Governance ReviewNo. 24Epochs 594 to 59610 Nov 2025 to 25 Nov 2025

Cardano's ₳1M committee pay budget closes at 21.2%, with ₳1.69B abstaining

A ₳1M budget to pay five constitutional committee members closed with 21.2% DRep support and ₳1.69B of voting power abstaining. Yoroi and EMURGO supported compensation in principle but wanted a clearer justification for the amount. The Cardano Foundation wanted an accountability framework first.

21.2%
of DRep power behind paying the committee, on 48 yes votes to 105 no
₳1.69B
of delegated power abstained on the proposal, more than the yes or the no votes carried
290
DReps had cast a vote in the previous twelve epochs at epoch 596, the fewest since epoch 539
₳78.0M
of the ₳350M ceiling still unused at epoch 596, with nothing paid out since epoch 578

The committee pay budget asks up to ₳200,000 per member

Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581-653 asked for a ₳1M budget to pay members of the constitutional committee for the term from epoch 581 to epoch 653. Its document notes that pools are paid by the protocol and DReps may be paid by the ada holders who delegate to them, and that the constitution limits the committee to ruling on whether governance actions are constitutional, whatever its members think of them, work that takes research, deliberation, drafting and meetings across time zones. Without compensation from a neutral source, it argues, service risks being limited to those who can cover the cost themselves or are subsidised by another institution, which it calls an “ivory tower”.

The document is signed by the five members it would pay: the Cardano Japan Council, Tingvard, the Eastern Cardano Council, Ace Alliance and the Cardano Atlantic Council. It records that the action was built from discussion among all seven serving members, and that KtorZ and Phil_uplc are not seeking compensation. Each of the five could request up to ₳200,000 as part of a single later treasury withdrawal, which all five had to approve before it was submitted, with the money paid into a separate smart contract per member. Each member could draw from their contract once every six epochs, in proportion to the time served in the 73 epoch term. The other four could pause a member’s draws if that member stopped serving, and anything left six epochs after the term would go back to the treasury.

₳1.69B abstains on the budget, more than the yes or the no votes carry

The budget closed at the start of epoch 596 with 21.2% of DRep power behind it, on 48 yes votes, 105 no and 27 abstain. The yes votes carried ₳0.83B and the no votes ₳1.50B, and ₳1.69B of delegated power abstained. DRep votes cast in epoch 595, the last epoch of voting, carried ₳981.2M of abstaining power, against ₳55.2M for yes and ₳54.2M for no.

The vote on paying the committee, in delegated ada

Bars show the votes cast, in delegated ada

YesNoAbstain
Committee compensationCommittee compensation, Yes: 0.83BCommittee compensation, No: 1.50BCommittee compensation, Abstain: 1.69B21.2%
More ada abstained than voted no, and more voted no than yes. The bars show votes cast only, and the share also counts power that did not vote on the no side.

Yoroi and EMURGO support paying the committee and abstain over the ₳1M figure

Yoroi W₳llet and EMURGO, the two abstaining DReps with the most delegated power at epoch 596, both cast their abstentions in epoch 595. Yoroi wrote that it “strongly supports” committee members being compensated as the constitution provides, but that the requested ₳1M “lacks a clear explanation of how the total was derived and what underlying assumptions it represents”, and that a structured discussion among stakeholders should mature the proposal before a treasury withdrawal. EMURGO wrote that it is “highly supportive” of sustainable pay for the committee, that a session it had organised with Intersect at the summit in Berlin showed “a gap in how the proposer and the DReps interpret the clarity” of the figure, and that a common forum was needed before moving forward. SASA_nagamaru_ながまる abstained because of “a direct interest in this proposal”, writing that it could not stay neutral.

The Cardano Foundation and CardanoYoda vote no, YUTA votes yes on conditions

The Cardano Foundation voted no while supporting the principle, because the proposal “lacks an explanation of how the requested amount was calculated” and an accountability framework. It wrote that a public framework defining the committee’s duties, minimum participation standards and “conditions for non-payment should be established before a budget for compensation is approved”. CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool) voted no, writing that the proposal “was not preceded by any debate with DReps and the community” and that it “makes no sense to introduce compensation for one group of governance bodies without knowing how we will compensate DReps”. YUTA voted yes conditionally, writing that compensation should be provided as a matter of principle and that “the issue is the amount”. It asked the five members to set out in their treasury withdrawal their current and estimated effort by type of governance action, and how their service would differ with and without pay.

Three prospective recipients find the committee pay budget constitutional, two abstain

All five members the budget would pay cast a committee vote, and KtorZ and Phil_uplc, who sought no pay, cast none. The Cardano Japan Council voted yes in epoch 591, Ace Alliance in epoch 594 and the Eastern Cardano Council in epoch 595. Ace Alliance disclosed that it is a named beneficiary and wrote that its review “is limited to assessing its constitutionality”, with DReps assessing the merits. The Cardano Atlantic Council abstained in epoch 592 over “the conflict of interest, real or perceived”, while writing that the budget complied with the constitution. Tingvard abstained in epoch 595, writing that any judgment it made “would amount to reviewing our own prospective remuneration”.

The budget itself moves no money. Paying the five would take the treasury withdrawal its document describes, which needs 67% of DRep power and the committee’s approval, and none was filed in epochs 594 to 596. The Cardano Atlantic Council, one of the five, resigned from the committee in epoch 597, which the review of epochs 597 to 599 covers.

The Snek Foundation loan stands at 75.9% at the close

Voting on three more proposals ended at the start of epoch 597. As of the close of epoch 596, Loan ₳5,000,000 to Expand Cardano’s Global Listings, the Snek Foundation’s withdrawal to list SNEK on centralised exchanges, repayable with 2.44% interest a year within five years of the payment, stood at 75.9% of DRep power. Ikigai’s deposit reimbursement, ₳103,000 to make good a ₳100,000 deposit its submitter lost to a bug in the node plus ₳3,000 in lost rewards, stood at 68.2%. Securing Generic Top-Level Domains for the Cardano Ecosystem, the Cardano Foundation’s request for support to apply for .ada and .cardano at its own expense, stood at 73.8%. The review of epochs 597 to 599 covers all three decisions.

DReps with a recent vote fall to 290, the fewest since epoch 539

The window recorded 296 votes, 241 from DReps, 37 from pools and 18 from committee members, with final votes from 82 distinct DReps. The count of DReps with a vote in the last 12 epochs fell to 290 at epoch 596, the lowest reading since epoch 539. The power delegated to DReps read ₳5.65B at epoch 596 across 853 DReps, the ten largest holding 49.6% of it. The treasury reading rose ₳8.1M to ₳1.64B, with nothing paid out of it since epoch 578 and ₳78.0M of the ₳350M ceiling unused.

Decided in this window

ActionOutcomeDRep yes
Constitutional Committee Compensation Epochs 581-653Closed 59621.2%

Open at the close of the window

ActionAmountStatusDRep yes
Loan ₳5,000,000 to Expand Cardano's Global Listings₳5.0MUndecided at the close of epoch 59675.9%
Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit.Undecided at the close of epoch 59668.2%
Securing Generic Top-Level Domains for the Cardano EcosystemUndecided at the close of epoch 59673.8%

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 594
₳5.64B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 596
₳5.65B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
296
DReps whose final vote fell in the window
82
Treasury, at the start of epoch 594
₳1,634.0M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 596
₳1,642.0M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out of the denominator, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
  • An abstention is a cast position, not a boycott and not a no. The reasons quoted for abstentions and no votes are the published rationales of the DReps named, cited under the sources below, and say nothing about the DReps who published none.
  • What the proposal asked for, how it argued for it and which members sought compensation are read from its own document, named under the sources below.
  • The three actions closing at the boundary that ends this window are quoted as of that close and without an outcome. Voting on them ended at the start of epoch 597, so the tallies the record stores for them are the state at that close.
  • Votes cast is every vote of epochs 594 to 596 across all three roles, superseded votes included. Per epoch DRep counts exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options. The ceiling in force runs to the end of epoch 604, which is not the end epoch the site registry carries today.

Sources and further reading

15 sources, open the list
  • Yoroi abstained on the compensation proposal, writing that it strongly supports committee members being compensated as the constitution provides, but that the requested 1,000,000 ada lacked a clear explanation of how the total was derived and what assumptions it rests on, and that a structured discussion among stakeholders should mature the proposal before a withdrawal. the rationale of Yoroi on the compensation proposal
  • EMURGO abstained on the compensation proposal, writing that it is highly supportive of sustainable compensation for committee members, that a session it organised with Intersect at the summit in Berlin showed a gap between how the proposer and the DReps read the clarity of the figure, and that a common forum was needed before moving forward. the rationale of EMURGO on the compensation proposal
  • The Cardano Foundation voted no on the compensation proposal, writing that it supports the principle, but that the proposal lacked an explanation of how the amount was calculated and an accountability framework defining the committee's duties, minimum participation standards and conditions for non payment, which should come before a budget for compensation. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the compensation proposal
  • YUTA voted yes conditionally on the compensation proposal, writing that compensation should be provided as a matter of principle, that the issue is the amount, which many DReps feel is too expensive, and asking the members behind the proposal to set out in their treasury withdrawal the current and estimated effort by type of governance action and how their service would differ with and without pay. the rationale of YUTA on the compensation proposal
  • CardanoYoda voted no on the compensation proposal, writing that it had not been preceded by any debate with DReps and the community, that only five of seven members were requesting compensation, and that it made no sense to introduce compensation for one governance body without knowing how DReps would be compensated. the rationale of CardanoYoda on the compensation proposal
  • SASA abstained on the compensation proposal, writing that it has a direct interest in it and could not maintain neutrality. the rationale of SASA on the compensation proposal
  • Tingvard abstained on the compensation proposal over a conflict of interest, perceived or otherwise, writing that because it is listed as one of the beneficiaries any constitutional judgment it made would amount to reviewing its own prospective remuneration, while finding the action properly framed as a budget information action. the rationale of Tingvard on the compensation proposal
  • Ace Alliance voted yes on the compensation proposal and found it constitutional, disclosing that it is a named beneficiary of the budget and writing that its review is limited to assessing constitutionality, with DReps assessing the merits. the rationale of Ace Alliance on the compensation proposal
  • The Cardano Atlantic Council abstained on the compensation proposal, writing that the budget had been written to comply fully with the constitution but that it chose not to vote on its constitutionality because of the conflict of interest, real or perceived. the rationale of the Cardano Atlantic Council on the compensation proposal
  • The proposal asks for a budget of 1,000,000 ada to compensate committee members serving between epochs 581 and 653. Its argument is that pools are compensated on chain and DReps may be compensated by ada holders, while the committee is limited to ruling on constitutionality regardless of its own preferences, that doing so takes research, deliberation, drafting and meetings across time zones, and that without compensation from a neutral source service risks being limited to those who can subsidise the cost themselves or who are subsidised by another institution, which it calls an ivory tower. the document behind the compensation proposal
  • The same document is signed by the five members it would compensate, the Cardano Japan Council, Tingvard, the Eastern Cardano Council, Ace Alliance and the Cardano Atlantic Council, identifies each serving member by key, records that it was built from discussion among the seven serving members and that KtorZ and Phil_uplc do not seek compensation, and cites the constitution on compensation for committee members. It lets each of the five request up to 200,000 ada as part of a single treasury withdrawal that all five must approve before submission, paid into a separate smart contract per member, from which the member may withdraw once every six epochs in proportion to service time in the 73 epoch term. The other four members may pause withdrawals if the member no longer serves, and funds left six epochs after the term are swept back to the treasury. the compensation proposal, on who asked for what
  • The document behind the listing loan request, authored by the Snek Foundation and Intersect, describes a 5,000,000 ada loan rather than a grant for the Snek Foundation to list the community token SNEK on centralised exchanges, retail brokers and trading platforms, at 2.44% annual interest, with principal repayment to begin no later than the last day of year three, an independent audit at the end of year three setting the schedule for the balance, and the full loan with interest repaid within five years of disbursement, under a binding loan agreement administered by Intersect. It is filed as the withdrawal against the loan budget agreed earlier. the document behind the listing loan request
  • The document behind the deposit refund asks for 103,000 ada: the 100,000 ada deposit the submitter of the early note of thanks could not recover because a bug in the node accepted an unregistered stake key, plus 3,000 ada for staking rewards and other opportunities lost since. the document behind the deposit refund
  • The document behind the domain plan seeks community support for an application by the Cardano Foundation to register .ada and .cardano as generic top level domains in the next application window, using only its own financial resources. the document behind the domain plan
  • The ceiling in force caps paid withdrawals at ₳350M for the period from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604. the document behind the ceiling in force