[OriLife × TonFarm] Identifying 180 Million Durians Without Physical Labels
6 of 7 committee members voted
- Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
This proposal is incredibly bad by all metrics, and it physically hurts to vote this as constitutional, however, I will do so as it doesn't violate any of the binary requirements set forth in the constitution.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This proposal is incredibly bad by all metrics, and it physically hurts to vote this as constitutional, however, I will do so as it doesn't violate any of the binary requirements set forth in the constitution.
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04NoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed "[OriLife × TonFarm] Identifying 180 Million Durians Without Physical Labels" Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action unconstitutional under Article II.7.5 and Article II.7.6. Rationales are archived at https://github.com/ace-alliance/ace-voting/
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
"[OriLife × TonFarm] Identifying 180 Million Durians Without Physical Labels" (2f583d8efb7a01...6b52#0) is a Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action and is therefore governed by both the general proposal standards in Article II, Section 6 and the additional Treasury Withdrawal standards in Article II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. The TWGA seeks to withdraw 2,400,000 ada from the Cardano Treasury to fund a tamper-evident agricultural traceability deployment across 12,000 hectares of durian production in Đắk Lắk, Vietnam, ahead of Vietnam's December 1, 2026 mandatory traceability connection deadline under Circular 11/2026/TT-BCT. The proposer is the OriLife Alliance, a three-company consortium comprising DDC Holdings, GreenSun Tech, and Aladin Contract, with field operations and government relations led by DDC Holdings, research and core intellectual property held by GreenSun Tech, and product and user experience delivered by Aladin Contract.
Article II.7.5 requires that "Treasury Withdrawals actions shall designate one or more administrators responsible for monitoring how the funds are used, and ensuring the deliverables are achieved." Article II.7.6 further requires that "Any ada received from a Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawal, so long as such ada is being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, must be kept in one or more separate accounts that can be audited by the Cardano Community, and such accounts shall not be delegated to an SPO but must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option." The proposal asserts that these requirements are satisfied through Intersect: the Abstract states that "All ADA locked in Intersect-managed escrow," the Milestones section repeats that "Funds locked in Intersect-managed escrow (Annex D), disbursed only upon 2-of-3 IOB signatures," and the proposal further asserts alignment with the "Intersect 2026 Budget Framework."
The on-chain governance action does not implement what the proposal text asserts. The withdrawal destination encoded in the proposed treasury withdrawal is the stake address stake1u9vp5r7j6n65xw9lkfy8fxweaght2cqsn7e0t62nmhlz2dcm5yzrr, which is the same stake address listed in the proposal metadata as the proposer's deposit return address. It is not an Intersect-managed Treasury Reserve Smart Contract or any other account under Intersect's administrative control. The Administrator framework as previously accepted by this Committee in the Intersect-administered TWGAs routes treasury funds directly to a Sundae Labs-audited treasury-management smart contract operated by Intersect, bypassing the proposer entirely. The OriLife withdrawal does not implement that routing. The proposal provides no MoU, signed agreement, letter of consent, or any other evidence that Intersect has agreed to administer these funds. The proposal also references an Intersect Oversight Body operating under a two-of-three signature regime, but this body is not defined anywhere in the on-chain anchor document, and the structure does not correspond to the four-member Oversight Committee model, with three-of-three administrative authorization and three-of-five trustee authorization for sensitive operations, that Intersect actually operates under the established TRSC framework.
The on-chain configuration of the withdrawal destination further fails Article II.7.6 on two of its three substantive requirements. The destination stake address is presently delegated to pool1q9kwa675j2z53jecrs6pn3fqsc9ypxrsypu5dgu6hammqkagy22, the TIGER pool, which the proposal's own Conflict of Interest disclosure identifies as operated by Duc Tiger, the Alliance's Project Manager. The Constitution provides that an administrator's holding account "shall not be delegated to an SPO." The destination is also delegated to drep1ygeqtuysj...fw96dg, a registered DRep, rather than to the predefined abstain voting option that Article II.7.6 mandates. The account that would receive the 2,400,000 ada from the Cardano Treasury is therefore presently configured in two ways that the Constitution forbids for administrator-held funds. The proposal contains no on-chain provision compelling re-delegation prior to or contemporaneous with disbursement, and no off-chain commitment that addresses the SPO-delegation and abstain-DRep requirements directly.
Articles II.7.5 and II.7.6 together establish a constitutional separation between the project receiving treasury funds and the account that holds those funds prior to milestone disbursement. The Administrator's role is to keep treasury ada one step removed from the project members who must demonstrate that the funded work is being delivered. The SPO-delegation prohibition and abstain-DRep delegation requirement together ensure that custody during the holding period cannot enrich a delivery party through stake-derived rewards or be used to influence Cardano governance. The proposed structure inverts this separation. The funds flow directly into the proposer's own stake address, which is delegated to the proposer's Project Manager's own stake pool. The constitutional requirement governs the account that receives the withdrawal from the Treasury, not a downstream transfer that the Constitution does not anticipate and that the on-chain governance action does not require. We do not reach the remaining sub-provisions of Article II.7 or the general standards of Article II.6, because the Article II.7.5 and Article II.7.6 defects identified above are dispositive on the record before us.
For these reasons, Ace Alliance finds the proposed "[OriLife × TonFarm] Identifying 180 Million Durians Without Physical Labels" Treasury Withdrawals Governance Action unconstitutional under Article II.7.5 and Article II.7.6.
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5NoActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
Cardano Curia (Constitutional Committee) finds the “[OriLife × TonFarm] Identifying 180 Million Durians Without Physical Labels” Treasury Withdrawals governance action unconstitutional. Internal vote: 4 NO / 1 YES. Final position: NO.
What is being proposed
This is a Treasury Withdrawals governance action requesting 2,400,000 ADA to fund a durian traceability deployment in Đắk Lắk, Vietnam, with milestones and annexed supporting materials. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}
Constitutional and guardrails consistency (v2.4)
Treasury withdrawals are subject to the general governance action standards and the additional treasury withdrawal standards, including requirements to:
- designate one or more administrators responsible for monitoring use of funds and ensuring deliverables; and
- ensure any administrator-held holding account prior to further disbursement is auditable and not delegated to an SPO, and delegated to the predefined abstain option.
Determination
Cardano Curia votes NO on constitutionality because the action’s on-chain withdrawal structure does not implement the administrator/escrow and custody constraints asserted in the proposal narrative.
In particular (as reflected by the action’s encoded withdrawal destination and configuration in independent reviews of the on-chain submission):
- Administrator / escrow is asserted but not implemented by the withdrawal itself. The proposal text asserts an Intersect-managed escrow/administration model, but the encoded withdrawal destination is a regular stake address associated with the proposer’s deposit return address, rather than an Intersect-controlled contract/account. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}
- Insufficient evidence of administrator designation/consent. The record cited in review materials does not include a binding agreement (e.g., MoU/letter of consent) demonstrating that Intersect (or another administrator) has agreed to custody/administer funds in the manner the proposal claims. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}
- Custody-account delegation constraints are not satisfied at the point of withdrawal. The receiving account is described as delegated in ways incompatible with the treasury-withdrawal custody restrictions (SPO delegation and non-abstain DRep delegation). :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
These issues are procedural and structural, not a judgment that the underlying real-world objective is unworthy. The constitutional standards for treasury withdrawals are designed to ensure that, at the moment of treasury disbursement, custody and oversight controls are already in force and not left to discretionary post-receipt actions by the proposer.
Internal position (Cardano Curia)
- 4 members: NO (unconstitutional)
- 1 member: YES (constitutional)
- Final CC position recorded by Cardano Curia: NO
For the reasons above, Cardano Curia finds the governance action unconstitutional and records a final position of NO, with an internal vote of 4 NO / 1 YES.
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31NoExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We consider this governance action to be unconstitutional.
This proposal is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action to withdraw ₳2,400,000 from the Cardano Treasury for the OriLife Alliance’s project “[OriLife × TonFarm] Identifying 180 Million Durians Without Physical Labels.” Regarding Article 2, Section 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Cardano Constitution, this proposal adopts an immutable off-chain reference based on a content hash, and the proposal text includes an overview, motivation, budget, milestones, refund conditions, technical architecture, and other details. Additionally, regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 1, the proposal also outlines the purpose of the Treasury Withdrawal, the implementation period, the budget, and the conditions for repayment. Regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 3, the requested amount for this proposal is ₳2,400,000, and we have confirmed that it falls within the 350M ADA Net Change Limit applicable to Epochs 613–713 at the time of submission. However, regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 6, we cannot confirm that the documentation meets the requirements regarding Treasury funding history within the past 24 months, independent audits, oversight metrics, and ADA allocation, fund administrators, “one or more separate accounts that can be audited by the Cardano Community,” “not be delegated to an SPO,” and “must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option.” Therefore, we determine that this proposal is unconstitutional.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is unconstitutional.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecNoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this treasury withdrawal governance action is unconstitutional.
The governance action with ID “gov_action19av...tgph5d” and title “[OriLife × TonFarm] Identifying 180 Million Durians Without Physical Labels” is a Treasury Withdrawal, so is subject to ARTICLE II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. While many of the requirements under this section were met by this governance action, it did not fulfil all of them.
ARTICLE II, Section 7(2) requires disclosure of whether the prospective recipient has received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the last 24 months, however this governance action does not provide any information in relation to this.
ARTICLE II, Section 7(6) states "Any ada received from a Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawal, so long as such ada is being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, must be kept in one or more separate accounts that can be audited by the Cardano Community, and such accounts shall not be delegated to an SPO but must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option."
The governance action provides a link to an external document called “Annex D — Fund Administration & Escrow Mechanism”, where it states that Intersect will be the administrator. However, at the time of assessment the receiving address is delegated to both a stake pool (TIGER) and a DRep (FIMI), which contravenes the requirement stipulated in ARTICLE II, Section 7(6).
We therefore find this governance action Unconstitutional.
This governance action does not sufficiently fulfil the criteria specified for treasury withdrawals in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed unconstitutional.
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43NoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges the “[OriLife × TonFarm] Identifying 180 Million Durians Without Physical Labels” treasury withdrawal governance action unconstitutional.
This governance action does not fully satisfy the procedural requirements for a treasury withdrawal under Article II, Section 6 and Article II, Section 7.
The proposal includes a title, abstract, rationale, supporting materials, purpose, delivery period, costs, refund conditions, and milestone structure, satisfying parts of Article II, Section 7, §1.
However, the proposal does not clearly disclose whether the prospective treasury withdrawal recipient has received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the last 24 months, as required under Article II, Section 7, §2.
The proposal also references fund administration and escrow arrangements, but the provided metadata does not clearly establish the administrator structure, auditability of custody accounts, and delegation restrictions in the same clear procedural form required under Article II, Section 7, §5 and §6.
The proposal states that funds will be locked in Intersect-managed escrow and references Annex D, but the procedural requirements must be sufficiently clear from the governance action metadata and supporting materials available for assessment.
Tingvard therefore finds that the governance action does not procedurally satisfy all constitutional requirements applicable to treasury withdrawal governance actions.Tingvard finds this governance action unconstitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49Not votedExpired · term ends epoch 653No rationale