for putting in the work” and wrote that v2.3 brings clarity on definitions and, by removing budget information actions, reduces the votes DReps have to cast. The Cardano Foundation wrote that v2.3 “strengthens accountability, improves clarity, and streamlines the governance process”.

Yoroi W₳llet wrote that the new phrasing on audits, “appoint independent auditors”, created “practical uncertainty over who is responsible for selection, funding, and timing”, and that letting custodians “vote or delegate” for the holders behind them, together with the shift from “owners” to “holders”, could “concentrate voting power among large custodial entities”. EMURGO named the same audit and custodian clauses and added that the revised net change limit “weakens the explicit link between approved budgets and treasury withdrawals”. Yoroi wrote that each point “could likely be addressed through clarification and community alignment”, and EMURGO that it remained ready to help refine those sections in future amendments.

Army of Spies voted no because the changes were still hard to track, with only one attached document showing them side by side. hix_coffeepool☕️ voted no because a constitution deserves “the same depth of discussion, inclusivity, and deliberative process” as the original convention.

On the committee, the Cardano Atlantic Council, Phil_uplc, the Cardano Japan Council, Tingvard and Ace Alliance voted yes. Tingvard found the revision constitutional but wrote that it had been drafted in a document “curated by a single individual”, without the structured forums the constitution envisions for amendments. The Eastern Cardano Council abstained because no public consultation phase or structured community forums had preceded the submission, and KtorZ abstained “due to lack of bandwidth”.

Yoroi, EMURGO and Army of Spies vote no in epoch 592

Yoroi, EMURGO and Army of Spies cast their no votes in epoch 592, the last epoch of voting, in which ₳1.11B of delegated power voted no. From its submission in epoch 586 to epoch 591, delegated power voting no on the revision had been at most ₳62.5M in any one epoch and ₳123.4M across the six epochs together. Each of these figures counts the votes of an epoch at the power they carried then, replaced votes included.

GovTool’s ₳1,150,000 withdrawal expires at 56.0%

Withdraw ₳1,150,000 for GovTool 12 months active maintenance and development expired at the start of epoch 591 with 56.0% of DRep power behind it, on 142 yes votes, 37 no and 11 abstain. A treasury withdrawal needs 67%. On the committee, Tingvard, the Cardano Atlantic Council, KtorZ, Ace Alliance and the Cardano Japan Council voted yes, the Eastern Cardano Council voted no and Phil_uplc did not vote.

The request follows Cardano GovTool Budget, the information action for the same sum covered in the review of epochs 573 to 575, and its document names that budget by id. GovTool is the set of open source applications used to register as a DRep, delegate, submit proposals and vote, maintained by the Cardano GovTool Consortium of ByronNetwork, WeDeliver, LidoNation and Dquadrant. Intersect would administer the money through a treasury smart contract, with anything unused going back to the treasury. The document itemises the sum: hosting and infrastructure, development of each part of GovTool priced in full time equivalents, ₳150,000 for contributions to its code and ₳100,000 for other open source governance tools built on its code and interfaces.

The Eternl DRep Committee abstained because “₳1,150,000 is too high” and wrote that it would vote yes on a revised proposal “closer to 50% of the current amount”. Sebastien Guillemot セバ voted no, writing that he did not think “the amount asked matches the value gov.tools brings to the ecosystem”. Dave voted no because the reported metrics, among them 50,000 unique users, were “not sufficiently supported by transparent data”, and wrote that a reduced budget would be welcome. EMURGO abstained to “observe how these operational improvements perform over time”.

Yoroi voted yes, writing that the withdrawal “faithfully aligns” with the budget it had supported and adds clearer delivery assurance and oversight through independent third parties. The Cardano Foundation voted yes, writing that “while the budget is large” the investment is justified, and that this level of funding “should not be considered a recurring annual expense”. YUTA voted yes, writing that governance “is in a very difficult situation” and that GovTool and wallet providers have to work together so that people can choose a DRep that matches their values.

The Eastern Cardano Council found the request unconstitutional because it allocated no ada for the “periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics” the constitution requires of a request for treasury ada. KtorZ and Ace Alliance found the requirement met, both citing the budget’s statement that part of the ₳100,000 committed by Intersect would cover periodic independent audits, and KtorZ wrote that the constitution asks for a provision for an auditor, not a named one.

Committee pay and the Snek Foundation loan stay open

Four proposals filed in epochs 589 and 590 were still open at the close, and the review of epochs 588 to 590 describes them: Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581-653, a ₳1M budget for five of the seven committee members, Loan ₳5,000,000 to Expand Cardano’s Global Listings, the Snek Foundation’s ₳5M withdrawal, Ikigai’s deposit reimbursement, a ₳103,000 refund, and Securing Generic Top-Level Domains for the Cardano Ecosystem, the Cardano Foundation’s domain plan.

443 votes, and no treasury withdrawal paid since epoch 578

The window recorded 443 votes, 428 from DReps, 6 from pools and 9 from committee members, with final votes from 152 distinct DReps. The power delegated to DReps read ₳5.63B at epoch 593 across 858 DReps, the ten largest holding 49.3% of it. The treasury reading rose ₳8.1M to ₳1.63B. No withdrawal had been paid out of it since epoch 578, and ₳78.0M of the ₳350M ceiling for the period ending with epoch 604 was still unused.