Pebble + Gerolamo - HLabs 2026 Budget
7 of 7 committee members voted
- Ace Alliance71aa5b3a…8f04YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Ace Alliance finds the proposed “Pebble + Gerolamo - HLabs 2026 Budget” Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action constitutional. Rationales are archived at https://github.com/ace-alliance/ace-voting/
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
“Pebble + Gerolamo - HLabs 2026 Budget” (gov_action1ky2...uz3scv) is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action and is therefore governed by both the general proposal standards in Article II, Section 6 and the additional Treasury Withdrawal standards in Article II, Section 7 of the Cardano Constitution. Article II.6.1 requires governance actions to follow a standardized and legible format, include a URL hosting additional context, and include the hash of an immutable off-chain document such that the on-chain Governance Action matches the final off-chain version. Article II.6.2 further requires sufficient rationale, including at minimum a title, abstract, justification, and relevant supporting materials. Article II.7 then imposes additional requirements for Treasury Withdrawals, including disclosure of purpose, delivery period, costs and expenses, refund conditions, prior treasury funding within the last 24 months, provision for independent audits and oversight metrics, designation of administrators, and separate auditable accounts delegated to the predefined abstain voting option rather than to an SPO.
This proposal satisfies those standards. It is presented in a structured and legible format with an abstract, motivation, rationale, duration and milestones, budget breakdown, and supporting references. It identifies the funded work with sufficient specificity: maintenance for an upcoming hard fork, a production-ready light node through Gerolamo, and a production-ready imperative smart contract language and tooling through Pebble. It also specifies a 12-month delivery period and states a total budget ask of 8,035,714 ada, derived from a stated 10 FTE annual budget plus a refundable 25% contingency.
The proposal also satisfies the Treasury Withdrawal-specific requirements of Article II.7. It states the purpose of the withdrawal, the period of delivery, and the relevant costs and expenses. It explains the refundable nature of the contingency and provides for return of unused funds to the Treasury, thereby addressing refund circumstances. It identifies an oversight structure and monitoring mechanism, including an independent oversight board and milestone-based disbursement controls. It also states that funds will be held through a smart-contract escrow arrangement in separate auditable accounts and that such escrowed funds will be delegated to the predefined auto-abstain option rather than to an SPO. These features directly respond to Article II.7.4, II.7.5, and II.7.6.
Article II.7.2 requires disclosure of whether the prospective recipient has received ada from the Treasury within the last 24 months. The proposal addresses that requirement by referencing prior funding history and retrospective materials. The constitutional requirement is disclosure, and the proposal provides that disclosure through its supporting materials. On the record before us, that is sufficient.
Article II.7.3 requires that a Net Change Limit be set and that Treasury Withdrawals not exceed that limit. That requirement is satisfied here. We have determined that the 350M ADA Net Change Limit is set and that this 8,035,714 ada requested at this time will not exceed that balance. Once that predicate is established, no remaining defect appears under Article II.7. The action therefore satisfies the constitutional guardrails applicable to Treasury Withdrawals.
Ace Alliance finds the proposed “Pebble + Gerolamo - HLabs 2026 Budget” Governance Action constitutional.
- Cardano Curia84feba94…6bd5YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
Cardano Curia judges the “Pebble + Gerolamo - HLabs 2026 Budget” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional, subject to final submission meeting immutability and auditability requirements.
What is being proposed
This governance action proposes a Treasury Withdrawal to fund a 12-month Harmonic Laboratories (HLabs) work program spanning: (1) hard-fork readiness and maintenance of widely used TypeScript Cardano libraries, (2) Gerolamo, a production-ready TypeScript light node including browser capability, and (3) Pebble, an imperative smart contract language and developer tooling compiling to optimized UPLC.
Constitutional and guardrails consistency (Constitution v2.4)
A Treasury Withdrawal is constitutional when it is properly specified, transparent, and auditable, and when it complies with the Constitution’s governance action standards and treasury withdrawal requirements. This proposal provides a defined purpose and delivery period (12 months), an FTE-based budget rationale with a refundable contingency, milestone-based delivery evidence, and a governance/administration scheme using smart-contract escrow with independent oversight, pause/stop mechanisms, segregated custody, and a failsafe sweep back to the Treasury.
Why this advances Cardano’s principles
Decentralization and resilience: Gerolamo enables more trust-minimized access to chain data for dApps and wallets (including in-browser use), reducing reliance on centralized indexers and supporting resilient, censorship-resistant application architectures. Client diversity and an additional relay implementation reduce single-implementation risk.
Builder accessibility: Pebble provides an imperative, TypeScript-like developer experience while targeting efficient on-chain code, lowering barriers for a large pool of developers without sacrificing performance.
Ecosystem continuity: Proactive maintenance of TypeScript libraries across hard forks reduces downstream breakage, fragmentation, and emergency rewrites, improving continuity for builders and users.
Determination (with conditions)
YES on constitutionality, contingent on the final on-chain submission including immutable canonical URLs and hashes for the proposal text and annexes, with clear versioning and an auditable public evidence register (milestones → artifacts → disbursement events) to preserve durable third-party auditability.
Cardano Curia finds this governance action constitutional. It meets the Constitution’s governance action standards and Treasury Withdrawal requirements, and includes meaningful safeguards for accountability and auditability. Final submission should preserve immutability (canonical URLs + hashes) and maintain a durable audit trail for milestone evidence and disbursements.
- Cardano Japan Council725d4d44…7b31YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
We consider this governance action to be constitutional.
This proposal is a Treasury Withdrawals proposal involving the withdrawal of funds from the Cardano Treasury, and its purpose is to support the development and maintenance of a suite of TypeScript libraries for the Cardano ecosystem (including Pebble and Gerolamo) by Harmonic Laboratories. In accordance with Article 2, Section 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution, the proposal text, URL, hash, supplementary materials, and related documents are provided, and the proposal’s content and supporting documentation are sufficiently identified. Furthermore, regarding Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, the intended use of funds, implementation period, cost breakdown, and refund conditions are stated; regarding Paragraph 2, disclosures regarding funds received within the past 24 months are provided. Furthermore, regarding Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, independent audits, the supervisory body, segregated management accounts, and delegation to auto-abstain are clearly specified, providing the management, audit, and accountability framework required for Treasury Withdrawals proposals. Furthermore, in relation to Article 2, Section 7, Paragraph 3, and the Treasury Guardrails (TREASURY-02a, TREASURY-03a), the requested amount of ₳8,035,714 for this proposal falls within the currently valid Net Change Limit (epochs 613–713, 350,000,000 ADA), and is submitted in ADA. Therefore, no conflict with the current Constitution or related guardrails has been identified. Based on the foregoing, this proposal meets the disclosure and governance requirements necessary for a Treasury Withdrawals proposal, and as no unconstitutional elements have been identified in light of constitutional requirements, it is deemed constitutional.
For the reasons stated above, we determine that it is constitutional.
- KtorZ64f97568…3a49YesExpired · term ends epoch 653Rationale
Ok 👍
While the proposal is a bit thin on some details regarding the outlined milestones, I believe it contains sufficient details to be constitutional. Whether it is convincing enough is a matter for the DReps.
Note also that proposers must disclose any prior funding received. While this isn't explicitly mentioned in the core proposal, it is mentioned as part of one of the listed immutable reference (ipfs://QmZVw82XNXNsgGmBj39R26Mx7jgzWaNjSw4A7JM9Erye9c) alongside a short retrospective for 2025.
Finally, the proposal does not explicitly allocate funds to "cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada.", as per Article II, Section 7.4 of the constitution. However the proposal uses a well-known smart contract for managing funds and facilitating public auditing. Plus, as stated in the proposal, they have also allocated a contingency budget for "overlooked challenges". With these two elements, I believe there's sufficient material in place to satisfy this constitutional requirement and ensure proper audit of the funds used.
- Phil_uplc68bb0b42…8746YesActive · term ends epoch 799Rationale
- Tingvard646d1b3a…be43YesActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
Tingvard judges the “Pebble + Gerolamo - HLabs 2026 Budget” treasury withdrawal governance action constitutional.
This governance action is properly framed as a Treasury Withdrawal under Article II, Section 7, §1 through §6 of the Cardano Constitution. It must therefore satisfy the general governance action requirements in Article II, Section 6, §1 and §2, the specific Treasury Withdrawal requirements in Article II, Section 7, §1 through §6, and the treasury guardrails in Appendix I.
The proposal satisfies Article II, Section 6, §1 and §2. It is submitted in a standardized and legible format, includes a title, abstract, motivation, rationale, and supporting materials, and sets out the off-chain content that accompanies the action. The proposal therefore provides the structure and rationale required for an on-chain governance action.
The proposal also satisfies Article II, Section 7, §1. It specifies the purpose of the withdrawal, namely funding Gerolamo, Pebble, and associated tooling maintenance. It identifies the delivery period as twelve months, provides detailed costs and expenses, and states the circumstances under which funds may return to the Cardano Treasury through escrow design and a failsafe sweep of unused funds.
Article II, Section 7, §4 is satisfied because the proposal includes oversight and audit mechanisms tied to the use of the withdrawn ada. Article II, Section 7, §5 is also satisfied because the proposal designates an oversight board responsible for monitoring fund usage and verifying delivery. These mechanisms are material constitutional safeguards for a Treasury Withdrawal of this size.
Article II, Section 7, §6 is satisfied because the proposal states that treasury funds held in escrow before disbursement will be kept in separate auditable accounts, will not be delegated to a Stake Pool Operator, and will instead be delegated to the predefined abstain option.
The proposal further addresses the Net Change Limit requirement. Article II, Section 7, §3 and Appendix I, TREASURY-02a require that Treasury Withdrawals must not exceed the Net Change Limit for the relevant period. The proposal states that this withdrawal does not exceed that limit. It is also denominated in ada, satisfying Appendix I, TREASURY-03a.
Tingvard’s main constitutional point is narrower than the broader strategic debate. There may well come a point where the community must decide whether Cardano has enough node implementations, enough tooling diversity, or enough parallel infrastructure efforts. That is a real governance question. It is not, however, a constitutional question. The Constitution does not establish a ceiling on the number of node implementations or developer tools that may be supported. Nor does it empower the Constitutional Committee to substitute its policy preference for the judgement of Delegated Representatives.
That judgement belongs to DReps under Article II, Section 4, §2, because DReps may vote on all types of governance actions and must evaluate the merits, priorities, and tradeoffs of treasury spending. Whether additional node diversity remains worth funding is therefore a judgement call for DReps, not a basis for a constitutional objection by the Constitutional Committee.
Nothing in the proposal, on its face, conflicts with the Constitution’s structural requirements for Treasury Withdrawals. To the contrary, the proposal is directed toward infrastructure resilience, developer onboarding, and ecosystem sustainability, all of which are constitutionally permissible aims and broadly consistent with the Tenets in Article I, Section 1.
Tingvard finds this governance action constitutional. It satisfies Article II, Section 6, §1 and §2, Article II, Section 7, §1 through §6, and the relevant treasury guardrails in Appendix I. The question of whether Cardano has reached a point where additional node diversity is no longer worth funding is a matter for DRep judgement, not a basis for finding the proposal unconstitutional.
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecNoActive · term ends epoch 726Rationale
We have determined that this treasury withdrawal governance action is unconstitutional.
The governance action with ID "gov_action1ky2...uz3scv" and title "Pebble + Gerolamo - HLabs 2026 Budget" is a Treasury Withdrawal, and is therefore subject to the following sections and guardrails in the Cardano Constitution.
ARTICLE II, Section 6 of the Cardano Constitution states that governance actions must follow a standardized and legible format, including a URL hosting an immutable document and a corresponding hash, and must provide sufficient rationale including a title, abstract, justification, and supporting materials.
This governance action includes a valid URL and hash, which matches the hash of the off-chain documentation referenced. The rationale also meets the minimum content specified in this section.
ARTICLE II, Section 7 specifies that Treasury Withdrawal governance actions must include the following:
1. Purpose, Delivery Period, Costs, and Refund Conditions
This governance action specifies:
- The purpose of the withdrawal is "for work intended to enhance the security, decentralization and long-term sustainability of Cardano."
- The period for delivery of proposed activities "spans Q2 2026 through Q1 2027"
- The relevant costs and expenses under the heading "Budget Breakdown"
- The circumstances under which funds may be refunded to the Cardano Treasury are "Funds left in the contract after expiration automatically sweep back to the Cardano treasury."
These elements fulfil the requirements of Article II, Section 7(1).
2. Prior Treasury Funding Disclosure
ARTICLE II, Section 7(2) requires disclosure of whether the prospective recipient has received ada from the Cardano Treasury within the last 24 months.
This governance action provides a "full retrospective of past funding", which fulfils the requirement of ARTICLE II, Section 7(2).
3. Net Change Limit (NCL)
ARTICLE II, Section 7(3) requires that Treasury Withdrawals must not exceed the Net Change Limit.
The Net Change Limit in effect at the time of submission of this vote on-chain is the governance action with ID "gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q".
- A. Current NCL Amount: 350000000 ada
- B. Current NCL Time Period: Epoch 613 to Epoch 713 (Inclusive)
- C. Total of Treasury Withdrawals within the Current NCL Time Period: 67842000 ada
- D. Amount of this Treasury Withdrawal: 8035714 ada
- E. "C" plus "D" = 75877714 ada
- F. "A" minus "E" = 274122286 ada
As the value of "F" is greater than or equal to zero, this governance action fulfils the NCL requirement.
4. Audit Allocation and Oversight Metrics
ARTICLE II, Section 7(4) states "Treasury Withdrawals actions shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada."
This governance action does not provide any information regarding the allocation ada to audit and provide oversight metrics for the work being done, so DOES NOT fulfil the requirement under ARTICLE II, Section 7(4).
5. Designated Administrators
ARTICLE II, Section 7(5) requires that one or more administrators are designated to monitor fund usage and ensure deliverables are achieved.
This governance action designates an "independent oversight board" as an administrator, which fulfils this requirement.
6. Fund Management Requirements
ARTICLE II, Section 7(6) states "Any ada received from a Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawal, so long as such ada is being held by an administrator prior to further disbursement to the Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, must be kept in one or more separate accounts that can be audited by the Cardano Community, and such accounts shall not be delegated to an SPO but must be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option."
This governance action specifies the following withdrawal address, which at the time of assessment is not delegated to an SPO and is delegated to the auto abstain voting option:
- stake17x3n2krrld46qms4f4hzqqxzjgaf59u3fecvl6eh8scmaacjqmvjw
Finally, the guardrails that require consideration for this governance action are TREASURY-01a, TREASURY-02a, and TREASURY-03a. These are addressed as follows:
- TREASURY-01a - The net change limit with governance action ID "gov_action1m3x...4jsr7q" is currently in effect, after being "agreed by the DReps via an on-chain governance action with a threshold of greater than 50% of the active voting stake".
- TREASURY-02a - As per the above assessment, this treasury withdrawal does not exceed the current Net Change Limit.
- TREASURY-03a - This treasury withdrawal is denominated in ada.
As it does not fulfil the requirements of ARTICLE II, Section 7(4), we find this governance action Unconstitutional.
This governance action does not sufficiently fulfil the criteria specified for treasury withdrawals in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed unconstitutional.