Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2
7 of 7 committee members voted
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2" Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action Constitutional. Rationales are archived at https://github.com/ace-alliance/ace-voting/
"Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2" (gov_action1lwu...lgmhse) is a Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action and is therefore governed by both the general proposal standards in Article II, Section 6 and the additional Treasury Withdrawal standards in Article II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. The action withdraws 2,350,000 ada from the Cardano Treasury, valued by the proposer at approximately 420,000 USD at an assumed rate of 0.1787 USD per ada, to fund twelve months of Eternl wallet operations, maintenance, and development from August 2026 through July 2027, at a stated 6.0 FTE within a ten-person team. The proposer is Tastenkunst GmbH, operating the Eternl product. As in the prior version, the proposal frames the requested ada as a loan rather than a grant, committing to convert up to 420,000 USD worth of ada into stablecoins held in a publicly viewable company wallet, to return any ada above that amount to the Treasury, and to repay the Treasury in ada equal to the original USD value through a semi-annual review cadence tied to the rollout of paid Eternl Pro plans. This is the resubmission of "Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026-2027)" (gov_action1ngp...dm3w3z), which Ace Alliance found unconstitutional under Article II.7.4. We assess the constitutionality of the Action, not the merits of the funding request, and we apply identical scrutiny to a resubmission.
Article II.6 (Governance Action Standards). The procedural standards are satisfied. The proposal anchors to an IPFS-hosted document, ipfs://QmQ6cDaLLeBMnf1zio7Xn8jV8uTUk68tPirx5uKH6HLr3L, with the on-chain blake2b-256 hash 8021a950826f251399495e5d370c4998723dd7dca2457b06c15ef218ba93df6a, a content-addressed form that is immutable once posted, and the metadata supplies the title, abstract, motivation, budget breakdown, roadmap, and supporting references that Article II.6.2 requires. The technical-review standard of Article II.6.3 applies only to Hard Fork Initiation and Parameter Update actions and is not engaged here.
Article II.7.1 (Terms of the Withdrawal). The proposal specifies the purpose (twelve months of Eternl operations, maintenance, and cross-platform development), the delivery period (August 2026 through July 2027), the relevant costs and expenses (an itemized budget of 1,292,500 ada for Frontend at 55%, 587,500 ada for Backend at 25%, 117,500 ada for Support at 5%, 305,500 ada for Admin at 13%, and 47,000 ada for Audits at 2%), and the circumstances of refund (any ada exceeding the 420,000 USD target returned to the Treasury upon conversion, plus the semi-annual ada-denominated repayment of the full USD value and an additional donation of up to 210,000 USD worth of ada). The requirement is met.
Article II.7.2 (Prior Treasury Receipt Disclosure). The proposal discloses prior receipts of treasury ada within the last 24 months. A History of Catalyst Grants and Treasury Grants section identifies the 2025 budget process withdrawal of 583,000 ada for Eternl maintenance administered by Intersect, the funding period of which ends in July 2026, together with an Intersect CIP-95 implementation grant of 70,000 ada and prior Catalyst awards. The proposal further states that the team has received approximately 153,000 USD less than the proposed amount of the 2025 withdrawal owing to the decline in the ada price. The disclosure requirement is satisfied.
Article II.7.3 (Net Change Limit). A Net Change Limit of 350,000,000 ada is in force for the period spanning epochs 613 through 713. The 2,350,000 ada requested here is well within that limit. Article II.7.3 is satisfied.
Article II.7.4 (Audit and Oversight Allocation). This is the provision on which the prior version failed, and it is the provision the resubmission is directed at curing. Article II.7.4 requires an allocation of ada to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of the withdrawn ada. In the prior version, a single generic line item labeled "Audits" was unaccompanied by any description, and we held that the proposal gave the Community no basis to conclude that either periodic independent audits or oversight metrics were in fact funded. This version addresses and remediates this defect. A dedicated Independent Audits and Oversight Metrics section states that the 47,000 ada Audits allocation covers periodic independent audits of treasury fund use and the implementation of oversight metrics; that an independent party unaffiliated with Tastenkunst GmbH or the Eternl team will perform the audits in February 2027 and August 2027; that the audits will review receipt, custody, conversion, spending, remaining balances, Pro plan income relevant to repayment, and any refunds or repayments to the Cardano Treasury; and that the oversight metrics will include balances, conversion rates, transaction hashes, and treasury repayment hashes. The allocation is now directed at both objects the provision names, the audits are stated to be periodic (semi-annual) and independent (performed by an unaffiliated party), and the oversight metrics are enumerated. In our opinion this satisfies Article II.7.4.
Article II.7.5 (Administrator). The proposal designates Tastenkunst GmbH as the treasury fund administrator. Tastenkunst is also the proposer, the recipient of the funds, and the entity that converts them to stablecoins and controls the company wallet, so the proposal again designates the recipient as its own and only administrator. As we observed in the prior version, the Constitution does not by its text define the administrator as a party distinct from the recipient, and self-administration, while it sits uneasily with the evident purpose of the rule, is not expressly prohibited. We note this structure as a continuing concern for the proposer and the Community to weigh, but it does not form the basis of our finding, and the newly specified independence of the auditing party partly addresses the oversight gap that the self-administration structure would otherwise leave.
Article II.7.6 (Auditable Accounts and Delegation). The on-chain withdrawal destination is the reward address stake1u92flcyspwcp92lmgs0p47vdjrrek96l07cv3v6033wddfc8h620a. We confirmed on chain that this account is registered, is not delegated to any stake pool, and is delegated to the predefined auto-abstain voting option, and the proposal commits that ada held before conversion or return will be kept in an auditable account that is not delegated to an SPO and is delegated to the abstain option. Paying treasury funds to a regular, non-script stake address is not prohibited by the Constitution. The requirements of Article II.7.6 are met.
Appendix I (Guardrails). The Treasury Withdrawals guardrails are satisfied: a Net Change Limit has been agreed by the DReps via on-chain action (TREASURY-01a), this withdrawal does not exceed it (TREASURY-02a), and the withdrawal is denominated in ada (TREASURY-03a).
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2" Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action Constitutional.
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
Cardano Curia finds the “Eternl: Path to Sustainability – v2” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional, with one abstention due to concerns about self-administration and treasury-control design. The proposal is sufficiently clear, bounded, auditable, and aligned with the Constitution, but future large Treasury Withdrawals should preferably use stronger independent administration, milestone-based disbursement, escrow, or multisig oversight.
What is being proposed
This governance action proposes a Treasury Withdrawal for “Eternl: Path to Sustainability – v2,” requesting 2,350,000 ada to support 12 months of Eternl wallet operations, maintenance, user support, development, and sustainability work.
The expected effect is to fund continued operation and improvement of Eternl as Cardano ecosystem infrastructure during the stated delivery period.
Constitutional and guardrails assessment
Cardano Curia classifies this action as a Treasury Withdrawal. It is therefore assessed under the Constitution’s general governance action standards and the specific Treasury Withdrawal requirements.
The proposal is constitutionally supportable because it identifies a clear purpose, a defined funding amount, a bounded delivery period, cost categories, audit and oversight provisions, and a public-interest rationale connected to Cardano wallet infrastructure. The proposal does not alter protocol rules, change governance rights, modify monetary policy, or interfere with ada owners’ ability to transact, delegate, vote, or use the Cardano Blockchain.
The action appears aligned with the constitutional principles of continuity, fair access, ecosystem utility, and long-term sustainability. Funding a widely used non-custodial Cardano wallet can be consistent with maintaining useful infrastructure for ada holders and ecosystem participants, provided the treasury controls and reporting commitments are honored.
Self-administration assessment
Cardano Curia considered the concern that the recipient also acts as administrator or fund controller. This is a material governance-control risk. For a large Treasury Withdrawal, self-administration weakens the practical safeguard that an administrator is expected to provide. Independent administration, milestone-based disbursement, escrow, or multisig oversight would be stronger and would better protect against fund misuse, under-delivery, or weak enforcement.
However, self-administration is not expressly prohibited by the constitutional text. The Constitution requires Treasury Withdrawal actions to designate one or more administrators responsible for monitoring fund use and ensuring deliverables are achieved, but it does not explicitly require those administrators to be independent from the recipient.
For that reason, Cardano Curia does not find self-administration alone to be an automatic constitutional violation. Instead, it is treated as a serious governance-quality concern that should be weighed by voters and improved in future proposals.
Treasury controls and auditability
The proposal’s positive constitutional case depends on the stated audit, reporting, oversight, and account-control commitments. For this action to remain constitutionally sound in practice, public reporting should be timely, audit outputs should be accessible, treasury funds should be traceable, and any unspent or unused funds should be handled according to the proposal’s refund or repayment commitments.
Cardano Curia also expects the recipient and administrator functions to be performed with heightened transparency because the same party is closely connected to both delivery and control of funds.
Determination
Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. The proposal is specific, bounded, related to existing Cardano infrastructure, and does not conflict with an explicit constitutional prohibition. The self-administration structure creates a material risk but does not, by itself, make the proposal unconstitutional under the current text.
Accordingly, Cardano Curia records four constitutional votes and one abstention. The abstention reflects concern over the self-administration structure and the precedent it may create for large Treasury Withdrawals, not a finding that the action is unconstitutional.
Cardano Curia finds the “Eternl: Path to Sustainability – v2” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional, while recording a material governance-control reservation.
The proposal is clear, bounded, tied to existing Cardano infrastructure, and includes audit and oversight commitments. Self-administration is a serious risk and should not become the preferred model for large Treasury Withdrawals, but it is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution.
Cardano Curia therefore records 4 constitutional votes, 0 unconstitutional votes, 1 abstention, 0 did-not-vote, and 0 against votes.
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We consider this governance action to be constitutional.
This proposal is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action to withdraw ₳2,350,000 from the Cardano Treasury for "Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2" by Tastenkunst GmbH / Eternl. In accordance with Article 2, Section 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Cardano Constitution, this proposal employs an immutable off-chain reference using IPFS. Furthermore, the proposal text includes an overview, budget, sustainability model, repayment terms, audit and oversight framework, FAQs, and past grant history; we therefore determine that it presents sufficient information for evaluation as a Governance Action. Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 1 outlines the purpose of the Treasury Withdrawal, implementation details, implementation period, cost breakdown, conversion to stablecoin, and conditions for repayment to the Treasury and donations. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 2, the proposal text includes a statement that Tastenkunst GmbH was a Treasury fund recipient during the 2025 budget process, as well as a reference to "Withdraw ₳583,000 for Eternl Maintenance administered by Intersect." Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 3, we have confirmed that the requested amount for this proposal is ₳2,350,000 and falls within the 350M ADA Net Change Limit applicable to Epochs 613-713 at the time of submission. Additionally, the requested amount for this proposal is stated in ADA, and the USD equivalent is provided for reference only. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 4, the proposal text lists "Audits: ₳47,000" as audit expenses and specifies an audit by an independent third party as well as oversight metrics. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 5, the proposal states that Tastenkunst GmbH is designated as the Treasury fund administrator. Furthermore, Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 6 specifies that Treasury funds will be held in an auditable account, will not be delegated to an SPO, and will be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option. Upon verifying the stake address of the withdrawal credential corresponding to the Governance Action, we confirmed that no stake delegation exists and that vote delegation is set to the predefined abstain voting option (alwaysAbstain). Therefore, as no clear conflict with the Cardano Constitution has been identified, we determine that this proposal is constitutional.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is constitutional.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecYesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this treasury withdrawal governance action is constitutional.
The governance action with ID "gov_action1lwu...lgmhse" and title "Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2" is a Treasury Withdrawal, and is therefore subject to the following sections and guardrails in the Cardano Constitution.
ARTICLE II, Section 6 of the Cardano Constitution states that governance actions must follow a standardized and legible format, including a URL hosting an immutable document and a corresponding hash, and must provide sufficient rationale including a title, abstract, justification, and supporting materials.
This governance action includes a valid URL and hash, which matches the hash of the off-chain documentation referenced. The rationale also meets the minimum content specified in this section.
ARTICLE II, Section 7 specifies that Treasury Withdrawal governance actions must include the following:
1. Purpose, Delivery Period, Costs, and Refund Conditions
This governance action specifies:
- The purpose of the withdrawal as "This proposal enables 12 months of operations, maintenance, and improvements. It includes frontend and backend maintenance and development, backend infrastructure, user support, and day-to-day operations."
- In the table under the Summary heading that the "Delivery period" is "12 months".
- The relevant costs and expenses under the heading "Budget and Budget Breakdown".
- The circumstances under which funds may be refunded to the Cardano Treasury as "If the Ada price is above $0.1787 when you convert the funds, what will you do? We will only keep $420,000 in stablecoins; the remaining Ada will be returned to the treasury."
These elements fulfil the requirements of Article II, Section 7(1).
2. Prior Treasury Funding Disclosure
ARTICLE II, Section 7(2) requires disclosure of whether the prospective recipient has received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the last 24 months.
This governance action states that "Tastenkunst GmbH was the recipient of treasury funds from the 2025 budget process". This fulfils the requirement of ARTICLE II, Section 7(2).
3. Net Change Limit (NCL)
ARTICLE II, Section 7(3) requires that Treasury Withdrawals must not exceed the Net Change Limit.
The Net Change Limit in effect at the time of submission of this vote on-chain is the governance action with ID "gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q".
- A. Current NCL Amount: 350000000 ada
- B. Current NCL Time Period: Epoch 613 to Epoch 713 (Inclusive)
- C. Total of Treasury Withdrawals within the Current NCL Time Period: 296536117 ada
- D. Amount of this Treasury Withdrawal: 2350000 ada
- E. "C" plus "D" = 298886117 ada
- F. "A" minus "E" = 51113883 ada
As the value of "F" is greater than or equal to zero, this governance action fulfils the NCL requirement.
4. Audit Allocation and Oversight Metrics
ARTICLE II, Section 7(4) states "Treasury Withdrawals actions shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada."
This governance action states that "The Audits allocation covers periodic independent audits of treasury fund use and the implementation of oversight metrics. It is not a technical security audit budget.", which fulfils the requirements of ARTICLE II, Section 7(4).
5. Designated Administrators
ARTICLE II, Section 7(5) requires that one or more administrators are designated to monitor fund usage and ensure deliverables are achieved.
This governance action states that "Tastenkunst GmbH will be the treasury fund administrator for this proposal.", which fulfils this requirement.
6. Fund Management Requirements
ARTICLE II, Section 7(6) states "Any ada received from a Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawal, so long as such ada is being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, must be kept in one or more separate accounts that can be audited by the Cardano Community, and such accounts shall not be delegated to an SPO but must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option."
This governance action specifies the following withdrawal address, which at the time of assessment is not delegated to an SPO and is delegated to the auto abstain voting option:
- stake1u92flcyspwcp92lmgs0p47vdjrrek96l07cv3v6033wddfc8h620a
Finally, the guardrails that require consideration for this governance action are TREASURY-01a, TREASURY-02a, and TREASURY-03a. These are addressed as follows:
- TREASURY-01a - The net change limit with governance action ID "gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q" is currently in effect, after being "agreed by the DReps via an on-chain governance action with a threshold of greater than 50% of the active voting stake".
- TREASURY-02a - As per the above assessment, this treasury withdrawal does not exceed the current Net Change Limit.
- TREASURY-03a - This treasury withdrawal is denominated in ada.
We therefore find this governance action Constitutional.
This governance action sufficiently fulfils the criteria specified for treasury withdrawals in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed constitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
Ok
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
The proposal funds the maintenance and continued operation of a widely used Cardano wallet and can therefore reasonably be considered aligned with the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem under Article I - Section 1.
It clearly identifies an administrator, discloses previous Catalyst, Intersect, and Treasury funding, includes repayment conditions, and provides a content-addressed reference with an associated hash. It also substantially strengthens its compliance (from its previous submission) with Article II - Section 7.4 by defining periodic independent financial audits, their intended scope, and a set of oversight metrics.
Hence, I do not identify a clear constitutional violation and consider the proposal constitutionally compliant.
- Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 799No rationale
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43NoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges the “Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2” Treasury Withdrawal governance action unconstitutional.
This proposal requests ₳2,350,000 from the Cardano Treasury to support 12 months of Eternl operations, maintenance, and improvements.
Tingvard notes that this revised proposal includes additional clarification on independent audits and oversight metrics. The proposal states that the audit allocation covers periodic independent audits of treasury fund use and the implementation of oversight metrics, and that an independent party unaffiliated with Tastenkunst GmbH or the Eternl team will perform audits in February 2027 and August 2027.
Tingvard therefore does not base this finding on Article II, Section 7, §4.
However, Tingvard finds that the proposal does not satisfy Article II, Section 7, §5.
Article II, Section 7, §5 requires Treasury Withdrawal actions to designate one or more administrators responsible for monitoring how the funds are used and ensuring that deliverables are achieved.
The starting point must be the wording of the provision.
The text does not expressly state that an administrator must be independent from the recipient. It also does not expressly state that the recipient may act as its own sole administrator. On that specific question, the wording is neutral. This is as noted in the previous ruling on Eternl: Path to Sustainability, the Constitution does not expressly prohibit self-administration.
Because the wording does not resolve the issue directly, Tingvard must consider the meaning of the administrator role, how treasury administration has been understood in practice, and the purpose of Article II, Section 7 as a whole, as well as its practical implications on the blockchain ecosystem.
An administrator is not merely a named party. In ordinary meaning, an administrator is someone responsible for managing, supervising, or overseeing a process. In the context of a Treasury Withdrawal, Article II, Section 7, §5 gives that role a specific constitutional function: monitoring how the funds are used and ensuring that deliverables are achieved.
That function requires substance.
Treasury administration has also developed in practice as more than passive self-reporting. Existing treasury administration models have used structures such as written legal contracts, smart contract escrow, vendor contracts, milestone-based disbursement, public reporting, oversight committees, independent assurance, multi-signature permissions, and mechanisms for returning unused funds to the Treasury.
Tingvard does not consider any one of these mechanisms mandatory in every case. The Constitution does not prescribe a single administration model. But existing practice shows the kind of problem Article II, Section 7, §5 is designed to address: treasury funds should not simply be transferred to a recipient and then monitored only by that same recipient.
Article II, Section 7 as a whole supports this interpretation. The section requires clear terms, disclosure of prior treasury funding, compliance with the Net Change Limit, periodic independent audits, oversight metrics, administrators, and restrictions on how funds held before disbursement may be handled.
Taken together, these requirements are not merely informational. They are safeguards. They exist to create accountability around the use of public treasury funds.
Against that background, the administrator requirement should not be interpreted in a way that reduces it to a formality.
The proposal designates Tastenkunst GmbH as the treasury fund administrator. Tastenkunst GmbH is also the submitting entity connected to Eternl and the entity receiving or controlling the requested funds. The proposal further states that it is not milestone-based and that funds will be converted into stablecoins and deposited into a public company wallet.
This creates a circular administration structure.
The same entity responsible for receiving and using the treasury funds is also designated as the entity responsible for monitoring the use of those funds and ensuring that the deliverables are achieved.
That is not a meaningful administrative check. It is self-monitoring.
The practical risk is not theoretical. In public funding systems on the Cardano blockchain, projects have historically faced delays, scope changes, partial delivery, or non-completion of milestones. That does not mean recipients are acting in bad faith. It means delivery risk is real.
That is precisely why independent review, milestone verification, audit, and administration matter.
If a vendor can decide for itself whether its own work has been sufficiently delivered, whether its own use of funds is acceptable, and whether its own operational commitments have been met, then the administrator role no longer provides the safeguard required by Article II, Section 7, §5.
Tingvard also recognizes the countervailing concern.
Requiring administration, oversight, assurance, or external review creates cost and complexity. Smaller vendors should not be forced into unnecessarily burdensome structures. Treasury administration should not become so centralized or expensive that only large organizations can participate.
That concern is valid.
A smaller Treasury Withdrawal may justify a lighter structure. A larger or longer proposal may justify a stronger one. Administration can be provided through different models, including independent administrators, third-party assurance, milestone review, public audit processes, smart contract controls, oversight committees, or other mechanisms to ensure administrative functions.
The constitutional question is not whether every proposal must use Intersect or one specific administration framework. It does not.
The question is whether the proposal creates a credible administrative function that is capable of monitoring fund use and ensuring delivery.
In this case, Tingvard does not find that it does.
Public wallet visibility and later independent audits improve transparency. They are relevant and positive additions. But they do not replace an administrator with a meaningful role during the funding period, especially where there is no milestone-based structure, no independent control layer, no escrow mechanism, and no external party with authority to verify delivery or prevent unilateral control over the funds.
Tingvard therefore finds that the proposal may satisfy the word “administrator” in a narrow formal sense, but fails to satisfy the substance and purpose of Article II, Section 7, §5.
Tingvard finds that the “Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2” Treasury Withdrawal governance action does not satisfy Article II, Section 7, §5.
The wording of the Constitution does not directly resolve whether a recipient may ever act as its own administrator. However, the purpose of the administrator requirement is to create a meaningful function for monitoring fund use and ensuring delivery.
In this proposal, the recipient and controlling entity is also the sole administrator. The proposal is not milestone-based and does not provide a sufficient independent control layer, escrow mechanism, delivery verification process, or external administrative check to give the administrator role meaningful substance.
Tingvard therefore judges this governance action unconstitutional.