Governance ReviewNo. 25Epochs 597 to 59925 Nov 2025 to 10 Dec 2025
The Cardano Atlantic Council resigns and leaves the committee one member short
The Cardano Atlantic Council's resignation left the constitutional committee below its seven-member minimum, blocking ratification of actions that needed its approval. The ₳5M Snek Foundation loan had already been ratified before the resignation and was paid in epoch 598.
The Cardano Atlantic Council resigns after the loan is ratified and before it is paid
The Cardano Atlantic Council resigned after the listing loan had been ratified but before it was paid.
At the boundary that opens epoch 597, Loan ₳5,000,000 to Expand Cardano’s Global Listings was ratified, with 75.9% of DRep power behind it and the committee in favour, Ace Alliance abstaining. At the start of epoch 598 the ledger paid the ₳5M out. It is the first treasury request structured as a loan rather than a grant. The ledger does not enforce repayment, which is governed by a loan agreement administered by Intersect. The borrower is the Snek Foundation, which wants the money to list SNEK on centralised exchanges and trading platforms, and the agreement has the loan repaid from Snek revenues at 2.44% a year within five years.
Between those two boundaries, inside epoch 597, the Cardano Atlantic Council resigned, identified by its key in the list of the seven serving members in the compensation proposal of the review of epochs 594 to 596.
The loan, the resignation and the replacement
Epochs in which each step happened
Why Yoroi, YUTA and the Cardano Foundation backed the loan, and why SIPO and HOSKY abstained
Yoroi W₳llet wrote that it establishes “a repayable Treasury loan with a defined 2.44% annual interest rate” and that the Snek Foundation had paid for listings on three large exchanges itself before. YUTA was blunter about what the contract holds: “there is no collateral or guarantor, so you still essentially need to trust the snek team”, and it voted yes because the team “has a clearly observable revenue track record on-chain”, which few teams in the ecosystem have. The Cardano Foundation wrote that its concerns from the budget stage had been “substantially resolved”.
SIPO called the loan model “a significant step toward treating Cardano’s treasury not merely as a grant pool, but as a public revolving fund”, and abstained because “institutionalizing support for one specific token risks creating an implicit ‘SNEK exception’” instead of a replicable framework open to future projects. HOSKY abstained because withholding a detailed cost breakdown for strategic reasons “feels like a cop out” that keeps delegators from judging the spend. On the committee, Ace Alliance abstained because members of its consortium had helped shape the off chain loan contract, and one of the constitutional questions was whether that contract properly implements the on chain terms.
With six members the committee cannot approve withdrawals or other actions needing its ruling
With six members the committee’s yes no longer counts. The protocol carries a parameter for the minimum committee size, set to seven, and while the number of active members is below it no governance action needing a committee ruling can be ratified at all. A treasury withdrawal, a parameter change, a constitution: all of them wait.
The loan was ratified before the resignation, so its payment in epoch 598 could proceed. What had not yet cleared that boundary was now stuck.
A committee seat, a ₳70M integrations budget, its withdrawal and a ceiling extension are filed
Add Constitutional Committee Member was filed in epoch 599 to put the number back to seven, with a member chosen by participating DReps in a snap election held between late November and early December. It asks pools as well as DReps, because a change to the committee always does, and its deadline was the start of epoch 606. The review of epochs 600 to 602 has the result.
Cardano Critical Integrations Budget was filed in epoch 597 and asks the community for ₳70M for an integration fund, to bring tier one stablecoins, institutional custody and wallet infrastructure, on chain analytics, cross chain bridges and pricing oracles onto Cardano, with Intersect holding the money and releasing it against signed agreements over up to 24 months and anything unspent going back to the treasury. Its text sizes the sum as the room left under the spending period’s ceiling rather than as a costed list, and it names the vendors only once each integration is done. Withdraw ₳70,000,000 for Cardano Critical Integrations Budget followed in epoch 599 as the payment against it, and says itself that it cannot go through unless the budget is endorsed first.
2025 Net Change Limit Extension, filed in the same epoch 597, asks to move the end of the spending period from the end of epoch 604 to the end of epoch 612, with everything spent since epoch 532 still counting against the same ₳350M. Its text spells out why: a withdrawal is paid one epoch after it is ratified, so the last boundary at which a payment could be ratified and still go out inside the period was the one into epoch 603, and the withdrawal depended on a budget whose vote would not close until the start of epoch 604. Without the extension the period would close with ₳73.0M of its ₳350M unused and the ₳70M request unpaid. The extension was still open at the close of epoch 599, and the review of epochs 603 to 605 has its result.
The Ikigai deposit refund closes at 68.2%, the domain plan at 73.8%
Ikigai’s deposit reimbursement closed at the start of epoch 597 with 68.2% of DRep power, on 158 yes votes to 13 no. It asks the community for ₳103,000 to make good the ₳100,000 deposit lost on the note of thanks the first edition covers, which a bug in the node let through with a stake key that could never reclaim it, plus ₳3,000 for the rewards forgone since. The extra ₳3,000 drew most of the comment. The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes while calling it “an annoying detail” and “a premium rewards amount” for fourteen months. On the committee the Cardano Japan Council abstained because the deposit was justified and the ₳3,000 “cannot necessarily be deemed constitutional”. AdaStat voted no for a different reason: the proposal did not say who was filing it or whether the original author wanted the money back.
Securing Generic Top-Level Domains for the Cardano Ecosystem closed at the same boundary with 73.8%, asking for support for an application, paid for by the Cardano Foundation itself, to register .ada and .cardano as internet domain endings, the part of an address after the last dot. YUTA wrote that with the Cardano Foundation paying “there is no merit” in voting no or abstaining, and the Eternl DRep Committee added that the domains “could be a net loss on your balance sheet” if demand is low. hix_coffeepool☕️ voted no, writing that use “would be limited to a small portion of the existing community” and that names could be registered by third parties for impersonation. The Cardano Foundation voted yes on its own proposal as a DRep, writing that it represents its delegators as well as itself, and most of the committee abstained, Tingvard writing that a poll of sentiment “carries no on-chain effect”. Both are signals: neither moves money on its own, and the refund would still need a withdrawal of its own.
The numbers
The window recorded 684 votes, 549 from DReps, 133 from pools and 2 from committee members, with final votes from 231 distinct DReps and 107 pools. The pool figure follows the committee proposal, which pools vote on. The power delegated to DReps read ₳5.59B at epoch 599 across 855 DReps, the ten largest holding 49.4% of it, and the count with a recent vote rose from 305 to 329. The treasury reading rose ₳2.6M to ₳1.65B, a smaller rise than usual because ₳5M left it in the same span, and ₳73.0M of the ₳350M ceiling remained.
Decided in this window
| Action | Amount | Outcome | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Loan ₳5,000,000 to Expand Cardano's Global Listings | ₳5.0M | Enacted 598 | 75.9% |
| Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit. | Closed 597 | 68.2% | |
| Securing Generic Top-Level Domains for the Cardano Ecosystem | Closed 597 | 73.8% |
Open at the close of the window
| Action | Amount | Status | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cardano Critical Integrations Budget | Voting ends at the start of epoch 604 | n/a | |
| 2025 Net Change Limit Extension | Voting ends at the start of epoch 604 | n/a | |
| Add Constitutional Committee Member | Voting ends at the start of epoch 606 | n/a | |
| Withdraw ₳70,000,000 for Cardano Critical Integrations Budget | ₳70.0M | Voting ends at the start of epoch 606 | n/a |
n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 597
- ₳5.56B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 599
- ₳5.59B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 684
- DReps whose final vote fell in the window
- 231
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 597
- ₳1,646.1M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 599
- ₳1,648.7M
- DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
- The order of events is taken from the record and nothing is inferred from it beyond the order. The loan was ratified at the boundary that opens epoch 597 and the resignation is dated to epoch 597, so the ratification came first. The site flags that decision as taken by a committee below its minimum size, which is a later roster applied to an earlier check, and no conclusion here rests on that flag.
- That the protocol requires seven members comes from the proposal filed to restore the number, which quotes the parameter, not from the snapshot: the snapshot holds no value for the minimum committee size at all.
- A loan is a loan because its proposal says so. The ledger paid out ₳5M and records no repayment obligation of its own, so the terms are a promise in a document rather than something the chain enforces.
- What the new proposals ask for is read from their own documents, named under the sources below. None of the four open at the close is decided here, so the record holds no share for them from inside this window, only tallies read afterwards.
- Votes cast is every vote of epochs 597 to 599 across all three roles, superseded votes included. Per epoch DRep counts exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options. The ceiling in force runs to the end of epoch 604 as its own proposal defines it, which is not the end epoch the site registry carries today.
Sources and further reading
23 sources, open the list
- Yoroi voted yes on the listing loan, writing that it establishes a repayable treasury loan with a defined 2.44% annual interest rate, that the borrower had self funded listings on three large exchanges before, and that milestone based disbursement through an audited treasury contract provides oversight. the rationale of Yoroi on the listing loan
- YUTA voted yes on the listing loan, writing that the contract has no collateral or guarantor, so the community still has to trust the team, and that the team has a revenue track record observable on chain, which few teams in the ecosystem have. the rationale of YUTA on the listing loan
- The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the listing loan, writing that its concerns from the budget stage had been substantially resolved and that the borrower and Intersect would resolve any residual concerns once the loan agreement was finalised. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the listing loan
- SIPO abstained on the listing loan, writing that it appreciates the innovation of a repayable, interest bearing treasury loan that treats the treasury as a revolving fund, but that institutionalising support for one specific token at treasury level risks creating an imbalance. the rationale of SIPO on the listing loan
- HOSKY abstained on the listing loan, writing that the proposal is constitutional and its structure sound, but that withholding a detailed cost breakdown for strategic reasons is a cop out that prevents delegators from evaluating whether it is a responsible use of treasury funds. the rationale of HOSKY on the listing loan
- Ace Alliance abstained on the listing loan on the committee because members of its consortium had been directly involved in shaping the off chain loan contract between the borrower and Intersect, and one of the constitutional questions was whether that contract properly implements the on chain terms. the rationale of Ace Alliance on the listing loan
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the deposit refund, writing that it was all for returning the funds, that adding 3,000 ada on top was an annoying detail, that the owner could have proposed the refund much earlier, and that the sum was a premium rewards amount for fourteen months. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the deposit refund
- AdaStat voted no on the deposit refund, writing that it supports refunding the deposit but did not know who was submitting the request or their relation to the original author, that the author had never directly asked for it, and that it would change its vote on confirmation from the author. the rationale of AdaStat on the deposit refund
- The Cardano Japan Council abstained on the deposit refund, writing that the claim for the 100,000 ada deposit is justified while the 3,000 ada portion cannot necessarily be deemed constitutional, and that opinions within the team were divided. the rationale of the Cardano Japan Council on the deposit refund
- YUTA voted yes on the domain plan, writing that acquiring the two domain endings is in the interest of the ecosystem and funded by the Cardano Foundation itself, so there was no merit in voting no or abstaining. the rationale of YUTA on the domain plan
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the domain plan, writing that the Cardano Foundation should consider that it could be a net loss on its balance sheet if demand for the domains is low or the price of individual domains too steep. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the domain plan
- hix_coffeepool☕️ voted no on the domain plan, writing that the likely use would be limited to a small part of the existing community, that community members might face pressure to register new domains, and that without identity verification high profile names could be registered by third parties for impersonation. the rationale of hix_coffeepool☕️ on the domain plan
- The Cardano Foundation voted yes on its own domain plan as a DRep, writing that the information action measures community support, that as a DRep it also represents its delegators, and that the application would cost the treasury nothing. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the domain plan
- Tingvard abstained on the domain plan, writing that it merely polls community sentiment, carries no on chain effect and is neither constitutional nor unconstitutional. the rationale of Tingvard on the domain plan
- The proposal filed to restore the committee states that the protocol parameter for the minimum committee size is 7, that governance actions needing a committee ruling cannot be ratified while the number of active members is below it, and that the new member was selected by participating DReps in a snap election hosted between late November and early December. the document behind the committee addition
- The compensation proposal of the previous window lists the seven serving members against their on chain key hashes, which identifies the member that resigned in epoch 597 as Cardano Atlantic Council. the compensation proposal, listing the members
- The loan proposal describes itself as the first loan based treasury request in Cardano governance, names the Snek Foundation as the borrower for an initiative to list SNEK on centralised exchanges, retail brokers and trading platforms, and states that the ₳5M would be repaid from Snek revenues at 2.44% a year, settled in full within five years. the document behind the loan
- The ceiling in force caps paid withdrawals at ₳350M for the period from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604. the document behind the ceiling in force
- The integrations budget asks for 70,000,000 ada for an integration fund covering tier one stablecoins, institutional custody and wallet infrastructure, on chain analytics, cross chain bridges and pricing oracles, states that the sum refers to the remaining funds available under the current net change limit, has Intersect administer the money with drawdowns only against signed agreements over a deployment of up to 24 months, returns unused funds to the treasury at the end of that period, and keeps the specific vendors confidential until each integration is completed. the document behind the integrations budget
- The integrations withdrawal states that it is submitted pursuant to the budget information action and can only be ratified if that budget is approved by DReps and the committee. the document behind the integrations withdrawal
- The extension proposes to move the end of the net change limit in force from the end of epoch 604 to the end of epoch 612, with all previous spending still counted against the same 350M ada, and explains that because a treasury withdrawal is enacted one epoch boundary after it is ratified, the last epoch in which a withdrawal could validly be ratified under the original period was epoch 603, so the timing was the reason for the extension. the document behind the ceiling extension
- The document behind the deposit refund asks for 103,000 ada: the 100,000 ada deposit the submitter of the early note of thanks could not recover because a bug in the node accepted an unregistered stake key, plus 3,000 ada for staking rewards and other opportunities lost since. the document behind the deposit refund
- The document behind the domain plan seeks community support for an application to register .ada and .cardano as generic top level domains in the next application window, using only the applicant's own financial resources. the document behind the domain plan