Governance ReviewNo. 26Epochs 600 to 60210 Dec 2025 to 25 Dec 2025

The Cardano constitutional committee is back to seven, and a proposal asks for an eighth

Cardano Curia filled the vacant constitutional committee seat in epoch 602, restoring the seven members needed for the committee to function. A separate proposal sought an eighth member to prevent another resignation from immediately blocking actions that required a committee ruling.

7
committee members at epoch 602, back at the protocol minimum after the seat was filled
79.4%
of DRep power behind filling the seat in the stored tally, votes after ratification included, on 173 yes votes and one no
321
stake pools voted yes on filling the seat and none voted no
₳73.0M
of the ₳350M ceiling still unused at epoch 602, with a ₳70M withdrawal request waiting

Cardano Curia takes the seventh seat

Add Constitutional Committee Member was ratified and took effect inside this window, and at the start of epoch 602 the committee had seven members again. The seat went to Cardano Curia, chosen by participating DReps in a snap election held from 26 November to 5 December, after the resignation of the Cardano Atlantic Council, which the review of epochs 597 to 599 covers, left the body one short of the seven the protocol requires. The proposal reports the audited result of that election: 88 DReps took part with ₳3.16B of stake behind them, and 33 of them, with ₳1.68B, chose Cardano Curia. The new member’s term runs to epoch 653, the same end as the seat it fills, and the other six seats are untouched.

The stored tally shows 79.4% of DRep power behind it, on 173 yes votes and a single no, and it includes votes recorded after ratification. 321 stake pools voted yes and none voted no. The stake share the record stores for that pool vote is 49.45%, below the 51% a committee change needs, which cannot be squared with a ratification that happened. The historical denominator may differ from the one behind that figure, or the figure may be wrong, and this edition does not have the reconstruction to say which. The record also dates some votes on the action, including that single DRep no, to epoch 601, after the ratification boundary, so the stored tally is not the tally the decision rested on either.

YUTA and EMURGO: the only election on offer

YUTA wrote that not adding a member “would not only make treasury withdrawal impossible, but would also make parameter updates and hard forks more difficult”, and that “no other entity has the resources to hold a similar election”, so rejecting the result “would likely be a waste of time”. It added that the elected members had told it they would work without compensation, which removed its earlier preference for an individual over a consortium. EMURGO wrote that the committee below its minimum “has effectively paused Constitutional Committee ratification for most governance actions” and that the election “followed constitutional guardrails”. Yoroi W₳llet called the result “a valid community decision”, and the Cardano Foundation described the appointment as a bridge from the resignation of the Cardano Atlantic Council to the next committee elections at epoch 653. The Eternl DRep Committee had taken part in the election itself. The single no came from Phil UPLC, who wrote that he “personally” did not want more “committee-based” members.

The eighth seat proposal for Christina is filed in epoch 600

Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina was filed in epoch 600, before the seventh seat had been filled. Its argument: with the committee at its minimum of seven, one resignation or retirement during the term stops ratification, and an eighth member reduces that risk.

The candidate it names is Christina, the other contender in the snap election, which its text says was exceptionally close, and it gives her the same term to epoch 653. It is chained to the Curia action as the one it must follow, so by its own design it could not be ratified before that seat was filled and cannot displace the result. It was filed by community participants independently rather than by whoever ran the election, and a DRep voting on it is being asked two questions at once: whether the committee should have a buffer, and whether a runner up in an off chain election should be seated by an on chain vote. Its deadline was the start of epoch 607, and the review of epochs 606 to 608 has the result and what the voters wrote.

The third revision and the strategy framework are filed in epoch 601

CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.4 was filed in epoch 601, the third attempt at a revision, after the versions that expired at epochs 581 and 593. It removes the budget step and folds it into the withdrawal action, adds definitions, requires proposal documents to stay immutable and keeps the audit and oversight requirements within the withdrawal rules. What is new is three reversions: EMURGO had voted no on the previous version over its wording on ada owners, on custodians and on independent audits, and this version returns those three passages to the text of the original constitution, in response, its document says, to EMURGO’s objections. Its deadline was the start of epoch 608.

Cardano 2030: Vision, Mission, Strategy Framework and KPIs arrived in the same epoch. The draft that the review of epochs 588 to 590 covers used material written by the product committee of Intersect but was submitted independently by a community member, and more delegated power abstained on it than voted yes and no combined. This version comes from the product committee itself, and its text sets out the process behind it: more than 700 people through surveys, focus groups and workshops from late 2024 onwards, with the group holding authority and funding granted by DReps in the budget cycle. Its deadline was the start of epoch 608.

The ₳70M integrations withdrawal and the ceiling extension stay open

Three proposals carried over: the integrations budget, the extension of the spending period and the ₳70M withdrawal that depends on both. None was decided here. The ceiling still allowed ₳73.0M through the end of epoch 604, the ₳70M request would use almost all of it, and the period was due to close in two epochs. The review of epochs 603 to 605 has what happens to the deadline.

The numbers

The window recorded 922 votes, 537 from DReps, 371 from pools and 14 from committee members, with final votes from 178 distinct DReps and 272 distinct pools. Pools turn out for committee votes: by the close of the window 321 had voted yes on the committee addition and 71 yes with 4 abstaining on the eighth seat proposal, against 16 on the strategy framework and none on the constitution. The power delegated to DReps read ₳5.58B at epoch 602 across 857 DReps, the ten largest holding 49.2% of it, and the count with a recent vote held between 324 and 330 across the three epochs. The treasury reading rose ₳7.96M to ₳1.66B.

Decided in this window

ActionOutcomeDRep yes
Add Constitutional Committee MemberEnacted 60279.4%

Open at the close of the window

ActionAmountStatusDRep yes
Add Constitutional Committee Member - ChristinaVoting ends at the start of epoch 607n/a
Cardano 2030: Vision, Mission, Strategy Framework and KPIsVoting ends at the start of epoch 608n/a
CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.4Voting ends at the start of epoch 608n/a
Cardano Critical Integrations BudgetVoting ends at the start of epoch 604n/a
2025 Net Change Limit ExtensionVoting ends at the start of epoch 604n/a
Withdraw ₳70,000,000 for Cardano Critical Integrations Budget₳70.0MVoting ends at the start of epoch 606n/a

n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 600
₳5.57B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 602
₳5.58B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
922
DReps whose final vote fell in the window
178
Treasury, at the start of epoch 600
₳1,652.7M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 602
₳1,660.7M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Pool shares on a committee change are yes stake over counted pool stake.
  • The pool figures for the committee addition do not reconcile and are reported as they stand. The action was ratified, which means the pool side met its bar at the decision, 321 pools voted yes and none voted no, and yet the stake share the record stores for it is 49.45% against a 51% bar. This edition does not reconstruct the historical stake denominator, so it reports the ratification and the counts and does not use the stored share to explain anything.
  • The record also dates some votes on the addition, among them its single DRep no, to epoch 601, after the ratification boundary. The stored tally includes them, so it is not the tally the ratification rested on.
  • Who took the seat, the election that chose them and what the new proposals ask for are read from their own documents, named under the sources below, not from the snapshot.
  • None of the six proposals open at the close is decided here, so the record holds no share for them from inside this window, only tallies read afterwards.
  • Votes cast is every vote of epochs 600 to 602 across all three roles, superseded votes included. Per epoch DRep counts exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options. The ceiling in force runs to the end of epoch 604 as its own proposal defines it, which is not the end epoch the site registry carries today.

Sources and further reading

13 sources, open the list
  • Yoroi voted yes on the committee addition, writing that with only six members the committee cannot approve most governance actions, and that recognising the result of the snap election on chain respects a valid community decision. the rationale of Yoroi on the committee addition
  • YUTA voted yes on the committee addition, writing that not adding a member would make withdrawals impossible and parameter changes and hard forks harder, that no other entity has the resources to hold a similar election so rejecting the result would likely be a waste of time, and that the elected members had said they would work without compensation. the rationale of YUTA on the committee addition
  • EMURGO voted yes on the committee addition, writing that a retirement had reduced the committee below the minimum size parameter, which effectively paused ratification for most governance actions, and that the snap election followed the constitutional guardrails with a stake weighted vote. the rationale of EMURGO on the committee addition
  • The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the committee addition, writing that it bridges the gap between the resignation of the Cardano Atlantic Council and the next committee elections in September 2026 at epoch 653. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the committee addition
  • The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the committee addition, writing that it had taken part in the snap election. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the committee addition
  • Phil UPLC voted no on the committee addition, writing that it personally did not want to see more committee based members on the committee. the rationale of Phil UPLC on the committee addition
  • The proposal that filled the seat states that the new member was selected by participating DReps in a snap election hosted between 26 November and 5 December, that the protocol parameter for the minimum committee size is 7, and that adding one member brings the count back to it so that on chain governance can resume in full. The member added is Cardano Curia. the document behind the committee addition
  • The same proposal reports the audited election result as 3,160,499,917 ada of participating stake represented by 88 DReps, of which 33 DReps with 1,679,248,296 ada supported Cardano Curia, sets the new member's term to expire at epoch 653 to match the retired seat, and leaves the remaining six members and their terms unchanged. the committee addition, on the election result
  • The proposal for an eighth member states that it was submitted independently by community participants, that the outcome of the snap election between the two candidates was exceptionally close, and that raising the number above the minimum of 7 reduces the risk of ratification delays if a member resigns or retires during the term. The candidate it names is Christina, with a term expiring at epoch 653 like the seat just filled, and it references the Curia action as its required predecessor, so that it cannot be ratified unless that action has been ratified first and cannot negate that outcome. the document behind the eighth seat proposal
  • The third revision of the constitution carries the same three changes as the version that expired at epoch 593, the removal of the budget mechanism, added definitions with immutable proposal documents, and treasury audit safeguards on every withdrawal. Against the previous version it reverts three wording changes to the text of the original constitution, on the term for ada owners, on custodians and on independent audits, because EMURGO had voted no on the previous version over them, and the document says it incorporates EMURGO's feedback. the document behind the third revision
  • The earlier strategy draft used material written by the product committee of Intersect but was submitted independently by a community member, not the committee or its members. the document behind the earlier strategy draft
  • The strategy framework records that the product committee of Intersect ran the process from late 2024 onwards, that more than 700 people took part through surveys, focus groups and workshops, that the group was given delegated authority and funding by DReps in the budget cycle, and that the process is meant to be reusable for keeping the vision and strategy current. the document behind the strategy framework
  • The ceiling in force caps paid withdrawals at ₳350M for the period from the start of epoch 532 to the end of epoch 604. the document behind the ceiling in force