Governance ReviewNo. 38Epochs 639 to 64123 Jun 2026 to 8 Jul 2026

Tweag wins funding with a smaller, one-year proposal

Three treasury withdrawals totalling ₳51.3M were paid in epochs 639 to 641, each clearing the 67% a withdrawal needs by four points or less. Tweag's ₳18.3M was a second attempt at less than half the sum and one year instead of two, and the Cardano Foundation wrote that the proposer had addressed its feedback. Rare Evo's sponsorship request was the only one to expire. Delegation to DReps fell ₳211M in three epochs.

₳23M
the largest withdrawal paid, for critical integrations
69.2%
of counted DRep power behind it, against a 67% bar
₳211M
left DRep delegation between epoch 639 and epoch 641
636
DRep ballots in epoch 641, the busiest epoch of the window

Tweag’s second try

Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026 to 2027 took ₳18.3M at the boundary to epoch 641, on 70.1% of DRep power, 116 yes votes, 20 no and 9 abstain. The shares in this edition are the yes power as a share of all counted power, with abstaining power left out and power that cast no ballot counted as no. A first request from the same team, over two years and for more than twice the sum, had expired in epoch 635 with almost nothing behind it, as the review of epochs 633 to 635 records. That request listed seventeen work packages. The second keeps three: the first release of a faster finality mechanism, cutting the time before a transaction can be treated as settled from roughly twelve minutes to about two, nodes that run without the whole chain history, and conformance testing for both.

The voters said what had changed. The Cardano Foundation, which had voted no on the first version, wrote that the proposer “addressed much of our previous feedback by halving the timeline, unbundling the scope, and detailing the budget”, while “concerns relating to prior funding remain”. The Eternl DRep Committee, also a no the first time, wrote “Yes to Peras in this new slimmed-down proposal”. YUTA wrote that at Cardano’s current transaction volume the benefits of faster finality “may be more immediately tangible” than those of the throughput upgrade. Yoroi W₳llet wrote that the deployment is overdue.

Tweag, first and second request

Seventeen work packages over two years, then three over one

First requestSecond request
Sum asked, in millions of adaFirst request: 39.8MSecond request: 18.3M39.8M18.3MDRep support67.0% barFirst request: 6.1%Second request: 70.1%6.1%70.1%
The first request expired in epoch 635, the second was paid at the boundary to epoch 641. The sum fell by more than half and the support rose past the 67% a withdrawal needs.

₳33M for integrations and farms

Cardano Critical Integrations V2 took ₳23M at the boundary to epoch 639, the second tranche of the integration fund for stablecoins, custody, analytics, bridges and oracles that an earlier edition describes, on 69.2%. Yoroi wrote that “maintenance of live infrastructure is not optional”: the integrations of the first budget carry recurring licensing and operational costs.

5am.earth Trust Layer Targeting Vision 2030 KPIs took ₳10M at the boundary to epoch 640 on 70.6%, 119 yes votes, 55 no and 27 abstain. It builds a record on Cardano that agricultural supply chains can be checked against: identity credentials that farmers control themselves, plus satellite data about farms and crops written on chain. EMURGO voted yes because the infrastructure “is already operational on Cardano Mainnet”, with 10,500 farmers and farms registered as of May 2026 at 500 a day. YUTA changed its vote to abstain, writing that “a smaller pilot test would be the wiser first step” but that the team was working seriously on real transactions. Sebastien Guillemot セバ abstained too, writing that he generally does not vote on commercial projects but considers this a serious team. None of the three payments passed comfortably: 69.2%, 70.1% and 70.6% against the 67% required.

Rare Evo’s sponsorship request expires

Rare Evo asked for ₳2.75M to make Cardano the title sponsor of a conference and of a governance day held ahead of it, with a fifth of premium ticket sales promised back to the treasury, and reached 36.3%. The committee split three yes against three no, short of its two thirds. KtorZ wrote that the proposal “does not clearly disclose previous funding received within the preceding 24 months”, which the constitution requires. On the DRep side YUTA voted no because it “couldn’t glean any information about past ecosystem outcomes” from the proposal, Yoroi, EMURGO and the Cardano Foundation voted yes on the event’s track record, and the Eternl DRep Committee abstained as “neither for or against”.

Delegation to DReps falls ₳211M

The power delegated to DReps fell from ₳5.56B at epoch 639 to ₳5.35B at epoch 641, and the count of DReps holding any of it from 892 to 883. These figures alone do not show why. A move of stake from one DRep to another can explain an individual loss, but does not reduce the total. The steepest single falls are measured across epochs 638 to 641. Over that span Yoroi went from ₳687.3M to ₳592.3M and YUTA from ₳477.8M to ₳428.5M. One DRep that had held ₳66.0M ended the span with no delegation while remaining registered, and another with ₳38.4M deregistered.

DReps cast 420 ballots in epoch 639, 549 in epoch 640 and 636 in epoch 641, and 156 distinct DReps cast a final ballot across the window, out of 883 holding power at its close. In the window eighteen requests were open for a vote.

The power delegated to DReps, epochs 619 to 641

In billions of ada, the two default options excluded

5.20B5.40B5.60B5.80B6.00BEpoch 619: 5.81B619Epoch 620: 5.83BEpoch 621: 5.79BEpoch 622: 5.83BEpoch 623: 5.82BEpoch 624: 5.82BEpoch 625: 5.83B625Epoch 626: 5.81BEpoch 627: 5.81BEpoch 628: 5.83BEpoch 629: 5.83BEpoch 630: 5.84B630Epoch 631: 5.84BEpoch 632: 5.85BEpoch 633: 5.85BEpoch 634: 5.84BEpoch 635: 5.83B635Epoch 636: 5.82BEpoch 637: 5.81BEpoch 638: 5.77BEpoch 639: 5.56BEpoch 640: 5.48BEpoch 641: 5.35B641
The series falls in each of the last four epochs shown, from ₳5.81B at epoch 637 to ₳5.35B at epoch 641, after a stretch that had barely moved since epoch 619.

Hydra and the committee size vote, as of the close of epoch 641

Two actions had their deadline at the boundary to epoch 642, and stand here as of the close of epoch 641. Hydra, ₳5.1M to harden a layer two that settles batches of transactions off the main chain, stood at 74.3%. Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5 stood at 80.1% against the 75% it needs, a second attempt whose text ties its own ratification to the cost model change of the review of epochs 636 to 638.

On Hydra, as of the close of epoch 641, YUTA had voted yes, writing that its development “hasn’t seemed to go smoothly” historically but that the current team appeared to be improving. Yoroi abstained with a new wording: it was withholding its vote “in light of the current situation” and would reassess “once conditions allow for a considered decision”. EMURGO abstained with a text of its own to the same effect, that it would “withhold judgment” until the situation was resolved. Both texts, recorded here after the fact, reappear on the abstentions the two DReps cast in the windows that followed.

Decided in this window

Open at the close of the window

ActionStatusDRep yes
IO: HydraUndecided at the close of epoch 64174.3%
Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5Undecided at the close of epoch 64180.1%

The numbers behind the window

Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 639
₳5.56B
Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 641
₳5.35B
Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
1,925
DReps whose final ballot fell in the window
156
Treasury, at the start of epoch 639
₳1,471.1M
Treasury, at the start of epoch 641
₳1,470.0M
  • DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that cast no ballot and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side.
  • Per DRep power changes are measured between epoch 638 and epoch 641, and only the ten largest falls are ranked.
  • Two votes had their deadline at the boundary that closes this window, and others were still running past it. For those two the tally is the final ballot, because no vote is possible after that boundary, and what became of them belongs to the window that follows.
  • Votes cast is every ballot of epochs 639 to 641 across all three roles, superseded votes included.

Sources and further reading

22 sources, open the list
  • The action page of the first Tweag request shows the sum it asked for, ₳39.8M, and the share of DRep power it closed on, 6.1%. the action page of the first Tweag request
  • The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the second Tweag request, writing that the proposer had addressed much of its previous feedback by halving the timeline, unbundling the scope and detailing the budget, while concerns about prior funding remained. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the second Tweag request
  • The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the second Tweag request with the words yes to Peras in this new slimmed down proposal. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the second Tweag request
  • YUTA voted yes on the second Tweag request, writing that given Cardano's current transaction volume the benefits of faster finality may be more immediately tangible than those of the throughput upgrade, cutting finality from roughly 12 minutes to about 2. the rationale of YUTA on the second Tweag request
  • Yoroi voted yes on the second Tweag request, writing that the deployment of the finality upgrade on the main network is overdue. the rationale of Yoroi on the second Tweag request
  • Yoroi voted yes on the integrations request, writing that maintenance of live infrastructure is not optional and that the integrations of the first budget carry recurring licensing and operational costs. the rationale of Yoroi on the integrations request
  • EMURGO voted yes on the agricultural trust layer, writing that the infrastructure is already operational on the main network with 10,500 farmers and farms registered as of May 2026 at 500 registrations a day. the rationale of EMURGO on the agricultural trust layer
  • YUTA changed its vote on the agricultural trust layer to abstain, writing that it still felt a smaller pilot would be the wiser first step, but that the team was working seriously on driving on-chain transactions. the rationale of YUTA on the agricultural trust layer
  • Sebastien Guillemot abstained on the agricultural trust layer, writing that he generally does not vote on commercial projects but considers this a serious team. the rationale of Sebastien Guillemot on the agricultural trust layer
  • KtorZ voted no on the conference sponsorship, writing that the proposal does not clearly disclose previous funding received within the preceding 24 months as the constitution requires. the rationale of KtorZ on the conference sponsorship
  • YUTA voted no on the conference sponsorship, writing that it could not glean information about past ecosystem outcomes from the proposal and that external engagement was hard to measure. the rationale of YUTA on the conference sponsorship
  • The Eternl DRep Committee abstained on the conference sponsorship, writing that it was neither for nor against it. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the conference sponsorship
  • Yoroi abstained on Hydra, writing that it was withholding its vote in light of the current situation and would reassess once conditions allow for a considered decision. the rationale of Yoroi on Hydra
  • EMURGO abstained on Hydra, writing that given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem it preferred to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty its mandate demands, and would revisit the proposal once the situation was resolved. the rationale of EMURGO on Hydra
  • YUTA voted yes on Hydra, writing that its development had historically not gone smoothly but that the current team appeared to be improving. the rationale of YUTA on Hydra
  • The document behind the Tweag payment covers three work packages over one year, with the mainnet deployment of the Peras finality upgrade as its primary focus, cutting finality from about 12 minutes to about 2, alongside partial history nodes to reduce what a stake pool has to store and conformance testing extended to Peras and Leios. Its text calls the three a single delivery pipeline rather than a modular menu. the document behind the Tweag payment
  • The document behind the first Tweag request covered 17 work packages across 9 core infrastructure areas over two years, with the same finality upgrade as its primary focus. the document behind the first Tweag request
  • The document behind the integrations payment covers a second contracted year and twelve months of maintenance for the integrations delivered under the first critical integrations budget, a stablecoin, cross chain messaging, price feeds and analytics, plus one new custody integration. the document behind the integrations payment
  • The document behind the trust layer payment describes an 18 month programme across three countries combining self sovereign identities for farmers and agricultural entrepreneurs with a satellite oracle writing verified farm and crop data on chain, three named application paths for certification, traceability and credit, and a target of 500,000 registered farmers. the document behind the trust layer payment
  • The document behind the sponsorship request asks for title sponsorship of a conference and of a governance day held ahead of it, and commits to returning 20% of premium ticket sales to the treasury. the document behind the sponsorship request
  • The document behind the Hydra request funds four workstreams hardening a layer two state channel that lets users transact among themselves and settles the result on the main chain. the document behind the Hydra request
  • The document behind the committee minimum change states that its ratification depends on the enactment of the Plutus cost model change, and recounts that a previous action for the same change was invalidated by a collision with another parameter change. the document behind the committee minimum change