Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026-2027)
7 of 7 committee members voted
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We consider this governance action to be constitutional.
This proposal is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action to withdraw ₳1,680,000 from the Cardano Treasury for the project “Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026–2027)” by Tastenkunst GmbH / Eternl. Regarding Article 2, Section 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Cardano Constitution, this proposal adopts an immutable off-chain reference using IPFS. The proposal text includes an overview, rationale, budget, reimbursement structure, operational framework, FAQ, and grant history. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 1 of the Cardano Constitution, this proposal aims to support the operation, maintenance, and improvement of the Eternl wallet over a 12-month period. The proposal provides details regarding the implementation period from August 2026 through July 2027, the budget breakdown, refund conditions, conversion to stablecoins, and the sustainability model utilizing the Pro plan. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 2 of the Cardano Constitution, the proposal text states that Tastenkunst GmbH was a Treasury fund recipient during the 2025 budget process and includes a reference to “Withdraw ₳583,000 for Eternl Maintenance administered by Intersect.” Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 3 of the Cardano Constitution, the requested amount is ₳1,680,000, and we confirmed that, at the time of submission, it falls within the 350M ADA Net Change Limit applicable to Epochs 613–713. Furthermore, the proposal is denominated in ADA. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 4 of the Cardano Constitution, the proposal text includes a reference to audit expenses in the amount of “Audits: ₳16,800.” Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 5 of the Cardano Constitution, the proposal states that Tastenkunst GmbH is designated as the administrator. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 6 of the Cardano Constitution, in the initial rationale (ipfs://QmQzwXo9Ytdm5zY4E7SfPFSxQVQ4Z1tGtVSrRVsLMoRBo7), we noted a concern because we were unable to confirm that the stake address associated with the withdrawal credential for this Governance Action had been delegated to a predefined abstain voting option. Subsequently, after re-examining the relevant stake address, we confirmed that no stake delegation exists and that the vote delegation is set to the predefined abstain voting option (alwaysAbstain). Therefore, the concern originally identified has been resolved. Accordingly, as no clear conflict with the Cardano Constitution has been identified, we determine that this proposal is constitutional.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is constitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
Ok, although clarification regarding audits are welcome.
The proposal funds the maintenance and continued operation of a widely used Cardano wallet and can therefore reasonably be considered aligned with the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem under Article I.1.
The proposal clearly identifies an administrator, discloses previous Catalyst, Intersect, and Treasury funding, includes repayment conditions, and provides a content-addressed reference with an associated hash. These elements generally satisfy the requirements of Articles II.6.1, II.7.1, II.7.2, and II.7.5.
There are some reservations regarding Article II.7.4. While the proposal allocates funds for audits and includes several transparency mechanisms (reports on earnings, public company's wallet, public repayments, ...), it does not clearly specify the nature, scope, independence, or periodicity of those audits. The Constitution explicitly requires provisions for periodic independent financial audits, and the proposal does not define an audit schedule, identify an auditor, or establish a recurring audit framework. As such, compliance with Article II.7.4 is only partially demonstrated.
These concerns notwithstanding, I do not identify a clear constitutional violation. The proposal appears broadly compliant with the Constitution, though the audit provisions would benefit from greater specificity.
- Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
This proposal is constitutional as it doesn't violate any of the binary requirements set forth in the constitution.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This proposal is constitutional as it doesn't violate any of the binary requirements set forth in the constitution.
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04NoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026-2027)" Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action unconstitutional. Rationales are archived at https://github.com/ace-alliance/ace-voting/
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
"Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026-2027)" (9a020ea7a6a0d8...25d7#0) is a Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action and is therefore governed by both the general proposal standards in Article II, Section 6 and the additional Treasury Withdrawal standards in Article II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. The TWGA seeks to withdraw 1,680,000 ada from the Cardano Treasury to fund twelve months of Eternl wallet operations, maintenance, and development from August 2026 through July 2027, at a stated 6.0 FTE within a ten-person team. The proposer is Tastenkunst GmbH, operating the Eternl product. The proposal frames the requested ada as a loan rather than a grant, committing to convert the full amount into stablecoins, deposit it in a publicly viewable company wallet, and repay the treasury in ada equivalent to the original USD value of the withdrawal through a semi-annual review cadence tied to the rollout of paid Eternl Pro plans.
Article II.6's procedural standards are satisfied. The proposal anchors to an IPFS-hosted document with the on-chain blake2b-256 hash d07ca099d9b18c459f57c1502365ad74ef0b674cc2c83a64d18b4762084fc50d, a content-addressed form that is immutable once posted, and the metadata supplies the title, abstract, motivation, budget breakdown, milestone roadmap, and supporting references that Article II.6.2 requires. We accept the proposal's textual disclosure under Article II.7.2: it identifies a prior 2025 budget process receipt of approximately 583,000 ada and notes that approximately 133,000 USD of that allocation was not received due to the ada price decline. Article II.7.3 is satisfied because the 1,680,000 ada requested here is well within the 350,000,000 ada Net Change Limit currently in force for the period spanning epochs 613 through 713.
The defect that renders this proposal unconstitutional lies in Article II.7.4. That provision requires that a Treasury Withdrawal "shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada." This is a two-part substantive requirement: an allocation directed at the cost of periodic independent audits, and an allocation directed at the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of the withdrawn ada. The proposal contains a single generic budget line item, labeled "Audits," allocating 16,800 ada, one percent of the request. Neither the metadata nor the reference PDF states that this line item is intended to cover periodic independent audits, and nothing in the proposal allocates any ada to the implementation of oversight metrics. Read at its most generous, the "Audits" line item might be assumed to encompass both functions, but the proposal supplies no description, scope, or explanation on which the Community could base that assumption. A line item bearing an audit-adjacent label, standing alone and unexplained, does not demonstrate that the two functions Article II.7.4 requires to be funded are in fact funded. We do not read Article II.7.4 to demand any particular label or itemization, but we do read it to require that the proposal make it possible to conclude that ada has been allocated both to periodic independent audits and to the implementation of oversight metrics. This proposal does not, and on that basis we find it unconstitutional.
We separately note a concern under Article II.7.5 that we raise for the proposer and the Community to weigh but that does not form the basis of our finding. Article II.7.5 (Administrator). That provision requires that a Treasury Withdrawal "shall designate one or more administrators responsible for monitoring how the funds are used, and ensuring the deliverables are achieved." Under Administrative Remarks, the proposal names Tastenkunst GmbH as the administrator. Tastenkunst is also the proposer, the recipient of the funds, the entity that converts them to stablecoins, and the entity that controls the company wallet. The proposal therefore designates the recipient as its own and only administrator. We acknowledge that the Constitution does not, by its text, define the administrator as a party distinct from the recipient, and that self-administration, while it sits uneasily with the evident purpose of the rule, is not expressly prohibited. The original intent of the administrator requirement, however, was to place a party between the recipient and the disbursal of treasury funds, providing oversight independent of the recipient's own discretion. The ratified Constitution broadened the original draft by permitting multiple administrators and by permitting a smart contract to serve as the administrator, but it did not remove the concept of the administrator. A structure in which the recipient is the sole administrator, holding the funds of an ongoing project in a fully controlled account, is in tension with that purpose. We raise this as a concern while resting our finding on Article II.7.4.
We find Article II.7.6 satisfied. Article II.7.6 (Auditable Accounts and Delegation). That provision requires that ada held by an administrator prior to disbursement be kept in one or more separate accounts that can be audited by the Cardano Community, that such accounts not be delegated to an SPO, and that they be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option. The on-chain withdrawal destination, stake1u92flcyspwcp92lmgs0p47vdjrrek96l07cv3v6033wddfc8h620a, is not delegated to any stake pool and is delegated to the auto-abstain DRep, and the company wallet is committed to be publicly viewable. Paying treasury funds to a regular, non-script stake address is not prohibited by the Constitution. The requirements of Article II.7.6 are met.
For these reasons, Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026-2027)" Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action unconstitutional under Article II.7.4, because the proposal does not allocate ada in a manner that demonstrates funding for both periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of the withdrawn ada. The Committee additionally notes a concern under Article II.7.5 regarding the designation of the recipient as its own sole administrator, as discussed above, though this concern does not form the basis of the finding. The Committee finds Article II.7.6 satisfied.
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5NoActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
Cardano Curia finds the Eternl: Path to Sustainability 2026–2027 Treasury Withdrawal unconstitutional in its present form because the proposal does not unambiguously establish periodic independent audits and oversight metrics as required by Article II, Section 7(4).
Determination
Cardano Curia finds this Treasury Withdrawal governance action unconstitutional in its present form.
The proposal is detailed and appears to satisfy many applicable Treasury Withdrawal requirements. It identifies a purpose, delivery period, budget, recipient, administrator, repayment conditions and mechanisms intended to make the use of funds publicly observable. This decision is therefore not a rejection of Eternl, its contribution to Cardano, or the merits of supporting sustainable wallet infrastructure.
Constitutional conflict
Article II, Section 7(4) requires a Treasury Withdrawal to allocate ada to cover both periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics concerning the use of the withdrawn ada.
The proposal contains a budget item of ₳16,800 labelled "Audits." However, it does not clearly state that the audits will be independent and periodic, and it does not define the oversight metrics that will be implemented. The audit scope, cadence, independence arrangements, reporting expectations and measurable oversight criteria are not specified.
A publicly observable withdrawal account and regular reporting may improve transparency, but they do not unambiguously satisfy the separate constitutional requirements for periodic independent audits and oversight metrics. The Constitutional Committee should not have to infer compliance with a mandatory safeguard from a generic budget heading.
The proposal also designates the recipient as the administrator responsible for monitoring its own use of funds. This is not necessarily prohibited, but it reinforces the need for independent audit and oversight arrangements to be stated clearly.
Opportunity to resubmit
Cardano Curia hopes the submitter will submit a revised version that removes this ambiguity. A revised proposal should expressly state that the audit allocation funds periodic independent audits, define auditor-independence criteria, specify the audit scope and cadence, identify the oversight metrics, explain where results will be published, and state how identified deficiencies will be addressed.
With these matters stated unambiguously in the canonical proposal, Cardano Curia would be able to reconsider the action on its merits.
Cardano Curia finds the action unconstitutional in its present form. The ₳16,800 "Audits" line does not unambiguously establish periodic independent audits and implementation of oversight metrics as required by Article II, Section 7(4). Cardano Curia encourages the submitter to resubmit a revised proposal expressly resolving these ambiguities.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecNoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this treasury withdrawal governance action is unconstitutional.
The governance action with ID “gov_action1ngp...dm3w3z” and title “Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026-2027)” is a Treasury Withdrawal, so is subject to ARTICLE II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. While most of the requirements under this section were met by this governance action, it did not fulfil the requirements under ARTICLE II, Section 7(4).
ARTICLE II, Section 7(4) states "Treasury Withdrawals actions shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada."
While the cost breakdown does include an item with the title "Audits", it is not clear what kind of audits this refers to. As this proposal is intended to fund ongoing software development of the Eternl wallet, it is likely that technical audits will be required, so the intent behind this item cannot be implied. As this governance action does not provide any explicit information regarding the allocation ada "to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics", it DOES NOT fulfil the requirement under ARTICLE II, Section 7(4).
We therefore find this governance action Unconstitutional.
This governance action does not sufficiently fulfil the criteria specified for treasury withdrawals in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed unconstitutional.
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43NoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges the “Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026-2027)” governance action unconstitutional.
This governance action is properly framed as a Treasury Withdrawals action and must therefore be assessed under Article II, Section 6 and Article II, Section 7 of the Constitution, together with the applicable treasury guardrails in Appendix I.
The proposal satisfies several constitutional requirements.
It identifies the purpose of the withdrawal as funding 12 months of Eternl operations, maintenance, and improvements. It specifies the requested amount as 1,680,000 ada, provides a delivery period from August 2026 to July 2027, gives a budget breakdown across frontend, backend, support, administration, and audits, and describes repayment conditions if paid plan income and remaining treasury funds exceed the stated operating requirement.
The proposal also discloses prior Cardano community funding, including Catalyst grants, Intersect funding, and a prior 2025 treasury withdrawal for Eternl maintenance. This satisfies Article II, Section 7, §2.
The constitutional defect is found under Article II, Section 7, §4.
Article II, Section 7, §4 requires Treasury Withdrawals actions to include an allocation of ada to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada.
The proposal includes a budget line titled “Audits” for 16,800 ada. However, the proposal does not explain what kind of audits this refers to, whether the audits are independent, whether they are periodic, or whether the allocation also covers implementation of oversight metrics for treasury fund use.
This is especially relevant because the proposal funds ongoing software operations and development. In that context, the word “Audits” could refer to technical audits, financial audits, compliance audits, security review, or another form of review. The proposal does not make this clear.
Tingvard does not read Article II, Section 7, §4 as requiring any specific wording or a separate budget line for every oversight function. However, the action must provide enough information to conclude that ada has been allocated both for periodic independent audits and for oversight metrics as to the use of the withdrawn ada.
A single unexplained audit line is not sufficient to establish that both constitutional requirements are met.
Tingvard therefore finds that the action fails to satisfy Article II, Section 7, §4.
Tingvard finds this governance action unconstitutional.
The proposal has a clear purpose, delivery period, budget, prior funding disclosure, repayment model, and named administrator. However, it does not sufficiently satisfy Article II, Section 7, §4 because it does not clearly allocate ada for periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of the withdrawn ada.