Governance ReviewNo. 28Epochs 606 to 6089 Jan 2026 to 24 Jan 2026

Ninety seven pools voted yes, and the eighth Cardano committee seat still fell short

The proposal to add an eighth committee member expired despite 97 pool votes in favour and none against. Those pools represented only 17.4% of counted stake against a 51% threshold, and DRep support also fell short of the required 67%.

17.4%
of counted pool stake behind adding an eighth committee member, from 97 yes votes and no no votes, against a 51% bar
53.8%
of DRep power behind the same proposal, against the 67% a committee change needs
79.85%
of DRep power behind the revised constitution, ratified at the start of epoch 608 on the third attempt
₳70,000,000
paid out at the start of epoch 606, the largest single payment of the record after the first spending round

The eighth seat proposal expires with 97 pools for it and none against

Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina expired at the start of epoch 607. 97 stake pools voted yes on it, four abstained, and not a single pool voted no.

Pools do not vote by head count. What counts is the stake delegated to them, and those 97 pools controlled 17.4% of the counted pool stake against the 51% a committee change needs. Most pools simply did not vote, and their stake still counts. A silent pool’s stake may count against the proposal, count as abstaining, or drop out of the denominator altogether, depending on what its reward account points at.

The DRep side fell short too, at 53.8% of DRep power against a 67% bar. Neither threshold was met.

The eighth seat on DReps and on pools

Yes share of counted power, against the bar each body had to reach

DRepsYes shareDReps, Yes share: 53.8%53.8%67.0% barPoolsYes sharePools, Yes share: 17.4%17.4%51.0% bar
Both bodies fell short of their own bar. On the pool side 97 yes votes and no no votes still came to 17.4% of the counted stake, because most stake did not vote.

Why Yoroi and EMURGO voted no: the snap election filled one seat

The proposal had asked for an eighth member so that the committee would not stop functioning if one of seven resigned, which is what had happened two windows earlier. Yoroi and EMURGO, the largest DReps to vote no, accepted that risk and rejected the route. Yoroi W₳llet wrote that the snap election “was held to select one replacement Constitutional Committee member”, that Cardano Curia was chosen through it, and that “the outcome does not provide a mandate to appoint an additional member”. EMURGO wrote that “adding the runner-up cannot be considered an outcome of that election” and that the constitution neither clearly permits nor prohibits a committee larger than the one elected. hix_coffeepool☕️ wrote that voters had cast their votes “under the assumption that only one seat was being filled”, and that adding a second seat afterwards risked a precedent of off chain elections being overridden through governance actions.

YUTA wrote that with seven members at a minimum of seven, “if even one of these seven entities resigns, governance would cease”, parameter changes and hard forks included. The Eternl DRep Committee wrote that Christina “was our choice for the additional seat” and that it wanted to signal support for her candidacy even if the proposal did not pass. The Cardano Foundation voted yes while noting that a committee of eight raises the aligned votes its two thirds needs from five to six. The committee stayed at exactly seven, and the next attempt to address the risk, lowering the minimum to five instead of adding a member, is in the review of epochs 612 to 614.

The constitution passes on the third attempt

CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.4 was ratified at the start of epoch 608 with 79.85% of DRep power behind it, on 157 yes votes to 24 no, and six committee members in favour with one against. Two earlier versions had expired below the required support, at 55.6% at epoch 581 and at 64.9% at epoch 593. Compared with the second of them, this version returns three passages to the text of the original constitution, on the term for ada owners, on custodians and on independent audits. Yoroi and EMURGO, the two largest DReps that had voted no on the previous revision, switched to yes over those passages. Yoroi wrote that the reverted audit provisions were “resolving our previous concerns regarding ambiguity over responsibility, funding, and execution”, and EMURGO that its concerns about the terms for ada ownership and custodianship had been addressed, “justifying a change in our voting position”, thanking Yuta, who had led the revision. The Cardano Foundation called the return to “ada owner” less precise and accepted it “to accommodate the concerns of other major stakeholders and unblock the constitutional amendment process”.

The budget information action disappears as a separate step: a treasury withdrawal carries the requirements itself, so a project no longer needs a budget endorsed first and a payment approved second. Provisions the text calls aspirational rather than enforceable are deleted, among them codes of conduct for DReps, pool operators and the committee. Definitions arrive for terms the constitution had been using without them, such as active voting stake and net change limit. A proposal’s documents must stay immutable after submission, which closes the gap a committee member had objected to earlier in the series. The audit and oversight requirements the original constitution set for treasury requests stay, now within the withdrawal rules.

Army of Spies voted no a third time because it valued “much of the aspirational language that has been deleted”. The Eastern Cardano Council, the one committee no, read the constitution’s amendment clause as two requirements, a collective decision making process and an on chain vote of 65% of the active voting stake, and found that no such process had been “defined or agreed via an on-chain Info governance action”. The revised constitution took effect one epoch later, at the start of epoch 609, in the review of epochs 609 to 611.

DReps back the product committee’s strategy

Cardano 2030: Vision, Mission, Strategy Framework and KPIs closed at the start of epoch 608 with 67.8% of DRep power behind it, on 152 yes votes to 26 no. The draft of the same strategy that the review of epochs 588 to 590 covers had closed far below that, with more delegated power abstaining than voting yes and no combined. That draft, submitted independently by a community member, already contained a strategic plan and measurable targets. This version comes from the product committee that ran the process and sets out its vision, a strategy framework and measurable targets.

YUTA voted yes with the reservation that some target definitions “seem somewhat vague”, because the risks of moving forward without a vision or targets were “extremely high” and a first version should pass quickly. The Eternl DRep Committee voted no on the opposite reading: “anything we lock in today will age badly over the next 5 years”, and it did not want the document “turned into soft policy that quietly excludes new use-cases by labeling them off-strategy”. Dave voted no over the recommendation to fund DReps, pools and the committee “based on observable activity”, asking who would decide what counts, and Patrick_Tobler because a vision that wide “almost makes it pointless”. Two committee members voted yes and two abstained, Tingvard among them, writing that an information action “has no on-chain effect, creates no binding obligations” while supporting its intent.

₳70M out, and a ₳500,000 request filed

Withdraw ₳70,000,000 for Cardano Critical Integrations Budget was paid at the start of epoch 606, the money for stablecoin, custody, analytics, bridge and oracle integration work that the review of epochs 603 to 605 describes.

A treasury withdrawal without a title in the record, titled Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1 in its own document, was filed in epoch 607 for ₳500,000, the first proposed payment against the stablecoin liquidity budget endorsed at epoch 589, and it was still open at the close of the window. Its deadline was the start of epoch 614, and the review of epochs 612 to 614 has what the committee made of it.

The van Rossem naming signal and the memory increase are filed in epoch 606

Name Protocol Version 11 hard fork - van Rossem, filed in epoch 606, asks for the next hard fork to be named in memory of Max van Rossem, a DRep who co-led the working group behind the election of the first elected committee and represented the Dutch community at the constitutional convention, the same tradition that gave the last two upgrades their names. Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2) arrived in the same epoch and is the first half of a pair: it raises the memory a Plutus script may use from 14 million to 16.5 million units in one transaction and from 62 million to 72 million in one block, the maximum increase the guardrails recommend for one step and enough to keep four transactions of the largest size in a block, and its own text says a guardrail requires the full 25% increase to come in two linked actions, both limits rising together in each. Both had deadlines at the start of epoch 613, and the review of epochs 612 to 614 has them.

The numbers

The window recorded 717 votes, 538 from DReps, 167 from pools and 12 from committee members, with final votes from 146 distinct DReps and 62 pools. The power delegated to DReps read ₳5.62B at epoch 608 across 862 DReps, the ten largest holding 49.8% of it. The treasury reading rose ₳7.93M across the three epochs to ₳1.61B, having fallen by the ₳70M payment at the start of the first of them. The committee remained at seven members, at the minimum of seven, with the revised constitution due to take effect at the next epoch boundary.

Decided in this window

Open at the close of the window

ActionAmountStatusDRep yes
Name Protocol Version 11 hard fork - van RossemVoting ends at the start of epoch 613n/a
Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2)Voting ends at the start of epoch 613n/a
A treasury withdrawal without a title in the record₳0.5MVoting ends at the start of epoch 614n/a
DeltaDeFi: Hydra Trading Infrastructure Budget (₳1,500,000)Voting ends at the start of epoch 610n/a
Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)Voting ends at the start of epoch 612n/a

n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 606
₳5.61B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 608
₳5.62B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
717
DReps whose final vote fell in the window
146
Treasury, at the start of epoch 606
₳1,606.5M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 608
₳1,614.5M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. Pool shares are yes stake over counted pool stake. A pool that does not vote is not simply counted against: a pool whose reward account is delegated to one of the predefined options votes that way by default, so the stake behind a silent pool can sit on either side or outside the count, and this edition does not reconstruct which.
  • Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained.
  • The record stores no title and no text for one withdrawal request in this window. What it asks for is read from its own anchor, named under the sources below. The address the withdrawal registered no longer serves that document, so the copy linked here is the version whose blake2b-256 hash matches the one the action stores on chain.
  • The unreconciled pool figure of the committee addition described in the review of epochs 600 to 602 is still unreconciled. Nothing here depends on it.
  • None of the proposals open at the close is decided here, so the record holds no share for them from inside this window, only tallies read afterwards. Votes cast is every vote of epochs 606 to 608 across all three roles, superseded votes included, and per epoch DRep counts exclude votes without a block time. Delegated power excludes the predefined delegation options.

Sources and further reading

23 sources, open the list
  • Yoroi voted no on the eighth seat, writing that the snap election was held to select one replacement member, that Cardano Curia was chosen through it, and that the outcome gave no mandate to appoint an additional member. the rationale of Yoroi on the eighth seat
  • EMURGO voted no on the eighth seat, writing that the snap election was explicitly conducted to elect one member, that adding the runner up cannot be considered an outcome of that election, and that the constitution neither clearly permits nor prohibits expanding the committee beyond replacing a resigning member. the rationale of EMURGO on the eighth seat
  • hix_coffeepool voted no on the eighth seat, writing that the election process had been announced for one seat, that voters cast their votes on that assumption, and that adding a second seat afterwards risks a precedent where off chain elections are overridden through governance actions. the rationale of hix_coffeepool on the eighth seat
  • YUTA voted yes on the eighth seat, writing that with seven members at a minimum of seven a single resignation would stop governance and force a re-election, blocking parameter changes and hard forks as well as withdrawals. the rationale of YUTA on the eighth seat
  • The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the eighth seat, writing that Christina was its choice for the additional seat and that even if the proposal did not pass it wanted to signal its support for her candidacy. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the eighth seat
  • The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the eighth seat, acknowledging that a committee of eight raises the number of aligned votes its two thirds majority needs from five to six, and supporting the candidate on her track record. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the eighth seat
  • Yoroi voted yes on the revised constitution, writing that it reverts the audit provisions to the original wording and so resolves the ambiguity over responsibility, funding and execution that had led it to vote no on the previous version. the rationale of Yoroi on the revised constitution
  • EMURGO voted yes on the revised constitution after a no on the previous version, writing that its concerns about the terms for ada ownership and custodianship had been addressed, and thanking Yuta for leading the revision. the rationale of EMURGO on the revised constitution
  • The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the revised constitution, writing that it viewed the return of the term ada owner in place of ada holder as less precise but accepted it to accommodate other major stakeholders and unblock the amendment, and that it endorsed the removal of the budget information action. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the revised constitution
  • Army of Spies voted no on the revised constitution, writing that many of the smaller changes were marginal improvements but that it valued much of the aspirational language that had been deleted. the rationale of Army of Spies on the revised constitution
  • The Eastern Cardano Council voted no on the revised constitution, writing that the constitution requires amendments to be approved by a collective decision making process as well as by an on chain vote of 65% of the active voting stake, that the two clauses are distinct requirements, and that no such process had been defined or agreed on chain. the rationale of the Eastern Cardano Council on the revised constitution
  • The Eternl DRep Committee voted no on the strategy framework, writing that anything locked in today will age badly over five years, that it did not want the document turned into soft policy that quietly excludes new use cases as off strategy, and that it is not enforceable because DReps decide with their votes. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the strategy framework
  • YUTA voted yes on the strategy framework, writing that the definitions of some targets seemed vague, but that the risks of moving forward without a vision or targets were extremely high and the first version should be approved as soon as possible. the rationale of YUTA on the strategy framework
  • Dave voted no on the strategy framework over its recommendation to fund DReps, pools and the committee based on observable activity, asking who would decide what counts, and over its description of itself as a filter for future funding requests. the rationale of Dave on the strategy framework
  • Patrick_Tobler voted no on the strategy framework, writing that its focus was still so wide as to be almost pointless and that a strong vision needs one simple statement everyone can rally behind. the rationale of Patrick_Tobler on the strategy framework
  • Tingvard abstained on the strategy framework, writing that as an information action it has no on chain effect and creates no binding obligations, while expressing support for its intent and the process behind it. the rationale of Tingvard on the strategy framework
  • The revision that was ratified removes the budget information action as a separate step and folds its requirements into the treasury withdrawal action, deletes provisions its text calls aspirational rather than enforceable, adds definitions for terms such as active voting stake and net change limit, requires proposal documents to stay immutable after submission, and applies treasury audit safeguards to every withdrawal. Against the previous version it reverts three wording changes to the text of the original constitution, on the term for ada owners, on custodians and on independent audits, because the largest DRep had voted no on the previous version over them. the document behind the revision
  • The naming signal proposes to name the protocol version 11 hard fork after Max van Rossem, describing him as a DRep in the Dutch DRep collective, a member and co-lead of the working group that ran the election of the first fully elected committee, and a delegate for the Dutch community at the constitutional convention, and places the proposal in the tradition that named the last two upgrades after community members who had died. the document behind the naming signal
  • The memory increase raises the per transaction Plutus memory limit from 14,000,000 to 16,500,000 units and the per block limit from 62,000,000 to 72,000,000 units, the maximum the guardrails recommend in one step, so that the same number of maximally sized transactions, four, still fit in a block. It states that a guardrail requires the proposed 25% increase to be made through two separate, linked actions, both limits rising together in each step, and that an equivalent change was enacted on both test networks beforehand. the document behind the memory increase
  • The strategy framework records that the product committee of Intersect ran the process from late 2024 onwards, that more than 700 people took part through surveys, focus groups and workshops, and that the group held authority and funding granted by DReps in the budget cycle. the document behind the strategy framework
  • The earlier draft, on which more delegated power abstained in epochs 588 to 590 than voted yes and no combined, used material written by the product committee of Intersect but was submitted independently by a community member, not the committee or its members. The strategy paper it links already sets out a strategic plan and measurable targets, among them $200 million of annual layer one revenue and 250,000 daily transactions. the document behind the earlier strategy draft and the strategy paper it links
  • The withdrawal the record holds no title for asks the community for ₳500,000 as the first payment against the stablecoin liquidity budget. the document the withdrawal anchored, at the version its on-chain hash pins
  • The proposal for an eighth member argued that a committee sitting at its minimum of 7 stops being able to ratify anything if one member leaves, and named the runner up of the snap election as the candidate. the document behind the eighth seat proposal