Governance ReviewNo. 37Epochs 636 to 6388 Jun 2026 to 23 Jun 2026

A ₳32.9M research bundle passes after three large DReps change their minds

Cardano Vision received ₳32.9M after Yoroi, EMURGO and YUTA switched from abstain to yes. YUTA pointed to the falling ada price, which had reduced the request's dollar value by almost a third. Four other requests expired, including Eternl's wallet proposal. Eternl had already submitted a revised version addressing the committee's objections.

₳32.9M
the only withdrawal paid in these three epochs
49.2%
of the power delegated to DReps held by the ten largest at epoch 638
493
DRep ballots in epoch 638, the busiest epoch since 632
4
committee members voted no on Eternl's first request

Yoroi, EMURGO and YUTA switch to yes on Cardano Vision

The treasury paid out once in these three epochs. Cardano Vision drew ₳32.9M for a research programme across seven work packages, from usability and governance through scaling to post quantum cryptography, run by a consortium of nine research partners. It was ratified in epoch 636 on 75.0% of DRep power, 167 yes votes, 29 no and 15 abstain, and paid at the start of epoch 637. The shares in this edition are the yes power as a share of all counted power, with abstaining power left out and power that cast no ballot counted as no.

Three of the largest DReps had abstained on it first. Yoroi W₳llet wrote that it had abstained because the bundled structure “limited the ability to assess and prioritise individual research streams”, and voted yes after further review on the importance of the programme as a whole. EMURGO wrote the same about “the scale and bundled structure” and changed to yes. YUTA had asked for the bundle to be split, and wrote that the falling ada price had settled the question: a request “originally premised on $7.9M” was now worth $5.4M, a 31% reduction in dollar terms, and “there is no buffer left”. The request had not changed. The price had.

Sebastien Guillemot セバ voted yes and published a ranking of the work packages, consensus improvements and data availability at the top, compliance and identity use cases among those he was less sure of.

Eternl files a revised request before the first expires

Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026-2027) asked ₳1.68M for twelve months of running a wallet that people use for payments, staking and governance, and ran out at the start of epoch 638 at 56.8%. It failed on the committee as well, four no votes against three. Cardano Curia wrote that the proposal “does not unambiguously establish periodic independent audits and oversight metrics”, which the constitution requires of a withdrawal. Yoroi and EMURGO abstained for that reason alone, both writing that the committee had found it unconstitutional and that they would assess the revised version. The Eternl DRep Committee wrote one line, that it votes abstain on its own proposal. Sebastien Guillemot voted no, writing that a paid plan for a wallet had been tried in a similar form with the team’s token collection and “didn’t really work out”.

The successor did not wait. Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2 was submitted in epoch 637 while the first was still being voted on. Its preamble attributes the committee’s no votes to a lack of clarity about audits and describes itself as the same request with a clarification on how the audit money is spent and overseen, an updated ada to dollar conversion, and a note that the wallet’s own DRep will abstain on it. The second version asks ₳2.35M instead of ₳1.68M, for the same work at a cost the proposal puts at about 420,000 dollars a year. Both versions carry a repayment clause: the sum is to be held in stablecoins, and once income from a paid plan covers the yearly cost, the surplus goes back to the treasury.

Eternl, two requests and one deadline

Epochs in which each step happened

630631632633634635636637638639EpochEpoch 631: First request filedFirst request filedEpoch 637: Revised request filedRevised request filedEpoch 638: First request expiresFirst request expires
The revised request was on the ballot before the first had run out, so the wallet never went without a live request.

The first node in the browser, Scalus and Cardano dOSPO expire

The first node in the browser asked ₳4.6M to put a fully validating Cardano node inside a web browser and finished at 50.0%, on 89 yes votes, 60 no and 33 abstain. It came from the same firm as the Pebble request, paid for the same sum at the boundary to epoch 635. YUTA voted yes: “given the high maintenance costs of the Haskell node, further competition is needed”, and application developers had told it they would use the node. Yoroi and EMURGO abstained on the sequencing of node diversity, both noting that the proposer had narrowed the scope after feedback. Sebastien Guillemot moved from no to abstain because the request was now separate from the Pebble request and the amount lower.

Scalus asked ₳8.5M for twelve months of turning a development platform into a full application platform with its own node, and reached 12.6% on 29 yes against 98. Yoroi, EMURGO and YUTA voted no over the evidence of demand, YUTA writing that the proposal did not show sufficient demand for the platform. The Eternl DRep Committee abstained, calling it a sound proposal from a capable team with features that are nice to have. The Cardano Foundation voted yes. One committee member abstained because the proposal had named it to its oversight committee. Cardano dOSPO asked ₳12M over three years for an office that would fund and mentor the maintainers of open source infrastructure, and finished at 2.0%, on 14 yes against 118. The Eternl DRep Committee abstained rather than give a council control over ₳12M, what it called a blank cheque, with no mention of who would serve on it, and the Cardano Foundation voted no over vacant councils and an unformed legal entity. The committee split three to three with one abstention on it.

What each withdrawal reached, epochs 636 to 638

DRep yes share of counted power, against the 67% bar

Cardano VisionCardano Vision: 75.0%75.0%Cardano Critical IntegrationsCardano Critical Integrations: 69.2%69.2%EternlEternl: 56.8%56.8%The first node in the browserThe first node in the browser: 50.0%50.0%ScalusScalus: 12.6%12.6%Cardano dOSPOCardano dOSPO: 2.0%2.0%67.0% bar
Six withdrawals were decided here, two above the bar and four below it.

A second year of integrations, and prices for the hard fork

Cardano Critical Integrations was ratified in epoch 638 on 69.2%, ₳23M due one epoch later, outside this window. Its text pays for a second contracted year and twelve months of maintenance for the integrations the first ₳70M budget delivered, a stablecoin, cross chain messaging, price feeds and analytics, plus one new custody integration. Two committee members abstained on it over a possible conflict of interest, one as an employee of the Cardano Foundation, Ace Alliance to avoid the appearance of one.

Update Plutus Cost Models was ratified in epoch 637 and took effect in epoch 638, on 68.6% from 120 yes votes, 4 no and 7 abstain. Plutus cost models assign a computation and memory cost to every operation a script can perform, and so what a transaction pays in fees. This change prices the new operations the coming hard fork will make available, enables the full set of operations in the two older versions of Plutus, and changes the settings for some operations already in use. Yoroi wrote that without it the new primitives could not be activated after the upgrade to protocol version 11. One action still open at the end of the window leaned on it: Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5, submitted in epoch 635, makes its own ratification dependent on the cost model change being in force first.

5am.earth Trust Layer Targeting Vision 2030 KPIs asked for ₳10M for a trust layer for agricultural supply chains, farmer identities and satellite crop data anchored on Cardano, and its voting ran to the boundary out of epoch 638, standing at 70.6% as of that close.

Power gathers at the top while more DReps vote

By the end of epoch 638 the power delegated to DReps was spread more unevenly than at any point since on-chain governance began at epoch 508. The Gini coefficient, a single number for how far a distribution sits from being equal, reached 0.9396, and the ten largest DReps held 47.9% of delegated power at epoch 636 and 49.2% at epoch 638. Over the same three epochs the count of DReps with a ballot in the previous twelve epochs rose from 326 to 337, and DReps cast 1,236 ballots, 493 of them in epoch 638.

Decided in this window

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 636
₳5.82B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 638
₳5.77B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
1,418
DReps whose final ballot fell in the window
205
Treasury, at the start of epoch 636
₳1,515.8M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 638
₳1,490.4M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that cast no ballot and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side.
  • Committee shares are yes votes over the members active at the decision minus those who abstained. A member who casts no ballot at all is not an abstainer and lowers the share.
  • Actions submitted inside this window whose voting ran past epoch 638 are not in the table, because a row can only carry an outcome the window saw. The 5am.earth request, whose voting closed exactly at the closing boundary, is quoted with its final tally and no outcome.
  • Votes cast is every ballot of epochs 636 to 638 across all three roles, superseded votes included.
  • The counts of DReps with and without a recent ballot are flagged in the data as approximate rather than exact.

Sources and further reading

27 sources, open the list
  • Yoroi wrote that it had previously voted abstain on Cardano Vision because the bundled structure limited the ability to assess individual research streams, and that after further review it voted yes on the strategic importance of the programme. the rationale of Yoroi on Cardano Vision
  • EMURGO wrote that it had previously voted abstain on Cardano Vision over the scale and bundled structure of the proposal, and changed its vote to yes. the rationale of EMURGO on Cardano Vision
  • YUTA wrote that it was changing its vote on Cardano Vision to yes: it had asked for the proposal to be split, but with the price decline a request originally premised on 7.9 million dollars was worth 5.4 million, a 31% reduction with no buffer left. the rationale of YUTA on Cardano Vision
  • Cardano Curia found the first Eternl request unconstitutional because it did not unambiguously establish periodic independent audits and oversight metrics. the rationale of the committee member Cardano Curia on the first Eternl request
  • Yoroi abstained on the first Eternl request, writing that the committee had found it unconstitutional and that a revised proposal had been submitted. the rationale of Yoroi on the first Eternl request
  • The Eternl DRep Committee abstained on the first Eternl request with the words that it votes abstain on its own proposal. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on its own request
  • Sebastien Guillemot voted no on the first Eternl request, writing that a paid plan for a wallet had already been tried in a similar form with the team's token collection and had not worked out. the rationale of Sebastien Guillemot on the first Eternl request
  • YUTA voted yes on the browser node, writing that given the high maintenance costs of the Haskell node further competition is needed, and that application developers had told it they intend to use the node. the rationale of YUTA on the browser node
  • Yoroi abstained on the browser node, writing that its position on node diversity sequencing continued and was no judgment on the team, and that the proposer had narrowed the scope after community feedback. the rationale of Yoroi on the browser node
  • Sebastien Guillemot changed from no to abstain on the browser node because the request was now separate from the Pebble request and the amount lower. the rationale of Sebastien Guillemot on the browser node
  • The Eternl DRep Committee abstained on Scalus, writing that it was a sound proposal from a capable team with nice to have features, and that it could not justify a yes. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on Scalus
  • YUTA voted no on Scalus, writing that the proposal did not provide sufficient justification of the demand for the platform. the rationale of YUTA on Scalus
  • One committee member abstained on Scalus because the proposal named it as a member of its oversight committee. the rationale of a committee member on Scalus
  • The Eternl DRep Committee abstained on the open source programme office request, writing that more structure needed to be in place before DReps could give a 12 million ada blank cheque to a council, with no mention of who would serve on it. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the open source programme office request
  • The Cardano Foundation voted no on the open source programme office request, writing that a 12 million ada upfront withdrawal with vacant councils, an unformed legal entity and an unreconciled budget was not a structure it could support. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the open source programme office request
  • Two committee members abstained on the integrations request over a possible conflict of interest, one as an employee of the Cardano Foundation, Ace Alliance to avoid the appearance of one. the rationale of the committee member Ace Alliance on the integrations request
  • Yoroi voted yes on the cost model update, writing that it provides the cost model settings needed to activate new Plutus primitives after the upgrade to protocol version 11. the rationale of Yoroi on the cost model update
  • The cost model change prices the new operations that the coming hard fork will make available, enables the full set of operations in the two older versions of Plutus as well as the current one, and alters the settings of some operations already in use. Its text states that the new operations only become usable once the hard fork raises the protocol version, while the changes to existing ones take effect on enactment. the document behind the cost model change
  • The wallet request covers twelve months of operations, maintenance and improvements for a non custodial light wallet used for payments, staking, governance and application interaction, at a cost its text puts at around 420,000 dollars a year. The withdrawn sum is to be converted into stablecoins, and every half year any surplus of those holdings plus paid plan income above the yearly cost is to be repaid to the treasury until the dollar value received has been returned. the document behind the wallet request
  • The document behind the resubmitted wallet request states in its preamble that the previous proposal received no votes from committee members over a lack of clarity about audits, and that the new one is essentially the same with a clarification on audit spending and oversight, updated ada to dollar conversion rates, and a note that the wallet DRep will abstain on it. It carries the same repayment clause. the document behind the resubmitted wallet request
  • The document behind the research request describes a programme organised into seven work packages, from human centred design and governance through scalability to post quantum security, funding a consortium of nine research partners. the document behind the research request
  • The document behind the integrations request covers a second contracted year and a twelve month maintenance programme for the integrations delivered under the first critical integrations budget, a stablecoin, cross chain messaging, price feeds and analytics, plus one new custody integration. It discloses ₳70,000,000 received under that first budget and states that the funds are to be held in stablecoins until needed. the document behind the integrations request
  • The document behind the browser node request funds a fully validating Cardano node that runs in the browser, and states that a separate proposal from the same firm for a smart contract language and tooling maintenance, at the same size, is voted on independently. the document behind the browser node request
  • The document behind the Scalus request funds a twelve month delivery period extending a development platform into a full application platform with its own node, native layer two integration and formal verification. the document behind the Scalus request
  • The document behind the dOSPO request funds ₳12,000,000 over 36 months for a program office that sustains open source infrastructure through a maintenance fund, a maintainer mentoring programme, bounties and contributor entry programmes. the document behind the dOSPO request
  • The document behind the committee minimum change states that its ratification depends on the enactment of the Plutus cost model change, a purely temporal dependency with no technical interaction between the parameters. the document behind the committee minimum change
  • The document behind the trust layer request funds an open trust layer for agricultural supply chains combining self sovereign identities for farmers with a satellite oracle delivering verified farm and crop data on Cardano. the document behind the trust layer request