Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025
7 of 7 committee members voted
- Eastern Cardano Council2ea7a78e…10ecYesExpired · term ends epoch 580Rationale
We have determined that this budget Info governance action is constitutional.
Article IV, Section 2 of the Cardano Constitution states "Cardano Blockchain budgets shall specify a process for overseeing use of funds from Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawals including designating one or more administrators who shall be responsible for such oversight."
The governance action with ID "gov_action1f9d...6ggge9" and title "Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025", as a budget Info governance action, designates "Selfdriven" as the administrator responsible for overseeing the use of funds. While the governance action does not explicitly specify a process for overseeing the use of funds, it could be implied that the process is delegated to Selfdriven.
By way of a split decision we find this governance action Constitutional.
This governance action was determined by a majority of the Eastern Cardano Council to have sufficiently fulfilled the criteria specified for budgets in the Cardano Constitution, so is deemed constitutional.
- Input | Output3c9ebce6…1e4cYesExpired · term ends epoch 580Rationale
Input Output finds the Budget Info Action “Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025” to be constitutional.
While this Budget Info Action is consistent with provisions of the Cardano Constitution for blockchain ecosystem budgets, questions may remain regarding its treatment of periodic audits, oversight metrics, delegation status, and the net change limit. We address these below.
Article IV, Section Four requires Budget Info Actions to provide for audits and oversight metrics.
“Any governance action requesting ada from the Cardano Blockchain treasury shall require an allocation of ada as a part of such funding request to cover the cost of periodic independent audits and the implementation of oversight metrics as to the use of such ada.”
Additionally, Article IV, Section Four requires provisions for dispute resolution in the governance of ada administered in such a budget.
“Contractual obligations governing the use of ada received from the Cardano Blockchain treasury pursuant to a Cardano Blockchain ecosystem budget shall include dispute resolution provisions.”
While neither of these provisions is accounted for directly in the Info Action rationale, the rationale does specify an administrator for its budget– Selfdriven – whose services include periodic audits and the implementation of oversight metrics. Selfdriven also specifies dispute resolution provisions for the governance of the funds it administers. This is based on the Selfdriven services referenced in the Budget Info Action at https://selfdriven.services/, accessed at 09:00UTC on July 28, 2025. An immutable version of the services referenced can be found at https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmaeQeSjCWGwtuwRs4j8mGMbHeAmfDLvxwbssCGGj8NDGG.
Article IV, Section Five also requires that administered funds be kept at a publicly auditable address, delegated to the auto-abstain DRep, and not delegated to any SPO. At the time of assessment, Selfdriven specifies commitments to these requirements. This is based on the Selfdriven services referenced in the Budget Info Action at https://selfdriven.services/, accessed at 09:00UTC on July 28, 2025. An immutable version of the services referenced can be found at https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmaeQeSjCWGwtuwRs4j8mGMbHeAmfDLvxwbssCGGj8NDGG.
We encourage Tempo to explicitly earmark a portion of the ada requested in the Treasury Withdrawal following this Budget Info Action for the services of their selected auditor, and to note the auditor’s commitment to constitutional procedures. But while this is ideal for clarity, we do not view its absence in the current Info Action as a constitutional violation.
Finally, at the time of assessment, the amount of ada specified in this budget does not cause the Cardano Blockchain treasury balance to violate the net change limit (NCL) that is currently in effect, even assuming that all treasury withdrawals presently live on chain are passed (Article IV, Section 3 and TREASURY-02a). You can see the corresponding governance action here, on chain: gov_action1nd3...md2k80
- Intersect Constitutional Council85c47dd4…bf64YesExpired · term ends epoch 580Rationale
The Intersect Constitutional Council votes that the budget info action, “495bd3cd44ea6b...1280#0”, to be constitutional.
In accordance with Article III Section 4, this budget info action is in connection with a proposed ecosystem budget and as permitted in Article IV Section 1, this proposal relates to the maintenance and future development of the Cardano blockchain ecosystem, in particular, the continued maintenance and development of Cardano governance tooling.
The proposal is submitted by the team from Tempo.Vote, a community team that has built out their own governance tooling to help ada holders participate in decentralised governance. It provides a platform that ada holders can use either as an alternative to, or in conjunction with other existing tools like GovTool, reducing reliance on a single platform. It proposes a budget for 6 months of maintenance and development with a value of 380,000 ada, divided across infrastructure and development costs. This proposal supports the article for participatory and decentralized governance as outlined in the constitution (Article III).
The proposal meets the standardized and legible format requirements as outlined in Article III Section 5. The rationale contains a title, abstract, reason for the proposal but does not provide any relevant supporting materials beyond a link to the selfdriven website within the rationale section text. Proposal metadata is hosted using IPFS storage and has a matching metadata hash.
The proposal provides a simple budget breakdown, stating that the 380,000 ada would be divided across 2 areas, 200,000 ada for infrastructure costs and 180,000 ada for development costs. It indicates that funds would be administered by selfdriven, meeting Article IV Section 2 requirements and is proposed in advance of any potential treasury withdrawal request, as per Article IV Section 3 “No withdrawals from the Cardano Blockchain treasury shall be permitted unless such withdrawals have been authorized and are being made pursuant to a budget for the Cardano Blockchain that is then in effect”.
The Intersect Constitutional Council has voted constitutional, with a vote split of 4-2-2.
- Cardano Atlantic Council07e0eb70…5bdeNoResigned · term ends epoch 580Rationale
This governance action, as proposed, is Unconstitutional.
The governance action titled "Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025" is unconstitutional due to failing to meet the criteria of Article IV, Section 2 which reads:
Cardano Blockchain budgets shall specify a process for overseeing use of funds from Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawals including designating one or more administrators who shall be responsible for such oversight.
Given that this proposal, as proposed, does not provide any process for overseeing the use of funds from Cardano Blockchain treasury withdrawals; we must find it to be unconstitutional.
- Cardano Foundation6796d87d…c280NoExpired · term ends epoch 580Rationale
The proposed Info Governance Action “Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025” is unconstitutional.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This Info Governance Action (gov_action1f9d...6ggge9) proposes a budget of 380,000 ada for the Tempo.vote platform. While its stated purpose of improving governance accessibility is noted, the proposal fails to meet specific constitutional requirements necessary for the accountable and transparent management of treasury funds.
Constitutional Alignment
A review of the governance actions against the Cardano Constitution has found that the proposal does not align with several constitutional provisions:
- Article III, Section 5 (Insufficient Information & Supporting Materials): This section requires that a proposal "shall include, at a minimum, a title, abstract, reason for the proposal, and relevant supporting materials" to provide sufficient information to justify the requested action. The information submitted—considered in its entirety—must enable reviewers and voters to independently assess the proposal and form an informed and reasoned opinion on it. The supporting materials are essential to substantiate the rationale and implications of a proposal. As such, they must form an integral part of the proposal’s core body and must be appropriately included in its metadata to ensure transparency and evaluability. The presented proposal lacks any linked supporting materials, such as a detailed budget breakdown, project roadmap, or team information. Essential details regarding the administrative process, dispute resolution, and fund handling are not included in the proposal but are located on the administrator's website (https://selfdriven.fyi/services). Such critical information must be clearly and directly presented as part of the proposal, not left for reviewers to discover externally. This proposal therefore does not meet the constitutional requirements as per Article III, Section 5 and specifically fails to provide "sufficient information" to justify the budget.
- Article IV, Section 2 (Lack of a Specified Oversight Process): This article mandates that budgets "shall specify a process for overseeing use of funds [...] including designating one or more administrators". The proposal itself does not specify this process. While the linked administrator's website outlines a service offering, the proposal fails to formally adopt, reference, or integrate this as the specific process for this budget. This omission leaves the commitment to a specific oversight framework ambiguous and constitutionally non-compliant.
Due to non-compliance with constitutional provisions under Articles III and IV, this Info Governance Action is Unconstitutional.
- Cardano Japan Council (ICC)4012cab5…0755NoExpired · term ends epoch 580Rationale
Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025 → Unconstitutional
[Unconstitutional] We conclude that this Governance Action is unconstitutional under the Cardano Constitution, particularly Article IV, Section 5. This section mandates that any stake addresses receiving treasury funds must be configured with the Auto-Abstain setting. The proposal fails to disclose the stake addresses intended to receive funds, which renders it impossible to verify compliance with this constitutional requirement.
In addition, the proposal lacks sufficient transparency regarding the custody and control of funds. While it outlines the existence of an oversight structure and a governance mechanism, it fails to detail cost breakdowns, specific recipient accounts, or the extent of auditor authority. This creates concerns under Article IV, Section 2, which emphasizes budgetary clarity, oversight, and transparent designation of administrative responsibility.
Moreover, given that the proposing entity is also acting as a DRep, the lack of Auto-Abstain address disclosure introduces a material risk of conflict of interest. This undermines the legitimacy of decentralized governance and contravenes the principles set forth in Article V, Section 2.
While two votes in favor recognized that the intent of the proposal may align with the public good and broader decentralization efforts, this does not override the constitutional deficiencies. We recommend resubmission of the proposal with clearly specified stake addresses, Auto-Abstain confirmation, and detailed fund allocation transparency to ensure compliance with the Constitution.
This Governance Action is ruled unconstitutional due to its omission of stake address information necessary to verify Auto-Abstain compliance, as required by Article IV, Section 5. Additional concerns about financial transparency and potential conflicts of interest further support this conclusion. The proposal must be revised to comply with core constitutional safeguards.
- Emurgodc2b0706…89b8NoExpired · term ends epoch 580Rationale
After reviewing the Tempo.Vote Budget Info Action proposal in light of the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution, EMURGO finds that this proposal does not fully comply with the constitutional requirements for a Treasury Withdrawal and associated budget.
Article III section 5
The proposal is extremely light on documentation. There is no detailed budget spreadsheet, no delivery timeline, and insufficient information for DReps to make informed decisions. Requiring DReps to search for details externally, like Selfdriven site, defeats the purpose of “legible and standarized” proposals as mandated in this section.
Article IV, Section 2
While the proposal designates Selfdriven as the budget administrator, it does not include an explicit oversight structure in the proposal text. There are no clearly defined milestones, progress metrics, or reporting mechanisms. These are critical to meeting the constitutional expectation of transparent fund administration.
Article IV, Section 4
This section mandates that proposals must include an allocation for independent audits, defined oversight metrics, and contractual dispute resolution mechanisms. These elements are not explicitly stated in the proposal. While Selfdriven’s services may include such provisions, the Constitution requires these to be part of the governance action itself to ensure clarity and enforceability.
Article IV, Section 5
The proposal fails to disclose the stake addresses that would receive treasury funds. As a result, it is not possible to verify whether these addresses are configured with Auto-Abstain, as required by this article
Procedural Diligence
The title includes a typo: “Cardono” instead of Cardano. While this might seem minor, it reflects lack of diligence in a governance process involving public funds and significant commitments.
EMURGO concludes that this governance action is not yet constitutional. While the intent and direction of the proposal are aligned with ecosystem goals, the governance action does not currently meet the structural, oversight, and transparency requirements outlined in the Cardano Constitution. EMURGO encourages the proposer to revise the submission by explicitly addressing Articles IV.2, IV.4, and IV.5 within the proposal content to ensure full compliance.