Governance ReviewNo. 39Epochs 642 to 6468 Jul 2026 to 2 Aug 2026
Twelve treasury requests paid and seven refused, in the voters' own words
The treasury paid ₳44.2M across twelve withdrawals in epochs 642 to 646, and seven other requests ran out, the closest at 63.0% against the 67% a withdrawal needs. The published rationales show concerns about custody, costs and how treasury funding should be allocated. Yoroi and EMURGO voted the same way on all nineteen, yes on eleven and abstain on eight, and Blockdaemon abstained on every one. The committee minimum fell from seven to five, and the voters said why.
Twelve paid, seven refused
The treasury paid twelve withdrawals across these five epochs, ₳44.2M together, and seven others reached the end of their voting periods with nothing. A twentieth was ratified inside the window for payment after it. A withdrawal needs 67% of DRep power, counted with abstaining power left out and power that cast no ballot as no. The lowest share behind a payment was 68.4%, the highest behind a refusal 63.0%.
More than half the money went into a single withdrawal, ₳25.4M to Intersect at 75.7%, for a year of its operations from June 2026 to June 2027: the member organisation, technical stewardship of the core repositories, incident response and release coordination, at a dollar figure its text puts below the previous year’s ask. Most of the rest is upkeep. The highest share of the twelve, 79.3%, went to the Mithril certificate scheme that lets a node bootstrap without replaying the whole chain, the lowest, 68.4%, to a lightweight data node.
The nineteen withdrawals paid or refused in epochs 642 to 646
Amount requested against the DRep yes share of counted power
What the voters wrote about the seven
The largest refusal was Cardano Builder DAO, ₳20M at 11.0% for a fund that would allocate money to builders against usage targets. SASA_nagamaru_ながまる voted no because, it wrote, the treasury should stay directly accountable to the DReps rather than hand funding decisions to another layer. The committee members who voted no wrote that no definitive administrator and custodian was named. Alchemy asked ₳10M and closed on 5.3%. The Cardano Foundation wrote that its no did not evaluate the proposal: the proposers had announced they no longer wished to proceed.
Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment asked ₳9M as treasury capital rather than a grant and had the tightest head count of the window, 65 yes against 64 no, at 20.5% of power. The Eternl DRep Committee abstained, writing that the room left under the spending limit “needs to be spend on voted Intersect budget items”. The Cardano Foundation voted no because liquidity of that scale should go through an ecosystem wide framework rather than one protocol. Blockfrost’s transformation to not-for-profit asked ₳9.8M to turn the service into a community owned not-for-profit over eighteen months and reached 43.3%. The Eternl DRep Committee voted no with a question: how a monthly cost of 13,600 dollars per employee is justified, and what the service earns today.
The smallest of the seven was Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit., ₳103,000 to reimburse a ₳100,000 deposit lost in 2024 to a node bug on one of the first info actions, plus ₳3,000 for the staking rewards forgone. At 63.0% it came nearest to passing. YUTA voted yes, writing that the loss “may not be a protocol bug, but it was at least due to poor design”. The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes because many DReps had already voted yes, “so we assume it’s legit”. A request for ₳4.0M for a payment card drawing on balances held on chain reached 54.4%.
How Yoroi and EMURGO voted
Yoroi W₳llet at ₳575.3M and EMURGO at ₳299.1M, the largest and the fourth largest DReps at the end of the window, cast identical ballots on all nineteen: yes on eleven, among them ten of the twelve that were paid, and abstain on the other eight, among them six of the seven that ran out. Each abstention came with the same short rationale. Yoroi wrote that it was withholding its vote “in light of the current situation” and would reassess “once conditions allow for a considered decision”. Blockdaemon at ₳334.4M, the third largest, abstained on every one of the nineteen with no rationale in the record.
Neither rationale says what the situation is. In the epochs that followed, and recorded here after the fact, both companies named it in their own words: a security incident at SecondFi. On 3 August 2026 EMURGO announced on X, for itself and the Yoroi DRep, its resignation from the Intersect board and its intention to deregister as a DRep in due course, adding that users migrating their wallet would be undelegated from their DRep.
Abstaining power leaves the count, while delegated power that cast no ballot stays in it as no. On Strike Finance, ₳2.29B of DRep power abstained, ₳0.61B voted yes and ₳1.37B no. On Blockfrost, ₳1.78B abstained, ₳1.51B voted yes and ₳1.16B no. Those shares were set by the DReps who voted yes or no, together with the silent power counted against, and without Yoroi, Blockdaemon and EMURGO.
A lower minimum for the committee, and why
The minimum size of the Constitutional Committee fell from seven members to five at the start of epoch 643. Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5 had been ratified one epoch earlier with 80.1% of DRep power behind it, on 137 yes votes, 22 no and 17 abstain, against the 75% it needed, and six committee members voted for it with none against. A single resignation earlier in the year had left six members where the protocol required seven, and everything needing a committee ruling stopped until the seat was filled.
YUTA wrote that only four candidates had run for the four seats up for election, “despite a candidacy period of more than one month and repeated appeals”, and that the committee sat at exactly its minimum. The Eternl DRep Committee wrote that it did not want single members to carry more weight at five, “on the other hand there are currently not many volunteers for this currently unpaid job”, and voted yes “to keep governance going”.
The hard fork passes the pool vote by 1.4 points
Hard Fork to Protocol Version 11 (‘van Rossem’ Hard Fork) was ratified at the boundary to epoch 643 and took effect one epoch later. It delivers the Plutus operations the cost model change of the previous window had already priced. DReps put 77.6% behind it against the 60% it needed. The pool side was the tight one: 383 pools voted yes, none voted no, 48 abstained, and the share was still 52.4% of stake against the 51% needed, because on a hard fork every pool that does not vote counts as no. The Eternl DRep Committee’s whole rationale was one line: the wallet is hard fork ready. Across the window the count of DReps that had voted in the last 12 epochs fell from 341 to 318, and the power delegated to DReps by ₳115.7M.
The request that did not fit under the limit
Cardano PRIME arrived in epoch 642 asking the community for ₳120M for a twelve month programme for decentralised finance on Cardano. The spending limit for epochs 613 to 713 stood at ₳350M, and by the end of epoch 646 withdrawals since epoch 613 had used ₳335.6M of it, leaving ₳14.4M. Its text makes the withdrawal conditional on a limit with enough room to cover it in full.
That limit was on the ballot at the same time. Net Change Limit, submitted in epoch 640 to replace the ₳350M cap with one of ₳500M, stood at 62.4% as of the close of epoch 646. Three withdrawals ran to the same boundary and stood, as of that close, at 51.8% for Scalus, 33.8% for Bifrost and 26.7% for Global Order Book. The review of epochs 647 to 649 takes all of them from there.
Decided in this window
23 actions, open the full list
Open at the close of the window
| Action | Status | DRep yes |
|---|---|---|
| Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713) | Undecided at the close of epoch 646 | 62.4% |
| Scalus 2026: Maintenance, Dijkstra Readiness, Interoperability & Application Runtime | Undecided at the close of epoch 646 | 51.8% |
| Bifrost: Unlocking Bitcoin DeFi on Cardano to Road to Mainnet (Phase 1 of 2) | Undecided at the close of epoch 646 | 33.8% |
| Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction | Undecided at the close of epoch 646 | 26.7% |
| Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal | Voting ends at the start of epoch 648 | n/a |
| Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME | Voting ends at the start of epoch 649 | n/a |
n/a: the record holds no DRep share from inside this window for this action, only a tally read after it closed.
The numbers behind the window
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 642
- ₳5.37B
- Delegated to DReps, at the start of epoch 646
- ₳5.26B
- Votes cast in the window, superseded votes included
- 2,553
- DReps whose final ballot fell in the window
- 229
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 642
- ₳1,473.8M
- Treasury, at the start of epoch 646
- ₳1,444.5M
- DRep shares are the share of counted power: abstaining power is left out, while power that cast no ballot and power delegated to the always no confidence option are folded into the no side. On the hard fork, pool stake that did not vote counts as no without exception. On other action types a pool can change that by where its reward account delegates.
- Four actions were submitted in this window and decided after it. Three of them are not in the table, because a row can only carry an outcome the window saw. The ₳120M request is listed as open with no share shown, because the record holds only its tally as it stands today, which is after this window. The same applies to the revised open source programme request, still running past the window.
- Four votes ended exactly at the boundary to epoch 647, the moment this window closes. They are listed with their final tallies and no outcome, because what became of them belongs to the window that follows.
- An info action carries no amount on chain, so the net change limit for epochs 613 to 713 comes from the treasury registry this site maintains. What has been drawn against it is summed from the enacted withdrawals themselves, as of the end of epoch 646.
- The committee minimum size in force before this window is not stated. The data behind this review holds no protocol parameter snapshot from before the change.
- Votes cast is every ballot of epochs 642 to 646 across all three roles, superseded votes included.
Sources and further reading
25 sources, open the list
- On 3 August 2026 EMURGO announced on X, for itself and the Yoroi DRep, its immediate resignation from the Intersect board and its intention to deregister its DRep role in due course, to direct its attention to the recovery effort for users affected by a security incident at SecondFi, and said that a user migrating their wallet would be undelegated from their stake pool and DRep and free to choose a new DRep. the EMURGO announcement on X
- Yoroi wrote on the Strike Finance request that it was withholding its vote in light of the current situation and would reassess once conditions allow for a considered decision, the same text it filed on the other requests it abstained on in the window. the rationale of Yoroi on the Strike Finance request
- The Eternl DRep Committee abstained on the Strike Finance request, writing that the remaining room under the net change limit needs to be spent on the budget items already voted for, and that this was no no to future attempts. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the Strike Finance request
- The Cardano Foundation voted no on the Strike Finance request, writing that treasury liquidity of this scale should be deployed through an ecosystem wide framework rather than a single protocol, and that the vote was no reflection on the team. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the Strike Finance request
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted no on the Blockfrost request, asking how a monthly cost of 13,600 dollars per employee is justified and what income the service currently generates. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the Blockfrost request
- The Cardano Foundation voted no on the Alchemy request because, it wrote, the proposers had announced they no longer wished to proceed with the withdrawal, so the vote did not evaluate the proposal. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the Alchemy request
- SASA_nagamaru voted no on the Cardano Builder DAO, writing that the treasury should remain directly accountable to DRep governance rather than delegate funding decisions to another governance layer. the rationale of SASA_nagamaru on the Cardano Builder DAO
- The committee members who voted no on the Cardano Builder DAO and on the Alchemy request wrote that neither identifies a definitive administrator and custodian for the withdrawn funds as the constitution requires. the rationale of a committee member on the Alchemy request
- YUTA voted yes on the deposit reimbursement, writing that the loss may not have been a protocol bug but was at least due to poor design, and that the funds should be given back. the rationale of YUTA on the deposit reimbursement
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the deposit reimbursement, writing that many DReps had already voted yes and it assumed the request was legitimate. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the deposit reimbursement
- YUTA voted yes on the committee minimum change, writing that only four candidates had run for the four committee seats despite a candidacy period of more than one month, and that the committee sat at exactly its minimum size. the rationale of YUTA on the committee minimum change
- The Eternl DRep Committee voted yes on the committee minimum change, writing that it did not want single members to carry more weight at five, but that there are not many volunteers for a currently unpaid job, and it voted yes to keep governance going. the rationale of the Eternl DRep Committee on the committee minimum change
- The Cardano Foundation voted yes on the hard fork, writing that it had taken part in the hard fork working group and monitored readiness across exchanges, infrastructure and stake pools. the rationale of the Cardano Foundation on the hard fork
- The document behind the Intersect payment funds its core operating model from June 2026 to June 2027, the member based organisation, technical stewardship of the core repositories, incident response and release coordination, and states that the overall ask is lower than the previous year in dollar terms. the document behind the Intersect payment
- The document behind the builder fund request describes a smart contract governed funding mechanism that allocates treasury money to builders against ecosystem usage targets. the document behind the builder fund request
- The document behind the Alchemy request splits the sum into two pools of about equal size, one for protocol infrastructure and staged launch liquidity whose profits and yield are to be returned to the treasury quarterly, the other for delivery, audit and integrations of bitcoin backed structured products. the document behind the Alchemy request
- The document behind the Blockfrost request funds an 18 month transition of the service into a community governed not-for-profit, with its source code, trademarks and domains transferred into community stewardship. the document behind the Blockfrost request
- The document behind the payments request was submitted by Intersect on behalf of the vendor through its budget process, and funds payment infrastructure whose core outcome is a card linked to balances held on chain. the document behind the payments request
- The document behind the liquidity deployment request describes a twelve month deployment of treasury owned capital rather than a grant, the ada sold for a stablecoin at deployment, with realised yield returned at six months and the principal plus remaining yield at twelve. the document behind the liquidity deployment request
- The document behind the deposit reimbursement states that the deposit of 100,000 ada on an info action submitted in September 2024 was lost to a node bug that allowed an unregistered stake key, and adds 3,000 ada for the staking rewards forgone. the document behind the deposit reimbursement
- The document behind the treasury governance info action puts basic propositions up for discussion, among them a dedicated budget with a thematic structure and an end to isolated withdrawals being voted against one another. the document behind the treasury governance info action
- The document behind the committee minimum change recounts that a previous action for the same change was invalidated by a collision with another parameter change live at the same time, ties its own ratification to the enactment of the Plutus cost model change, and tabulates that at five members four votes reach the two thirds bar and two can block it, where at seven it takes five and three. the document behind the committee minimum change
- The document behind the hard fork lists new Plutus primitives, the availability of all built-in functions across all three Plutus versions, and native case expressions, and records the constitutional condition that at least 85% of stake pools by active stake should have upgraded to a supporting node before ratification. the document behind the hard fork
- The document behind the Cardano PRIME request funds a twelve month programme to improve the readiness of decentralised finance protocols, activate incentives and grow lasting liquidity in Cardano markets, and makes the withdrawal conditional on a net change limit having been agreed with enough remaining capacity to cover it in full at enactment. the document behind the Cardano PRIME request
- The document behind the higher limit replaces the ₳350M net change limit for epochs 613 to 713 with one of ₳500M for the same period, on the argument that the practical room under the old limit was becoming constrained. It states that the agreement is recorded when yes votes exceed 50% of the active voting stake, and that it has no direct on chain effect and authorises no withdrawal. the document behind the higher limit
Data behind this edition: a snapshot of the site's governance data taken 2026-09-09 18:02 UTC, frozen as epochs-642-646.pack.json next to the article. Every figure above traces to a field in that file. Its git blob hash f7e2d8086cbc pins the exact bytes, whatever later happens to the branch.