Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs
7 of 7 committee members voted
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed “Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs” Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action constitutional. Rationales are archived at https://github.com/ace-alliance/ace-voting/
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action (TWGA) requests 6,900,000 ada to fund twelve months of engineering on the Dingo Cardano node.
Under Article II.6, governance actions must use a standardized format, include an immutable URL and hash, and provide sufficient rationale. This TWGA satisfies these requirements by utilizing an immutable IPFS URL and hash, and providing a title, abstract, justification, and supporting materials.
Under Article II.7, TWGAs must meet six specific requirements. This TWGA satisfies all of them:
- II.7.1 (Terms): Specifies the 12-month period, costs, purpose, and refund circumstances via a smart contract "Failsafe Sweep".
- II.7.2 (Disclosure): Discloses prior Catalyst funding and confirms no recent treasury withdrawals were received.
- II.7.3 (Net Change Limit): A Net Change Limit must be set and not exceeded. The 350M ADA NCL is treated as set (see Precedent), and this ₳6,900,000 request does not exceed the ₳339,858,000 remaining balance.
- II.7.4 (Audits): Allocates $500,000 for periodic independent security audits.
- II.7.5 (Administrators): Designates an Independent Oversight Board as administrators.
- II.7.6 (Custody): Enforces auto-abstain delegation and prohibits SPO delegation for all escrowed funds held by the administrator smart contract prior to disbursement.
Ace Alliance finds the proposed “Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs” Governance Action constitutional.
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
Vote: YES (constitutional). This Treasury Withdrawal supports a scoped, time-bounded delivery plan for Dingo with described controls for administration and auditability consistent with the Constitution’s governance action and treasury-withdrawal standards.
What is being proposed
This governance action proposes a Treasury Withdrawal to fund delivery of Dingo, a Go implementation of a Cardano node, targeting production-grade readiness (including block-producing capability) over an approximately 12-month period, with controlled administration and accountability measures.
Constitutional consistency (v2.4)
A Treasury Withdrawal is constitutional when it is properly specified (purpose, delivery period, costs, refund/close-out mechanics), includes the required disclosures, remains within the applicable Net Change Limit, and provides credible oversight and auditability. The supporting materials associated with this action describe: (i) a defined purpose and timeframe, (ii) cost/budget framing, (iii) an administration model intended to control disbursement, (iv) public traceability/reporting and independent audit intent, and (v) segregated custody and delegation constraints for administrator-held funds.
Determination
Based on the documentation referenced by the action and the controls described, this action is assessed as constitutional and is supported with a YES vote.
YES — constitutional, provided the on-chain metadata and referenced documents remain immutable and sufficiently specific to support ongoing community auditability and oversight.
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We consider this governance action to be constitutional.
This proposal meets the formal requirements for a Governance Action as set forth in Article 2, Section 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Cardano Constitution, and is presented via an immutable off-chain document. Furthermore, this proposal is a Treasury Withdrawal governance action under Article 2, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. In relation to Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, and 6, it includes details regarding the purpose of fund usage, the implementation period, a breakdown of costs, repayment conditions, the supervising entity, and the audit and management framework. Additionally, under Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 3 of the Cardano Constitution, the Net Change Limit (Epoch 613 to Epoch 713) (gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q) is in effect, and no conflict with this limit has been identified. Please note that while some references to articles in the Constitutionality Checklist within the proposal text do not align with the current Constitution, the Constitutional Committee has verified the proposal based on the current Constitution and found no constitutional conflicts. Therefore, this proposal is deemed constitutional.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is constitutional.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecYesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this treasury withdrawal governance action is constitutional.
The governance action with ID "gov_action17df...jtsmpe" and title "Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs" is a Treasury Withdrawal, and is therefore subject to the following sections and guardrails in the Cardano Constitution.
ARTICLE II, Section 6 of the Cardano Constitution states that governance actions must follow a standardized and legible format, including a URL hosting an immutable document and a corresponding hash, and must provide sufficient rationale including a title, abstract, justification, and supporting materials.
This governance action includes a valid URL and hash, which matches the hash of the off-chain documentation referenced. The rationale also meets the minimum content specified in this section.
ARTICLE II, Section 7 specifies that Treasury Withdrawal governance actions must include the following:
1. Purpose, Delivery Period, Costs, and Refund Conditions
This governance action specifies:
- The purpose of the withdrawal is "to fund Dingo's development to production readiness"
- The period for delivery of proposed activities as "We're requesting a single treasury withdrawal to cover twelve months of development."
- The relevant costs and expenses under the heading "Budget Breakdown"
- The circumstances under which funds may be refunded to the Cardano Treasury as "Unused ADA sweeps back to the treasury at contract expiration."
These elements fulfil the requirements of Article II, Section 7(1).
2. Prior Treasury Funding Disclosure
ARTICLE II, Section 7(2) requires disclosure of whether the prospective recipient has received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the last 24 months.
This governance action states that "Our prior Cardano funding has come from Project Catalyst (which funded gOuroboros development and initial Dingo work) and from self-funding. We're PRAGMA members, but we haven't received any funds from Amaru's treasury proposal or any other treasury withdrawal despite our membership." This fulfils the requirement of ARTICLE II, Section 7(2).
3. Net Change Limit (NCL)
ARTICLE II, Section 7(3) requires that Treasury Withdrawals must not exceed the Net Change Limit.
The Net Change Limit in effect at the time of submission of this vote on-chain is the governance action with ID "gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q".
- A. Current NCL Amount: 350000000 ada
- B. Current NCL Time Period: Epoch 613 to Epoch 713 (Inclusive)
- C. Total of Treasury Withdrawals within the Current NCL Time Period: 10142000 ada
- D. Amount of this Treasury Withdrawal: 6900000 ada
- E. "C" plus "D" = 17042000 ada
- F. "A" minus "E" = 332958000 ada
As the value of "F" is greater than or equal to zero, this governance action fulfils the NCL requirement.
4. Audit Allocation and Oversight Metrics
ARTICLE II, Section 7(4) states
Treasury Withdrawals actions shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada.While this governance action does not explicitly state that "an allocation of ada" will be used for "periodic independent audits", it does state that "Anyone can verify. Quarterly financials published with category-level detail." The majority of ECC members believe that this sufficiently fulfils the requirements of ARTICLE II, Section 7(4).
5. Designated Administrators
ARTICLE II, Section 7(5) requires that one or more administrators are designated to monitor fund usage and ensure deliverables are achieved.
This governance action states that "Audited SundaeSwap smart contracts with an independent oversight board" will be used as an administrator, which fulfils this requirement.
6. Fund Management Requirements
ARTICLE II, Section 7(6) states "Any ada received from a Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawal, so long as such ada is being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, must be kept in one or more separate accounts that can be audited by the Cardano Community, and such accounts shall not be delegated to an SPO but must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option."
This governance action specifies the following withdrawal address, which at the time of assessment is not delegated to an SPO and is delegated to the auto abstain voting option:
- stake1790c5a0h3qwkxquehkdg746ccaa3hdfzgp7ckx6wzdpp7lq6ysdg0
Finally, the guardrails that require consideration for this governance action are TREASURY-01a, TREASURY-02a, and TREASURY-03a. These are addressed as follows:
- TREASURY-01a - The net change limit with governance action ID "gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q" is currently in effect, after being "agreed by the DReps via an on-chain governance action with a threshold of greater than 50% of the active voting stake".
- TREASURY-02a - As per the above assessment, this treasury withdrawal does not exceed the current Net Change Limit.
- TREASURY-03a - This treasury withdrawal is denominated in ada.
By way of a split decision we therefore find this governance action Constitutional.
This governance action sufficiently fulfils the criteria specified for treasury withdrawals in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed constitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
Ok
The proposed withdrawal is compliant with constitutional requirements. One could argue that Article II - Section 7.1 requires withdrawal to specify "circumstances under which the withdrawal might be refunded to the Cardano Treasury", which isn't explicitly done in the withdrawal here.
However, the withdrawal does specify using a usual smart contract (developed by Sundae Labs) for treasury management which explicitly enforce treasury reimbursement at the end of the budget period. I therefore considered this properly addressed.
- Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges the “Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs” governance action constitutional.
This governance action is properly framed as a Treasury Withdrawals action under Article II, § 7 of the Cardano Constitution. It therefore must satisfy the general governance action standards in Article II, § 6, as well as the additional requirements specific to treasury withdrawals in Article II, § 7, 1 through 6.
The action satisfies Article II, § 6, 1 and 2. It provides a title, abstract, motivation, rationale, and extensive supporting materials, including repositories, contract references, and related documentation. The proposal is legible, structured, and sufficiently detailed to allow DReps, SPOs, the Constitutional Committee, and the broader community to understand both the substance of the request and the governance framework through which the funds would be administered.
The action also satisfies Article II, § 7, 1. It clearly specifies the purpose of the withdrawal, namely funding twelve months of full-time engineering work to bring Dingo to production readiness as a block-producing Cardano node written in Go. It identifies the delivery period, breaks down the relevant costs and expenses, and explains the circumstances under which unused funds would be returned to the treasury through contract-enforced sweep mechanisms. This is exactly the sort of specificity the Constitution requires for treasury withdrawals.
The action satisfies Article II, § 7, 2 by disclosing prior treasury-related funding context. The proposal states that Blink Labs has previously received Catalyst funding and self-funded parts of the work, while also expressly stating that it has not received funds from the Amaru treasury proposal or any other treasury withdrawal. That disclosure is sufficient to address the constitutional requirement to state whether the prospective recipient has received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the last 24 months.
The action also satisfies Article II, § 7, 3. A Net Change Limit must be set, and treasury withdrawals must not exceed it. Tingvard notes that the active Net Change Limit has been set at 350 million ada, and this withdrawal of 6.9 million ada does not exceed that limit. On its face, the proposal is therefore compatible with the constitutional requirement that treasury withdrawals remain within the applicable NCL.
The proposal satisfies Article II, § 7, 4 by allocating resources for periodic independent audits and oversight. It includes a substantial line item for a major external security audit and establishes a reporting and public transaction journal framework that enables ongoing scrutiny of the use of funds. While the constitutional requirement refers to independent audits and oversight metrics in relation to the use of treasury funds, this proposal does provide both an explicit audit allocation and a concrete oversight structure.
The action satisfies Article II, § 7, 5 by designating administrators responsible for monitoring the use of funds and ensuring deliverables are achieved. The proposal relies on a smart-contract-based administration framework and identifies an independent oversight board with defined roles in co-signing disbursements, reviewing milestones, and pausing funding if required. This satisfies the constitutional requirement that one or more administrators be designated for oversight and accountability.
The action also satisfies Article II, § 7, 6. The proposal states that treasury funds held in escrow are segregated through dedicated treasury and vendor contracts, are publicly auditable on-chain, and are delegated to the predefined abstain voting option rather than to any SPO. That is directly consistent with the Constitution’s custody and delegation requirements for treasury funds held by administrators prior to further disbursement.
Beyond formal compliance, the proposal is also consistent with the Tenets in Article I, particularly Tenet 7, Tenet 8, and Tenet 9. Supporting an additional independent node implementation promotes network resilience and long-term sustainability. A second production-grade block producer strengthens decentralisation at the implementation layer and reduces reliance on a single codebase. The use of open-source licensing, on-chain auditable administration, milestone-based disbursement, and an external oversight structure also supports fair, transparent, and sustainable treasury usage.Tingvard finds this governance action constitutional. It conforms to Article II, § 6 and Article II, § 7, 1 through 6 of the Cardano Constitution. The proposal clearly states the purpose, duration, and costs of the withdrawal, discloses prior treasury funding context, remains within the active Net Change Limit, allocates resources for oversight and audit, designates administrators, and ensures auditable custody of funds under the predefined abstain voting option. It therefore meets the constitutional standard for a Treasury Withdrawals action.