Discussed in the Governance Review for epochs 660 to 662.
On-chain governance action (Parameter Change).
This governance action proposes reducing minPoolCost from 170,000,000 Lovelace (170 ada) to 75,000,000 Lovelace (75 ada), a decrease of approximately 55.9%. No other protocol parameters are changed by this action.
stake1uygyajn4dq8smt779tyaf7f8ha2x5veyuehmtd9lvy8kjjqwmde62Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 1mo ago.
Reducing minPoolCost to 75 ada eases a fixed fee that disproportionately penalises small pools, helping them stay competitive.
This governance action has a CIP-179 survey linked to it. Eventually, most governance tools should support these surveys directly in the UI while you are casting your vote.
However, in the meantime you can also cast your vote on this survey here:
https://tessera-mainnet.matthieu-pizenberg.workers.dev/survey/ae8683acd550d7448fbd790c6f3b3b8ac7c90dc482faccc0eeedc21d7c8fc217%3A0
It also allows regular ADA holders (i.e., stakeholders) to vote in addition to DReps, SPOs, and CC members.
Now supported on DRepTalk.
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 1mo ago.
Generating enough transaction fees for Cardano to sustain itself is one of the toughest challenges we face. But there are two sides to the equation. Network revenue is just the numerator. The denominator is operating costs. And reducing operating costs is arguably the only other way we have to meaningfully affect self-sustainability.
minPoolCost prevents pools from competing to lower operating costs, and it props up pools that cannot operate as cost-efficiently. That’s likely one reason we still have roughly 3,000 registered pools and over 1,600 active pools even though stakePoolTargetNum is set to 500. Having a minimum margin instead (CIP-23) fixes the issue as well, but at the cost of time. It is at least two hard forks and another parameter change governance action away, but our endeared community SPOs are already being forced to close left and right.
Personally I want as many honest pools as possible to be successful, and the original incentives structure was beautifully designed to do exactly that. But we have to give the parameters some tender loving care. To get where we want to be, successful pools should be able to compete primarily on pledge, and then on operating costs, without sacrificing performance. Lowering the minimum fixed fee is the first step to get there, and I'm putting my own money where my mouth is to see it through.
If we want Cardano to last, we need to attack the problem from both directions and let SPOs fairly compete to lower costs.
Vote to lower minPoolCost to 75.
This is GNP1 commenting
Great to see this up again - lets get it passed
I have a tool where I have a column that shows what the ROS is when min pool fee is 0 ADA but I will add a column for 75 ADA so that people can see how that improves the returns for small pools - https://server-tools.grahamsnumberplus1.com/delegator_tool.html and scroll to the bottom of the page after entering the ticker or pool id
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 1mo ago.
Imagine two Cardanos.
Cardano A has 100 highly efficient professional operators.
Cardano B has 1,000 geographically, politically and organizationally independent operators, even if some of them are less efficient or simply different.
A may look better from a narrow efficiency perspective. I still prefer B. Redundancy and resilience have value - especially in complex networks. Apparent efficiency can mask tail risk.
If the 170 ADA minPoolCost puts smaller pools at a structural disadvantage and pushes delegation towards larger operators, reducing it to 75 ADA is reasonable. It does not guarantee greater decentralization, but it removes some of the pressure working against it.
I understand there are economic realities for every SPO. Reducing minPoolCost potentially reduces operator income. I support 75 ADA as an incremental step. My support for 75 ADA should not be read as support for any particular future change to SPO parameters.
Essentially, I am willing to accept some inefficiency in exchange for greater resilience. Cardano does not need maximum efficiency if greater concentration leads to a system that may prove to be more fragile when unexpected threats emerge.
📢 Here is the truth about pool min fee, it's killing small pools!!!
"By forcing a smaller pool to take 170 ADA out of ~330 ADA block rewards, is forcing a smaller pool to take roughly 51% of the total rewards. This leads to a decrease in that Pools Return on ADA (ROA) for their delegators. Smaller pools have argued that this is an unfair barrier that prevents them from competing with larger pools and ultimately can prevent them from growing."
https://medium.com/@blinklabs_io/cardano-parameters-whats-what-a49c97f7483a
Vote YES to Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada!
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 1mo ago.
Small pools are disadvantaged by a min pool cost. A reduction leads to more equitable return for delegators who want to support a smaller pool
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 1mo ago.
Hard NO. 75 ADA minPoolCost is not sustainable under current market conditions.
Before reducing minPoolCost any further, we must first introduce a minMargin in the 5–10% range to ensure sustainable SPO operations.
SPOs voted down this proposal only a few epochs ago, albeit in another context where it was bundled with a Plutus update. Parameters that directly affect stake pool economics should not be changed without adequate SPO support.
See also my Constitution Amendment Proposal: “Require SPO Approval for Changes to Stake Pool Economic Parameters”
https://cap.intersectmbo.org/#/detail/10
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 1mo ago.
My vote stands at "No" for the same reasons outlined before. Why vote for another tactical reduction when the previous tactical reduction already proved insufficient?
There's still no concrete evidence that reducing minPoolCost from 170 to 75 ADA is necessary: the market did not collapse after the 2023 reduction, and the proposal itself shows that 340 ADA remains the dominant setting. Lowering the floor may improve short-term competitiveness for marginal pools, yet it also reduces treasury inflows and risks postponing the structural work that matters more, namely transaction-fee growth, sustainable network demand, proportional pool economics, and a credible path toward minPoolMargin.
Even if we lower the minPoolCost again, the core economic fact does not change, because** minPoolCost is a distribution parameter. It does not create one additional ADA of rewards! It only changes who gets how much of an already shrinking pie. And if the pie is the problem, which it is, arguing over slice geometry is not a strategy**. This ain't rocket science. Also, let's not forget that SPOs pay costs in fiat. Therefore, dropping the floor to 75 ADA does not magically make a marginal pool viable once SPOs have to pay for living costs in the real world! If anything, it risks pushing operators into a worse position while pretending the network became fairer.
The culprit is reward decay and the absence of structural reform. Cutting the floor again is just another round of parameter fiddling while the actual economic model keeps slipping. We must stop treating declining reserve rewards as a reason to keep lowering the floor and instead require the economic model, namely minPoolMargin pathway (I'd say 5%-1% seems realistic) and fee-growth strategy to advance together.
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 1mo ago.
Vote: YES
I support reducing minPoolCost from 170 ada to 75 ada.
The strongest case for this change is not delegator yield — it's incentive design. A high fixed-fee floor rewards single-block pools disproportionately: as long as a pool produces at least one block in an epoch, it draws the full fixed fee out of that block's reward before anything is split with delegators. The fewer blocks a pool produces, the larger a share of its reward the floor consumes.
A well-capitalized operator can exploit this by splitting stake across many single-block pools rather than consolidating into fewer, better-performing ones, collecting the floor repeatedly instead of once. Lowering the floor directly weakens that arbitrage.
This matters more for genuine decentralization than pool count itself:
I don't think 75 ada meaningfully changes the survival odds of a small, genuinely independent pool. At current ada prices, that is roughly two days' worth of the fixed fee over a five-day epoch — well below the operating cost of a properly run node, regardless of where the floor sits.
The argument that this reduction "saves small pools" is weaker than the argument that it removes an outsized payout specifically for single-block operation.
The 2023 precedent (340 ada → 170 ada) is relevant evidence here:
This history gives the current reduction an empirical basis rather than a purely theoretical one.
My one reservation: this reduction is explicitly framed as an interim step ahead of a proportional minPoolMargin (CIP-0023), which by current sequencing is still roughly two hard forks away.
I would like to see Intersect and the Technical Steering Committee (TSC) commit to a concrete timeline for that structural work, ensuring this floor doesn't become a permanent substitute for the more complete fix it is meant to bridge toward.
I am voting YES on the substance of the case as submitted, with the expectation of a clear CIP-0023 timeline noted for the record.
drep1y28xhrjxe496rnle8ln3slpggnp8leu3mn244ujrhwet0cc2vmte4
drep13e4cu3kdfwsul7fluuv8c2zycfl70ywu64d0ysamk2m7xrv7rsv
minPoolCost has to go. PoolCost was a bad idea from the start. It makes pools that produce few blocks very unattractive (because it deduces a fixed amount before distributing to the delegators). On the other hand, it does not guarantee a fixed income for the SPOs. If they do not produce any blocks (because delegators fled their bad offer), they also don't get the PoolCost. It's name is a lie.
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 1mo ago.
This is a difficult one. On one hand I think that the stake pools, particularly the smaller ones need to be protected in their income stream, especially in a negative macro environment. Maintaining stake-pool health and viability is a critical requirement for the Cardano ecosystem to function.
However, with the current setup, stakers can be losing around 50% of rewards to the stake pool if it is a small pool. This in game-theory leads to an overwhelming negative incentive to move to large pools which then will make small-pools unviable to start. As there needs to be a viable entry point for a small pool to join the ecosystem and then grow into a larger pool overtime, I believe the current min-pool setup will lead to a barrier to starting which will lead to fewer and fewer small pools overtime and more concentration and centralization.
While this min-pool change likely will not allow for a self-sustaining business for small pools, it likely will make it more likely that even though they are small, stakers are still willing to stake with them instead of only going for large pools, and thus it will still be viable to plant a seed as a small pool in the hopes it will grow.
I believe the weight in favor of our values - maintain viability of decentralization - shifts to the balance of approving this change.
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 1mo ago.
Voting YES.
This overall is an iterative improvement but not intended as an ultimate solution to challenges ahead with SPOs, rewards, and long-term viability. Current circumstances I think mandate we do "something" - even with potential new parameter changes on the horizon. Those changes are not yet here, therefore we should take action on what we can control today, and that is minPoolCost.
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 24d ago.
I'm voting Yes. The current fixed minimum really hurts smaller stake pools, especially as block rewards drop, because it takes a bigger chunk of the rewards from pools that only make a few blocks each epoch. Lowering the floor gives smaller pools a better shot at competing for delegation and boosts returns for delegators without forcing anyone to actually lower their fees. I think this is a solid temporary fix while Cardano works on a fairer, more proportional setup like minPoolMargin.
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 17d ago.
Governance Action: Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ADA
Vote: YES
This Governance Action proposes reducing the minPoolCost protocol parameter from 170 ADA to 75 ADA, a decrease of approximately 55.9%, without changing any other protocol parameters.
minPoolCost establishes the minimum fixed fee that Stake Pool Operators (SPOs) can retain from staking rewards before distributing the remaining rewards to delegators. The parameter was previously reduced from 340 ADA to 170 ADA in 2023.
As reserve-funded block rewards have progressively declined, fixed fees have come to represent a larger proportion of rewards earned by smaller pools, particularly those producing only one or a few blocks per epoch. This reduces the relative returns available to their delegators and places smaller pools at a competitive disadvantage.
The proposed reduction would allow SPOs to voluntarily adopt lower fixed fees, potentially improving delegator returns and pool competitiveness. Operators would remain free to maintain their existing fees.
The proposal follows PCP-006, published in March 2026, and received Technical Steering Committee ratification in July 2026. It represents an incremental adjustment while broader reforms to staking incentives, including a proportional minPoolMargin mechanism, remain under development.
The proposal addresses a legitimate economic problem affecting smaller stake pools. As reserve-funded rewards decline, a relatively high fixed fee represents an increasingly large proportion of the rewards available for distribution. Reducing the minimum fee allows smaller operators to distribute a greater share of their rewards to delegators, potentially improving their competitiveness.
The economic mechanism is understandable and supported by a prolonged process of discussion and research, including contributions from technical and economic structures within the Cardano ecosystem.
The principal benefit is the additional flexibility granted to SPOs. The reduction does not require operators to lower their fees. Those who find their current remuneration appropriate may preserve it, while operators seeking to improve their competitiveness may voluntarily adopt a lower fee.
This flexibility accommodates different operational conditions and economic strategies. If delegation inertia remains high and reducing fees offers insufficient benefits, operators can maintain their existing remuneration. If competition increases and lower fees create opportunities to attract delegators, they will have an additional instrument available.
The proposal also represents an opportunity to support more responsive and adaptive governance. Cardano has experienced substantial delays in implementing economic parameter adjustments and incentive reforms. Supporting appropriately justified incremental changes reinforces the capacity to periodically revise parameters and respond to changing economic conditions.
The proposal does not address the structural inertia of stake delegation within Cardano. Delegators frequently remain associated with the same pools for extended periods, even when economic or operational conditions change. Historical cases of delegators remaining associated with retired pools, without receiving rewards, illustrate this problem.
The expected competitive benefits depend partly on delegators identifying differences in returns and deciding to move their stake. However, marginal differences in annual returns, such as between 2.0% and 2.1% or 2.2%, may be insufficient to influence delegators who do not actively monitor their staking arrangements.
Consequently, reducing minPoolCost removes an economic barrier but does not necessarily generate meaningful stake redistribution or improvements in network decentralization.
The timing also limits the potential impact. The adjustment comes several years after Shelley, following prolonged discussions about staking incentives and a progressive decline in reserve-funded rewards. The economic appeal of staking has diminished compared with earlier periods, while Cardano operates in a different competitive environment.
An earlier implementation, when rewards were higher and delegator activity potentially more dynamic, could have produced more substantial results. The delay may have reduced the opportunity for this type of incentive adjustment to generate significant changes.
Although the proposer has also engaged with broader issues involving sticky stake and delegation incentives, this Governance Action remains a partial intervention rather than a comprehensive solution.
Concerns about SPO sustainability and competitive pressure are economically coherent. Smaller operators may feel compelled to reduce their fees to remain competitive, potentially sacrificing revenue without attracting enough additional delegation to compensate for the reduction.
This risk may be aggravated by low delegator mobility. Larger operators, benefiting from economies of scale and shared operational costs, may also be better positioned to sustain lower fees than independent operators.
However, reducing minPoolCost does not impose a compulsory reduction in operator remuneration. SPOs that find 75 ADA insufficient to sustain their activities can retain their current fees. Operators that identify competitive advantages in lowering fees can choose to do so.
Competitive pressure may still encourage reductions despite their voluntary nature, but this does not establish that the measure will produce generalized economic harm.
Economic interests among participating SPOs also warrant recognition. Operators opposing the reduction may benefit from maintaining existing conditions, while supportive operators may benefit from greater pricing flexibility. Such interests do not automatically invalidate either position.
There is insufficient conclusive evidence that the potential negative effects would outweigh the benefits of additional flexibility. Nevertheless, the proposal does not guarantee increased participation by smaller pools, measurable decentralization improvements, or a comprehensive correction of existing incentive deficiencies.
Vote: YES
The reduction of minPoolCost from 170 ADA to 75 ADA is supported primarily because it expands the economic options available to Stake Pool Operators without requiring them to reduce their existing fees.
An operator that considers its current remuneration appropriate can preserve it. An operator that identifies opportunities to improve competitiveness through lower fees will have the freedom to do so. This flexibility remains valuable even if the aggregate economic impact is limited.
The concerns regarding operator sustainability, competitive pressure, and delegation inertia are legitimate. However, the voluntary nature of individual fee reductions mitigates part of these risks, and there is insufficient conclusive evidence that negative consequences would predominate.
Expectations regarding the proposal's impact remain modest. The reduction does not resolve sticky stake, guarantee significant redistribution of delegations, or ensure measurable improvements in decentralization. Its effectiveness is further constrained by declining staking rewards and the delayed implementation of incentive reforms.
An additional institutional consideration supports approval: Cardano governance must retain the capacity to revise economic parameters through evidence-based, proportionate adjustments. This proposal follows an extended process of technical and economic discussion and introduces a limited change without demonstrated predominant systemic risks.
The vote therefore supports greater flexibility and adaptive governance rather than an expectation of substantial economic transformation. It does not imply automatic support for future parameter changes, which must continue to receive individual scrutiny.
The proposed reduction provides SPOs with additional economic flexibility while preserving their ability to maintain existing fees. Although delegation inertia, declining rewards, and delayed reforms limit its expected impact, the potential benefits outweigh the demonstrated risks. Approval supports a proportionate incremental adjustment, without assuming significant improvements in decentralization.
Ação de Governança: Redução do minPoolCost para 75 ADA
Voto: SIM
Esta Ação de Governança propõe reduzir o parâmetro de protocolo minPoolCost de 170 ADA para 75 ADA, uma diminuição de aproximadamente 55,9%, sem alterar outros parâmetros do protocolo.
O minPoolCost estabelece a taxa fixa mínima que os operadores de stake pools (SPOs) podem reter das recompensas de staking antes de distribuir o restante aos delegadores. O parâmetro já havia sido reduzido de 340 ADA para 170 ADA em 2023.
Com a redução progressiva das recompensas provenientes das reservas, as taxas fixas passaram a representar uma proporção maior das recompensas obtidas por pools menores, especialmente aqueles que produzem apenas um ou poucos blocos por época. Isso reduz o retorno relativo disponível aos seus delegadores e coloca esses pools em desvantagem competitiva.
A redução proposta permitiria que os SPOs adotassem voluntariamente taxas fixas menores, potencialmente melhorando o retorno dos delegadores e a competitividade dos pools. Os operadores continuariam livres para manter suas taxas atuais.
A proposta decorre da PCP-006, publicada em março de 2026, e recebeu ratificação do Technical Steering Committee em julho de 2026. Trata-se de um ajuste incremental enquanto reformas mais amplas dos incentivos de staking, incluindo um mecanismo proporcional de minPoolMargin, permanecem em desenvolvimento.
A proposta aborda um problema econômico legítimo que afeta os stake pools menores. À medida que as recompensas provenientes das reservas diminuem, uma taxa fixa relativamente elevada representa uma proporção crescente das recompensas disponíveis para distribuição. A redução da taxa mínima permite que operadores menores distribuam uma parcela maior das recompensas aos delegadores, potencialmente melhorando sua competitividade.
O mecanismo econômico é compreensível e fundamentado em um processo prolongado de discussão e pesquisa, incluindo contribuições de estruturas técnicas e econômicas do ecossistema Cardano.
O principal benefício é a flexibilidade adicional concedida aos SPOs. A redução não obriga os operadores a diminuírem suas taxas. Aqueles que considerarem sua remuneração atual adequada poderão preservá-la, enquanto operadores interessados em melhorar sua competitividade poderão adotar voluntariamente uma taxa menor.
Essa flexibilidade contempla diferentes condições operacionais e estratégias econômicas. Se a inércia das delegações permanecer elevada e a redução das taxas oferecer benefícios insuficientes, os operadores poderão manter sua remuneração atual. Se a competição aumentar e taxas menores criarem oportunidades de atrair delegadores, terão um instrumento adicional à disposição.
A proposta também representa uma oportunidade de apoiar uma governança mais responsiva e adaptativa. A Cardano enfrentou atrasos substanciais na implementação de ajustes de parâmetros econômicos e reformas de incentivos. Apoiar mudanças incrementais adequadamente fundamentadas reforça a capacidade de revisar parâmetros periodicamente e responder às mudanças nas condições econômicas.
A proposta não enfrenta a inércia estrutural das delegações de stake na Cardano. Delegadores frequentemente permanecem associados aos mesmos pools por períodos prolongados, mesmo quando as condições econômicas ou operacionais mudam. Casos históricos de delegadores que permaneceram associados a pools aposentados, sem receber recompensas, ilustram esse problema.
Os benefícios competitivos esperados dependem parcialmente de que os delegadores identifiquem diferenças nos rendimentos e decidam movimentar suas delegações. Entretanto, diferenças marginais no retorno anual, como entre 2,0% e 2,1% ou 2,2%, podem ser insuficientes para influenciar delegadores que não acompanham ativamente suas delegações.
Consequentemente, a redução de minPoolCost remove uma barreira econômica, mas não necessariamente gera uma redistribuição significativa de stake ou melhorias na descentralização da rede.
O momento da implementação também limita o impacto potencial. O ajuste ocorre vários anos após Shelley, depois de discussões prolongadas sobre incentivos de staking e de uma redução progressiva das recompensas provenientes das reservas. O apelo econômico do staking diminuiu em comparação com períodos anteriores, enquanto a Cardano opera em um ambiente competitivo diferente.
Uma implementação anterior, quando as recompensas eram maiores e a atividade dos delegadores potencialmente mais dinâmica, poderia ter produzido resultados mais expressivos. O atraso pode ter reduzido a oportunidade de esse tipo de ajuste de incentivos gerar mudanças significativas.
Embora o proponente também tenha participado de iniciativas relacionadas a problemas mais amplos de sticky stake e incentivos de delegação, esta Ação de Governança permanece uma intervenção parcial, e não uma solução abrangente.
As preocupações com a sustentabilidade dos SPOs e a pressão competitiva são economicamente coerentes. Operadores menores podem se sentir pressionados a reduzir suas taxas para permanecer competitivos, potencialmente sacrificando receita sem atrair delegações adicionais suficientes para compensar a redução.
Esse risco pode ser agravado pela baixa mobilidade dos delegadores. Operadores maiores, beneficiados por economias de escala e custos operacionais compartilhados, também podem estar em melhores condições para sustentar taxas menores do que operadores independentes.
Entretanto, a redução de minPoolCost não impõe uma diminuição compulsória da remuneração dos operadores. SPOs que considerarem 75 ADA insuficientes para sustentar suas atividades poderão manter suas taxas atuais. Operadores que identificarem vantagens competitivas na redução poderão optar por fazê-lo.
A pressão competitiva ainda pode incentivar reduções, apesar de seu caráter voluntário, mas isso não demonstra que a medida produzirá prejuízos econômicos generalizados.
Os interesses econômicos dos SPOs participantes também merecem reconhecimento. Operadores contrários à redução podem se beneficiar da manutenção das condições atuais, enquanto operadores favoráveis podem se beneficiar de maior flexibilidade na definição de taxas. Esses interesses não invalidam automaticamente nenhuma das posições.
Não existem evidências suficientemente conclusivas de que os potenciais efeitos negativos superariam os benefícios da flexibilidade adicional. Ainda assim, a proposta não garante maior participação dos pools menores, melhorias mensuráveis na descentralização ou uma correção abrangente das deficiências existentes no sistema de incentivos.
Voto: SIM
A redução de minPoolCost de 170 ADA para 75 ADA recebe apoio principalmente porque amplia as opções econômicas disponíveis aos Stake Pool Operators sem obrigá-los a reduzir suas taxas atuais.
Um operador que considerar sua remuneração atual adequada poderá preservá-la. Um operador que identificar oportunidades de melhorar sua competitividade por meio de taxas menores terá liberdade para fazê-lo. Essa flexibilidade permanece valiosa mesmo que o impacto econômico agregado seja limitado.
As preocupações com a sustentabilidade dos operadores, a pressão competitiva e a inércia das delegações são legítimas. Entretanto, o caráter voluntário da redução individual das taxas mitiga parte desses riscos, e não existem evidências suficientemente conclusivas de que as consequências negativas seriam predominantes.
As expectativas quanto ao impacto da proposta permanecem modestas. A redução não resolve o problema de sticky stake, não garante uma redistribuição significativa das delegações e não assegura melhorias mensuráveis na descentralização. Sua eficácia também é limitada pela diminuição das recompensas de staking e pelo atraso na implementação de reformas de incentivos.
Uma consideração institucional adicional sustenta a aprovação: a governança da Cardano deve preservar a capacidade de revisar parâmetros econômicos por meio de ajustes proporcionais e fundamentados em evidências. Esta proposta passou por um processo prolongado de discussão técnica e econômica e introduz uma mudança limitada, sem demonstração de riscos sistêmicos predominantes.
O voto, portanto, apoia uma maior flexibilidade e uma governança adaptativa, e não uma expectativa de transformação econômica substancial. Isso não implica apoio automático a futuras alterações de parâmetros, que deverão continuar sendo examinadas individualmente.
A redução proposta oferece maior flexibilidade econômica aos SPOs, preservando a possibilidade de manter suas taxas atuais. Embora a inércia das delegações, a diminuição das recompensas e o atraso nas reformas limitem o impacto esperado, os benefícios potenciais superam os riscos demonstrados. A aprovação apoia um ajuste incremental proporcional, sem pressupor melhorias significativas na descentralização.
Frozen. On-chain rationale, submitted 15d ago.
My position remains unchanged from the previous proposal. I continue to support reducing the minimum pool cost from 170 ADA to 75 ADA, as it improves the economics of smaller stake pools, increases their competitiveness, and can contribute to further decentralization of stake distribution.
Since this proposal only reintroduces the minimum pool cost reduction, I support it for the same reasons stated in my previous rationale.
I still see value in lowering Min Pool cost