Governance ReviewNo. 29Epochs 609 to 61124 Jan 2026 to 8 Feb 2026

Power delegated to Cardano DReps jumps ₳190.1M in one epoch, and concentration falls with it

Delegation to Cardano DReps rose ₳190.1M in epoch 609 while the share held by the ten largest fell from 49.8% to 47.5%. The figures do not identify the delegations behind the change.

₳190.1M
added to the power delegated to DReps between the epoch 608 and epoch 609 readings, in one step
47.5%
of delegated power held by the ten largest DReps at epoch 609, down from 49.8% one epoch earlier
12
the smallest number of DReps that together held half of the delegated power at epoch 609, up from 11
12.0%
of DRep power behind the ₳1.5M trading infrastructure budget, which closed at the start of epoch 610

Power delegated to DReps rises ₳190.1M at epoch 609

The revised constitution took effect at the start of epoch 609, and between the epoch 608 and epoch 609 readings the power delegated to DReps rose ₳190.1M, from ₳5.62B to ₳5.81B, the largest single epoch increase in the series of readings from epoch 589 to 611. Delegated power is the ada delegated to a DRep, so the total moves when new delegations arrive or when the balances behind existing delegations change.

Share of delegated power held by the ten largest DReps, epochs 589 to 611

In percent of the power delegated to DReps, the predefined options excluded

46.0%47.3%48.5%49.8%51.0%Epoch 589: 49.1%589Epoch 590: 49.1%Epoch 591: 49.1%Epoch 592: 49.2%Epoch 593: 49.3%Epoch 594: 49.4%Epoch 595: 49.4%595Epoch 596: 49.6%Epoch 597: 49.5%Epoch 598: 49.3%Epoch 599: 49.4%Epoch 600: 49.3%600Epoch 601: 49.3%Epoch 602: 49.2%Epoch 603: 49.2%Epoch 604: 49.4%Epoch 605: 49.8%605Epoch 606: 49.9%Epoch 607: 49.8%Epoch 608: 49.8%Epoch 609: 47.5%Epoch 610: 47.5%Epoch 611: 47.8%611Epoch 609: the epoch of the jumpthe epoch of the jump
The share sits near 49% for twenty epochs and drops at epoch 609, the same reading at which the delegated total rose ₳190.1M. Both changes happen at that one boundary.

At the same reading the share held by the ten largest DReps fell from 49.8% to 47.5%, and the smallest number of DReps that together held half the delegated power rose from 11 to 12. The Gini figure for the whole spread fell too, from 0.9367 to 0.9344. All four measures show the distribution widened at the top, none identifies the delegations behind the change.

The largest single decline listed for one DRep over the stretch from epoch 608 to 611 is measured across four epochs while the jump happened in one, so the two are not measurements of the same movement. A snapshot of totals cannot follow a delegation from one DRep to another, and the predefined options are excluded from the totals entirely, so stake moving between a DRep and always abstain changes the figure without leaving a destination anywhere in it.

DReps with a vote in the last twelve epochs fall from 320 to 273

The count of DReps with a vote in the last 12 epochs fell from 320 at epoch 608 to 273 at epoch 611, and 864 DReps held power at epoch 611. Neither figure is a measure of current turnout. The rolling count looks back twelve epochs, so it falls whenever a busy stretch ages out of it, and the epochs with hundreds of votes on the first spending round were now well behind. Inside this window 109 distinct DReps cast a final vote across the proposals open in it.

The new constitution takes effect, and DeltaDeFi’s trading infrastructure budget expires at 12.0%

CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.4 took effect at the start of epoch 609, one epoch after the ratification the review of epochs 606 to 608 covers. From that boundary the budget information action is gone as a separate step: a treasury withdrawal carries the requirements itself, so the sequence that had sunk two requests earlier in the series no longer applies. Definitions and immutable proposal documents came with it, and the audit and oversight requirements for treasury requests carried over into the withdrawal rules.

DeltaDeFi: Hydra Trading Infrastructure Budget (₳1,500,000) was exactly such a budget information action, filed in epoch 603 under the rules the new constitution replaced. It closed at the start of epoch 610 with 12.0% of DRep power behind it, on 37 yes votes, 114 no and 18 abstain, and pool votes of two yes, five no and 22 abstain. It asked for ₳1.5M over six months to take an order book exchange running on Cardano’s layer two from beta into production, so that ada and the larger Cardano native tokens would have a venue with the latency and data feeds traders expect, with 20% of the sum set aside for a programme measuring Cardano’s markets against the targets of the 2030 strategy framework endorsed one window earlier.

Yoroi W₳llet wrote that the proposal “does not clearly explain how this directly benefits” ada holders in practice. YUTA wrote that a withdrawal dilutes holders, so the benefit to them has to be shown, and that layer two products “tend to have a hard time justifying this” because their adoption does not increase the number of transactions on the main chain. EMURGO wanted “clear and durable ecosystem-wide benefits” from anything framed as infrastructure. CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool) objected to a fifth of the sum going to a measurement programme when public dashboards for the same metrics already existed. The Cardano Foundation voted yes, writing that a production ready exchange on that layer would “validate” its utility for decentralised finance.

One stake pool abstained, writing that budget information actions “were a mandatory requirement under the previously active on-chain Constitution” and that the new version “no longer” requires one, “which now ultimately renders this proposal redundant”, a side effect of changing a central piece of governance “while processes and proposals are currently running in parallel”. Tingvard abstained on the committee for the same reason from the other side: the constitution “contains no transition provisions” for proposals submitted under a prior understanding, no grandfathering and no grace periods, so the committee cannot preserve prior expectations. At 12.0% it is among the weakest results in the series, and it was the last budget information action to be decided.

Two ceilings for the same period

Net Change Limit of 300 Million ADA for Epochs 613 to 713 was filed in epoch 611, proposing a ₳300M ceiling for exactly the period that Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713) already covers at ₳350M, which as of the close of epoch 611 was in its last epoch of voting. Both take the ₳306.9M that flowed into the treasury between epochs 532 and 604 as their reference. The earlier proposal sets its ceiling at about 115% of that because it counts in the ₳50M liquidity budget the DReps endorsed before this window and nobody had yet drawn on, and it was filed for the budget committee of Intersect. The later one stays just under the inflows, gives no other reason, and says it would supersede any limit agreed for the same period. Two ceilings for one period is a pattern from the review of epochs 545 to 547 onwards, and the review of epochs 612 to 614 has the first result.

The naming signal for the next hard fork, the first half of the memory increase and the untitled ₳500,000 withdrawal, the first draw against that same liquidity budget, were also open. The window recorded 446 votes, 305 from DReps, 130 from pools and 11 from committee members. The treasury reading rose ₳7.7M to ₳1.63B.

Decided in this window

Open at the close of the window

ActionAmountStatusDRep yes
Net Change Limit of 300 Million ADA for Epochs 613 to 713Voting ends at the start of epoch 618n/a
Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713)Undecided at the close of epoch 611n/a
Name Protocol Version 11 hard fork - van RossemVoting ends at the start of epoch 613n/a
Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2)Voting ends at the start of epoch 613n/a
A treasury withdrawal without a title in the record₳0.5MVoting ends at the start of epoch 614n/a

n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 609
₳5.81B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 611
₳5.82B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
446
DReps whose final vote fell in the window
109
Treasury, at the start of epoch 609
₳1,618.4M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 611
₳1,626.1M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that did not vote and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side.
  • Delegated power is the stake pointed at a DRep at the start of the epoch named. The figures exclude the predefined delegation options, so stake moving to or from always abstain or always no confidence changes the total without appearing anywhere in it as a destination.
  • The share of the ten largest and the Gini figure answer different questions about the same distribution, and neither identifies a delegation. The largest decline the record lists for a single DRep is measured across epochs 608 to 611, while the jump in the total falls between epochs 608 and 609, so the two are not measurements of the same movement and no transfer between them is claimed here.
  • A lower share for the ten largest is not by itself less inequality overall. The Gini figure for the whole spread also fell at that reading, and the smallest group of DReps holding half the power grew by one, so on those three measures the distribution did widen at the top. Below the top the snapshots say nothing.
  • The count of DReps holding power without a recent vote and the rolling count of recent voters are both twelve epoch measures that exclude votes without a block time. Neither is a reading of current turnout, and a fall in either is not evidence that anyone stopped voting.
  • None of the five proposals open at the close is decided here, so the record holds no share for them from inside this window, only tallies read afterwards. Votes cast is every vote of epochs 609 to 611 across all three roles, superseded votes included.

Sources and further reading

12 sources, open the list
  • Yoroi voted no on the trading infrastructure budget, writing that the proposal did not clearly explain how it directly benefits ada holders in practice, and that improved infrastructure alone does not guarantee better user outcomes. the rationale of Yoroi on the trading infrastructure budget
  • YUTA voted no on the trading infrastructure budget, writing that a withdrawal dilutes ada holders so the benefit to them must be explained, that adoption of layer two products does not increase the number of transactions on the main chain and may decrease it, and that such products are hard to justify on that basis. the rationale of YUTA on the trading infrastructure budget
  • EMURGO voted no on the trading infrastructure budget, writing that projects funded by the treasury should demonstrate clear and durable ecosystem wide benefits, particularly when framed as infrastructure rather than commercial applications. the rationale of EMURGO on the trading infrastructure budget
  • CardanoYoda voted no on the trading infrastructure budget, writing that allocating nearly 20% of the sum to a measurement programme was unjustified because the ecosystem's new analytics partnership already enables low cost public dashboards for most of the proposed metrics. the rationale of CardanoYoda on the trading infrastructure budget
  • The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the trading infrastructure budget, writing that a production ready layer two exchange from an experienced team would validate the utility of that layer for decentralised finance. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the trading infrastructure budget
  • One stake pool abstained on the trading infrastructure budget, writing that budget information actions had been mandatory under the previous constitution, that the newly enacted version no longer requires one before a withdrawal, which renders the proposal redundant, and that this shows the side effects of changing a central piece of governance while proposals are running in parallel. the rationale of a stake pool on the trading infrastructure budget
  • Tingvard abstained on the trading infrastructure budget, writing that the constitution contains no transition provisions for proposals submitted under a prior governance understanding, no grandfathering, grace periods or retroactive rules, so the committee cannot preserve prior expectations. the rationale of Tingvard on the trading infrastructure budget
  • The trading infrastructure budget asks for ₳1,500,000 over six months to take an order book exchange built on Cardano's layer two from beta to a production venue for ada and Cardano native tokens, with the latency and data infrastructure that traders expect from a centralised exchange, and reserves 20% of the sum for a programme measuring Cardano's decentralised finance markets against the targets of the 2030 strategy framework. the document behind the trading infrastructure budget
  • The lower next ceiling proposes 300,000,000 ada for epochs 613 to 713, states that on approval it supersedes any previously agreed limit for the same period, and sets the figure with reference to total treasury inflows of 306,940,195 ada between epochs 532 and 604, giving no other reason for the amount. the document behind the lower next ceiling
  • The withdrawal the record holds no title for asks the community for ₳500,000 as the first payment against the stablecoin liquidity budget. The address the action registered no longer serves the document, so the copy cited is the version whose hash matches the one stored on chain. the document the liquidity withdrawal anchored, at the version its on-chain hash pins
  • The next ceiling proposes 350,000,000 ada for epochs 613 to 713 on behalf of the budget committee of Intersect, defines treasury inflows from epoch 532 through epoch 604 as 306,940,195 ada, and sets the limit at approximately 115% of that figure because it includes the 50,000,000 ada stablecoin liquidity budget DReps had approved but the proposers had not yet drawn on. the document behind the next ceiling
  • The constitution that took effect here removes the budget information action as a separate step and folds its requirements into the treasury withdrawal action, deletes provisions its text calls aspirational, adds definitions, requires proposal documents to stay immutable after submission, and applies treasury audit safeguards to every withdrawal. the document behind the new constitution