EN - I have a relevant conflict of interest exists regarding this proposal; consequently, I will abstain.

PT - Eu tenho um conflito de interesse relevante em relação a esta proposta; consequentemente, irei me abster.

Governance Action Review [EN]

1. Introduction

Alchemy is a Cardano-native Bitcoin treasury protocol and BTCfi infrastructure layer proposed by Sundial Protocol and Charms. It aims to provide reusable infrastructure for Bitcoin-backed structured exposure on Cardano, including a shared BTC reserve architecture, composable FIRE and ICE assets, public dashboards, integration adapters, monthly reporting, and staged launch liquidity.

The proposal requests 10,000,000 ada, using an approximate reference value of USD 0.20 per ada, for a planning budget of about USD 2.0 million. The request is divided into two pools: approximately USD 1.0 million for protocol infrastructure and treasury-supported launch liquidity, and approximately USD 1.0 million for delivery, audit, integrations, dashboards, governance reporting, legal/compliance work, and go-to-market execution.

The proposal includes fund separation, staged liquidity deployment, public reporting, audit allocation, ADA price protection, pause rules, refund conditions, and a rollover clause if external investment funds Alchemy development. Intersect is proposed as interim fund administrator, subject to confirmation and final agreement.

1. Governance Action Analysis
   Positive aspects

Conceptually, the proposal is interesting. There is clear care in demonstrating the strategic importance of a BTCfi layer for Cardano, and the proposal presents a reasonable narrative about the opportunity to attract Bitcoin-related liquidity to the ecosystem. The examples of similar products in other ecosystems, with significant TVL and volumes, help indicate that there is a real and potentially relevant market category.

It is also positive that the proposal tries to structure mechanisms for returns to the Treasury, especially by providing that profits, yield, or returns generated by the Treasury-supported liquidity position would be returned to the Treasury itself.

Negative aspects

These positive points are not sufficient to justify approval of a 10,000,000 ADA withdrawal. The main problem is that the numbers presented about comparable markets and protocols seem to serve more to support an opportunity narrative than to establish objective success commitments. The proposal mentions TVL, volume, and demand in other contexts, but does not convert that thesis into its own KPIs, with clear targets and timelines for Alchemy on Cardano.

Objective targets are missing for adoption, organic liquidity, integrations, users, volume, revenue, Treasury return, or measurable ecosystem impact.

The budget granularity is also insufficient for a request of this scale. Although general allocation categories exist, the proposal does not provide adequate detail on FTEs, rates, number of professionals, seniority, workload, scope by function, or granular cost composition. This makes it difficult to adequately assess cost-benefit, especially in a request that combines development, audit, integrations, go-to-market, and financial structuring.

Another relevant point is possible overlap with other initiatives. Other projects, proposals, and teams already exist that are developing, or seeking to develop, Bitcoin adaptations, Bitcoin DeFi, or Bitcoin-related infrastructure within the Cardano ecosystem. For that reason, it would be important for the proposal to present its differentiators more clearly in relation to these initiatives, especially when there are Treasury funding requests for workstreams that may have some degree of overlap.

Without a more explicit comparison, it remains uncertain whether the Treasury would be funding truly complementary infrastructure or multiple initiatives with partially redundant scopes. A clearer explanation of positioning, complementarity, technical differentiators, and limits of overlap would help better assess the need and proportionality of this request.

Risks and concerns

There is a broader concern with using the Treasury as a liquidity provider. The proposal tries to mitigate this point by providing for profits to be returned to the Treasury, but it still shifts to the Treasury a risk role that, under normal conditions, should be assumed by private investors, specialized vehicles, or mechanisms specifically designed for this type of allocation.

Recurring use of the Treasury as a source of initial liquidity for specific financial products may create artificial incentives, distort markets, and harm the organic growth of the ecosystem.

If the market thesis is as promising as the proposal suggests, it is reasonable to expect interest from private capital or from vehicles more appropriate for this type of risk, such as funds or ecosystem investment vehicles focused on commercial and liquidity opportunities. The Cardano Treasury should not automatically be treated as the first-instance funder for promising projects, especially when the public benefit depends on future adoption that has not yet been demonstrated.

1. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO.

The proposal presents a relevant idea and an interesting strategic narrative, but does not offer sufficient impact KPIs, does not present adequate budget granularity, places the Treasury in the position of liquidity provider and risk taker for a specific financial product, and does not sufficiently clarify its differentiation from other Bitcoin-related initiatives on Cardano.

Conditions or signals that could change the vote: Unknown.

1. Conclusion

The decisive issues are the absence of sufficient impact KPIs, inadequate budget granularity, the use of the Treasury as liquidity provider and risk taker for a specific financial product, and insufficient clarification of differentiation from other Bitcoin-related initiatives in Cardano.

---

Revisão de Ação de Governança [PT]

1. Introdução

Alchemy é um protocolo de tesouraria de Bitcoin nativo de Cardano e uma camada de infraestrutura BTCfi proposta por Sundial Protocol e Charms. Seu objetivo é fornecer infraestrutura reutilizável para exposição estruturada lastreada em Bitcoin na Cardano, incluindo arquitetura compartilhada de reserva em BTC, ativos composáveis FIRE e ICE, dashboards públicos, adaptadores de integração, relatórios mensais e liquidez inicial em etapas.

A proposta solicita 10.000.000 ada, usando um valor de referência aproximado de USD 0,20 por ada, para um orçamento de planejamento de cerca de USD 2,0 milhões. O pedido é dividido em dois pools: aproximadamente USD 1,0 milhão para infraestrutura de protocolo e liquidez inicial apoiada pelo Tesouro, e aproximadamente USD 1,0 milhão para entrega, auditoria, integrações, dashboards, relatórios de governança, trabalho jurídico/compliance e execução go-to-market.

A proposta inclui separação de fundos, implantação de liquidez em etapas, relatórios públicos, alocação para auditoria, proteção de preço do ADA, regras de pausa, condições de reembolso e uma cláusula de rollover caso investimento externo financie o desenvolvimento da Alchemy. A Intersect é proposta como administradora interina dos fundos, sujeita a confirmação e acordo final.

1. Análise da Ação de Governança
   Aspectos positivos

Conceitualmente, a proposta é interessante. Há um cuidado claro em demonstrar a importância estratégica de uma camada BTCfi para Cardano, e a proposta apresenta uma narrativa razoável sobre a oportunidade de atrair liquidez relacionada a Bitcoin para o ecossistema. Os exemplos de produtos semelhantes em outros ecossistemas, com TVL e volumes significativos, ajudam a indicar que existe uma categoria de mercado real e potencialmente relevante.

Também é positivo que a proposta tente estruturar mecanismos de retorno ao Tesouro, especialmente ao prever que lucros, yield ou retornos gerados pela posição de liquidez apoiada pelo Treasury sejam devolvidos ao próprio Tesouro.

Aspectos negativos

Esses pontos positivos não são suficientes para justificar a aprovação de uma retirada de 10.000.000 ADA. O principal problema é que os números apresentados sobre mercados e protocolos comparáveis parecem servir mais para sustentar uma narrativa de oportunidade do que para estabelecer compromissos objetivos de sucesso. A proposta menciona TVL, volume e demanda em outros contextos, mas não transforma essa tese em KPIs próprios, com metas e prazos claros para Alchemy em Cardano.

Faltam alvos objetivos de adoção, liquidez orgânica, integrações, usuários, volume, receita, retorno ao Treasury ou impacto mensurável no ecossistema.

A granularidade do orçamento também é insuficiente para um pedido dessa escala. Embora existam categorias gerais de alocação, a proposta não apresenta detalhamento adequado de FTEs, taxas, número de profissionais, senioridade, carga horária, escopo por função ou composição granular dos custos. Isso dificulta uma avaliação adequada de custo-benefício, especialmente em um pedido que combina desenvolvimento, auditoria, integrações, go-to-market e estruturação financeira.

Outro ponto relevante é a possível sobreposição com outras iniciativas. Já existem outros projetos, propostas e times desenvolvendo, ou buscando desenvolver, adaptações de Bitcoin, Bitcoin DeFi ou infraestrutura relacionada a Bitcoin dentro do ecossistema Cardano. Por isso, seria importante que a proposta apresentasse com mais clareza seus diferenciais em relação a essas iniciativas, especialmente quando há pedidos de funding ao Tesouro para frentes que podem ter algum grau de sobreposição.

Sem uma comparação mais explícita, permanece incerto se o Tesouro estaria financiando uma infraestrutura realmente complementar ou se estaria custeando múltiplas iniciativas com escopos parcialmente redundantes. Uma explicação mais clara sobre posicionamento, complementaridade, diferenciais técnicos e limites de sobreposição ajudaria a avaliar melhor a necessidade e a proporcionalidade deste pedido.

Riscos e preocupações

Há uma preocupação mais ampla com o uso do Tesouro como provedor de liquidez. A proposta tenta mitigar esse ponto ao prever retorno de lucros ao Treasury, mas ainda assim desloca para o Tesouro um papel de risco que, em condições normais, deveria ser assumido por investidores privados, veículos especializados ou mecanismos desenhados especificamente para esse tipo de alocação.

O uso recorrente do Treasury como fonte de liquidez inicial para produtos financeiros específicos pode criar incentivos artificiais, distorcer mercados e prejudicar o crescimento orgânico do ecossistema.

Se a tese de mercado é tão promissora quanto a proposta sugere, é razoável esperar interesse de capital privado ou de veículos mais apropriados para esse tipo de risco, como fundos ou ecosystem investment vehicles voltados a oportunidades comerciais e de liquidez. O Treasury de Cardano não deve ser tratado automaticamente como o financiador de primeira instância para projetos promissores, especialmente quando o benefício público depende de adoção futura ainda não demonstrada.

1. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NÃO.

A proposta apresenta uma ideia relevante e uma narrativa estratégica interessante, mas não oferece KPIs de impacto suficientes, não apresenta granularidade orçamentária adequada, coloca o Tesouro em uma posição de provedor de liquidez e tomador de risco para um produto financeiro específico, e não esclarece suficientemente sua diferenciação frente a outras iniciativas relacionadas a Bitcoin em Cardano.

Condições ou sinais que poderiam alterar o voto: Unknown.

1. Conclusão

Os pontos decisivos são a ausência de KPIs de impacto suficientes, a granularidade orçamentária inadequada, o uso do Tesouro como provedor de liquidez e tomador de risco para um produto financeiro específico, e a falta de esclarecimento suficiente sobre diferenciação frente a outras iniciativas relacionadas a Bitcoin em Cardano.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report

My vote on this proposal is NO due to insufficient budget detail and the absence of KPIs with verifiable targets.

Most of the budget, equivalent to approximately USD 200,000, is generically allocated to “engineering hours.” However, the proposal does not disclose the total number of funded hours, hourly rates, number of professionals, roles, seniority levels, allocation percentages, or total FTE commitment. It also does not explain how resources will be divided between Plutarch, Ply, corrective maintenance, protocol compatibility work, and new enhancements.

Without this information, it is not possible to adequately assess the reasonableness of the costs, the amount of engineering capacity being purchased, or the overall cost-benefit of the request.

The proposal also lists potential indicators, such as the number of bugs fixed, optimizations delivered, developer-experience improvements, and documentation updates, but establishes no minimum targets for any of them. The four quarterly milestones repeat essentially the same acceptance criteria and do not commit to a minimum number of hours, deliverables, releases, fixes, or improvements.

The relevance of Plutarch and Ply and MLabs’ experience are acknowledged. However, reputation and technical importance do not replace the need for a verifiable budget and measurable commitments. As submitted, the proposal does not provide sufficient information to support a responsible assessment of the requested use of Treasury funds.

---

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança

Meu voto nesta proposta é NÃO devido à insuficiência de detalhes orçamentários e à ausência de KPIs com metas verificáveis.

A maior parte do orçamento, equivalente a aproximadamente US$ 200.000, é destinada genericamente a “horas de engenharia”. No entanto, não são informados o número total de horas financiadas, as taxas horárias, a quantidade de profissionais, suas funções, senioridades, percentuais de dedicação ou o total de FTEs. Também não é apresentada uma distribuição dos recursos entre Plutarch, Ply, manutenção corretiva, compatibilidade com atualizações do protocolo e novos aprimoramentos.

Sem essas informações, não é possível avaliar adequadamente a razoabilidade dos custos, a quantidade de capacidade técnica adquirida ou a relação custo-benefício da solicitação.

A proposta também enumera possíveis indicadores, como número de bugs corrigidos, otimizações realizadas, melhorias de experiência do desenvolvedor e atualizações de documentação, mas não estabelece metas mínimas para nenhum deles. Os quatro marcos trimestrais repetem essencialmente os mesmos critérios e não definem uma quantidade mínima de horas, entregas, releases, correções ou melhorias a serem concluídas.

A relevância de Plutarch e Ply e a experiência da MLabs são reconhecidas. Contudo, reputação e importância técnica não substituem a necessidade de um orçamento verificável e de compromissos mensuráveis. Nas condições apresentadas, não há informação suficiente para exercer uma avaliação responsável sobre o uso dos recursos do Tesouro.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Review

My vote is NO due to the insufficient granularity of the budget.

The proposal requests 3,810,423 ADA, of which 3,699,440 ADA is allocated to the development of the Mithril protocol and 110,983 ADA to the Intersect administration fee. Although the funds are distributed across different deliverables, the proposal does not disclose the team size, roles, seniority levels, rates, working hours, FTE allocations, or the methodology used to calculate the cost of each item. It also does not provide sufficient detail regarding the 220,000 ADA infrastructure expense.

Without this information, it is not possible to adequately assess the proportionality of the amounts, the cost-effectiveness of the request, or whether the funds are being allocated efficiently. Mithril’s strategic relevance and the team’s technical capability do not replace the obligation to present a verifiable budget for a Treasury withdrawal of this magnitude.

This rejection is limited to the insufficient financial transparency of this request and does not represent opposition to the Mithril protocol or to the continuation of its development.

---

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança

Meu voto é NÃO devido à insuficiente granularidade do orçamento.

A proposta solicita 3.810.423 ADA, dos quais 3.699.440 ADA são destinados ao desenvolvimento do protocolo Mithril e 110.983 ADA à taxa de administração da Intersect. Embora os recursos sejam distribuídos entre diferentes entregáveis, não são informados o tamanho da equipe, as funções, senioridades, taxas, cargas horárias, FTEs ou a metodologia utilizada para calcular os custos de cada item. Também não há detalhamento suficiente da despesa de 220.000 ADA com infraestrutura.

Sem essas informações, não é possível avaliar adequadamente a proporcionalidade dos valores, o custo-benefício da solicitação ou se os recursos estão sendo alocados de maneira eficiente. A relevância estratégica do Mithril e a capacidade técnica da equipe não substituem a obrigação de apresentar um orçamento verificável para uma retirada dessa magnitude.

A recusa está limitada à insuficiência de transparência financeira desta solicitação e não representa oposição ao protocolo Mithril ou à continuidade de seu desenvolvimento.

Governance Action Review [EN]

1. Introduction

Intersect Technical Steering Committee Support requests 1,193,000 ADA, equivalent to US$298,250 at the exchange rate specified by the proposer, for a twelve-month period. The proposal is divided into three work packages. WP1 funds attendance by approximately twelve technical experts at ecosystem events and the commissioning of up to four technical reports. WP2 funds the Parameter Committee, CIP editors, and the Hard Fork Working Group. WP3 establishes a pilot independent technical review programme for the 2027 budget cycle, with an average of three reviews for up to thirty-five core infrastructure proposals. Intersect will administer the funds, all expenditure will be accounted for, and any unspent balance will be returned to the Cardano Treasury. Technical workshops, the Security Council, and the Bug Bounty Programme are funded through Intersect’s main budget and are excluded from this request. Execution of the work packages is contingent on approval of the IntersectMBO budget proposal.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The Technical Steering Committee performs an important function in Cardano’s technical governance, and the presented work packages fund activities necessary for the continuity, security, and orderly evolution of the protocol. These activities include the work of the Parameter Committee, the CIP editors, the Hard Fork Working Group, the production of technical reports and studies, and the creation of an independent evaluation programme for infrastructure proposals.

The budget presents an acceptable level of detail. Each item is associated with identifiable activities, with quantities, rates, or limits that make it possible to understand the origin of the requested amounts. Estimates are provided for specialist participation in meetings, report preparation, benchmarking studies, event attendance, CIP editor compensation, hard fork coordination, and technical proposal evaluations. This is a relevant difference from proposals that concentrate large amounts in generic categories without disclosing rates, numbers of professionals, or units of delivery.

The amounts allocated to participation in the Parameter Committee and the Hard Fork Working Group appear reasonable and even modest given the expected level of specialisation. Compensation of up to twelve specialists at US$250 per month in the Parameter Committee does not appear excessive for people expected to participate in recurring meetings, review parameter proposals, and contribute to formal recommendations. Similarly, monthly payment of US$500 for up to six specialists involved in hard fork coordination appears prudent, especially considering the responsibility associated with preparing upgrades, monitoring dependencies, and assessing the readiness of different ecosystem participants.

The planned compensation for CIP editors also appears justifiable. This is a specialised and relevant function, historically performed largely on a voluntary basis, involving triage, organisation, editorial review, and monitoring of the CIP lifecycle. A monthly rate of approximately US$4,000 may be appropriate for significant dedication. The nominal amount is plausible, although the absence of an estimate of hours or expected percentage of dedication prevents a precise determination of whether it is below, within, or above market levels.

The amounts of US$10,000 per technical report or benchmarking study also appear reasonable as an initial reference. Depending on complexity, a technical report may require specialised research, analysis, data collection, review, and publication. An empirical study of node performance may require substantially more work than a synthesis report on a technical subject. Time estimates and minimum scope criteria would be useful, but the unit amount does not appear excessive.

The budget for specialist participation in events also appears prudent. An average of US$2,000 per specialist, covering flights and accommodation, does not stand out as high, particularly because events may take place in different regions. These participations should produce publicly available results, such as post-event reports, discussion summaries, recommendations, or records of identified demands, so that the benefit is not measured only by the specialist’s physical presence.

WP3 provides for up to thirty-five proposals to be evaluated, with an average of three reviews per proposal, totalling approximately 105 evaluations at US$250 each. Based on Agora’s experience as a proposal reviewer in Project Catalyst, US$250 is a fair rate for a structured evaluation. Depending on length and complexity, this amount could correspond to approximately two to five hours of work. As the proposals would mainly concern technical infrastructure, some reviews can reasonably be expected to require specialised knowledge and substantial dedication.

Some dReps opposed to the proposal argued that there could be overlap between this funding and Intersect’s main operating budget, or that these activities should be incorporated into Intersect’s 25.4 million ADA proposal. Although this concern is legitimate, the existence of a separate proposal is not, by itself, a problem. DReps and the community frequently request more granular proposals that are less dependent on large bundles. A dedicated budget makes it possible to evaluate and fund the Technical Steering Committee specifically, without requiring approval of all other operational, administrative, and coordination activities of Intersect.

This separation also recognises that different committees do not necessarily have the same level of importance or performance. They should not all be funded automatically as part of a single package. The Technical Steering Committee has a more essential function and a more positive performance than other areas of Intersect. Protocol technical coordination, the CIP process, parameter recommendations, hard fork readiness, and technical support for dReps constitute institutional infrastructure that merits separate consideration.

A basic participation reward would not prevent specialists from receiving additional compensation for specific technical activities. When members receive only a relatively low stipend to attend meetings and perform general institutional duties, it is reasonable for additional work, such as preparing recommendations, coordinating hard forks, or conducting specialised proposal reviews, to receive separate compensation. The issue is not necessarily receipt of both payments, but ensuring that the same activity or working period is not paid twice.

The proposal includes quantitative delivery targets, such as numbers of reports, studies, participations, specialists, and reviews. It also includes milestone completion criteria, including publication of recommendations, annual reports, readiness assessments, and creation of the evaluation framework. These elements make it possible to verify whether the activities were performed.

The absence of a more robust set of KPIs is not a determining factor for rejecting the proposal. This is not an adoption project in which value depends on reaching future numbers of users, transactions, or integrations. Much of the benefit is already embedded in the outputs themselves. The publication of technical evaluations, benchmarking studies, parameter recommendations, reports, and readiness documents already produces materials that can be used by the ecosystem. The principal uncertainty concerns the quality of these deliverables, not whether their existence can be verified.

WP3 includes specific independence mechanisms: open reviewer selection, documented criteria, publication of recusals, no single organisation holding a majority of reviewing capacity, and full publication of reviews. These mechanisms are positive.

The evaluation of Intersect’s main proposal was different because broader problems of coordination, granularity, accountability, and performance were identified in certain areas. Approval of this proposal does not represent unrestricted approval of Intersect’s structure or general budget. It is a specific decision concerning a committee whose function is more essential, whose activities are more concrete, and whose operating history appears more positive.

Negative aspects

The proposal could better specify the workload or expected percentage of dedication for CIP editors. Without that estimate, the nominal monthly amount may be regarded as plausible, but it cannot be determined precisely whether the compensation is below, within, or above market levels.

The proposed US$10,000 reference amount for each technical report or benchmarking study is not accompanied by a sufficiently precise definition of length, methodology, depth, or expected number of hours. An empirical study of node performance may require much more work than a synthesis report on a technical topic. Time estimates and minimum scope criteria would allow the relationship between cost and expected delivery to be evaluated more precisely.

Specialist participation in events should produce publicly available outputs, such as post-event reports, summaries of discussions, recommendations, or records of identified demands. Without these outputs, the benefit may be measured only through physical attendance.

The required depth of the WP3 reviews is not completely defined. It is unclear whether they will be relatively objective and standardised evaluations or in-depth technical due diligence covering architecture, feasibility, security, team capacity, and execution risks. The proposed rate may be appropriate for the first case and relatively low for the second. The rate itself appears appropriate, but the relationship between compensation, time, and expected quality should be more explicit.

The proposal attempts to establish boundaries by stating that technical workshops, the Security Council, and the Bug Bounty Programme are funded through Intersect’s main budget and are excluded from this request. However, the separation is not sufficiently clear at the level of people, hours, and activities. The main budget also mentions basic rewards for committee participation, but does not disclose unit amounts or explain how those rewards relate to the specific fees included in this proposal.

A clear matrix of responsibilities and funding sources should identify which activities are covered by Intersect’s main budget, which are funded by this proposal, and under what circumstances the same person could receive both payments. The absence of this distinction does not prove overlap, but prevents it from being ruled out completely. This is a relevant transparency limitation, although not sufficient to reject the proposal, particularly because the individual amounts are modest and the funded activities are important.

The proposal contains few KPIs with targets for measuring quality, usefulness, or effectiveness. Expressions such as “active throughput”, the absence of an “unreasonable” backlog, stakeholders being “adequately informed”, or reports that “demonstrably inform” discussions do not provide baselines or objective targets. Useful measures could include average CIP review time, changes in the backlog, timeliness of evaluations, dRep satisfaction, and the perceived usefulness of reports and reviews.

A qualitative or quantitative survey of dReps, SPOs, developers, and other users of TSC outputs could measure clarity, independence, relevance, and usefulness. It would also be possible to track how many dReps used the technical evaluations, how many recommendations were considered in decisions, and whether hard fork processes were positively evaluated by the participants involved.

The most important recommendation is to strengthen measurement of the quality and usefulness of publicly available materials. The absence of these indicators reduces the ability to evaluate the committee’s subsequent performance, but does not invalidate the expected value of the activities.

The proposal also contains editorial inconsistencies and gaps in time estimates, the separation between funding sources, and the measurement of quality.

Risks and concerns

The main overlap concern is the possibility of duplicate compensation for the same activity or working period. The lack of a complete distinction between the main Intersect budget and this proposal does not establish that duplication exists, but it prevents the risk from being fully excluded.

The Technical Steering Committee should not be characterised as completely independent. It is a standing committee of Intersect, depends on the organisation’s operational structures, and will have its resources administered by Intersect. The independence safeguards included in WP3 are positive, but their effectiveness depends on implementation.

The TSC’s function should remain consultative and technical, providing evidence, evaluations, and recommendations without replacing the judgement of dReps or becoming a central authority that determines the technically correct answer for the ecosystem.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: YES.

The budget is sufficiently granular and the requested amounts appear reasonable. The work packages fund activities necessary for Cardano’s technical governance, including the Technical Steering Committee, the Parameter Committee, CIP editors, the Hard Fork Working Group, technical reports and studies, and independent evaluations of infrastructure proposals. The proposal contains identifiable activities, quantities, rates, limits, and verifiable deliverables, and its separate submission permits a more granular decision than inclusion of these functions in a large operating budget.

The gaps in workload estimates, quality criteria, separation from Intersect’s main budget, safeguards against duplicate compensation, and measurement of output usefulness remain relevant. They do not, however, outweigh the expected value of the proposal. The vote is accompanied by recommendations for greater clarity on workload, quality standards, the relationship with Intersect’s main budget, prevention of duplicate compensation, and periodic evaluation of the usefulness of outputs by dReps and the community.

4. Conclusion

The proposal combines necessary technical governance functions with identifiable costs and verifiable outputs. The remaining gaps concern workload, quality measurement, funding separation, and duplicate-compensation safeguards. These limitations do not outweigh the expected benefit of sustaining the TSC’s specialist groups and technical review activities.

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Revisão de Ação de Governança [PT]

1. Introdução

A proposta Intersect Technical Steering Committee Support solicita 1.193.000 ADA, equivalentes a US$ 298.250 na taxa de câmbio indicada pelo proponente, para um período de doze meses. A proposta está dividida em três work packages. O WP1 financia a participação de aproximadamente doze especialistas técnicos em eventos do ecossistema e a contratação de até quatro relatórios técnicos. O WP2 financia o Parameter Committee, os CIP editors e o Hard Fork Working Group. O WP3 estabelece um programa-piloto de avaliações técnicas independentes para o ciclo orçamentário de 2027, com média de três avaliações para até 35 propostas de infraestrutura central. A Intersect administrará os recursos, todas as despesas serão contabilizadas e qualquer saldo não utilizado será devolvido ao Tesouro da Cardano. Workshops técnicos, o Security Council e o Bug Bounty Programme são financiados pelo orçamento principal da Intersect e estão excluídos deste pedido. A execução dos work packages depende da aprovação da proposta orçamentária da IntersectMBO.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

O Technical Steering Committee exerce uma função importante na governança técnica da Cardano, e os work packages apresentados financiam atividades que a Agora considera necessárias para a continuidade, a segurança e a evolução ordenada do protocolo. Isso inclui o trabalho do Parameter Committee, dos CIP editors, do Hard Fork Working Group, a produção de relatórios e estudos técnicos e a criação de um programa de avaliações independentes para propostas de infraestrutura.

O orçamento apresenta um nível de detalhamento aceitável. Cada item está associado a atividades identificáveis, com quantidades, taxas ou limites que permitem compreender de onde vêm os valores solicitados. Há estimativas para participação de especialistas em reuniões, elaboração de relatórios, estudos de benchmarking, presença em eventos, remuneração de CIP editors, coordenação de hard forks e avaliações técnicas de propostas. Isso representa uma diferença relevante em relação a propostas que concentram valores elevados em categorias genéricas sem informar taxas, número de profissionais ou unidades de entrega.

Os valores destinados à participação no Parameter Committee e no Hard Fork Working Group parecem razoáveis e até modestos diante do nível de especialização esperado. A remuneração de até 12 especialistas a US$ 250 por mês no Parameter Committee não parece excessiva para pessoas que devem participar de reuniões recorrentes, revisar propostas de parâmetros e contribuir para recomendações formais. Da mesma maneira, o pagamento de US$ 500 mensais para até seis especialistas envolvidos na coordenação de hard forks parece prudente, especialmente considerando a responsabilidade associada à preparação de upgrades, ao acompanhamento de dependências e à avaliação da prontidão dos diferentes participantes do ecossistema.

A remuneração prevista para os CIP editors também parece justificável. Trata-se de uma função especializada e relevante, historicamente exercida em grande parte de forma voluntária, que envolve triagem, organização, revisão editorial e acompanhamento do ciclo de vida dos CIPs. Uma taxa mensal de aproximadamente US$ 4 mil pode ser apropriada para uma dedicação significativa. O valor nominal é plausível, embora a ausência de uma estimativa de carga horária ou percentual de dedicação esperado impeça determinar com precisão se está abaixo, dentro ou acima do mercado.

Os valores de US$ 10 mil por relatório técnico ou estudo de benchmarking também parecem razoáveis como referência inicial. Dependendo da complexidade, um relatório técnico pode exigir pesquisa especializada, análise, coleta de dados, revisão e publicação. Um estudo empírico sobre desempenho de nós pode demandar muito mais trabalho do que um relatório de síntese sobre um tema técnico. Seria recomendável apresentar estimativas de tempo e critérios mínimos de escopo, mas o valor unitário não parece excessivo.

O orçamento para participação de especialistas em eventos também parece prudente. A média de US$ 2 mil por especialista, cobrindo voos e acomodação, não chama atenção como um valor elevado, principalmente considerando que os eventos podem ocorrer em diferentes regiões. Essas participações deveriam produzir resultados publicamente disponíveis, como relatórios pós-evento, sínteses das discussões, recomendações ou registros das demandas identificadas, para que o benefício não seja medido apenas pela presença física do especialista.

No WP3, a proposta prevê até 35 propostas avaliadas, com uma média de três reviews por proposta, totalizando aproximadamente 105 avaliações a US$ 250 cada. Com base na experiência da Agora como revisora de propostas no Project Catalyst, US$ 250 é uma taxa justa para uma avaliação estruturada. Dependendo da extensão e da complexidade, esse valor poderia corresponder a aproximadamente duas a cinco horas de trabalho. Como as propostas em questão seriam voltadas principalmente para infraestrutura técnica, é razoável esperar que algumas análises exijam conhecimento especializado e dedicação substancial.

Alguns dReps contrários à proposta argumentaram que poderia haver sobreposição entre est

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Review — Vote: NO

1. Introduction

The “Consensus Upgrades” treasury withdrawal requests ₳27,714,342 to continue Leios development as a consensus-layer scalability upgrade for Cardano. The proposal presents Leios as an enhancement to Ouroboros Praos, intended to increase throughput capacity and support faster settlement while preserving Cardano’s security guarantees.

The proposal positions Leios as necessary for Cardano’s 2030 strategy, which targets growth from approximately 800,000 transactions per month to more than 27 million monthly transactions.

The 2026/2027 cycle focuses on moving Leios from an early public testnet stage toward mainnet readiness. The work is organized around three objectives: producing a release candidate, increasing confidence through testing and adversarial validation, and enabling the conditions for a future Leios hard fork.

The proposal identifies Carlos Lopez De Lara and Sebastian Nagel as leads, with an expected duration of 6–9 months.

The budget allocates ₳23,834,334, or 86% of the total treasury ask, to Development. Additional categories include Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance, and Others.

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2. Governance Action Analysis

1. Introduction

Wirex Limited requests 3,961,538 ADA, equivalent to US$1.03 million at the proposal’s fixed conversion rate of US$0.26 per ADA, for a nine-month Treasury Withdrawal administered by Intersect. The new technical initiative would deliver open-source infrastructure for real-world payments on Cardano, connecting on-chain settlement to Visa, banking rails, fiat ramps, wallets, APIs, and stablecoin-compatible systems.

Delivery is divided into five phases: core smart-contract infrastructure; Visa and banking integration; a wallet and API ecosystem layer; security and external audit; and launch and ecosystem activation. The proposed outputs include account abstraction, batched transactions, settlement logic, public SDKs, documentation, developer tooling, sandbox environments, independent audits, penetration testing, mainnet deployment, at least one live wallet integration, and one institutional or program partner onboarded.

The budget allocates US$350,000 to Core Infrastructure, US$250,000 to Visa & Banking Integration, US$200,000 to the Wallet & API Ecosystem Layer, US$100,000 to Security & External Audit, US$100,000 to Launch & Ecosystem Activation, and US$30,000 to Intersect’s administration fee. Unspent ADA resulting from favorable exchange-rate movements would be returned to the Treasury at the end of the project.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Negative aspects

2.1. Budget with insufficient detail

The proposal requests 3,961,538 ADA, equivalent to US$1.03 million, but presents the budget only through large aggregated categories:

US$350,000 for Core Infrastructure; US$250,000 for Visa & Banking Integration; US$200,000 for the Wallet & API Ecosystem Layer; US$100,000 for Security & External Audit; US$100,000 for Launch & Ecosystem Activation; and US$30,000 for Intersect administration.

Although each category contains a general list of activities, there is insufficient itemization to permit a responsible evaluation of the costs. The proposal does not disclose the number of professionals, roles and seniority levels, FTEs, working hours or dedication percentages, hourly rates, cost per activity, infrastructure costs, suppliers, regulatory costs, partner integration costs, or the internal distribution of each allocation.

Consequently, amounts ranging from US$100,000 to US$350,000 are presented as lump sums associated with generic descriptions. Knowing that US$350,000 will be spent on smart contracts, account abstraction, batched transactions, settlement logic, and internal audits does not reveal how much each component costs, how many people will work on them, or whether the amount requested is proportional to the effort required.

The same problem occurs in the remaining categories. The proposal identifies the broad destinations of the funds but does not demonstrate how the amounts were calculated. For a request exceeding one million dollars, this level of granularity is unacceptable.

2.2. Near absence of KPIs with relevant impact targets

The proposal contains some technical completion criteria but presents very few quantitative KPIs capable of demonstrating real impact for Cardano.

The main numerical targets are at least two external developers or teams integrating in the sandbox, one active wallet integration, one institutional or program partner onboarded, and the remediation of critical and high-severity vulnerabilities before launch.

These targets have limited usefulness for evaluating adoption or return to the ecosystem.

The integration of two external developers or teams is a small and poorly defined target. It is unclear who may be counted as an external developer, what depth of integration will be required, whether a basic sandbox test will be sufficient, whether the integration must reach production, whether it will produce users, volume, or transactions, and how long it must remain active.

A single wallet integration also demonstrates only that the infrastructure can be connected to a wallet. It does not demonstrate relevant usage, retention, number of users, processed volume, or sustainable adoption.

The onboarding of only one institutional or program partner has the same problem. There is no minimum requirement related to the size of the partner, number of users, volume transferred, geographic reach, or activity effectively generated on Cardano.

The remediation of critical and high-severity vulnerabilities is an important security condition, but it is not an impact or adoption KPI. It is a basic condition for securely launching financial infrastructure.

The proposal also mentions more than one million incremental transactions per year and US$250 million in annualized transaction volume.

However, these figures are presented as projections rather than binding commitments. They do not appear as milestone acceptance criteria, do not condition payments, and are not accompanied by a measurement methodology, assessment period, or consequence in the event of non-compliance.

Therefore, the proposal uses relevant figures in its impact narrative but avoids transforming them into measurable obligations. There is an important institutional difference between stating that a project may produce one million transactions and contractually committing to deliver a specific result.

The central problem is not the complete absence of numerical targets. It is the absence of robust impact KPIs proportional to the amount requested. The few thresholds presented primarily measure technical availability or minimal integrations, while the most important economic and adoption outcomes remain only narrative expectations.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The NO vote results from two serious and independent failures. Either one, by itself, would already be sufficient to prevent approval of the Treasury Withdrawal.

The proposal combines a large financial request without sufficient granularity to evaluate cost-effectiveness and weak impact commitments, with the main adoption estimates presented only as non-binding projections.

It is not necessary to reach a conclusion regarding Wirex’s competence, the strategic importance of payments, or the technical merit of the initiative. The budget and the KPIs each independently fail to meet the minimum level of accountability required for a withdrawal of this magnitude.

For these two reasons, the simplified template applies and the vote is NO.

4. Conclusion

The requested amount exceeds US$1 million without sufficient cost itemization, while the principal economic and adoption estimates remain non-binding projections. The budget and the impact KPIs independently fail to provide the minimum accountability required for approval of the Treasury Withdrawal.

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Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

1. Introdução

A Wirex Limited solicita 3.961.538 ADA, equivalentes a US$ 1,03 milhão pela taxa de conversão fixa de US$ 0,26 por ADA utilizada na proposta, para uma retirada do Tesouro com duração estimada de nove meses e administração da Intersect. A nova iniciativa técnica pretende entregar uma infraestrutura open-source para pagamentos no mundo real em Cardano, conectando liquidação on-chain à Visa, sistemas bancários, fiat ramps, wallets, APIs e sistemas compatíveis com stablecoins.

A execução está dividida em cinco fases: infraestrutura central de smart contracts; integração com Visa e sistemas bancários; camada de ecossistema para wallets e APIs; segurança e auditoria externa; e lançamento e ativação do ecossistema. As entregas propostas incluem account abstraction, transações em lote, lógica de liquidação, SDKs públicos, documentação, ferramentas para desenvolvedores, ambientes sandbox, auditorias independentes, testes de penetração, implantação na mainnet, pelo menos uma integração ativa com wallet e o onboarding de um parceiro institucional ou de programa.

O orçamento destina US$ 350.000 à Core Infrastructure, US$ 250.000 à Visa & Banking Integration, US$ 200.000 à Wallet & API Ecosystem Layer, US$ 100.000 à Security & External Audit, US$ 100.000 à Launch & Ecosystem Activation e US$ 30.000 à taxa de administração da Intersect. ADA não utilizados em razão de movimentos cambiais favoráveis seriam devolvidos ao Tesouro ao final do projeto.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos negativos

2.1. Orçamento com detalhamento insuficiente

A proposta solicita 3.961.538 ADA, equivalentes a US$ 1,03 milhão, mas apresenta o orçamento apenas por grandes categorias agregadas:

US$ 350.000 para Core Infrastructure; US$ 250.000 para Visa & Banking Integration; US$ 200.000 para Wallet & API Ecosystem Layer; US$ 100.000 para Security & External Audit; US$ 100.000 para Launch & Ecosystem Activation; e US$ 30.000 para administração da Intersect.

Embora cada categoria contenha uma lista geral de atividades, não existe discriminação suficiente para permitir uma avaliação responsável dos custos. Não são informados o número de profissionais, funções e senioridades, FTEs, carga horária ou percentual de dedicação, hourly rates, custo por atividade, custos de infraestrutura, fornecedores, custos regulatórios, custos de integração com parceiros ou a distribuição interna de cada alocação.

Consequentemente, valores entre US$ 100.000 e US$ 350.000 são apresentados como lump sums associados a descrições genéricas. Saber que US$ 350.000 serão gastos com smart contracts, account abstraction, batched transactions, settlement logic e auditorias internas não permite saber quanto custa cada componente, quantas pessoas trabalharão neles ou se o valor solicitado é proporcional ao esforço necessário.

O mesmo problema ocorre nas demais categorias. A proposta informa os grandes destinos do dinheiro, mas não demonstra como os valores foram calculados. Para uma solicitação superior a um milhão de dólares, esse nível de granularidade é inaceitável.

2.2. Quase ausência de KPIs com alvos relevantes de impacto

A proposta contém alguns critérios de conclusão técnica, mas apresenta pouquíssimos KPIs quantitativos capazes de demonstrar impacto real para Cardano.

Os principais alvos numéricos são pelo menos dois desenvolvedores ou equipes externas integrando no sandbox, uma wallet integration ativa, um parceiro institucional ou de programa onboarded e a correção das vulnerabilidades críticas e de alta severidade antes do lançamento.

Esses alvos têm utilidade limitada para avaliar adoção ou retorno para o ecossistema.

A integração de dois desenvolvedores ou equipes externas é um alvo pequeno e pouco definido. Não está claro quem pode ser contado como desenvolvedor externo, qual profundidade de integração será exigida, se um teste básico no sandbox será suficiente, se a integração deverá chegar à produção, se produzirá usuários, volume ou transações e por quanto tempo deverá permanecer ativa.

Uma única integração com wallet também demonstra apenas que a infraestrutura pode ser conectada a uma wallet. Não demonstra uso relevante, retenção, número de usuários, volume processado ou adoção sustentável.

O onboarding de apenas um parceiro institucional ou de programa sofre do mesmo problema. Não há exigência mínima relacionad

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report

The note below limits the rejection to budgetary concerns. The proposal requests 1,684,050 ADA, including USD 315,000 for a “development team” and USD 12,000 for cloud infrastructure, without adequately detailing the composition of these costs.

My vote on this proposal is NO due to the insufficient granularity of the budget.

There is no opposition to TxPipe as a team, nor is there a negative conclusion regarding the technical merits or potential usefulness of Tx3. TxPipe has a strong reputation within the Cardano ecosystem and a relevant track record in the development of open-source tools. The decisive issue lies exclusively in the inability to adequately assess the cost-effectiveness of the request.

The proposal allocates USD 315,000 to a “development team” over 12 months. However, it does not disclose how many professionals comprise this team, what their roles and seniority levels will be, their rates, working hours, or percentages of dedication. It also does not provide the total number of FTEs or the allocation of human resources among the different planned activities, such as protocol integration, SDK generation, plugin development, agent infrastructure, operation of public services, and documentation.

The deliverables are described in relatively detailed terms, but this does not explain how the USD 315,000 cost was calculated. Without knowing the composition and the amount of capacity actually being contracted, it is not possible to determine whether the budget is proportionate to the volume and complexity of the work. There is insufficient information to conclude that the amount is excessive, but there is also insufficient information to determine that it represents an efficient use of Treasury resources.

The exchange-rate contingency and the commitment to return excess funds are positive elements, but they do not resolve the lack of detail regarding the main costs. A sound contingency mechanism protects the project’s USD-denominated value, but it does not demonstrate that the amounts originally established for labor and infrastructure are adequately justified.

A Treasury Withdrawal should allow dReps to understand not only what will be delivered, but also which resources will be used, how much they cost, and how the budget was calculated. Since this fundamental information is not available, the cost-benefit relationship remains excessively subjective.

For this reason, my vote is NO.

---

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança

A nota abaixo limita a recusa ao orçamento. A proposta solicita 1.684.050 ADA, incluindo US$ 315.000 para uma “development team” e US$ 12.000 para infraestrutura cloud, sem detalhar adequadamente a composição desses custos.

Meu voto nesta proposta é NÃO devido à insuficiente granularidade do orçamento.

Não há oposição à TxPipe enquanto equipe, nem uma conclusão negativa sobre o mérito técnico ou a possível utilidade de Tx3. A TxPipe possui uma reputação sólida no ecossistema Cardano e um histórico relevante no desenvolvimento de ferramentas open-source. A questão decisiva está exclusivamente na impossibilidade de avaliar adequadamente o custo-benefício da solicitação.

A proposta destina US$ 315.000 a uma “development team” durante 12 meses. No entanto, não informa quantos profissionais compõem essa equipe, quais serão suas funções, senioridades, taxas, cargas horárias ou percentuais de dedicação. Também não apresenta o total de FTEs nem a distribuição dos recursos humanos entre as diferentes atividades previstas, como integração de protocolos, geração de SDKs, desenvolvimento de plugins, infraestrutura para agentes, operação dos serviços públicos e documentação.

A descrição dos entregáveis é relativamente detalhada, mas isso não explica como o custo de US$ 315.000 foi calculado. Sem conhecer a composição e a capacidade efetivamente contratada, não é possível determinar se o orçamento é proporcional ao volume e à complexidade do trabalho. Não existem informações suficientes para afirmar que o valor seja excessivo, mas também não existem elementos suficientes para concluir que ele representa uma utilização eficiente dos recursos do Tesouro.

A reserva cambial e o compromisso de devolução dos recursos excedentes são aspectos positivos, mas não resolvem a ausência de detalhamento dos custos principais. Uma boa mecânica de contingência protege o valor em dólares do projeto, porém não demonstra que o valor originalmente definido para trabalho e infraestrutura esteja adequadamente justificado.

Uma retirada do Tesouro deve permitir que os dReps compreendam não apenas o que será entregue, mas também quais recursos serão utilizados, quanto custam e como o orçamento foi calculado. Como essas informações fundamentais não estão disponíveis, a relação de custo-benefício permanece excessivamente subjetiva.

Por essa razão, meu voto é NÃO.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report

The maintenance proposals for Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC follow practically identical structures. Each requests funding for a 12-month period using the same labor model, the same contingency mechanism, the same Intersect administration framework, and substantially similar quarterly milestones. Although the repositories perform different technical functions, the same material budget concern applies to all four proposals. For this reason, a standardized rationale is being used.

This standardized treatment does not mean that Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC are technically equivalent or equally important to the Cardano ecosystem. Each project occupies a different position within the technical stack and may have a different level of strategic relevance, adoption, downstream dependency, and substitutability. The use of a common rationale reflects the similarity of their funding structures and the fact that the same budget deficiency remains unresolved across all four proposals.

There is no opposition to TxPipe as a team. TxPipe has a strong reputation within the Cardano ecosystem and is one of the most relevant contributors to Cardano’s technical stack. The team maintains several open-source projects used by other developers and ecosystem participants and has a broadly positive history of completing previously funded proposals. While one proposal experienced a limited delay of a few months, there does not appear to be a broader pattern of prolonged delays or execution failures. In general, TxPipe has demonstrated an ability to deliver funded work within reasonable timeframes.

There are also meaningful signs that these projects are not purely experimental or unused. The repositories associated with these proposals show relevant levels of activity, engagement, contributions, forks, integrations, and use by other ecosystem participants. Considering the relatively limited size of the Cardano developer ecosystem, this engagement suggests that the projects have already demonstrated practical usefulness for developers, infrastructure providers, and other contributors.

No independent conclusion is being reached regarding the precise technical essentiality of each project. Determining how indispensable Oura, Pallas, Dolos, or UTxO RPC may be, which alternatives exist, and what technical consequences could arise from discontinued maintenance requires specialized knowledge. Developers with direct experience using these tools and understanding their respective dependencies are better positioned to assess their strategic importance and technical differentiation.

Although the proposals identify Pillar 2, Adoption and Utility, as their primary strategic alignment, these activities appear more directly aligned with Pillar 1, Infrastructure and Research Excellence. These projects do not constitute adoption initiatives by themselves. They provide technical infrastructure, libraries, standards, or data-access components that enable other applications and services. Their contribution to adoption is therefore primarily indirect, while their immediate function is to support the infrastructure on which other ecosystem activity depends.

The principal concern is the budget. The maintenance proposals request the equivalent of USD 105,000 to fund a part-time developer for 12 months, but they do not adequately define what “part-time” represents. They do not disclose the expected number of weekly or monthly hours, the percentage of full-time equivalent capacity, the hourly or monthly rate, the specific seniority of the funded professional, or the estimated allocation of time among maintenance, community support, documentation, protocol compatibility, enhancements, and AI-related activities.

The proposals state generally that the work will be carried out by experienced Rust developers and that a dedicated technical lead will provide oversight, with the cost of that technical leadership absorbed by TxPipe. However, this does not identify the amount of labor capacity that the Treasury is actually purchasing. Without an objective definition of the expected level of commitment, it is impossible to determine whether USD 105,000 corresponds to ten, twenty, thirty, or nearly forty hours of specialized work per week.

This omission makes the cost-benefit evaluation excessively subjective. There is not enough evidence to conclude that the proposed price is excessive, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the market for specialized blockchain and Rust development. At the same time, there is also not enough information to verify that the price is proportionate to the amount of work being contracted. The team’s reputation and the apparent usefulness of the projects do not replace the need to explain how the labor cost was calculated.

The quarterly milestones reinforce this uncertainty. Across the maintenance proposals, the milestones repeat substantially similar activities and completion criteria, including dependency updates, protocol compatibility, bug fixing, performance improvements, documentation, issue triage, contribution review, and AI-friendly development resources. Terms such as responding to issues within a “reasonable timeframe” do not establish an objective service level.

There are also no clearly defined minimum volumes of work, release targets, response times, availability expectations, issue-resolution targets, or specific deliverables for the AI-related scope. Some flexibility is appropriate for maintenance work because future bugs, protocol changes, and community requests cannot be predicted precisely. However, that flexibility should be balanced by a clearer definition of the labor capacity being contracted.

The contingency reserve and the commitment to return unused funds are positive elements. The mechanism is designed to preserve a fixed USD budget if ADA falls below the proposal conversion rate, while requiring excess ADA to be returned to the Treasury when it is not needed to cover the approved USD amount. This reduces the risk that the contingency reserve automatically becomes additional compensation. Nevertheless, a sound exchange-rate mechanism does not resolve the absence of granularity in the underlying labor budget.

The fact that four similar proposals are being submitted by the same provider also increases the importance of consolidated staffing transparency. The documentation does not clearly establish whether the funded work will be performed by four separate developers, shared team members, or overlapping resources. It also does not provide a consolidated view of total full-time-equivalent capacity, responsibilities, or separation of work among the four projects.

This does not establish that overlapping billing or duplicated work will occur. However, the information provided is insufficient to exclude that risk or to verify the provider’s aggregate delivery capacity across all four contracts. When multiple simultaneous Treasury requests rely on similar descriptions of undefined part-time resources, a clear staffing and allocation map should be provided.

If the proposals specified the expected hours, full-time-equivalent allocation, seniority, staffing arrangement, and calculation of labor costs, the principal budget objection would be removed. Under those circumstances, the most likely position would be ABSTAIN, given TxPipe’s reputation, delivery history, and the evidence that these projects have practical use, while recognizing that more technically qualified participants are better positioned to determine the strategic essentiality of each project.

Under the current terms, however, a Treasury Withdrawal must allow DReps to assess not only whether the provider is reputable and the project appears useful, but also how much labor is being purchased and whether the requested amount is proportionate to that capacity. Because this fundamental information is not available, the cost-benefit relationship cannot be evaluated with sufficient confidence.

For these reasons, the vote on the Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC maintenance proposals is NO.

---

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança

As propostas de manutenção de Oura, Pallas, Dolos e UTxO RPC possuem estruturas praticamente idênticas. Todas solicitam financiamento para um período de 12 meses, utilizando o mesmo modelo de custo de trabalho, o mesmo mecanismo de contingência, a mesma estrutura de administração da Intersect e milestones trimestrais substancialmente semelhantes. Embora os repositórios exerçam funções técnicas diferentes, a mesma preocupação orçamentária material está presente nas quatro propostas. Por essa razão, é utilizada uma fundamentação padronizada.

Esse tratamento padronizado não significa que Oura, Pallas, Dolos e UTxO RPC sejam tecnicamente equivalentes ou igualmente importantes para o ecossistema Cardano. Cada projeto ocupa uma posição diferente dentro da infraestrutura técnica e pode apresentar níveis distintos de relevância estratégica, adoção, dependência por outros projetos e possibilidade de substituição. A utilização de uma fundamentação comum decorre da semelhança entre suas estruturas de financiamento e do fato de que a mesma deficiência orçamentária permanece sem solução nas quatro propostas.

Não existe oposição à TxPipe enquanto equipe. A TxPipe possui grande reputação no ecossistema Cardano e é um dos principais times responsáveis pelo desenvolvimento de componentes relevantes da infraestrutura técnica da Cardano. A equipe mantém diversos projetos open-source utilizados por outros desenvolvedores e participantes do ecossistema e apresenta um histórico amplamente positivo de conclusão de propostas financiadas anteriormente. Embora uma proposta tenha apresentado um atraso limitado de poucos meses, não parece existir um padrão mais amplo de atrasos prolongados ou falhas de execução. Em geral, a TxPipe demonstrou capacidade de entregar trabalhos financiados em prazos razoáveis.

Também existem sinais relevantes de que esses projetos não são puramente experimentais ou sem utilização. Os repositórios associados às propostas apresentam níveis significativos de atividade, engajamento, contribuições, forks, integrações e utilização por outros participantes do ecossistema. Considerando as dimensões relativamente limitadas da comunidade de desenvolvimento da Cardano, esse nível de engajamento indica que os projetos já demonstraram utilidade prática para desenvolvedores, provedores de infraestrutura e outros contribuidores.

Não será adotada uma conclusão independente sobre o grau exato de essencialidade técnica de cada projeto. Determinar o quanto Oura, Pallas, Dolos ou UTxO RPC são indispensáveis, quais alternativas estão disponíveis e quais consequências técnicas poderiam decorrer da interrupção da manutenção exige conhecimento especializado. Desenvolvedores com experiência direta nessas ferramentas e compreensão de suas respectivas dependências possuem melhores condições de avaliar sua importância estratégica e diferenciação técnica.

Embora as propostas indiquem o Pilar 2, Adoption and Utility, como seu principal alinhamento estratégico, essas atividades parecem estar mais diretamente relacionadas ao Pilar 1, Infrastructure and Research Excellence. Esses projetos não constituem iniciativas de adoção por si próprios. Eles oferecem infraestrutura técnica, bibliotecas, padrões ou componentes de acesso a dados que habilitam outras aplicações e serviços. Sua contribuição para adoção é, portanto, principalmente indireta, enquanto sua função imediata consiste em sustentar a infraestrutura da qual outras atividades do ecossistema dependem.

A principal preocupação está no orçamento. As propostas de manutenção solicitam o equivalente a US$ 105.000 para financiar um desenvolvedor part-time durante 12 meses, mas não definem adequadamente o que “part-time” representa. Não são informados o número esperado de horas semanais ou mensais, o percentual de dedicação equivalente a tempo integral, a taxa horária ou mensal, a senioridade específica do profissional financiado ou a distribuição estimada do tempo entre manutenção, suporte à comunidade, documentação, compatibilidade com o protocolo, melhorias e atividades relacionadas a inteligência artificial.

As propostas afirmam genericamente que o trabalho será realizado por desenvolvedores experientes em Rust e que haverá supervisão de um technical lead dedicado, cujo custo será absorvido pela p

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report

The maintenance proposals for Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC follow practically identical structures. Each requests funding for a 12-month period using the same labor model, the same contingency mechanism, the same Intersect administration framework, and substantially similar quarterly milestones. Although the repositories perform different technical functions, the same material budget concern applies to all four proposals. For this reason, a standardized rationale is being used.

This standardized treatment does not mean that Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC are technically equivalent or equally important to the Cardano ecosystem. Each project occupies a different position within the technical stack and may have a different level of strategic relevance, adoption, downstream dependency, and substitutability. The use of a common rationale reflects the similarity of their funding structures and the fact that the same budget deficiency remains unresolved across all four proposals.

There is no opposition to TxPipe as a team. TxPipe has a strong reputation within the Cardano ecosystem and is one of the most relevant contributors to Cardano’s technical stack. The team maintains several open-source projects used by other developers and ecosystem participants and has a broadly positive history of completing previously funded proposals. While one proposal experienced a limited delay of a few months, there does not appear to be a broader pattern of prolonged delays or execution failures. In general, TxPipe has demonstrated an ability to deliver funded work within reasonable timeframes.

There are also meaningful signs that these projects are not purely experimental or unused. The repositories associated with these proposals show relevant levels of activity, engagement, contributions, forks, integrations, and use by other ecosystem participants. Considering the relatively limited size of the Cardano developer ecosystem, this engagement suggests that the projects have already demonstrated practical usefulness for developers, infrastructure providers, and other contributors.

No independent conclusion is being reached regarding the precise technical essentiality of each project. Determining how indispensable Oura, Pallas, Dolos, or UTxO RPC may be, which alternatives exist, and what technical consequences could arise from discontinued maintenance requires specialized knowledge. Developers with direct experience using these tools and understanding their respective dependencies are better positioned to assess their strategic importance and technical differentiation.

Although the proposals identify Pillar 2, Adoption and Utility, as their primary strategic alignment, these activities appear more directly aligned with Pillar 1, Infrastructure and Research Excellence. These projects do not constitute adoption initiatives by themselves. They provide technical infrastructure, libraries, standards, or data-access components that enable other applications and services. Their contribution to adoption is therefore primarily indirect, while their immediate function is to support the infrastructure on which other ecosystem activity depends.

The principal concern is the budget. The maintenance proposals request the equivalent of USD 105,000 to fund a part-time developer for 12 months, but they do not adequately define what “part-time” represents. They do not disclose the expected number of weekly or monthly hours, the percentage of full-time equivalent capacity, the hourly or monthly rate, the specific seniority of the funded professional, or the estimated allocation of time among maintenance, community support, documentation, protocol compatibility, enhancements, and AI-related activities.

The proposals state generally that the work will be carried out by experienced Rust developers and that a dedicated technical lead will provide oversight, with the cost of that technical leadership absorbed by TxPipe. However, this does not identify the amount of labor capacity that the Treasury is actually purchasing. Without an objective definition of the expected level of commitment, it is impossible to determine whether USD 105,000 corresponds to ten, twenty, thirty, or nearly forty hours of specialized work per week.

This omission makes the cost-benefit evaluation excessively subjective. There is not enough evidence to conclude that the proposed price is excessive, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the market for specialized blockchain and Rust development. At the same time, there is also not enough information to verify that the price is proportionate to the amount of work being contracted. The team’s reputation and the apparent usefulness of the projects do not replace the need to explain how the labor cost was calculated.

The quarterly milestones reinforce this uncertainty. Across the maintenance proposals, the milestones repeat substantially similar activities and completion criteria, including dependency updates, protocol compatibility, bug fixing, performance improvements, documentation, issue triage, contribution review, and AI-friendly development resources. Terms such as responding to issues within a “reasonable timeframe” do not establish an objective service level.

There are also no clearly defined minimum volumes of work, release targets, response times, availability expectations, issue-resolution targets, or specific deliverables for the AI-related scope. Some flexibility is appropriate for maintenance work because future bugs, protocol changes, and community requests cannot be predicted precisely. However, that flexibility should be balanced by a clearer definition of the labor capacity being contracted.

The contingency reserve and the commitment to return unused funds are positive elements. The mechanism is designed to preserve a fixed USD budget if ADA falls below the proposal conversion rate, while requiring excess ADA to be returned to the Treasury when it is not needed to cover the approved USD amount. This reduces the risk that the contingency reserve automatically becomes additional compensation. Nevertheless, a sound exchange-rate mechanism does not resolve the absence of granularity in the underlying labor budget.

The fact that four similar proposals are being submitted by the same provider also increases the importance of consolidated staffing transparency. The documentation does not clearly establish whether the funded work will be performed by four separate developers, shared team members, or overlapping resources. It also does not provide a consolidated view of total full-time-equivalent capacity, responsibilities, or separation of work among the four projects.

This does not establish that overlapping billing or duplicated work will occur. However, the information provided is insufficient to exclude that risk or to verify the provider’s aggregate delivery capacity across all four contracts. When multiple simultaneous Treasury requests rely on similar descriptions of undefined part-time resources, a clear staffing and allocation map should be provided.

If the proposals specified the expected hours, full-time-equivalent allocation, seniority, staffing arrangement, and calculation of labor costs, the principal budget objection would be removed. Under those circumstances, the most likely position would be ABSTAIN, given TxPipe’s reputation, delivery history, and the evidence that these projects have practical use, while recognizing that more technically qualified participants are better positioned to determine the strategic essentiality of each project.

Under the current terms, however, a Treasury Withdrawal must allow DReps to assess not only whether the provider is reputable and the project appears useful, but also how much labor is being purchased and whether the requested amount is proportionate to that capacity. Because this fundamental information is not available, the cost-benefit relationship cannot be evaluated with sufficient confidence.

For these reasons, the vote on the Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC maintenance proposals is NO.

---

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança

As propostas de manutenção de Oura, Pallas, Dolos e UTxO RPC possuem estruturas praticamente idênticas. Todas solicitam financiamento para um período de 12 meses, utilizando o mesmo modelo de custo de trabalho, o mesmo mecanismo de contingência, a mesma estrutura de administração da Intersect e milestones trimestrais substancialmente semelhantes. Embora os repositórios exerçam funções técnicas diferentes, a mesma preocupação orçamentária material está presente nas quatro propostas. Por essa razão, é utilizada uma fundamentação padronizada.

Esse tratamento padronizado não significa que Oura, Pallas, Dolos e UTxO RPC sejam tecnicamente equivalentes ou igualmente importantes para o ecossistema Cardano. Cada projeto ocupa uma posição diferente dentro da infraestrutura técnica e pode apresentar níveis distintos de relevância estratégica, adoção, dependência por outros projetos e possibilidade de substituição. A utilização de uma fundamentação comum decorre da semelhança entre suas estruturas de financiamento e do fato de que a mesma deficiência orçamentária permanece sem solução nas quatro propostas.

Não existe oposição à TxPipe enquanto equipe. A TxPipe possui grande reputação no ecossistema Cardano e é um dos principais times responsáveis pelo desenvolvimento de componentes relevantes da infraestrutura técnica da Cardano. A equipe mantém diversos projetos open-source utilizados por outros desenvolvedores e participantes do ecossistema e apresenta um histórico amplamente positivo de conclusão de propostas financiadas anteriormente. Embora uma proposta tenha apresentado um atraso limitado de poucos meses, não parece existir um padrão mais amplo de atrasos prolongados ou falhas de execução. Em geral, a TxPipe demonstrou capacidade de entregar trabalhos financiados em prazos razoáveis.

Também existem sinais relevantes de que esses projetos não são puramente experimentais ou sem utilização. Os repositórios associados às propostas apresentam níveis significativos de atividade, engajamento, contribuições, forks, integrações e utilização por outros participantes do ecossistema. Considerando as dimensões relativamente limitadas da comunidade de desenvolvimento da Cardano, esse nível de engajamento indica que os projetos já demonstraram utilidade prática para desenvolvedores, provedores de infraestrutura e outros contribuidores.

Não será adotada uma conclusão independente sobre o grau exato de essencialidade técnica de cada projeto. Determinar o quanto Oura, Pallas, Dolos ou UTxO RPC são indispensáveis, quais alternativas estão disponíveis e quais consequências técnicas poderiam decorrer da interrupção da manutenção exige conhecimento especializado. Desenvolvedores com experiência direta nessas ferramentas e compreensão de suas respectivas dependências possuem melhores condições de avaliar sua importância estratégica e diferenciação técnica.

Embora as propostas indiquem o Pilar 2, Adoption and Utility, como seu principal alinhamento estratégico, essas atividades parecem estar mais diretamente relacionadas ao Pilar 1, Infrastructure and Research Excellence. Esses projetos não constituem iniciativas de adoção por si próprios. Eles oferecem infraestrutura técnica, bibliotecas, padrões ou componentes de acesso a dados que habilitam outras aplicações e serviços. Sua contribuição para adoção é, portanto, principalmente indireta, enquanto sua função imediata consiste em sustentar a infraestrutura da qual outras atividades do ecossistema dependem.

A principal preocupação está no orçamento. As propostas de manutenção solicitam o equivalente a US$ 105.000 para financiar um desenvolvedor part-time durante 12 meses, mas não definem adequadamente o que “part-time” representa. Não são informados o número esperado de horas semanais ou mensais, o percentual de dedicação equivalente a tempo integral, a taxa horária ou mensal, a senioridade específica do profissional financiado ou a distribuição estimada do tempo entre manutenção, suporte à comunidade, documentação, compatibilidade com o protocolo, melhorias e atividades relacionadas a inteligência artificial.

As propostas afirmam genericamente que o trabalho será realizado por desenvolvedores experientes em Rust e que haverá supervisão de um technical lead dedicado, cujo custo será absorvido pela p

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report

The maintenance proposals for Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC follow practically identical structures. Each requests funding for a 12-month period using the same labor model, the same contingency mechanism, the same Intersect administration framework, and substantially similar quarterly milestones. Although the repositories perform different technical functions, the same material budget concern applies to all four proposals. For this reason, a standardized rationale is being used.

This standardized treatment does not mean that Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC are technically equivalent or equally important to the Cardano ecosystem. Each project occupies a different position within the technical stack and may have a different level of strategic relevance, adoption, downstream dependency, and substitutability. The use of a common rationale reflects the similarity of their funding structures and the fact that the same budget deficiency remains unresolved across all four proposals.

There is no opposition to TxPipe as a team. TxPipe has a strong reputation within the Cardano ecosystem and is one of the most relevant contributors to Cardano’s technical stack. The team maintains several open-source projects used by other developers and ecosystem participants and has a broadly positive history of completing previously funded proposals. While one proposal experienced a limited delay of a few months, there does not appear to be a broader pattern of prolonged delays or execution failures. In general, TxPipe has demonstrated an ability to deliver funded work within reasonable timeframes.

There are also meaningful signs that these projects are not purely experimental or unused. The repositories associated with these proposals show relevant levels of activity, engagement, contributions, forks, integrations, and use by other ecosystem participants. Considering the relatively limited size of the Cardano developer ecosystem, this engagement suggests that the projects have already demonstrated practical usefulness for developers, infrastructure providers, and other contributors.

No independent conclusion is being reached regarding the precise technical essentiality of each project. Determining how indispensable Oura, Pallas, Dolos, or UTxO RPC may be, which alternatives exist, and what technical consequences could arise from discontinued maintenance requires specialized knowledge. Developers with direct experience using these tools and understanding their respective dependencies are better positioned to assess their strategic importance and technical differentiation.

Although the proposals identify Pillar 2, Adoption and Utility, as their primary strategic alignment, these activities appear more directly aligned with Pillar 1, Infrastructure and Research Excellence. These projects do not constitute adoption initiatives by themselves. They provide technical infrastructure, libraries, standards, or data-access components that enable other applications and services. Their contribution to adoption is therefore primarily indirect, while their immediate function is to support the infrastructure on which other ecosystem activity depends.

The principal concern is the budget. The maintenance proposals request the equivalent of USD 105,000 to fund a part-time developer for 12 months, but they do not adequately define what “part-time” represents. They do not disclose the expected number of weekly or monthly hours, the percentage of full-time equivalent capacity, the hourly or monthly rate, the specific seniority of the funded professional, or the estimated allocation of time among maintenance, community support, documentation, protocol compatibility, enhancements, and AI-related activities.

The proposals state generally that the work will be carried out by experienced Rust developers and that a dedicated technical lead will provide oversight, with the cost of that technical leadership absorbed by TxPipe. However, this does not identify the amount of labor capacity that the Treasury is actually purchasing. Without an objective definition of the expected level of commitment, it is impossible to determine whether USD 105,000 corresponds to ten, twenty, thirty, or nearly forty hours of specialized work per week.

This omission makes the cost-benefit evaluation excessively subjective. There is not enough evidence to conclude that the proposed price is excessive, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the market for specialized blockchain and Rust development. At the same time, there is also not enough information to verify that the price is proportionate to the amount of work being contracted. The team’s reputation and the apparent usefulness of the projects do not replace the need to explain how the labor cost was calculated.

The quarterly milestones reinforce this uncertainty. Across the maintenance proposals, the milestones repeat substantially similar activities and completion criteria, including dependency updates, protocol compatibility, bug fixing, performance improvements, documentation, issue triage, contribution review, and AI-friendly development resources. Terms such as responding to issues within a “reasonable timeframe” do not establish an objective service level.

There are also no clearly defined minimum volumes of work, release targets, response times, availability expectations, issue-resolution targets, or specific deliverables for the AI-related scope. Some flexibility is appropriate for maintenance work because future bugs, protocol changes, and community requests cannot be predicted precisely. However, that flexibility should be balanced by a clearer definition of the labor capacity being contracted.

The contingency reserve and the commitment to return unused funds are positive elements. The mechanism is designed to preserve a fixed USD budget if ADA falls below the proposal conversion rate, while requiring excess ADA to be returned to the Treasury when it is not needed to cover the approved USD amount. This reduces the risk that the contingency reserve automatically becomes additional compensation. Nevertheless, a sound exchange-rate mechanism does not resolve the absence of granularity in the underlying labor budget.

The fact that four similar proposals are being submitted by the same provider also increases the importance of consolidated staffing transparency. The documentation does not clearly establish whether the funded work will be performed by four separate developers, shared team members, or overlapping resources. It also does not provide a consolidated view of total full-time-equivalent capacity, responsibilities, or separation of work among the four projects.

This does not establish that overlapping billing or duplicated work will occur. However, the information provided is insufficient to exclude that risk or to verify the provider’s aggregate delivery capacity across all four contracts. When multiple simultaneous Treasury requests rely on similar descriptions of undefined part-time resources, a clear staffing and allocation map should be provided.

If the proposals specified the expected hours, full-time-equivalent allocation, seniority, staffing arrangement, and calculation of labor costs, the principal budget objection would be removed. Under those circumstances, the most likely position would be ABSTAIN, given TxPipe’s reputation, delivery history, and the evidence that these projects have practical use, while recognizing that more technically qualified participants are better positioned to determine the strategic essentiality of each project.

Under the current terms, however, a Treasury Withdrawal must allow DReps to assess not only whether the provider is reputable and the project appears useful, but also how much labor is being purchased and whether the requested amount is proportionate to that capacity. Because this fundamental information is not available, the cost-benefit relationship cannot be evaluated with sufficient confidence.

For these reasons, the vote on the Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC maintenance proposals is NO.

---

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança

As propostas de manutenção de Oura, Pallas, Dolos e UTxO RPC possuem estruturas praticamente idênticas. Todas solicitam financiamento para um período de 12 meses, utilizando o mesmo modelo de custo de trabalho, o mesmo mecanismo de contingência, a mesma estrutura de administração da Intersect e milestones trimestrais substancialmente semelhantes. Embora os repositórios exerçam funções técnicas diferentes, a mesma preocupação orçamentária material está presente nas quatro propostas. Por essa razão, é utilizada uma fundamentação padronizada.

Esse tratamento padronizado não significa que Oura, Pallas, Dolos e UTxO RPC sejam tecnicamente equivalentes ou igualmente importantes para o ecossistema Cardano. Cada projeto ocupa uma posição diferente dentro da infraestrutura técnica e pode apresentar níveis distintos de relevância estratégica, adoção, dependência por outros projetos e possibilidade de substituição. A utilização de uma fundamentação comum decorre da semelhança entre suas estruturas de financiamento e do fato de que a mesma deficiência orçamentária permanece sem solução nas quatro propostas.

Não existe oposição à TxPipe enquanto equipe. A TxPipe possui grande reputação no ecossistema Cardano e é um dos principais times responsáveis pelo desenvolvimento de componentes relevantes da infraestrutura técnica da Cardano. A equipe mantém diversos projetos open-source utilizados por outros desenvolvedores e participantes do ecossistema e apresenta um histórico amplamente positivo de conclusão de propostas financiadas anteriormente. Embora uma proposta tenha apresentado um atraso limitado de poucos meses, não parece existir um padrão mais amplo de atrasos prolongados ou falhas de execução. Em geral, a TxPipe demonstrou capacidade de entregar trabalhos financiados em prazos razoáveis.

Também existem sinais relevantes de que esses projetos não são puramente experimentais ou sem utilização. Os repositórios associados às propostas apresentam níveis significativos de atividade, engajamento, contribuições, forks, integrações e utilização por outros participantes do ecossistema. Considerando as dimensões relativamente limitadas da comunidade de desenvolvimento da Cardano, esse nível de engajamento indica que os projetos já demonstraram utilidade prática para desenvolvedores, provedores de infraestrutura e outros contribuidores.

Não será adotada uma conclusão independente sobre o grau exato de essencialidade técnica de cada projeto. Determinar o quanto Oura, Pallas, Dolos ou UTxO RPC são indispensáveis, quais alternativas estão disponíveis e quais consequências técnicas poderiam decorrer da interrupção da manutenção exige conhecimento especializado. Desenvolvedores com experiência direta nessas ferramentas e compreensão de suas respectivas dependências possuem melhores condições de avaliar sua importância estratégica e diferenciação técnica.

Embora as propostas indiquem o Pilar 2, Adoption and Utility, como seu principal alinhamento estratégico, essas atividades parecem estar mais diretamente relacionadas ao Pilar 1, Infrastructure and Research Excellence. Esses projetos não constituem iniciativas de adoção por si próprios. Eles oferecem infraestrutura técnica, bibliotecas, padrões ou componentes de acesso a dados que habilitam outras aplicações e serviços. Sua contribuição para adoção é, portanto, principalmente indireta, enquanto sua função imediata consiste em sustentar a infraestrutura da qual outras atividades do ecossistema dependem.

A principal preocupação está no orçamento. As propostas de manutenção solicitam o equivalente a US$ 105.000 para financiar um desenvolvedor part-time durante 12 meses, mas não definem adequadamente o que “part-time” representa. Não são informados o número esperado de horas semanais ou mensais, o percentual de dedicação equivalente a tempo integral, a taxa horária ou mensal, a senioridade específica do profissional financiado ou a distribuição estimada do tempo entre manutenção, suporte à comunidade, documentação, compatibilidade com o protocolo, melhorias e atividades relacionadas a inteligência artificial.

As propostas afirmam genericamente que o trabalho será realizado por desenvolvedores experientes em Rust e que haverá supervisão de um technical lead dedicado, cujo custo será absorvido pela p

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report

The maintenance proposals for Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC follow practically identical structures. Each requests funding for a 12-month period using the same labor model, the same contingency mechanism, the same Intersect administration framework, and substantially similar quarterly milestones. Although the repositories perform different technical functions, the same material budget concern applies to all four proposals. For this reason, a standardized rationale is being used.

This standardized treatment does not mean that Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC are technically equivalent or equally important to the Cardano ecosystem. Each project occupies a different position within the technical stack and may have a different level of strategic relevance, adoption, downstream dependency, and substitutability. The use of a common rationale reflects the similarity of their funding structures and the fact that the same budget deficiency remains unresolved across all four proposals.

There is no opposition to TxPipe as a team. TxPipe has a strong reputation within the Cardano ecosystem and is one of the most relevant contributors to Cardano’s technical stack. The team maintains several open-source projects used by other developers and ecosystem participants and has a broadly positive history of completing previously funded proposals. While one proposal experienced a limited delay of a few months, there does not appear to be a broader pattern of prolonged delays or execution failures. In general, TxPipe has demonstrated an ability to deliver funded work within reasonable timeframes.

There are also meaningful signs that these projects are not purely experimental or unused. The repositories associated with these proposals show relevant levels of activity, engagement, contributions, forks, integrations, and use by other ecosystem participants. Considering the relatively limited size of the Cardano developer ecosystem, this engagement suggests that the projects have already demonstrated practical usefulness for developers, infrastructure providers, and other contributors.

No independent conclusion is being reached regarding the precise technical essentiality of each project. Determining how indispensable Oura, Pallas, Dolos, or UTxO RPC may be, which alternatives exist, and what technical consequences could arise from discontinued maintenance requires specialized knowledge. Developers with direct experience using these tools and understanding their respective dependencies are better positioned to assess their strategic importance and technical differentiation.

Although the proposals identify Pillar 2, Adoption and Utility, as their primary strategic alignment, these activities appear more directly aligned with Pillar 1, Infrastructure and Research Excellence. These projects do not constitute adoption initiatives by themselves. They provide technical infrastructure, libraries, standards, or data-access components that enable other applications and services. Their contribution to adoption is therefore primarily indirect, while their immediate function is to support the infrastructure on which other ecosystem activity depends.

The principal concern is the budget. The maintenance proposals request the equivalent of USD 105,000 to fund a part-time developer for 12 months, but they do not adequately define what “part-time” represents. They do not disclose the expected number of weekly or monthly hours, the percentage of full-time equivalent capacity, the hourly or monthly rate, the specific seniority of the funded professional, or the estimated allocation of time among maintenance, community support, documentation, protocol compatibility, enhancements, and AI-related activities.

The proposals state generally that the work will be carried out by experienced Rust developers and that a dedicated technical lead will provide oversight, with the cost of that technical leadership absorbed by TxPipe. However, this does not identify the amount of labor capacity that the Treasury is actually purchasing. Without an objective definition of the expected level of commitment, it is impossible to determine whether USD 105,000 corresponds to ten, twenty, thirty, or nearly forty hours of specialized work per week.

This omission makes the cost-benefit evaluation excessively subjective. There is not enough evidence to conclude that the proposed price is excessive, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the market for specialized blockchain and Rust development. At the same time, there is also not enough information to verify that the price is proportionate to the amount of work being contracted. The team’s reputation and the apparent usefulness of the projects do not replace the need to explain how the labor cost was calculated.

The quarterly milestones reinforce this uncertainty. Across the maintenance proposals, the milestones repeat substantially similar activities and completion criteria, including dependency updates, protocol compatibility, bug fixing, performance improvements, documentation, issue triage, contribution review, and AI-friendly development resources. Terms such as responding to issues within a “reasonable timeframe” do not establish an objective service level.

There are also no clearly defined minimum volumes of work, release targets, response times, availability expectations, issue-resolution targets, or specific deliverables for the AI-related scope. Some flexibility is appropriate for maintenance work because future bugs, protocol changes, and community requests cannot be predicted precisely. However, that flexibility should be balanced by a clearer definition of the labor capacity being contracted.

The contingency reserve and the commitment to return unused funds are positive elements. The mechanism is designed to preserve a fixed USD budget if ADA falls below the proposal conversion rate, while requiring excess ADA to be returned to the Treasury when it is not needed to cover the approved USD amount. This reduces the risk that the contingency reserve automatically becomes additional compensation. Nevertheless, a sound exchange-rate mechanism does not resolve the absence of granularity in the underlying labor budget.

The fact that four similar proposals are being submitted by the same provider also increases the importance of consolidated staffing transparency. The documentation does not clearly establish whether the funded work will be performed by four separate developers, shared team members, or overlapping resources. It also does not provide a consolidated view of total full-time-equivalent capacity, responsibilities, or separation of work among the four projects.

This does not establish that overlapping billing or duplicated work will occur. However, the information provided is insufficient to exclude that risk or to verify the provider’s aggregate delivery capacity across all four contracts. When multiple simultaneous Treasury requests rely on similar descriptions of undefined part-time resources, a clear staffing and allocation map should be provided.

If the proposals specified the expected hours, full-time-equivalent allocation, seniority, staffing arrangement, and calculation of labor costs, the principal budget objection would be removed. Under those circumstances, the most likely position would be ABSTAIN, given TxPipe’s reputation, delivery history, and the evidence that these projects have practical use, while recognizing that more technically qualified participants are better positioned to determine the strategic essentiality of each project.

Under the current terms, however, a Treasury Withdrawal must allow DReps to assess not only whether the provider is reputable and the project appears useful, but also how much labor is being purchased and whether the requested amount is proportionate to that capacity. Because this fundamental information is not available, the cost-benefit relationship cannot be evaluated with sufficient confidence.

For these reasons, the vote on the Oura, Pallas, Dolos, and UTxO RPC maintenance proposals is NO.

---

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança

As propostas de manutenção de Oura, Pallas, Dolos e UTxO RPC possuem estruturas praticamente idênticas. Todas solicitam financiamento para um período de 12 meses, utilizando o mesmo modelo de custo de trabalho, o mesmo mecanismo de contingência, a mesma estrutura de administração da Intersect e milestones trimestrais substancialmente semelhantes. Embora os repositórios exerçam funções técnicas diferentes, a mesma preocupação orçamentária material está presente nas quatro propostas. Por essa razão, é utilizada uma fundamentação padronizada.

Esse tratamento padronizado não significa que Oura, Pallas, Dolos e UTxO RPC sejam tecnicamente equivalentes ou igualmente importantes para o ecossistema Cardano. Cada projeto ocupa uma posição diferente dentro da infraestrutura técnica e pode apresentar níveis distintos de relevância estratégica, adoção, dependência por outros projetos e possibilidade de substituição. A utilização de uma fundamentação comum decorre da semelhança entre suas estruturas de financiamento e do fato de que a mesma deficiência orçamentária permanece sem solução nas quatro propostas.

Não existe oposição à TxPipe enquanto equipe. A TxPipe possui grande reputação no ecossistema Cardano e é um dos principais times responsáveis pelo desenvolvimento de componentes relevantes da infraestrutura técnica da Cardano. A equipe mantém diversos projetos open-source utilizados por outros desenvolvedores e participantes do ecossistema e apresenta um histórico amplamente positivo de conclusão de propostas financiadas anteriormente. Embora uma proposta tenha apresentado um atraso limitado de poucos meses, não parece existir um padrão mais amplo de atrasos prolongados ou falhas de execução. Em geral, a TxPipe demonstrou capacidade de entregar trabalhos financiados em prazos razoáveis.

Também existem sinais relevantes de que esses projetos não são puramente experimentais ou sem utilização. Os repositórios associados às propostas apresentam níveis significativos de atividade, engajamento, contribuições, forks, integrações e utilização por outros participantes do ecossistema. Considerando as dimensões relativamente limitadas da comunidade de desenvolvimento da Cardano, esse nível de engajamento indica que os projetos já demonstraram utilidade prática para desenvolvedores, provedores de infraestrutura e outros contribuidores.

Não será adotada uma conclusão independente sobre o grau exato de essencialidade técnica de cada projeto. Determinar o quanto Oura, Pallas, Dolos ou UTxO RPC são indispensáveis, quais alternativas estão disponíveis e quais consequências técnicas poderiam decorrer da interrupção da manutenção exige conhecimento especializado. Desenvolvedores com experiência direta nessas ferramentas e compreensão de suas respectivas dependências possuem melhores condições de avaliar sua importância estratégica e diferenciação técnica.

Embora as propostas indiquem o Pilar 2, Adoption and Utility, como seu principal alinhamento estratégico, essas atividades parecem estar mais diretamente relacionadas ao Pilar 1, Infrastructure and Research Excellence. Esses projetos não constituem iniciativas de adoção por si próprios. Eles oferecem infraestrutura técnica, bibliotecas, padrões ou componentes de acesso a dados que habilitam outras aplicações e serviços. Sua contribuição para adoção é, portanto, principalmente indireta, enquanto sua função imediata consiste em sustentar a infraestrutura da qual outras atividades do ecossistema dependem.

A principal preocupação está no orçamento. As propostas de manutenção solicitam o equivalente a US$ 105.000 para financiar um desenvolvedor part-time durante 12 meses, mas não definem adequadamente o que “part-time” representa. Não são informados o número esperado de horas semanais ou mensais, o percentual de dedicação equivalente a tempo integral, a taxa horária ou mensal, a senioridade específica do profissional financiado ou a distribuição estimada do tempo entre manutenção, suporte à comunidade, documentação, compatibilidade com o protocolo, melhorias e atividades relacionadas a inteligência artificial.

As propostas afirmam genericamente que o trabalho será realizado por desenvolvedores experientes em Rust e que haverá supervisão de um technical lead dedicado, cujo custo será absorvido pela p

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report - Hardware Wallet Maintenance 2026

1. Introduction

This Treasury Withdrawal funds Hardware Wallet Maintenance 2026. It requests 12 months of funding for production maintenance of Cardano hardware-wallet support: Ledger and Trezor compatibility updates, maintenance of supporting interoperability libraries and cardano-hw-cli, developer support for ecosystem integrators, support for integration paths involving externally maintained components where shared hardware-wallet flows intersect, and vendor-required product or security audits where firmware or app changes trigger them. This is a continuity proposal for an already-proven Cardano access layer, not a request to build a new wallet product. The requested budget is 1,310,960 ADA, equivalent to USD 314,630 at an ADA/USD conversion rate of USD 0.24. VacuumLabs is the proposer and Intersect is the administrator. The delivery model is capped time and materials, with milestone claims every eight weeks, public progress reporting, and evidence-backed acceptance. Any portion of the approved cap not consumed by delivered work will remain unclaimed, and any audit reserve not required by vendor-triggered audit conditions will not be drawn.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The maintenance of hardware-wallet integrations has evident strategic importance for the Cardano ecosystem. Compatibility with devices such as Ledger and Trezor is not merely a convenience for individual users, but forms part of a sensitive layer of security, custody, and network access. If these integrations fail to keep pace with Cardano protocol updates, firmware changes, new device models, or changes to manufacturers’ applications, users may face difficulties signing transactions, moving assets, participating in governance, or interacting with wallets and decentralized applications.

For this reason, there is relevant alignment with Cardano Vision 2030. Primary alignment is with Pillar 1, Infrastructure & Research Excellence, because the work seeks to preserve security, interoperability, reliability, and operational continuity. There is also secondary alignment with Pillar 2, Adoption & Utility, because a secure and compatible user experience is a necessary condition for users and applications to use Cardano in practice. Hardware-wallet infrastructure that ceases to function properly harms both existing users and the development of new integrations.

VacuumLabs’ specific experience must also be recognized. The company states that it has worked with Cardano hardware-wallet integrations since 2018 and maintains components related to Ledger, Trezor, cardano-hw-cli, and interoperability libraries. Agora is not aware of another team that currently performs the same function comprehensively within the ecosystem. This does not establish that VacuumLabs is technically the only team capable of performing the work, but it demonstrates that, in practice, there is a relevant dependency on its accumulated knowledge and operational continuity.

The preventive nature of the maintenance must also be recognized: correcting incompatibilities before they affect users may be safer and less costly than reacting only after a production failure.

Another favorable aspect is that blockchain ecosystems funding hardware-wallet integrations does not appear to be unique to Cardano. There are examples of foundations, grant programs, and community funds from other networks financing the development or maintenance of applications and integrations for Ledger and other devices. Therefore, it would not be correct to reject the proposal solely on the argument that a blockchain should never fund this type of work. In some cases, this is protocol-specific infrastructure that would not be economically maintained by the manufacturer without some support from the interested ecosystem.

The proposal’s financial model also includes some protections. The work follows a capped time-and-materials model rather than constituting an automatic entitlement to receive the entire approved amount. The proposal states that unused capacity will remain undrawn and that the audit reserve will not be consumed if no audit is required. Accountability cycles are also planned every eight weeks, presenting hours consumed, pull requests, releases, tests, fixes, documentation, and any audit evidence. These mechanisms partially reduce the risk of full payment for work that was not actually performed.

Negative aspects

Despite these merits, an institutional issue is not adequately explained. Ledger and Trezor are commercial, for-profit companies. Their products are sold to users who wish to store and move various assets, including ADA and Cardano Native Tokens. Although the available information does not make it possible to determine what portion of their sales comes specifically from Cardano users, it is reasonable to state that these users generate revenue for the manufacturers.

For this reason, there should be a clearer explanation of the division of responsibilities and costs. It is not sufficiently demonstrated how much of the work is financed directly by Ledger or Trezor, how much is performed by employees of those companies, how much is VacuumLabs’ technical responsibility, and how much must be subsidized by the Cardano Treasury. It is also unclear whether there is any form of co-funding or contribution from the manufacturers.

If the Cardano ecosystem fully funds all updates, fixes, tests, integrations, and audits required for commercial products to continue functioning, a comfortable situation is created for the manufacturers: compatibility-specific expenses may be socialized while sales revenue remains private. This does not mean that no Treasury contribution is legitimate. It only means that funding should be accompanied by transparency regarding which responsibilities are public, which are commercial, and why the Treasury should assume a particular share.

The proposal should distinguish, for example, between maintenance of Cardano-side components that function as public infrastructure, changes required within manufacturers’ applications, support requested by commercial wallets, specific third-party integrations, and audits imposed by the vendors themselves. Without this separation, it is not possible to understand whether the Treasury is funding an indispensable public good, subsidizing obligations of private companies, or doing both simultaneously.

However, this is not the main reason for the opposing vote. The decisive objection is the lack of budget granularity.

The budget divides development costs into only two broad items. The first allocates 845,208 ADA, equivalent to approximately USD 202,850, for 156 person-days of compatibility updates, release engineering, and integration maintenance. The second allocates 281,736 ADA, equivalent to approximately USD 67,617, for 52 person-days of incident response, developer support, and partner integration support. Together, these items represent 208 person-days, presented as 0.8 annualized FTE. There is also a USD 35,000 reserve for external audits and the Intersect administration fee.

This information provides some quantification, but remains too superficial for an adequate value-for-money evaluation. The proposal does not state how many people will work on it, what roles they will perform, the seniority of each professional, how much time will be allocated to development, support, management, coordination, or testing, or the hourly or daily rate for each category.

It is also not explained whether the amount includes corporate overhead, profit, administrative management, incident availability, charges, equipment, or other expenses. It is not possible to identify whether the 208 person-days correspond predominantly to the work of highly specialized senior developers, a combination of professionals with different experience levels, or a broader team structure.

Using eight hours per person-day solely as an estimate, the 208 days would correspond to 1,664 hours. The USD 270,467 allocated to the two development items would result in an approximate implicit cost of USD 162.54 per hour, or about USD 1,300 per person-day.

This amount cannot automatically be interpreted as an individual salary. It may represent a blended rate that includes salaries, charges, administration, corporate profit, management, and other costs. However, this is precisely the problem: the proposal does not provide enough information to determine what the amount represents.

The implicit hourly rate appears high and has already been questioned by other dReps, but there is not enough data to conclude definitively that it is inflated. There is also not enough data to conclude that it is reasonable. The lack of granularity prevents both proper validation and proper challenge of the budget.

Merely stating 0.6 FTE for one broad set of activities and 0.2 FTE for another does not permit evaluation of allocation efficiency. It is unknown whether one person will work part-time throughout the year, several people will work during different periods, a team will remain available on demand, or some combination of these models will be used. The historical volume of incidents and updates that justifies this capacity is also unknown.

A comparison with the previous cycle should be presented: approved budget, amount actually consumed, number of people involved, hours used, releases produced, incidents handled, audits performed, and scope delivered. Without this basis, it is not possible to determine whether the 208 person-days represent a realistic projection, an excessive reserve, or a reduction compared with the previous effort.

The milestones also do not resolve this deficiency. The six eight-week cycles present practically the same deliverables and completion criteria. All contain generic references to pull requests, releases, fixes, tests, reports, audits where applicable, and budget consumption. This structure may make sense for unpredictable maintenance, but it does not establish sufficiently specific commitments before execution.

The proposal mentions incident response, remediation time, compatibility coverage, and audit turnaround, but does not define concrete targets. There is no specific response time for priority incidents, maximum mitigation period, minimum coverage of devices and versions, expected number of releases, or defined window for completing audits. The indicators are relevant, but remain without clear thresholds for success or failure.

Risks and concerns

The dependency on VacuumLabs increases the risk of not funding any form of maintenance. Abruptly interrupting the work without an alternative team prepared could create an operational gap. If incompatible changes occur in the protocol or manufacturers’ products, there may be no other provider immediately able to respond, test, coordinate audits, and publish updates.

In its current version, it is not possible to determine whether the requested amounts correspond to acceptable market prices, include an excessive margin, whether the projected capacity is proportional to demand, or whether some costs should be borne by the commercial manufacturers. The information asymmetry is too significant for public resources to be approved safely.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The position is not opposed to hardware-wallet maintenance, to VacuumLabs as a team, or to the principle of using the Treasury to fund strategic infrastructure. The proposal has potential value, strategic alignment, and a plausible continuity justification. Other ecosystems also fund similar work, and abandoning a security layer without an operational alternative would be risky.

The decisive objection is the lack of budget granularity. The strategic importance of the work does not remove the obligation to justify its price, and classification as critical infrastructure cannot authorize approval of a budget without sufficient information about its composition. The vote is conditioned on the insufficiency of the information provided and is not a definitive rejection of the work.

The vote would be converted to YES if a more granular budget were provided, containing at least the team composition, roles, seniority levels, hours or days by activity, hourly or daily rates, applicable overhead, demand estimates, a comparison with the previous cycle, and an explanation of the division of costs among VacuumLabs, Ledger, Trezor, and the Cardano ecosystem. If that documentation demonstrated that compensation is within reasonable market parameters and that there is no unjustified cost inflation, the proposal’s strategic relevance would be sufficient to justify approval.

4. Conclusion

The strategic importance of hardware-wallet maintenance does not compensate for the inability to evaluate the budget adequately. Until the requested costs, projected capacity, market parameters, and division of responsibilities with commercial manufacturers are demonstrated with sufficient granularity, the information asymmetry remains too significant for approval of public resources.

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Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capa

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report

1. Introduction

The Strike Finance V2 Treasury Deployment Proposal requests 9,000,000 ADA for a 12-month deployment into Strike Finance V2 liquidity infrastructure. The ADA would be sold for USDM and supplied as stablecoin-denominated liquidity for Cardano-native perpetual futures markets. The capital would remain owned by the Cardano Treasury and would not constitute grant funding.

Using an assumed ADA price of USD 0.15, the deployment would represent approximately 1,350,000 USDM. A modeled annual return of approximately 900,000 ADA-equivalent is presented, although returns are not guaranteed. Yield realized during the first six months would be returned at month 6. At month 12, the remaining principal and realized yield would be returned to the Treasury.

Operational custody would be controlled by an independent multisig council, without unilateral control by Strike Finance. Monthly public reporting, third-party assurance, drawdown review thresholds, and early termination procedures are included. Success targets include USD 1 billion in 30-day volume, 5,000 traders, and a USD 5 million annualized revenue run rate within 12 months.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

This position does not constitute criticism of the people or teams involved, many of whom have positive reputations in the ecosystem. It also does not require a conclusion that Strike lacks a functional product or economic activity.

Negative aspects

The objection lies in the concept of using collective resources to replace liquidity that should be attracted organically from market makers and liquidity providers.

When there is insufficient interest in providing liquidity, that absence represents an economic signal. It may reflect high risk, insufficient returns, limited demand, or more attractive opportunities in other markets. Using the Treasury to fill this gap does not necessarily correct these causes. It may only temporarily hide the problem through a public subsidy.

The Cardano ecosystem has already allocated significant resources over several years to stimulate projects that, in many cases, did not achieve economic sustainability. Expanding this model so that the Treasury also provides the liquidity required to sustain or expand private commercial models is not appropriate.

There is a difference between funding the initial creation of infrastructure or an application and using the Treasury to continuously replace the private capital required for a market to function. The first may create productive capacity. The second may distort economic signals, make real problems more difficult to identify, and reduce incentives to develop self-sustaining solutions.

Public liquidity provision also creates political selection among protocols, favoring certain participants with collective capital and potentially harming those required to compete for liquidity under normal market conditions.

Risks and concerns

Experience with yield farming programs and liquidity incentives demonstrates that subsidized capital frequently remains only while incentives exist. When support ends, the structural problem reappears.

There is also a risk that an initially temporary deployment creates dependency and generates political pressure for further withdrawals to preserve volume, liquidity, and revenue.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The vote will be NO due to a principle-based objection to using the Cardano Treasury as a liquidity provider for DeFi protocols.

The objection lies in using collective resources to replace liquidity that should be attracted organically from market makers and private providers. When sufficient interest in supplying liquidity does not exist, that absence represents an economic signal that may reflect high risk, insufficient returns, limited demand, or more attractive opportunities in other markets. Treasury resources do not necessarily correct these causes and may only temporarily hide the problem through a public subsidy.

For these reasons, direct liquidity provision to private protocols is not an appropriate use of Treasury resources. The ecosystem should prioritize projects capable of attracting users, capital, and liquidity sustainably instead of perpetuating models whose scale depends on subsidies financed by the community.

4. Conclusion

Direct liquidity provision to private protocols is not an appropriate use of Treasury resources. Projects capable of attracting users, capital, and liquidity sustainably should be prioritized instead of perpetuating models whose scale depends on subsidies financed by the community.

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Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança

1. Introdução

A Strike Finance V2 Treasury Deployment Proposal solicita 9.000.000 ADA para uma implantação de 12 meses na infraestrutura de liquidez da Strike Finance V2. O ADA seria vendido por USDM e fornecido como liquidez denominada em stablecoin para os mercados de futuros perpétuos nativos da Cardano. O capital permaneceria sob propriedade do Tesouro da Cardano e não constituiria financiamento por grant.

Com base em um preço presumido de USD 0,15 por ADA, a implantação representaria aproximadamente 1.350.000 USDM. É apresentado um retorno anual projetado de aproximadamente 900.000 ADA equivalentes, embora os retornos não sejam garantidos. O rendimento realizado durante os primeiros seis meses seria devolvido no sexto mês. No décimo segundo mês, o principal restante e o rendimento realizado seriam devolvidos ao Tesouro.

A custódia operacional seria controlada por um conselho multisig independente, sem controle unilateral pela Strike Finance. Estão previstos relatórios públicos mensais, assurance independente, limites de drawdown para revisão e procedimentos de encerramento antecipado. As metas incluem USD 1 bilhão em volume de 30 dias, 5.000 traders e um run rate anualizado de receita de USD 5 milhões dentro de 12 meses.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

Essa posição não constitui uma crítica às pessoas ou equipes envolvidas, muitas das quais possuem reputação positiva no ecossistema. Também não exige uma conclusão de que a Strike não possui um produto funcional ou atividade econômica.

Aspectos negativos

A objeção está no conceito de utilizar recursos coletivos para substituir a liquidez que deveria ser atraída organicamente de market makers e provedores de liquidez.

Quando não existe interesse suficiente em fornecer liquidez, essa ausência representa um sinal econômico. Pode refletir risco elevado, retorno insuficiente, demanda limitada ou oportunidades mais atrativas em outros mercados. A utilização do Tesouro para preencher essa lacuna não necessariamente corrige essas causas. Ela pode apenas esconder temporariamente o problema por meio de um subsídio público.

O ecossistema Cardano já alocou recursos significativos durante anos para estimular projetos que, em muitos casos, não alcançaram sustentabilidade econômica. Não se considera adequado expandir esse modelo para que o Tesouro também passe a fornecer a liquidez necessária para sustentar ou ampliar modelos comerciais privados.

Há uma diferença entre financiar a criação inicial de infraestrutura ou de uma aplicação e utilizar o Tesouro para substituir continuamente o capital privado necessário ao funcionamento de um mercado. O primeiro pode criar capacidade produtiva. O segundo pode distorcer os sinais econômicos, dificultar a identificação de problemas reais e reduzir os incentivos para o desenvolvimento de soluções autossustentáveis.

A provisão pública de liquidez também cria uma seleção política entre protocolos, favorecendo determinados participantes com capital coletivo e potencialmente prejudicando aqueles que precisam competir por liquidez em condições normais de mercado.

Riscos e preocupações

A experiência de programas de yield farming e incentivos de liquidez demonstra que capital subsidiado frequentemente permanece apenas enquanto os incentivos existem. Quando o apoio termina, o problema estrutural reaparece.

Existe ainda o risco de que uma implantação inicialmente temporária produza dependência e gere pressão política por novas retiradas para preservar volume, liquidez e receita.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NO

O voto será NO por uma objeção de princípio ao uso do Tesouro da Cardano como fornecedor de liquidez para protocolos DeFi.

A objeção está no uso de recursos coletivos para substituir a liquidez que deveria ser atraída organicamente de market makers e provedores privados. Quando não existe interesse suficiente em fornecer liquidez, essa ausência representa um sinal econômico que pode refletir risco elevado, retorno insuficiente, demanda limitada ou oportunidades mais atrativas em outros mercados. Os recursos do Tesouro não necessariamente corrigem essas causas e podem apenas esconder temporariamente o problema por meio de um subsídio público.

Por essas razões, a provisão direta de liquidez a protocolos privados não constitui um uso adequado dos recursos do Tesouro. O ecossistema deve priorizar projetos capazes de atrair usuários, capital e liquidez de maneira sustentável, em vez de perpetuar modelos cuja escala dependa de subsídios financiados pela comunidade.

4. Conclusão

A provisão direta de liquidez a protocolos privados não constitui um uso adequado dos recursos do Tesouro. Devem ser priorizados projetos capazes de atrair usuários, capital e liquidez de maneira sustentável, em vez de perpetuar modelos cuja escala dependa de subsídios financiados pela comunidade.

Governance Action Review [EN] - Intersect: Governance Coordination and Technical Stewardship for the Cardano Ecosystem

1. Introduction

This Treasury Withdrawal requests 25,400,000 ADA, valued at USD 6,350,000 using an ADA/USD conversion rate of USD 0.25, to fund Intersect’s operating model from June 2026 to June 2027.

The proposal is divided into three work packages. WP1 allocates 6,000,000 ADA to Intersect operations and ecosystem coordination, including the operation of the Member-Based Organization, Cardano Development Holdings, eight elected committees, working groups, elections, membership systems, legal and financial administration, and governance support. WP2 allocates 18,800,000 ADA to technical stewardship, incident response, security coordination, repository management, release coordination, technical communications, and infrastructure supporting more than 130 repositories and more than 160 users. WP3 reserves 600,000 ADA to coordinate critical and time-sensitive processes that emerge without a predefined owner or budget.

Intersect would administer its own allocation through Treasury Reserve and Project-Specific Smart Contracts. Administrative actions require combinations of Intersect administrators, Intersect leadership, and members of an external Oversight Committee composed of Sundae Labs, Cardano Foundation, Dquadrant, NMKR, Sundial, and Eternl. Appold would provide independent audit and assurance.

The proposal includes quarterly milestone-based drawdowns, public updates, on-chain fund tracking, and the possible return of funds that are no longer required, cannot be responsibly deployed, or remain unspent. Intersect states that the requested amount was reduced from USD 7.875 million in the previous cycle to USD 6.35 million, while also clarifying that part of the reduction results from changes in scope and the separation of administration activities.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

Strategic importance to Cardano’s operational continuity

There are legitimate and strategically relevant reasons to continue funding Intersect. The organization performs functions that have become important to Cardano’s operation, particularly the stewardship of core repositories, coordination of releases and upgrades, incident response, support for governance structures, and administration of Treasury-funded initiatives.

The main reason to consider a favorable vote does not come from a demonstrated record of institutional efficiency, but from the strategic position Intersect has come to occupy within the ecosystem.

Intersect operates as a coordination layer among participants, organizations, committees, developers, infrastructure operators, and governance actors. Some essential Cardano activities have no single owner and must be organized among independent actors. An entity responsible for facilitating coordination, communication, incident response, and operational continuity therefore has real value.

Cardano is becoming a more distributed technical environment, with multiple organizations, new clients, different development teams, decentralized governance, and a growing number of participants responsible for interdependent components. This evolution increases the need for technical coordination. Decentralization does not eliminate coordination; it makes coordination more complex.

Stewardship of core Cardano repositories

Intersect performs a relevant technical function through the stewardship of important Cardano repositories, including infrastructure associated with the Haskell client and other core components.

The stewardship of more than one hundred repositories, access management, contributor coordination, release organization, and maintenance of development lifecycle processes are not trivial activities. Their continuity is important to the stability, security, and predictability of the network’s infrastructure.

No specific critical problems were identified in relation to repository stewardship. No substantial criticism of the Technical Steering Committee was identified either.

It would not be accurate to state that Intersect fails in all its functions or produces no technical value. Certain technical responsibilities may be performed adequately while serious deficiencies remain in other areas.

Agora do not have enough technical and operational knowledge to conduct a deep evaluation of the internal efficiency of these activities. The appropriate conclusion is not that excellent technical performance has been demonstrated, but that no critical problems were identified and the function itself is relevant.

Coordination of upgrades, releases, and incident response

The coordination of upgrades and releases in a decentralized blockchain has systemic relevance. Failures in this function can result in disorganization among operators, delays, incompatibilities, operational incidents, and loss of confidence.

The proposal also includes incident response, security coordination, bug bounties, red-team exercises, monitoring, and communication during critical events. The general necessity of these functions is difficult to dispute.

The absence of organized incident-response capacity could increase the time required to understand and respond to failures, especially when multiple independent actors need to collaborate. The November 2025 chain partition demonstrates that the network can face situations requiring rapid communication, clear responsibilities, and coordination among teams.

This is a relevant argument in favor of funding. Recognition of the need for the function, however, does not automatically justify the proposed budget or establish that Intersect is the only possible structure capable of performing it.

Preservation of institutional knowledge

Intersect has accumulated knowledge of technical, administrative, and governance processes over recent years. Its activities have included upgrade coordination, administration of Treasury initiatives, electoral processes, support for committees and working groups, development of the budget framework, governance processes, repository management, incident response, and coordination among different stakeholders.

An abrupt interruption of these functions could produce loss of continuity and dispersion of institutional knowledge. Even when an institutional structure has problems, replacement requires transition, documentation, redistribution of responsibilities, and clear designation of new responsible actors.

A negative vote should not be interpreted as support for a disorderly interruption of Intersect’s critical functions. It reflects the inadequacy of the submitted request and the insufficiency of the safeguards provided, not a denial of the need for technical coordination or operational continuity.

Open institutional structure and community participation

Intersect maintains a structure of members, committees, and working groups that offers an institutional participation channel for different ecosystem groups.

In principle, this structure can preserve knowledge, facilitate participation by specialists, support the formation of working groups, develop recommendations, connect technical and governance actors, organize elections and participatory processes, and create formal pathways for contribution.

A Member-Based Organization can provide a stable structure for activities that have no single owner.

The abstract validity of this model is not the problem. The problem is the difference between its institutional potential and the quality of the observed results. Organizational structure, nominal participation, and membership figures are not equivalent to effective coordination or results proportional to the resources used.

Nominal reduction from the previous funding cycle

The requested amount was reduced from USD 7.875 million to USD 6.35 million.

This reduction is positive in nominal terms. There is also information that Intersect is implementing cuts, reorganizations, or spending reductions during the current period.

The willingness to reduce costs and seek greater efficiency should be recognized. The proposal also refers to contractor-to-direct-hire conversions, artificial-intelligence tools, more disciplined procurement, membership revenue, and other funding sources.

However, the reduction is partially compositional because some activities were separated from the main request. The lower amount therefore does not necessarily demonstrate an equivalent reduction in operating costs or a proportional efficiency gain.

Without a sufficiently detailed comparison between the previous and current structures, it is not possible to determine which functions were eliminated, which functions were transferred, which positions were reduced, what savings were achieved, which costs remain, which responsibilities were added, how much of the reduction results from actual efficiency, and how much results only from reclassification or separation of scope.

The nominal reduction is positive, but insufficient to demonstrate efficiency.

Audit and formal control mechanisms

The appointment of Appold to provide independent audit and assurance is positive.

Milestone-based drawdowns, fund-management smart contracts, the Oversight Committee, multi-signature requirements, the possible return of unused resources, quarterly reporting, on-chain transaction records, a public dashboard, and controls over transfers and reorganization of resources are also relevant.

These mechanisms reduce certain risks of unilateral use, administrative error, and improper movement of funds.

They do not resolve the principal accountability problem. An audit can evaluate compliance, financial controls, and adherence to the approved mandate. It does not necessarily determine whether the budget was efficient, personnel costs were proportional, reviewers acted independently, or institutional results justified the resources used.

The smart-contract mechanisms mainly control how funds are moved. They do not replace budget granularity, efficiency criteria, staffing transparency, or substantive milestone-review quality.

Negative aspects

Insufficient performance as a Member-Based Organization responsible for coordination

Intersect occupies a central coordination position within the Cardano ecosystem. Its request links funding to the organization of stakeholders, committees, working groups, governance processes, budget processes, and technical activities.

This function must be evaluated through concrete coordination results, not only through the formal existence of structures.

Intersect has not demonstrated sufficient capacity to perform this coordination at a level compatible with its institutional position, budget, and claimed responsibilities.

Committees, groups, meetings, and processes exist, but their existence does not demonstrate that the ecosystem is being coordinated effectively. Relevant measures include the ability to produce clearer decisions, more coherent processes, strategic planning, accountability, improved proposal quality, and greater alignment among stakeholders.

Results in several of these dimensions are unsatisfactory.

Failures in coordination of the budget process

The most strongly grounded criticism concerns the Budget Committee and the budget framework.

My participation in the Budget Committee provided direct observation of limitations that were already visible externally. Intersect should be one of the main structures responsible for organizing strategic resource allocation, coordinating priorities, establishing a credible framework, and improving the quality of ecosystem budget decisions.

Nevertheless, several Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions continue to be submitted outside the budget framework.

This demonstrates that the process has not consolidated itself as the central coordination mechanism. A framework intended to organize priorities and reduce fragmentation continues to coexist with several parallel funding routes.

Independent submissions are not exclusively Intersect’s responsibility because the protocol permits them. However, a framework with sufficient legitimacy, quality, predictability, and strategic value should reasonably become the predominant and preferred route for budget decisions.

That has not occurred.

The fragmentation affects strategic prioritization, comparison among proposals, management of the Net Change Limit, consolidated visibility over Treasury commitments, identification of duplication, coordination among initiatives, evaluation of aggregate impacts, and medium- and long-term planning.

Intersect requests funding to continue performing this role, but recent experience does not demonstrate that the current model is sufficiently effective.

Insufficiency of the 2026 budget framework

Changes were made between the 2025 and 2026 cycles and should be recognized. The process nevertheless remains far below the standard required for adequate allocation of public Treasury resources.

Sixty-nine proposals were submitted in the 2026 cycle and only eleven advanced. This quantitative filtering may appear rigorous, but the proportion of rejected proposals is not evidence of deliberative quality.

A process can reject many proposals while remaining superficial, inconsistent, or insufficiently transparent.

Public and substantive rationales were not mandatory for every vote. Some participants voluntarily provided explanations, but the system did not ensure that each decision was accompanied by a verifiable justification.

This limits the ability to determine why a proposal was approved or rejected, which criteria were applied, whether those criteria were applied consistently, which problems could be corrected, whether budget, risk, conflicts of interest, and execution capacity were examined, and whether participants performed due diligence.

A process of major financial relevance that permits votes without substantive justification encourages shallow evaluation. It also reduces accountability because it becomes impossible to distinguish an informed decision from a superficial preference.

Weak quality of feedback

The quality of feedback provided during the budget-review process was weak in many cases.

When dozens of proposals compete for Treasury access, the value of the process cannot be limited to producing a final list. It should generate useful information for proposers, dReps, SPOs, ecosystem members, future budget cycles, revision of rejected proposals, and identification of recurring quality standards.

Generic comments, short rationales, and absent justifications do not perform this function.

The lack of substantive feedback also makes it difficult to evaluate the quality of the process itself. It is not possible to determine whether a proposal was rejected for budgetary, strategic, technical, political, procedural, or merely preferential reasons.

Intersect claims a role in coordination and governance improvement, but the design of the process did not impose minimum standards compatible with that responsibility.

A process that encourages superficiality

The problem does not depend only on individual participant behavior. The mechanism itself encourages low-depth evaluations.

When rationales are not mandatory, detailed evaluation provides little additional institutional value compared with an unsupported vote. A participant who spends many hours evaluating a proposal produces formally the same result as someone who votes after minimal consideration.

This creates a negative asymmetry: deep diligence requires time, but the process does not adequately distinguish or value that effort.

An adequate institutional design should require minimum rationales, establish evaluation criteria, preserve decision trails, permit challenges, guarantee transparency, encourage consistency, and make the quality of participation visible.

Without these elements, the budget process risks becoming another political stage rather than a robust strategic-allocation mechanism.

Inability to coordinate an integrated budget strategy

There is insufficient evidence that Intersect’s coordination layer is producing a truly integrated budget strategy.

Treasury allocation continues through separate initiatives, proposals, and processes. There is insufficient clarity regarding aggregate priorities, trade-offs among areas, recommended limits by category, duplication analysis, dependencies among proposals, future resource availability, and strategic distribution among infrastructure, governance, adoption, community, and sustainability.

The budget framework should reduce this fragmentation. It has not achieved that objective to a satisfactory degree.

Different evidentiary limits across committees

The criticisms of different committees do not have the same evidentiary basis.

There is direct experience and internal knowledge concerning the Budget Committee. The objections related to it therefore have a stronger foundation.

There are observations concerning the results, speed, and outputs of the Civics Committee and Product Committee, but knowledge of their internal operations is more limited.

There are recurring public criticisms of the Membership and Community Committee reported by third parties, but insufficient basis to validate all of them.

No critical problems were identified in the technical committees, especially the Technical Steering Committee, but there is also insufficient information for a deep evaluation.

Perceptions, third-party reports, and partial knowledge should not be transformed into categorical conclusions.

Membership and Community Committee

Participants in the ecosystem have raised criticisms concerning the historical performance of the Membership and Community Committee, particularly its ability to improve the membership, participation, and engagement experience.

These criticisms appear recurrent and have been expressed publicly. There is not enough direct knowledge to independently confirm all allegations.

The MCC’s performance should therefore not serve as an isolated or determinative basis for the vote. It provides an additional signal that the coordination problems observed in the Budget Committee may not be confined to one structure.

The exact extent of the problems and Intersect’s specific responsibility remain Unknown, although the existing criticism deserves consideration.

Civics Committee and slow governance evolution

Governance and civics work appears to be progressing more slowly than necessary.

Cardano has a new, complex, and still-developing governance system. Caution, consultation, consensus-building, and institutional review are naturally required. Not all problems can be resolved quickly.

Complexity cannot indefinitely justify limited delivery capacity.

Intersect is one of the entities responsible for facilitating coordination, process development, and institutional evolution. Many important issues nevertheless remain without sufficient progress, and the processes appear excessively slow.

The Civics Committee and Intersect do not possess authority to impose decisions on the Cardano ecosystem. The proposal correctly states that Intersect is not a decision-making authority over Cardano governance.

Facilitation does not mean absence of responsibility.

An entity funded to coordinate should be able to organize discussions, establish timelines, structure proposals, identify pending decisions, publish options, record disagreements, bring matters to an institutional conclusion, and facilitate the conversion of discussions into concrete action.

The absence of formal authority does not eliminate responsibility for the quality of coordination.

Product Committee and delayed operationalization of Cardano Vision 2030

The Product Committee’s work on Cardano Vision 2030 is important. A shared strategic vis

Vote: NO

The problems identified in this Info Action are real and deserve attention. Cardano's current treasury governance process lacks strategic coordination, places a significant evaluation burden on DReps, and has contributed to fragmentation and conflict around treasury funding decisions. These issues warrant discussion and future reform.

However, I do not believe this Info Action is sufficiently developed to serve as a non-binding coordination instrument for the ecosystem.

Unlike binding governance actions, the effectiveness of an Info Action depends primarily on its political legitimacy, methodological clarity, and broad ecosystem participation. While this proposal presents several concrete institutional ideas, it does not demonstrate that they were developed through a sufficiently broad collaborative process or supported by a representative group of ecosystem participants.

In particular, the proposed budget structure introduces categories that differ from the recently endorsed Cardano Vision 2030 framework, yet the proposal does not explain how the two frameworks relate to one another. Without that clarification, approving this Info Action could create unnecessary ambiguity by signaling support for an alternative strategic structure without establishing whether it complements, extends, operationalizes, or replaces the existing framework.

The proposal also introduces significant governance concepts, including a strategic entity, an expert commission, thematic budgets, and a new model for approving treasury withdrawals. However, these concepts remain insufficiently specified to justify formal ecosystem endorsement, even as a non-binding signal.

A proposal with the ambition of coordinating treasury governance at the ecosystem level would benefit from broader collaboration before being submitted for on-chain approval. The proposer could engage with groups already working on strategic budgeting, treasury governance, and ecosystem coordination, such as the Intersect Budget Committee, the Ecosystem Funding Working Group within Intersect's Product Committee, and the DRep DAO.

These groups are not the exclusive owners of treasury reform, but they already bring together participants with relevant experience and are actively exploring frameworks and methodologies for budget coordination. Collaboration with them, as well as with other ecosystem stakeholders, could help improve the proposal's structure, clarify its relationship with Cardano Vision 2030, develop stronger institutional safeguards, and provide the broader political legitimacy required for an effective non-binding coordination instrument.

For these reasons, my vote is NO. This should not be interpreted as disagreement with the problems identified or with the objective of improving treasury governance. Rather, this Info Action still requires greater clarity, organization, methodological development, and broader ecosystem participation before it can appropriately serve as a coordination framework at the ecosystem level.

Voto: NÃO

Os problemas identificados nesta Info Action são reais e merecem atenção. O processo atual de governança do tesouro da Cardano carece de coordenação estratégica, impõe uma carga significativa de avaliação aos DReps e tem contribuído para fragmentação e conflitos em torno das decisões de financiamento pelo tesouro. Essas questões justificam discussão e futuras reformas.

No entanto, entendo que esta Info Action ainda não está suficientemente desenvolvida para servir como um instrumento não vinculante de coordenação para o ecossistema.

Diferentemente de ações de governança vinculantes, a efetividade de uma Info Action depende principalmente de sua legitimidade política, clareza metodológica e participação ampla do ecossistema. Embora esta proposta apresente diversas ideias institucionais concretas, ela não demonstra que essas ideias tenham sido desenvolvidas por meio de um processo colaborativo suficientemente amplo ou respaldadas por um grupo representativo de participantes do ecossistema.

Em especial, a estrutura orçamentária proposta introduz categorias diferentes daquelas estabelecidas pelo Cardano Vision 2030, recentemente apoiado pelos DReps, sem explicar de que forma ambos os frameworks se relacionam. Sem esse esclarecimento, a aprovação desta Info Action pode gerar ambiguidade desnecessária ao sinalizar apoio a uma estrutura estratégica alternativa sem definir se ela complementa, amplia, operacionaliza ou substitui o framework existente.

A proposta também introduz conceitos relevantes de governança, como uma entidade estratégica, uma comissão de especialistas, budgets temáticos e um novo modelo de aprovação de retiradas do tesouro. Entretanto, esses conceitos permanecem insuficientemente especificados para justificar um endosso formal do ecossistema, ainda que apenas como um sinal político não vinculante.

Uma proposta com a ambição de coordenar a governança do tesouro em nível de ecossistema se beneficiaria de um processo mais amplo de construção coletiva antes de ser submetida à aprovação on-chain. O proponente poderia colaborar com grupos que já atuam em discussões relacionadas a planejamento orçamentário, governança do tesouro e coordenação do ecossistema, como o Intersect Budget Committee, o Ecosystem Funding Working Group, vinculado ao Product Committee da Intersect, e o DRep DAO.

Esses grupos não são proprietários exclusivos da reforma da governança do tesouro, mas já reúnem participantes com experiência relevante e vêm trabalhando na construção de frameworks e metodologias de coordenação orçamentária. A colaboração com esses espaços, além de outros participantes do ecossistema, poderia contribuir para melhorar a estrutura da proposta, esclarecer sua relação com o Cardano Vision 2030, desenvolver salvaguardas institucionais mais sólidas e proporcionar a legitimidade política necessária para um instrumento não vinculante de coordenação.

Por essas razões, meu voto é NÃO. Isso não deve ser interpretado como discordância em relação aos problemas identificados nem ao objetivo de aprimorar a governança do tesouro. Esta Info Action ainda necessita de maior clareza, organização, desenvolvimento metodológico e participação ampla do ecossistema antes de poder servir adequadamente como um framework de coordenação em nível de ecossistema.

Governance Action Report [EN]

1. Introduction

This governance action proposes upgrading Cardano Mainnet to Protocol Version 11 through an intra-era hard fork named “van Rossem.” The ledger remains in the Conway era, with no era transition, while the protocol moves from Major Version 10 to Major Version 11 and Minor Version 0. The upgrade introduces new Plutus primitives defined in CIP-0109, CIP-0132, CIP-0133, CIP-0138, and CIP-0153, makes all Plutus built-in functions consistently available across Plutus V1, V2, and V3, and adds case expressions for built-in types in Untyped Plutus Core.

The action also includes ledger and node-level changes: VRF key hash uniqueness enforcement at the ledger level, revised reference input rules for Plutus V1/V2, promotion of the Constitutional Committee voting restriction from a mempool-only check to a ledger predicate, clearer validation of non-matching withdrawals, and improved reporting for protocol parameter hash mismatches. At least 85% of stake pools by active stake should have upgraded to a node version capable of supporting Protocol Version 11 before ratification, with readiness reports from Intersect’s Hard Fork Working Group supporting verification by the Constitutional Committee and SPOs.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The governance action was recommended by the Hard Fork Working Group, endorsed by the Technical Steering Committee, and accompanied by claims of tests, audits, and benchmarks without regressions.

No NO vote or strong technical objection indicating imminent risk or a clear basis for rejection was identified in the reviewed DREP rationales.

The abstentions found appear to reflect mainly an institutional position of deference to SPOs and infrastructure operators, who are more directly exposed to the operational risk of hard fork activation.

Risks and concerns

The governance action concerns a deep technical upgrade of the Cardano protocol, involving an intra-era hard fork, new Plutus primitives, changes to ledger rules, node behavior, cost model requirements, and operational readiness of the network.

A complete independent evaluation would require substantially greater technical capacity and time than were available for this analysis.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: ABSTAIN

The most responsible position for Agora is ABSTAIN. The governance action concerns a deep technical upgrade of the Cardano protocol, involving an intra-era hard fork, new Plutus primitives, changes to ledger rules, node behavior, cost model requirements, and operational readiness of the network.

Although the proposal was recommended by the Hard Fork Working Group, endorsed by the Technical Steering Committee, and accompanied by claims of tests, audits, and benchmarks without regressions, a complete independent evaluation would require substantially greater technical capacity and time than were available for this analysis.

No NO vote or strong technical objection indicating imminent risk or a clear basis for rejection was identified in the reviewed rationales. The abstentions found appear to reflect mainly an institutional position of deference to SPOs and infrastructure operators, who are more directly exposed to the operational risk of hard fork activation.

The abstention does not express opposition to the upgrade. It expresses recognition of the limits of a dRep’s technical competence in the face of a highly specialized decision, while respecting the role of SPOs, the Hard Fork Working Group, the Technical Steering Committee, and the Constitutional Committee in validating the network’s technical and operational readiness.

4. Conclusion

The position is ABSTAIN because the action is highly technical, no clear basis for rejection was identified, and the validation of readiness depends on actors more directly equipped to assess operational and protocol-level risk. The abstention reflects institutional restraint, not opposition to the upgrade.

Relatório de Ação de Governança [PT]

1. Introdução

Esta ação de governança propõe atualizar a Mainnet da Cardano para a Versão de Protocolo 11 por meio de um hard fork intra-era chamado “van Rossem”. O ledger permanece na era Conway, sem transição de era, enquanto o protocolo passa da Versão Maior 10 para a Versão Maior 11 e Versão Menor 0. A atualização introduz novos primitivos Plutus definidos nas CIP-0109, CIP-0132, CIP-0133, CIP-0138 e CIP-0153, torna todas as funções built-in de Plutus disponíveis de forma consistente em Plutus V1, V2 e V3, e adiciona expressões case para tipos built-in em Untyped Plutus Core.

A ação também inclui mudanças no ledger e no node: aplicação da unicidade do hash da chave VRF no nível do ledger, revisão das regras de reference inputs para Plutus V1/V2, promoção da restrição de voto do Comitê Constitucional de uma checagem apenas de mempool para um predicado de ledger, validação mais clara de non-matching withdrawals e melhoria nos relatórios de divergências de hash de parâmetros de protocolo. Pelo menos 85% dos stake pools por stake ativo devem ter atualizado para uma versão do node capaz de suportar a Versão de Protocolo 11 antes da ratificação, com relatórios de prontidão da Hard Fork Working Group da Intersect apoiando a verificação pela Constitutional Committee e pelos SPOs.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

A governance action foi recomendada pela Hard Fork Working Group, endossada pelo Technical Steering Committee e acompanhada de alegações de testes, auditorias e benchmarks sem regressões.

Não foi identificado, nos racionales revisados, nenhum voto NO ou objeção técnica forte que indique risco iminente ou fundamento claro para rejeição.

As abstenções encontradas parecem refletir principalmente uma posição institucional de deferência aos SPOs e operadores de infraestrutura, que estão mais diretamente expostos ao risco operacional de ativação do hard fork.

Riscos e preocupações

A governance action trata de uma atualização técnica profunda do protocolo Cardano, envolvendo hard fork intra-era, novos primitivos Plutus, mudanças em regras de ledger, node behavior, requisitos de cost model e prontidão operacional da rede.

Uma avaliação independente completa exigiria capacidade técnica e tempo substancialmente maiores do que os disponíveis para esta análise.

3. Voto e Racional

Voto: ABSTAIN

A posição mais responsável para Agora é ABSTAIN. A governance action trata de uma atualização técnica profunda do protocolo Cardano, envolvendo hard fork intra-era, novos primitivos Plutus, mudanças em regras de ledger, node behavior, requisitos de cost model e prontidão operacional da rede.

Embora a proposta tenha sido recomendada pela Hard Fork Working Group, endossada pelo Technical Steering Committee e acompanhada de alegações de testes, auditorias e benchmarks sem regressões, uma avaliação independente completa exigiria capacidade técnica e tempo substancialmente maiores do que os disponíveis para esta análise.

Não foi identificado, nos racionales revisados, nenhum voto NO ou objeção técnica forte que indique risco iminente ou fundamento claro para rejeição. As abstenções encontradas parecem refletir principalmente uma posição institucional de deferência aos SPOs e operadores de infraestrutura, que estão mais diretamente expostos ao risco operacional de ativação do hard fork.

Portanto, a abstenção não expressa oposição ao upgrade. Expressa reconhecimento dos limites de competência técnica de um dRep diante de uma decisão altamente especializada, ao mesmo tempo em que respeita o papel dos SPOs, da Hard Fork Working Group, do Technical Steering Committee e da Constitutional Committee na validação da prontidão técnica e operacional da rede.

4. Conclusão

A posição é ABSTAIN porque a ação é altamente técnica, nenhum fundamento claro para rejeição foi identificado, e a validação da prontidão depende de atores mais diretamente capacitados para avaliar riscos operacionais e de protocolo. A abstenção reflete contenção institucional, não oposição ao upgrade.

Governance Action Report [EN]

1. Introduction

This governance action requests a treasury withdrawal of 103,000 ADA to reimburse the submitter of the “Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -” Info governance action. The original action was submitted in September 2024, shortly after the Chang hard fork introduced on-chain governance, and asked the community to agree with a symbolic statement thanking those who helped Cardano reach that stage and expressing hope for the future.

A bug in the Cardano node allowed an unregistered stake key to be used in the governance action. As a result, the submitter was unable to recover the original 100,000 ADA deposit. The current withdrawal request includes the 100,000 ADA deposit plus an additional 3,000 ADA to compensate for lost staking rewards at a rate of 2% per year.

The action states that delivery would occur instantly through on-chain enactment. It also states that there are no associated costs or expenses, no refund circumstances, no prior treasury funding for the recipient, and no need for separate administration or custody because the funds would be distributed directly. DReps are nominated as the Administrator only to satisfy the relevant constitutional requirement.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The concern over the recipient of the reimbursement was sufficiently clarified by the verification that the same stake address is linked to the original action and to the current treasury withdrawal.

The reimbursement of 103,000 ADA is justified as a specific correction for an objective loss that occurred at the beginning of on-chain governance and was caused by a technical failure of the system itself.

Risks and concerns

The central concern was confirming whether the reimbursement recipient is the same participant affected by the loss of the Ikigai governance action deposit.

Denying this reimbursement would create an unfair precedent for participants who legitimately used governance mechanisms and were harmed by a failure outside their control.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: YES.

The final position is YES. The central concern was confirming whether the reimbursement recipient is the same participant affected by the loss of the Ikigai governance action deposit. This doubt was sufficiently clarified by the verification that the same stake address is linked to the original action and to the current treasury withdrawal.

Given this, the reimbursement of 103,000 ADA is justified as a specific correction for an objective loss that occurred at the beginning of on-chain governance and was caused by a technical failure of the system itself. Denying this reimbursement would create an unfair precedent for participants who legitimately used governance mechanisms and were harmed by a failure outside their control.

Therefore, the vote is YES.

4. Conclusion

The decisive point is that the reimbursement recipient was sufficiently verified through the link between the same stake address and both the original governance action and the current treasury withdrawal. The 103,000 ADA reimbursement is supported as a specific correction for an objective loss caused by a technical failure outside the participant’s control.

Relatório de Ação de Governança [PT]

1. Introdução

Esta ação de governança solicita uma retirada do tesouro de 103.000 ADA para reembolsar o proponente da ação de governança informativa “Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -”. A ação original foi submetida em setembro de 2024, pouco depois do hard fork Chang introduzir a governança on-chain, e perguntou à comunidade se concordava com uma declaração simbólica de agradecimento àqueles que ajudaram Cardano a chegar até aquele ponto e de esperança para o futuro.

Uma falha no código do Cardano node permitiu que uma stake key não registrada fosse utilizada na ação de governança. Como resultado, o proponente não conseguiu recuperar o depósito original de 100.000 ADA. A retirada atual inclui o depósito de 100.000 ADA mais 3.000 ADA adicionais para compensar recompensas de staking perdidas a uma taxa de 2% ao ano.

A ação afirma que a entrega ocorreria instantaneamente por meio da promulgação on-chain. Também afirma que não há custos ou despesas associadas, não há circunstâncias de reembolso ao tesouro, não houve financiamento prévio do tesouro para o destinatário, e não há necessidade de administração ou custódia separada porque os fundos seriam distribuídos diretamente. Os DReps são nomeados como Administrador apenas para cumprir o requisito constitucional relevante.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

A preocupação sobre o destinatário do reembolso foi suficientemente esclarecida pela verificação de que a mesma stake address está vinculada à ação original e à treasury withdrawal atual.

O reembolso de 103.000 ADA é justificado como uma correção pontual por uma perda objetiva ocorrida no início da governança on-chain e causada por uma falha técnica do próprio sistema.

Riscos e preocupações

A preocupação central era confirmar se o destinatário do reembolso é o mesmo participante afetado pela perda do depósito da Ikigai governance action.

Negar esse reembolso criaria um precedente injusto para participantes que utilizaram legitimamente os mecanismos de governança e foram prejudicados por uma falha fora de seu controle.

3. Voto e Fundamentação

Voto: YES.

A posição final é YES. A preocupação central era confirmar se o destinatário do reembolso é o mesmo participante afetado pela perda do depósito da Ikigai governance action. Essa dúvida foi suficientemente esclarecida pela verificação de que a mesma stake address está vinculada à ação original e à treasury withdrawal atual.

Diante disso, o reembolso de 103.000 ADA é justificado como uma correção pontual por uma perda objetiva ocorrida no início da governança on-chain, causada por uma falha técnica do próprio sistema. Negar esse reembolso criaria um precedente injusto para participantes que utilizaram legitimamente os mecanismos de governança e foram prejudicados por uma falha fora de seu controle.

Portanto, o voto é YES.

4. Conclusão

O ponto decisivo é que o destinatário do reembolso foi suficientemente verificado pelo vínculo entre a mesma stake address e a ação de governança original e a treasury withdrawal atual. O reembolso de 103.000 ADA é sustentado como uma correção pontual por uma perda objetiva causada por uma falha técnica fora do controle do participante.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report

1. Introduction

This Treasury Withdrawal governance action requests ₳5,100,781 to fund Hydra v2 hardening and production readiness. Hydra is Cardano’s Layer 2 state-channel protocol, intended to allow participants to transact with sub-second finality and near-zero fees while settling final outcomes on Cardano L1. The action presents Hydra as the only production-grade Layer 2 currently running live workloads on Cardano, including Delta DeFi, Masumi, Hydra Doom, Glacier Drop, Intersect voting infrastructure, VTech Labs, Blockfrost, and Midgard.

The requested funding covers four workstreams: performance optimization, operational excellence, ecosystem support, and maintenance and developer experience. The performance workstream targets 2x to 10x improvements in snapshot signing and memory profile, together with on-chain contract optimization to reduce L1 fees. Operational work includes runbooks, easier node configuration, observability, logging, and TUI improvements. Ecosystem support includes production-user feature requests, hackathons, workshops, developer relations, and Hydra Alliance facilitation. Maintenance and DevX are scoped over Q3–Q4 2026.

The funding would be milestone-gated, administered through Intersect’s treasury governance process, supported by independent third-party assurance, and subject to refund conditions for undisbursed funds or reduced scope.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The NO vote does not result from a rejection of Hydra as a technology, nor from a denial of the importance of scalability solutions for Cardano. Hydra can be relevant infrastructure for the ecosystem, especially for use cases that require lower latency, lower transaction costs, and greater operational capacity than the base layer can directly provide.

The proposal presents a technical expectation of performance improvement, including 2x to 10x gains in snapshot signing and memory profile. This is a positive point. Technical improvements are relevant.

Milestone gating, Intersect administration, third-party assurance, and refund conditions help reduce custody risk, non-delivery risk, and improper disbursement risk.

Hydra may deserve funding. Public funding, however, needs to come with a granular budget, clear targets, and a transparency standard compatible with the amount requested.

Negative aspects

A simplified evaluation framework is being applied, suitable for votes where there is not enough time or capacity for a complete analysis of all technical, financial, and operational aspects of the proposal. Even under this reduced framework, two bottlenecks are sufficient to justify a NO vote: lack of budget granularity and absence of KPIs with measurable targets.

The first and most concerning problem is the lack of budget granularity. The proposal requests a multimillion-ADA amount, but presents the budget in a broad, vague, and aggregated way. Most resources are concentrated in a generic development category, without sufficient detail on number of people involved, FTEs, seniority, hourly rates, estimated duration by role, split between internal team and contractors, cost per milestone, or assumptions used to reach the requested amount. This prevents a serious evaluation of proportionality, reasonableness, and spending efficiency.

This level of detail is especially important because the proposal is not being submitted by a small team without structure, but by the main company historically associated with Cardano’s technical development. Precisely because of that position, IO should present a higher transparency standard, not a lower one. In multimillion-ADA proposals, it is not enough to state that resources will be used for development, infrastructure, security, operations, or ecosystem support. It is necessary to demonstrate how the amount was calculated, who will be paid, for how long, in which roles, and with which associated deliverables.

The pattern observed in recent IO proposals also raises concern. Comparing different treasury withdrawals submitted in recent months indicates the use of a standardized budget structure, with similar percentage distributions across categories. This suggests that the budget may be presented more as a simplified template than as a specific estimate built from the real needs of each proposal. For small proposals, this would already be weak. For multimillion-ADA proposals, it is institutionally unacceptable.

The consequence is that DReps and delegators lack sufficient elements to evaluate whether the requested amount is fair. It is not possible to know whether the budget reflects a real engineering need, whether there is excessive padding, whether there is overlap with already funded work, whether the amounts are compatible with market standards, or whether a relevant part of the Treasury is being used to sustain IO’s recurring operational structure without the level of openness expected for public resources.

The point is not to presume bad faith. The point is that there is not enough data to properly evaluate the cost. In at least other proposals, there was some exposure of hourly rate or reference to FTE equivalent. In this proposal, that minimum level of information does not appear. Without this information, it is not possible to evaluate whether personnel costs are reasonable, above or below international benchmarks, reflective of the complexity of the work, or compatible with the economic reality of the ecosystem.

The second problem is the absence of KPIs with clear targets. The proposal mentions alignment with KPIs such as TVL, monthly transactions, active users, throughput, uptime, reliability, and protocol revenue. However, these KPIs appear mainly as narrative alignment categories, not as measurable commitments. There are no clear minimum targets for TVL increase, number of transactions, active users, volume processed by Hydra, number of active integrations, revenue generated for L1, minimum uptime, or verifiable impact on real network usage.

The proposal presents technical expectations of performance improvement, which is positive, but insufficient to resolve the absence of ecosystem-impact targets. Technical improvements are relevant, but a Treasury withdrawal should also explain which observable results would justify public spending after delivery. Without targets, the ecosystem is left only with a general promise that Hydra may contribute to adoption, usage, TVL, revenue, and scalability.

This is a recurring problem in large proposals: there is a strong strategic narrative, but few objective commitments. The proposal states that Hydra can help keep applications on Cardano, attract builders, increase activity, and generate indirect revenue for L1. These possibilities may be true, but they are not sufficient as accountability. For a multimillion-ADA proposal, there should be minimum impact targets, even if adjusted to the stage of the technology. Without this, it becomes difficult to distinguish verifiable success from narrative progress.

The combination of these two problems is decisive. A proposal may have a budget with limited granularity but partially compensate with strong and verifiable impact targets. It may also have immature KPIs but present an extremely transparent and well-justified budget. Here, both sides fail at the same time: the cost is not sufficiently detailed and the expected impact is not sufficiently bound by measurable targets.

Risks and concerns

The current context makes the budget problem more serious. ADA is devalued, several ecosystem projects face difficulties or close operations, and the Treasury needs to be handled with discipline. In this environment, approving multimillion-ADA withdrawals with generic budgets sends a poor signal: small projects and dApps are frequently asked for details, deliverables, and justifications, while large suppliers can access much larger amounts with broad budget descriptions. This creates an accountability asymmetry that should not be normalized.

It is also concerning that ecosystem actors, including dReps do not press more strongly for budget transparency from large suppliers. The technical importance of infrastructure should not reduce the scrutiny standard. On the contrary, the more central the infrastructure and the larger the supplier, the higher the level of public scrutiny should be. Cardano should not accept most Treasury resources being consumed by a few recurring executors without granularity proportional to the amount requested.

Milestone gating, Intersect administration, third-party assurance, and refund conditions do not resolve the budget problem. These mechanisms help reduce custody risk, non-delivery risk, and improper disbursement risk. But they do not replace budget justification before approval. A milestone audit can verify whether something was delivered, but it does not answer whether the approved price was adequate from the start. The Treasury needs execution control, but it also needs cost control.

The central issue is not whether Hydra is important. The issue is whether this governance action presents an acceptable standard for Treasury use. It does not. The strategic relevance of the technology should not be used as a shortcut to reduce the transparency standard required of a multimillion-ADA withdrawal. If Cardano accepts this standard for large suppliers, it tends to repeat. As occurred in 2025, there is a risk that 2026 reproduces a dynamic in which large budget blocks are approved with low granularity, while the community remains without strong mechanisms for comparison, prioritization, and cost control.

Approving proposals of this size based only on institutional trust in IO is not adequate. Cardano’s on-chain governance exists precisely so that Treasury decisions are evaluated with responsibility, transparency, and accountability. Trust can be a contextual factor, but it does not replace detailed budgets, verifiable targets, and clear impact commitments. If the main company in the ecosystem requests public resources, it should demonstrate the best accountability standard, not ask the ecosystem to accept a simplified budget because the technology is important.

A NO vote may be interpreted by some as opposition to Hydra or scalability. That interpretation would be incorrect. The vote is against the structure of this specific withdrawal, not against Cardano’s need for technical evolution.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO.

The NO vote follows from two sufficient bottlenecks: lack of budget granularity and absence of KPIs with measurable targets. The vote does not reject Hydra as a technology and does not deny the importance of scalability for Cardano. A Treasury withdrawal must be evaluated as an institutional decision to allocate Cardano public resources, not merely as a generic statement of support for an important technology.

The requested amount is multimillion-ADA, while the budget remains broad, aggregated, and concentrated in a generic development category without enough detail on FTEs, rates, seniority, role duration, internal versus contractor allocation, milestone cost, or calculation assumptions. This prevents an adequate evaluation of cost proportionality and spending efficiency.

The proposal also lacks clear KPI targets. Alignment with TVL, transactions, active users, throughput, uptime, reliability, and protocol revenue is presented mainly as narrative alignment, not as measurable commitment. Technical performance improvements are positive, but they do not substitute for observable ecosystem-impact targets.

The decisive issue is the combination of weak financial granularity and absence of objective impact commitments. Even recognizing Hydra’s potential importance for Cardano’s scalability and competitiveness, it is not acceptable to approve a multimillion-ADA proposal with an excessively aggregated budget and KPIs without measurable targets.

Funding could be acceptable if accompanied by a granular budget, clear targets, and a transparency standard compatible with the amount requested.

4. Conclusion

The decision rests on the structure of this specific Treasury withdrawal. Hydra may be important and may deserve funding, but this request does not meet the minimum standard required for support. Low financial granularity and lack of measurable impact commitments make the proposed use of public Treasury resources unacceptable.

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu jul

Governance Action Report [EN]

1. Introduction

This Parameter Change proposes reducing the minimum Constitutional Committee size, committeeMinSize, from 7 to 5.

The current Constitutional Committee has 7 members, equal to the current committeeMinSize of 7. Under the current setting, a single resignation, vacancy, or term expiration could cause the number of registered Constitutional Committee members to fall below the protocol minimum. If that happens, governance actions requiring Constitutional Committee approval become ineligible for ratification, affecting Parameter Changes, Constitution Updates, Treasury Withdrawals, and Hard Forks.

The proposed change introduces a buffer between the current number of elected seats and the minimum number of members required for Cardano governance to continue operating. It does not directly change the current number of Constitutional Committee members, does not change the maximum number of members, and does not state a desire to reduce the committee to 5 members.

Enactment depends on another live Parameter Change related to Plutus cost model settings ahead of the van Rossem hard fork. The dependency is temporal only, with no technical interaction between the parameters being changed. The proposal states that the relevant guardrails are satisfied by setting committeeMinSize to 5 and that the change is reversible if at least 7 Constitutional Committee members are registered.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

A YES vote is supported because the current fragility of operating with the effective Constitutional Committee size equal to committeeMinSize is more concerning than the risks introduced by reducing the minimum to 5.

The proposal should not be understood as support for a smaller Constitutional Committee, nor as normalization of 5 members. It creates an institutional buffer so governance can continue functioning during transitional periods of vacancy, resignation, term expiration, or institutional recomposition.

A minimum below the committee’s operational size is a reasonable resilience measure, provided that 7 continues to be treated as the acceptable standard for operation.

Risks and concerns

If the Constitutional Committee were to operate persistently with only 5 members, there would be a real concern regarding centralization and increased individual power. In that scenario, governance would become more fragile, and the community should react politically, including through the available mechanisms of control and institutional recomposition.

However, there is not sufficient evidence to assume that this normalization will occur as a direct consequence of this action.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: YES.

A YES vote is cast because the fragility of the current design, with no margin between the number of Constitutional Committee members and the protocol minimum, is excessively fragile. Operating with the effective Constitutional Committee size equal to committeeMinSize creates a more concerning risk than the risks introduced by reducing the minimum to 5.

The opposing arguments identify real risks, especially the possibility that a Constitutional Committee operating persistently with only 5 members would increase centralization concerns and individual veto power. However, they do not demonstrate a reason strong enough to reject the action.

The decisive point is that the proposal creates an institutional buffer for transitional periods of vacancy, resignation, term expiration, or recomposition, without implying support for a smaller Constitutional Committee or normalization of 5 members.

The relevant condition is that 7 must continue to be treated as the acceptable standard for operation. If persistent operation with only 5 members became normalized, governance would become more fragile and the community should respond politically through the available mechanisms of control and institutional recomposition.

4. Conclusion

The current absence of any margin between the Constitutional Committee’s operating size and the protocol minimum creates excessive governance fragility. Reducing committeeMinSize to 5 provides an institutional buffer, while the acceptable operating standard should remain 7 members. The identified risks are real but not sufficient to reject the action.

Relatório de Ação de Governança [PT]

1. Introdução

Esta Mudança de Parâmetro propõe reduzir o tamanho mínimo do Comitê Constitucional, committeeMinSize, de 7 para 5.

O Comitê Constitucional atual possui 7 membros, igual ao committeeMinSize atual de 7. Com a configuração atual, uma única renúncia, vacância ou expiração de mandato poderia fazer com que o número de membros registrados do Comitê Constitucional ficasse abaixo do mínimo protocolar. Se isso ocorrer, ações de governança que exigem aprovação do Comitê Constitucional se tornam inelegíveis para ratificação, afetando Mudanças de Parâmetro, Atualizações da Constituição, Saques do Tesouro e Hard Forks.

A mudança proposta introduz uma margem entre o número atual de assentos eleitos e o número mínimo de membros necessário para que a governança da Cardano continue operando. Ela não altera diretamente o número atual de membros do Comitê Constitucional, não altera o número máximo de membros e não afirma o desejo de reduzir o comitê para 5 membros.

A promulgação depende de outra Mudança de Parâmetro ativa relacionada às configurações do modelo de custo Plutus antes do hard fork van Rossem. A dependência é apenas temporal, sem interação técnica entre os parâmetros alterados. A proposta afirma que os guardrails relevantes são satisfeitos ao definir committeeMinSize como 5 e que a mudança é reversível se houver pelo menos 7 membros registrados no Comitê Constitucional.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

O voto YES é apoiado porque a fragilidade atual de operar com o tamanho efetivo do Comitê Constitucional igual ao committeeMinSize é mais preocupante do que os riscos introduzidos pela redução do mínimo para 5.

A proposta não deve ser entendida como apoio a um Comitê Constitucional menor, nem como normalização de 5 membros. Ela cria um buffer institucional para que a governança continue funcionando durante períodos transitórios de vacância, renúncia, expiração de mandato ou recomposição institucional.

Um mínimo abaixo do tamanho operacional do comitê é uma medida razoável de resiliência, desde que 7 continue sendo tratado como o padrão aceitável de funcionamento.

Riscos e preocupações

Se o Comitê Constitucional passasse a operar de forma persistente com apenas 5 membros, haveria uma preocupação real de centralização e aumento do poder individual de veto. Nesse cenário, a governança se tornaria mais frágil, e a comunidade deveria reagir politicamente, inclusive por meio dos mecanismos disponíveis de controle e recomposição institucional.

Porém, não há evidência suficiente para assumir que essa normalização ocorrerá como consequência direta desta ação.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: YES.

O voto YES é registrado porque a fragilidade do desenho atual, sem qualquer margem entre o número de membros do Comitê Constitucional e o mínimo protocolar, é excessivamente frágil. Operar com o tamanho efetivo do Comitê Constitucional igual ao committeeMinSize cria um risco mais preocupante do que os riscos introduzidos pela redução do mínimo para 5.

Os argumentos contrários identificam riscos reais, especialmente a possibilidade de que um Comitê Constitucional operando de forma persistente com apenas 5 membros aumente preocupações de centralização e poder individual de veto. Porém, eles não demonstram um motivo forte o suficiente para rejeitar a ação.

O ponto decisivo é que a proposta cria um buffer institucional para períodos transitórios de vacância, renúncia, expiração de mandato ou recomposição, sem implicar apoio a um Comitê Constitucional menor ou normalização de 5 membros.

A condição relevante é que 7 deve continuar sendo tratado como o padrão aceitável de funcionamento. Se a operação persistente com apenas 5 membros se tornasse normalizada, a governança se tornaria mais frágil e a comunidade deveria reagir politicamente por meio dos mecanismos disponíveis de controle e recomposição institucional.

4. Conclusão

A ausência atual de qualquer margem entre o tamanho operacional do Comitê Constitucional e o mínimo protocolar cria fragilidade excessiva de governança. Reduzir o committeeMinSize para 5 oferece um buffer institucional, enquanto o padrão aceitável de funcionamento deve continuar sendo 7 membros. Os riscos identificados são reais, mas não suficientes para rejeitar a ação.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report — Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027 [EN]

This is a quick-check vote. I am not taking a position here on the technical merit, strategic relevance, or necessity of the proposed work.

My vote is NO due to insufficient budget granularity.

The proposal requests a large treasury withdrawal but does not provide enough detail to allow an independent assessment of whether the requested amount is proportionate. It references an average rate of USD 176/hour and uses FTE-based costing, but it does not clearly disclose how many people will work on the project, what roles they will perform, how hours are allocated across milestones, what seniority mix is assumed, or how the estimated workload was derived.

For a treasury withdrawal of this scale, this level of budget detail is not sufficient. DReps should not be required to infer the actual staffing model or rely primarily on trust in the proposer and later contracting arrangements. Without a clear breakdown of personnel, responsibilities, hours, and milestone-level costs, the budget cannot be adequately verified before voting.

For this reason, I vote NO.

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança — Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027 [PT]

Voto: NÃO

Este é um voto de quick check. Não será tomada posição, aqui, sobre o mérito técnico, a relevância estratégica ou a necessidade do trabalho proposto.

O voto é NÃO devido à granularidade insuficiente do orçamento.

A proposta solicita uma retirada relevante do Tesouro, mas não fornece detalhes suficientes para permitir uma avaliação independente sobre a proporcionalidade do valor solicitado. A proposta menciona uma taxa média de USD 176 por hora e utiliza uma estimativa baseada em FTE, mas não informa com clareza quantas pessoas trabalharão no projeto, quais funções serão exercidas, como as horas serão distribuídas entre milestones, qual composição de senioridade foi assumida ou como o volume de trabalho estimado foi calculado.

Para uma retirada do Tesouro dessa escala, esse nível de detalhamento orçamentário não é suficiente. DReps não deveriam precisar inferir o modelo real de alocação de equipe nem depender primariamente da confiança no proponente e em arranjos contratuais posteriores. Sem uma decomposição clara de pessoas, responsabilidades, horas e custos por milestone, o orçamento não pode ser adequadamente verificado antes do voto.

Por esse motivo, o voto é NÃO.

Governance Action Report [EN]

1. Introduction

The governance action is a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action requesting ₳2,750,000 from the Cardano Treasury, using a reference price of US$0.24 per ADA, equivalent to US$660,000. The funds would position Cardano as title sponsor of the Rare Evo 2026 main stage and global livestream, while also supporting the second annual Rare Dev Gov Day 2026, a dedicated Cardano-focused technical, governance, and community coordination event scheduled for July 28, 2026, at ARIA Las Vegas.

The proposal covers two sponsorship packages: Rare Evo 2026 Cardano Title Sponsorship and Cardano Dev Gov Day 2026 Sponsorship. It includes branding, livestream integration, governance programming, technical workshops, free General Admission access for the Cardano community, complimentary booth space for selected ecosystem projects, travel and lodging support for contributors and volunteers, media sponsorship, community giveaways, legal and audit costs, taxes withheld, and a deposit for Dev Gov Day 2027.

Rare Evo 2026 will occur regardless of treasury funding. The requested withdrawal would therefore not fund the existence of the event itself, but would expand Cardano’s presence, accessibility, programming, sponsorship position, and industry outreach within an already operational event.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

Rare Network has relevant history in the Cardano ecosystem, with activity since 2020 and five years of Rare Evo execution. The proposal reports positive historical metrics for 2025, including 2,500 participants, 80 booths, 85 speakers, more than 100 ecosystem partners, more than 20,000 livestream views, 4 million social impressions, more than 40 Cardano projects represented, more than 100 media coverage items or interviews, more than 50 enterprise participants, and more than 500 participants at Dev Gov Day 2025.

This weighs positively on execution. Unlike proposals that depend only on a future promise, Rare Network demonstrates previous capacity to organize complex events, attract participants, and deliver real operational infrastructure. Execution risk therefore appears relatively low.

The strongest component of the proposal is Cardano Dev Gov Day. An event dedicated to governance, technical coordination, DReps, SPOs, builders, projects, and community may have public value, especially when it is free, open, and directed toward governance and development discussions.

Cardano governance depends on social coordination, not only on on-chain mechanisms. In-person spaces may facilitate relationships, alignment, context sharing, noise reduction, and trust-building among actors who normally interact in fragmented ways.

In this sense, Dev Gov Day is more defensible than a simple brand sponsorship. It offers a more substantial argument around coordination, education, governance, and community participation.

The proposal includes free General Admission access for the Cardano community, free booth space for selected projects, programming slots, livestream, media, and support for participants and contributors. These elements may reduce participation barriers for some ecosystem members and offer visibility to projects that may not have their own budget to attend.

This may benefit startups, builders, dApps, community projects, DReps, and other ecosystem actors that need exposure, networking, and contact with stakeholders.

The proposal includes a commitment to return 20% of all VIP ticket sales to the Treasury. This mechanism is positive in principle, because it creates some alignment between commercial success of the event and return to the ecosystem.

Although this mechanism is insufficient as a financial guarantee, it is better than event proposals without any return mechanism. As precedent, it may be useful for future sponsorship or event proposals.

A possible favorable argument is that, during market contraction, Cardano risks losing external presence, narrative, and coordination. In theory, maintaining presence at relevant events may help preserve visibility, reinforce confidence, and keep projects connected during a difficult cycle.

Rare Evo also has a multi-chain character, which may allow Cardano exposure to audiences outside the ecosystem, including developers, enterprises, investors, media, and communities from other networks.

Negative aspects

There is recognition that Cardano governance has real problems, structural gaps, and relevant failures. However, one more governance event or workshop does not appear to be a proportional response to those problems.

Cardano has already held many workshops, events, in-person discussions, and online processes related to governance, including discussions around CIP-1694, the Constitution, and Voltaire. Despite those efforts, relevant problems of coordination, accountability, execution, institutional clarity, and effectiveness remain.

The point is not to deny abstract value to in-person gatherings. The problem is treating one more workshop as a relevant solution for structural failures that have already survived years of workshops, events, and deliberative processes. The marginal utility of another in-person event appears limited if there are no more concrete mechanisms for reform, execution, accountability, or institutional change.

The proposal concentrates in-person benefits in Las Vegas, United States. Even with livestream and free General Admission, the most relevant benefits of an in-person event remain networking, informal conversations, panel presence, stakeholder access, booths, meetings, visibility, and relationship-building.

These benefits favor people with visas, time, resources, geographic proximity, ability to travel, and existing connections. The proposal offers travel and lodging support for a small group of participants, but that does not eliminate concentration. It only transfers Treasury resources to subsidize physical attendance for some people.

For a global Treasury, this is an important problem. The Cardano ecosystem is international, but the direct return from this type of event tends to be localized, with greater benefit for participants in North America and groups already integrated into the event circuit.

The proposal includes relevant amounts for travel and lodging, food and beverage, happy hour and kickoff party, hotel rooms, VIP tickets, and other hospitality forms. This is particularly problematic in the current context.

In a bear market, with projects facing funding difficulties, initiatives closing or reducing activity, and contributors struggling to obtain support for more essential work, using Treasury resources to subsidize travel, lodging, food, and social events does not appear to be a priority.

The objection is not moralistic. Events may have normal operational costs. The problem is fiscal priority: when resources are scarce and there are multiple critical needs, spending on international travel, open bar, lodging, and hospitality perks appears less defensible than more direct investments in infrastructure, maintenance, tools, institutional governance, measurable adoption, or distributed support for contributors.

A decisive point is that Rare Evo 2026 will occur even without this Treasury withdrawal. Therefore, the proposal should not be evaluated as whether to fund the existence of the event. The correct question is whether the Treasury should pay ₳2.75M to expand Cardano’s presence through title sponsorship, branding, livestream, expanded Dev Gov Day, benefits, and hospitality.

This reduces the weight of the necessity argument. The Treasury would be buying an additional delta on top of an existing event. That delta may have value, but it needs to be demonstrated with much greater clarity, especially when it involves high expenditure and benefits that are difficult to measure.

The community and DReps already rejected Cardano Summit, the main annual event explicitly focused on Cardano. This creates a relevant political precedent. If Cardano’s own flagship event was rejected because of concerns around cost, ROI, priority, or structure, approving a relevant sponsorship for another event requires a particularly strong justification.

Rare Evo has its own merits: history, Cardano roots, multi-chain character, and Dev Gov Day. Even so, these elements do not eliminate the need to demonstrate why this package would be more justifiable than other rejected or questioned events.

The objection is not against marketing itself. Cardano may need marketing, communication, external presence, and greater visibility. The problem is the chosen format.

A large, in-person, expensive, and concentrated event may be an imprecise form of marketing. There are potentially more distributed, measurable, and cost-effective alternatives: targeted campaigns, technical content, regional programs, builder support, onboarding actions, partnerships with external audiences, segmented media, continuous education, smaller grants, or mechanisms that expand access globally.

At this moment, spending a relevant amount on sponsorship, physical presence, and hospitality appears less attractive than more targeted, measurable, and distributed allocations.

The negative position does not need to question Rare Network’s reputation, competence, or track record. On the contrary, the team appears to have execution capacity and a real delivery history.

The problem lies in the structure, timing, priority, measurement, and composition of the funded package. A proposal may be executable and still not be a good Treasury allocation.

The position is not against investing Treasury resources in governance. There are many real gaps in Cardano governance. The point is that another in-person event or workshop does not appear to be the best way to solve those problems.

Governance needs reforms, accountability, better processes, incentives, tools, institutional clarity, continuous support, evaluation standards, and distributed capacity. Events may help marginally, but they do not replace structural changes.

The position is also not against marketing or external visibility. Cardano needs to communicate its value proposition better. The problem is that marketing through a large, expensive, concentrated, in-person event appears less appropriate in this cycle than more precise, measurable, and distributed initiatives.

Risks and concerns

The absence of KPI targets is a serious problem and, by itself, could justify a NO vote.

The proposal lists several metrics that will be reported after the event, such as Rare Evo attendance, Dev Gov Day attendance, number of participating Cardano projects, workshops, governance sessions, livestream viewership, media coverage, social impressions, number of participants with travel support, tickets distributed, booth participation, developer participation, enterprise and institutional participation, networking participation, cross-chain collaboration opportunities, announcements or launches, and qualitative feedback.

However, these metrics appear as categories to be measured or reported. They are not accompanied by verifiable minimum targets.

For an event proposal, this is an especially negative failure. Events are one of the easiest categories to project and measure. It would be reasonable to expect minimum targets for participants, livestream views, represented Cardano projects, developers present, enterprise leads, media, participating DReps and SPOs, qualified meetings, follow-ups, newly onboarded builders, Treasury return, and regional diversity.

Without targets, there is no objective ruler to distinguish formal execution from impact proportional to the expenditure. The proposal may deliver photos, videos, livestream, programming, booths, and a post-event report, and still not demonstrate that the Treasury bought sufficient impact.

It is important to separate deliverables from performance targets.

Items such as 50 VIP tickets, food and beverage for 500 people, travel and lodging support for 20 participants, free General Admission tickets, free booths, livestream, media sponsorship, or return of 20% of VIP sales are deliverables, benefits, or economic mechanisms. They are not, by themselves, performance targets.

A KPI target would indicate the minimum expected result: for example, minimum number of participants, minimum number of Cardano projects, minimum number of qualified developers, minimum number of institutional leads, minimum number of views, minimum published media, minimum financial return to the Treasury, or minimum number of verifiable follow-ups.

The proposal presents many purchased outputs, but does not establish success thresholds.

The commitment to return 20% of VIP ticket sales to the Treasury is positive, but insufficient as a financial accountability mechanism.

The proposal does not present VIP sales projections, historical VIP sales, expected volume, estimated Treasury return, or minimum guarantee. Therefore, “20% of VIP ticket sales” is 20% of an unknown number.

Without a minimum floor or projection, this mechanism may have symbolic value, but it does not allow real financial recovery or spending proportionality to be evaluated.

The budget is relatively detailed by category, but a significant part of the resources is allocated to politically sensitive items: travel and lodging, food and beverage, happy hour and kickoff party, hotel rooms, VIP tickets, media sponsorship, legal, audit and admin fees, taxes withheld, and a deposit for 2027.

Even if these costs are normal in professional events, the question is whether they should be paid by the Cardano Treasury at this moment. The budget composition makes it difficult to classify the proposal as an essential governance action or pure public good.

The inclusion of a deposit for Dev Gov Day 2027 is a problem of precedent and fiscal discipline. The proposal funds a 2026 action, but reserves resources to secure a future venue, which would be followed by another Treasury proposal.

This anticipates commitment before the 2026 results are evaluated. It also creates recurrence risk or implicit pressure for continuity. Future editions should be evaluated based on delivered results, impact report, cost-benefit, and new budget context, not through pre-commitments embedded in the current budget.

The proposal combines components with different natures into a single action: Dev Gov Day, with a stronger governance and public-good argument; Rare Evo title sponsorship, closer to marketing and branding; hospitality and in-person benefits; travel and lodging support; media; legal, administrative, and tax costs; and a deposit for 2027.

This bundling creates a governance problem. A dRep could support Dev Gov Day in isolation while rejecting title sponsorship, hospitality, travel support, or a future deposit. The action does not allow that separation.

The most defensible component is tied to less defensible elements.

The proposal indicates that, if another sponsor purchases certain packages before approval, Cardano will receive another sponsorship of “equal impact/dollar value,” such as Enterprise & Policy Social, Registration, Closeout Party, or College Row.

This reduces the precision of the funded object. The Treasury would be voting on a package that may change according to available commercial inventory. Even if the dollar value is maintained, the strategic impact of each sponsorship may vary.

For a Treasury Withdrawal, the funded object should be more stable and verifiable.

The proposal states the amount requested from the Treasury, but does not sufficiently clarify the total Rare Evo budget, other expected revenue, sponsors, ticket sales, paid booths, commercial margin, percentage of the event covered by Cardano, or degree of cross-subsidy.

Because Rare Evo is a commercial and multi-chain event that will occur regardless, it is relevant to understand whether Cardano is buying fair market value or disproportionately subsidizing an already existing commercial infrastructure.

This point is especially important because the proposal requests public resources for a sponsorship package inside an event with multiple potential revenue sources.

Favorable external reviews tend to emphasize Rare Network’s execution history, the value of in-person interactions, the importance of Dev Gov Day, the need for Cardano’s external presence, the limited availability of large events for the ecosystem, the value of a Cardano-native and independent initiative, and alignment with governance, community, and visibility.

Cautious or opposing reviews tend to emphasize high cost in a constrained context, a proposal focused on insiders, difficulty proving ROI, absence of KPI targets, the fact that the event will occur without funding, travel, lodging, food and hospitality costs, the 2027 deposit, recurrence risk, lack of clarity on financial return, geographic concentration, and preference for infrastructure, direct adoption, liquidity, tooling, or distributed funding.

These reviews are useful as deliberative input, but do not replace the proposal itself.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO.

The proposal has real merits: Rare Network has history, Rare Evo is relevant for part of the ecosystem, Dev Gov Day has clearer public value, execution risk appears low, and there are positive elements such as free access, booths, livestream, media coverage, and partial return of VIP ticket sales to the Treasury.

However, these positive points do not overcome the central gaps of the proposal.

The package is expensive, concentrated, includes low-priority hospitality and travel support items, mixes Dev Gov Day with title sponsorship and perks, includes a deposit for 2027, lacks minimum KPI targets, and funds the amplification of an event that will occur independently of the Treasury.

The absence of KPI targets is a critical problem. For an event proposal, there should be clear targets for participation, reach, media, projects, developers, enterprises, Treasury return, diversity, and follow-up. Without this, there is no objective criterion to evaluate success proportional to expenditure.

The most consistent position is to recognize the value of Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day, but reject the current structure of the proposal as an inadequate use of the Treasury at this moment. The NO vote is based on fiscal prioritization, absence of KPI targets, low marginal utility of another governance workshop, geographic concentration, hospitality and travel support items, bundling, and weak alignment between spending and measurable impact.

A future proposal would be more defensible if it were smaller, separated Dev Gov Day from title sponsorship, removed hospitality-heavy items and future deposits, presented clear KPI targets, included a Treasury return projection, detailed the total event budget, and demonstrated measurable external impact.

4. Conclusion

Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day have recognizable value, and Rare Network has execution history. The current package, however, combines high cost, geographic concentration, hospitality and travel support, bundling, lack of KPI targets, uncertain financial return, and a 2027 pre-commitment. On that basis, the current Treasury withdrawal is not justified.

Relatório de Ação de Governança [PT]

1. Introdução

A ação de governança é uma Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action que solicita ₳2.750.000 do Tesouro da Cardano, usando uma referência de US$0,24 por ADA, equivalente a US$660.000. Os recursos posicionariam a Cardano como title sponsor do palco principal e do livestream global da Rare Evo 2026, além de apoiar o segundo Rare Dev Gov Day 2026, um evento técnico, de governança e coordenação comunitária focado em Cardano, previsto para 28 de julho de 2026, no ARIA Las Vegas.

A proposta cobre dois pacotes de sponsorship: Rare Evo 2026 Cardano Title Sponsorship e Cardano Dev Gov Day 2026 Sponsorship. Ela i

EN - I know the proposer and have participated in initiatives with him. Therefore, I consider that a relevant conflict of interest exists regarding this proposal; consequently, I will abstain.

PT - Conheço o proposer e participei de iniciativas com ele. Portanto, considero que existe um conflito de interesse relevante em relação a esta proposta; consequentemente, irei me abster.

Governance Action Report: Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026–2027) [EN]

1. Introduction

Eternl is a non-custodial Cardano light wallet available on web, browser extension, Android, and iOS. Users rely on Eternl for payments, staking, governance, and DApp interaction. This governance action requests ₳2,350,000, at approximately $0.1787 per ADA, to fund 12 months of operations from August 2026 to July 2027.

The proposal covers frontend and backend maintenance and development, backend infrastructure, user support, audits, administration, and day-to-day operations. The annual cost is presented as approximately $420,000, corresponding to 6.0 FTE distributed across 10 contributors at an average of $70,000 per FTE. The requested budget is allocated to frontend, backend, support, admin, and audits.

Eternl plans to introduce paid Pro plans for personal and company use. The proposal states that around 5,500 paying users, or about 4.2% of its install base, would be enough to cover the annual operating cost. It also includes conversion of up to $420,000 worth of ADA into stablecoins, public monitoring of the company wallet, return of excess ADA to the Treasury, periodic independent audits, oversight metrics, and repayment or donation mechanisms if Pro plan income exceeds defined thresholds.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

Eternl is one of the most relevant wallets in the Cardano ecosystem. It is widely used for payments, staking, DApp interaction, governance participation, power users, and daily blockchain access. The proposal also includes important positive elements, especially by attempting to establish a financial sustainability path through paid plans and by indicating mechanisms for possible return of funds to the Treasury.

The new version of the proposal incorporates relevant improvements compared to the previous version. Clarifications were added on audits, oversight metrics, financial transparency, and mechanisms for eventual return of funds to the Treasury. Eternl also changed its previous position and now declares that its DRep abstains from this vote. These changes represent concrete responses to criticisms raised during the evaluation of the previous proposal and should be positively recognized.

The attempt to build a financial sustainability model should be recognized as positive. This movement may have come late, but the explanation presented by the team should not be ignored. In an ecosystem where many large projects remain recurrently or structurally dependent on public subsidies, there is at least a declared attempt here to build an independent revenue source and reduce future dependence on the Treasury. This point counts in favor of the proposal.

The new version introduces an estimate that approximately 5,500 paying users, or about 4.2% of the installed base, would be enough to fully cover annual operating costs. This information helps contextualize the sustainability strategy and represents an improvement compared to the previous proposal.

In governance, the new proposal presents an important improvement. The previous version explicitly declared that Eternl would vote on its own proposal. That position raised significant concern, since the direct beneficiary of the funds intended to use delegated voting power to support a Treasury withdrawal for its own benefit.

The new version changes that position and states that the Eternl DRep abstains from this vote. This change should be recognized positively. Abstention by the direct beneficiary significantly reduces the concern related to the use of delegated voting power to approve self-funding and strengthens the legitimacy of the decision-making process.

Greater detail was also provided on independent audits, oversight metrics, custody of funds, financial transparency, and mechanisms for eventual return of funds to the Treasury. These changes increase predictability on how the funds would be administered and monitored during the funded period.

Eternl remains one of the main wallets used by the Cardano community. It is a reliable tool, with a relevant track record and an important role for advanced users, DeFi participants, DApps, staking, governance, and daily interaction with the network. The proposal also seeks to fund real maintenance: frontend, backend, infrastructure, support, hard fork compatibility, CIPs, hardware wallets, governance tooling, and daily operations.

Continuity of Eternl has value for the ecosystem. If Eternl stopped operating or drastically reduced its capacity, there would be an impact on a relevant portion of users. There are other wallets in the Cardano ecosystem, and perhaps even more wallets than necessary in some segments. Even so, Eternl probably would not be one of the wallets the ecosystem should want to lose. Its practical importance as an access interface is clear.

It is also positive that the proposal indicates an intention to return excess ADA if conversion occurs above the reference price, as well as a more detailed structure for eventual return of funds to the Treasury if the Pro plan generates surplus. This type of mechanism is better than a simple request for an operational subsidy without any sustainability or return plan. The existence of this concern with sustainability and possible repayment should be recognized.

Negative aspects

The relevance of Eternl as a product and access infrastructure does not eliminate the problems of the proposal as a Treasury withdrawal instrument. Evaluation of a Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action requires more than recognizing utility. It requires accountability, budget clarity, verifiable targets, proportionality, and adequate monitoring mechanisms. These elements continue not to be presented at a sufficient level to justify a favorable vote.

The first relevant problem is the absence of KPIs with verifiable targets. The proposal mentions alignment with core Cardano KPIs, such as TVL, monthly transactions, and active wallets / MAU. It also states that Eternl conducts between 10% and 18% of mainnet transactions. However, no verifiable source was presented for this metric, and no concrete targets were established in relation to it. If Eternl’s share of mainnet transactions is used as an argument for systemic relevance, it would be reasonable to expect the proposal to establish targets for maintaining or growing that share, as well as a measurement method and reporting cadence.

The absence of targets is especially problematic because this type of proposal could benefit significantly from clear KPIs. Unlike an exploratory or early-stage research proposal, an operational wallet has several measurable dimensions: usage, stability, revenue, conversion, support, governance, uptime, delegations, voting volume, releases, incidents, and feature adoption. The proposal does not turn its own impact claims into trackable commitments.

This problem also appears in governance. The proposal highlights the relevance of Eternl’s governance tools, including DRep dashboards, proposal browsing, in-wallet voting, and proposal creation directly through the interface. These points are relevant, but they were not accompanied by specific KPIs. Targets could have been included on the number of DReps viewed through the interface, number of delegations made through Eternl, voting power delegated through the wallet, number of votes cast through the interface, number of users interacting with governance features, percentage of users participating in delegation or voting, or metrics related to interface neutrality.

There is also a lack of clear targets for the financial sustainability plan. The proposal states that it intends to introduce paid plans and move toward self-sustainability. This is a positive point, but it is not accompanied by concrete targets for conversion, revenue, retention, break-even timeline, progressive reduction of Treasury dependence, or objective criteria to evaluate whether the plan is working.

Even with the estimate that around 5,500 paying users would be sufficient to cover annual costs, the proposal still does not establish formal conversion targets, timelines, monitoring milestones, or measurable commitments that would allow an objective assessment of whether the transition to self-sustainability is occurring as planned.

A positive intention does not replace verifiable targets. A sustainability plan without quantitative targets or clear success criteria remains insufficient to justify a new Treasury withdrawal.

The second relevant problem is the budget. The budget presented remains excessively high-level. The new version clarifies that the funding corresponds to approximately six FTEs distributed across ten contributors and that the average cost considered is approximately $70,000 per FTE. This information adds useful context and represents an improvement compared to the previous version.

However, the main problem is not the average value itself, but the lack of granularity.

The proposal still does not allow an adequate evaluation of which roles are being funded, the seniority of each person, the working hours dedicated to each workstream, the strategic importance of each function, which activities require which FTEs, and how effort will be distributed across maintenance, infrastructure, support, governance tooling, development of new features, and the Pro plan.

In a company, not all professionals usually receive the same amount or have the same level of responsibility, seniority, or strategic contribution. The aggregated budget presentation creates an impression of generalization and makes it harder to evaluate the precision of the request.

Without greater granularity, it is not possible to identify whether the workload and effort required for the described features actually justify the number of FTEs and the requested amount. It is also not possible to clearly evaluate how much of the budget relates to essential ecosystem maintenance and how much relates to commercial roadmap development or features that should be funded through own revenue, paying users, private investment, or other funding mechanisms.

The proposal became stronger by clarifying the number of FTEs and the average cost considered, but it still does not explain with sufficient precision the roles, responsibilities, seniority, time distribution, and relationship between team and deliverables. The total number of FTEs provides some sense of cost and scale, but does not allow an adequate assessment of proportionality. In a Treasury withdrawal, especially to fund operations of a private company, this lack of detail continues to reduce confidence in the accuracy of the budget.

The third problem is the partially commercial and closed nature of the proposal. Eternl is a relevant and reliable wallet, but its main product is not open source. The proposal states that some libraries will be published, but the main wallet interface will not be open. This weakens the public good thesis.

A tool does not need to be fully open source to have public value, but when a private company requests recurring Treasury funding to maintain and develop a closed product, the standard for transparency, accountability, and public return needs to be higher.

This does not mean that Eternl has no value for the ecosystem. It does. But there is a difference between funding open public infrastructure and funding the operational continuity of a proprietary product. The more closed the product is, the harder it becomes to justify broad public funding without very clear counterparties, a well-delimited scope, and strong monitoring mechanisms.

Risks and concerns

The absence of governance KPIs is especially sensitive because wallets can influence users’ delegation behavior. In a context where there are already concerns in the ecosystem about wallets using nudges or interfaces that favor certain DReps linked to the wallet’s own maintaining entity, it would be important for a public funding proposal for a wallet with integrated governance to establish explicit commitments to neutrality, transparency, and reporting. Eternl could have used this proposal to increase public trust on this point. It did not.

Although the decision by the Eternl DRep to abstain reduces a major concern, it does not eliminate all potential conflicts, since the beneficiary entity remains both the executor and administrator of the funds. The change removes one of the main institutional concerns present in the previous proposal and represents a relevant governance improvement, but the remaining structure still requires strong accountability.

Despite the improvements, the central problems related to operational accountability and financial evaluation remain largely present. The proposal advanced in important aspects related to governance, audits, financial transparency, and return mechanisms. However, it still does not present KPIs accompanied by verifiable targets and still presents an excessively aggregated budget for an adequate assessment of proportionality, efficiency, and necessity of the requested funds.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO.

The vote NO should not be interpreted as a rejection of Eternl as a product or as a denial of its importance to Cardano. Eternl is relevant, possibly essential in certain areas of use. The vote NO is a negative evaluation of the proposal as presented: absence of KPIs with verifiable targets, insufficiently granular budget, limitations in the evaluation of financial sustainability, and broad scope for a partially closed product funded by Treasury resources.

The new version shows that part of the concerns raised previously was taken into account. The clarification on audits, financial transparency mechanisms, the structure for eventual return of funds to the Treasury, and the decision by the Eternl DRep to abstain represent concrete improvements. Even so, the proposal still does not provide verifiable targets for its objectives and still presents an excessively aggregated budget for an adequate assessment of proportionality and efficiency in the use of resources.

The positive points do not overcome the identified problems. As long as these gaps remain, the proposal continues not to meet the necessary standard to receive support.

4. Conclusion

Eternl has clear practical importance for Cardano and the revised proposal includes real improvements in governance, audits, transparency, and possible repayment. However, the absence of verifiable KPI targets, insufficient budget granularity, limited assessment of the sustainability plan, and broad scope for a partially closed product continue to prevent support. The vote is NO.

Relatório de Ação de Governança: Eternl: Path to Sustainability (2026–2027) [PT]

1. Introdução

A Eternl é uma carteira light não custodial da Cardano disponível para web, extensão de navegador, Android e iOS. Usuários dependem da Eternl para pagamentos, staking, governança e interação com DApps. Esta ação de governança solicita ₳2.350.000, a aproximadamente US$0,1787 por ADA, para financiar 12 meses de operação entre agosto de 2026 e julho de 2027.

A proposta cobre manutenção e desenvolvimento de frontend e backend, infraestrutura de backend, suporte a usuários, auditorias, administração e operações diárias. O custo anual é apresentado como aproximadamente US$420.000, correspondente a 6,0 FTE distribuídos entre 10 colaboradores, a uma média de US$70.000 por FTE. O orçamento solicitado é alocado entre frontend, backend, suporte, administração e auditorias.

A Eternl pretende introduzir planos Pro pagos para uso pessoal e empresarial. A proposta afirma que cerca de 5.500 usuários pagantes, ou aproximadamente 4,2% de sua base instalada, seriam suficientes para cobrir o custo anual de operação. Também inclui conversão de até US$420.000 em ADA para stablecoins, monitoramento público da carteira da empresa, devolução de ADA excedente ao Tesouro, auditorias independentes periódicas, métricas de supervisão e mecanismos de repayment ou doação caso a receita do plano Pro exceda limites definidos.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

A Eternl é uma das carteiras mais relevantes do ecossistema Cardano. Trata-se de uma wallet amplamente utilizada para pagamentos, staking, interação com DApps, participação em governança, uso por power users e acesso cotidiano à blockchain. A proposta também apresenta elementos positivos importantes, especialmente ao tentar estabelecer um caminho de sustentabilidade financeira por meio de planos pagos e ao indicar mecanismos de possível retorno de recursos ao Tesouro.

A nova versão da proposta incorpora melhorias relevantes em relação à versão anterior. Foram adicionados esclarecimentos sobre auditorias, métricas de supervisão, transparência financeira e mecanismos de eventual devolução de recursos ao Tesouro. Além disso, a Eternl alterou sua posição anterior e passou a declarar que seu DRep se abstém desta votação. Essas mudanças representam respostas concretas a críticas levantadas durante a avaliação da proposta anterior e devem ser reconhecidas positivamente.

A tentativa de construir um modelo de sustentabilidade financeira deve ser reconhecida como positiva. Talvez esse movimento tenha vindo tarde, mas a explicação apresentada pela equipe não deve ser ignorada. Em um ecossistema onde muitos projetos grandes continuam recorrente ou estruturalmente dependentes de subsídios públicos, ao menos existe aqui uma tentativa declarada de construir uma fonte de receita própria e reduzir dependência futura do Tesouro. Esse ponto conta a favor da proposta.

A nova versão introduz uma estimativa segundo a qual aproximadamente 5.500 usuários pagantes, ou cerca de 4,2% da base instalada, seriam suficientes para cobrir integralmente os custos anuais da operação. Essa informação ajuda a contextualizar a estratégia de sustentabilidade e representa uma melhoria em relação à proposta anterior.

No campo da governança, a nova proposta apresenta uma melhoria importante. A versão anterior declarava explicitamente que a Eternl votaria em sua própria proposta. Essa postura foi objeto de preocupação significativa, uma vez que o beneficiário direto dos recursos pretendia utilizar delegated voting power para apoiar uma retirada do Tesouro em seu próprio benefício.

A nova versão altera esse posicionamento e informa que o DRep da Eternl se abstém desta votação. Essa mudança deve ser reconhecida positivamente. A abstenção do beneficiário direto reduz significativamente a preocupação relacionada ao uso de voting power delegado para aprovar financiamento próprio e fortalece a legitimidade do processo decisório.

Também foi fornecido maior detalhamento sobre auditorias independentes, métricas de supervisão, custódia dos recursos, transparência financeira e mecanismos de eventual devolução de recursos ao Tesouro. Essas mudanças aumentam a previsibilidade sobre como os recursos seriam administrados e monitorados ao longo do período financiado.

A Eternl continua sendo uma das principais carteiras utilizadas pela comunidade Cardano. É uma ferramenta confiável, com histórico relevante e papel importante para usuários avançados, participantes de DeFi, DApps, staking, governança e interação cotidiana com a rede. A proposta também busca financiar manutenção real: frontend, backend, infraestrutura, suporte, compatibilidade com hard forks, CIPs, hardware wallets, governance tooling e operação diária.

A continuidade da Eternl possui valor para o ecossistema. Se a Eternl deixasse de operar ou reduzisse drasticamente sua capacidade, haveria impacto para parte relevante dos usuários. Existem outras carteiras no ecossistema Cardano, e talvez até mais carteiras do que o necessário em alguns segmentos. Ainda assim, a Eternl provavelmente não seria uma das carteiras que o ecossistema deveria querer perder. Sua importância prática como interface de acesso

Governance Action Report [EN]

1. Introduction

This governance action proposes to update the Plutus V3 Cost Model through a Parameter Update governance action. The update enables the new Plutus primitives that will become available after the van Rossem hard fork to Protocol Version 11, enables all Plutus primitives in Plutus V1 and V2 as well as Plutus V3, and changes settings for some existing Plutus primitives.

The new primitives will not become available under Protocol Version 10. They will only become available after the hard fork to Protocol Version 11. However, changes to existing primitives will take effect immediately upon enactment of this governance action.

The governance action states that the changes were recommended by Intersect’s Parameter Committee, confirmed by Intersect’s Technical Steering Committee, and tested through equivalent changes enacted on SanchoNet, Preview, and Preprod. The proposal also states that benchmarking results were obtained for the new primitives and that changes to existing primitives were benchmarked. The update introduces primitives related to cryptography, list manipulation, array operations, and value and data manipulation, and declares consistency with the relevant Cardano Constitution guardrails for Plutus cost model updates.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

This is a highly technical protocol parameter update, and Agora does not have the technical expertise required to independently evaluate the correctness of the proposed Plutus cost model changes, the benchmarking assumptions, or the potential compatibility effects on existing applications.

For that reason, Agora must rely substantially on the expertise of the relevant technical committees and the individuals involved in reviewing and discussing the proposed changes. The process appears to have received broad support from the technical bodies involved, and the proposal states that the update was recommended by Intersect’s Parameter Committee, confirmed by the Technical Steering Committee, and deployed on SanchoNet, Preview, and Preprod before mainnet submission. The proposal also states that the cost model changes are based on benchmarking and are intended to support the Plutus primitives associated with Protocol Version 11.

Risks and concerns

Agora does not feel comfortable voting YES because there are unresolved concerns that cannot be independently assessed. The proposal itself makes clear that, while the new primitives will only become available after the Van Rossem hard fork, changes to existing primitives will take effect immediately upon enactment of this governance action. This creates a different risk profile from a purely future-facing activation step.

There are also concerns raised in the broader review process regarding backward compatibility, potential effects on existing applications, and whether some changes should have been introduced through a new Plutus version rather than through the current update path. One external rationale argues that the changes should be proposed under Plutus V4 instead of as an extension of Plutus V3, citing backward compatibility concerns and possible downstream transaction-builder issues. Another rationale explicitly notes reliance on the Intersect Parameter and Technical Steering Committees while requesting an update from those teams if backward compatibility issues require resolution.

The TSC meeting notes also indicate that there was awareness of risks related to increasing costs, careful testing, timing pressure, and the possibility of retracting the governance action if issues were found before enactment. In addition, some supporting communication material appears to be access-restricted, which is not ideal for material intended to support public governance decision-making.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: ABSTAIN.

Given these uncertainties, Agora does not believe a YES vote would be responsible. At the same time, Agora also does not believe a NO vote is justified, because there was strong support from the technical participants involved in the process, and there is not sufficient technical basis to conclude that the action should be blocked.

Therefore, Agora will abstain.

This abstention reflects uncertainty and limits of technical competence, not opposition to the objective of improving Plutus or supporting the Van Rossem hard fork. For highly technical governance actions where there is broad expert support but also unresolved compatibility or process concerns that cannot be independently evaluated, abstention is the most responsible position.

Conditions or signals that could change the vote: an update from the Intersect Parameter and Technical Steering Committees if backward compatibility issues require resolution.

4. Conclusion

The governance action has broad technical support and is tied to Plutus improvements for Protocol Version 11, but unresolved compatibility and process concerns remain outside Agora’s independent technical capacity to evaluate. A YES vote would not be responsible, while a NO vote would not be justified. The resulting position is ABSTAIN.

---

Relatório de Ação de Governança [PT-BR]

1. Introdução

Esta ação de governança propõe atualizar o Modelo de Custo do Plutus V3 por meio de uma ação de governança de Atualização de Parâmetros. A atualização habilita os novos primitivos Plutus que ficarão disponíveis após o hard fork Van Rossem para a Versão de Protocolo 11, habilita todos os primitivos Plutus em Plutus V1 e V2, além de Plutus V3, e altera configurações de alguns primitivos Plutus existentes.

Os novos primitivos não ficarão disponíveis na Versão de Protocolo 10. Eles somente ficarão disponíveis após o hard fork para a Versão de Protocolo 11. No entanto, as mudanças em primitivos existentes entrarão em vigor imediatamente após a promulgação desta ação de governança.

A ação de governança afirma que as mudanças foram recomendadas pelo Comitê de Parâmetros da Intersect, confirmadas pelo Comitê Técnico Diretor da Intersect e testadas por meio de mudanças equivalentes promulgadas na SanchoNet, Preview e Preprod. A proposta também afirma que resultados de benchmarking foram obtidos para os novos primitivos e que as mudanças em primitivos existentes foram submetidas a benchmarking. A atualização introduz primitivos relacionados a criptografia, manipulação de listas, operações com arrays e manipulação de valores e dados, e declara consistência com os guardrails relevantes da Constituição da Cardano para atualizações do modelo de custo do Plutus.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

Esta é uma atualização de parâmetro de protocolo altamente técnica, e a Agora não possui a expertise técnica necessária para avaliar independentemente a correção das mudanças propostas no modelo de custo do Plutus, as premissas de benchmarking ou os potenciais efeitos de compatibilidade sobre aplicações existentes.

Por esse motivo, a Agora deve se apoiar substancialmente na expertise dos comitês técnicos relevantes e dos indivíduos envolvidos na revisão e discussão das mudanças propostas. O processo parece ter recebido amplo apoio dos órgãos técnicos envolvidos, e a proposta afirma que a atualização foi recomendada pelo Comitê de Parâmetros da Intersect, confirmada pelo Comitê Técnico Diretor e implantada na SanchoNet, Preview e Preprod antes da submissão à mainnet. A proposta também afirma que as mudanças no modelo de custo são baseadas em benchmarking e têm como objetivo dar suporte aos primitivos Plutus associados à Versão de Protocolo 11.

Riscos e preocupações

A Agora não se sente confortável em votar YES porque há preocupações não resolvidas que não podem ser avaliadas independentemente. A própria proposta deixa claro que, embora os novos primitivos somente fiquem disponíveis após o hard fork Van Rossem, as mudanças em primitivos existentes entrarão em vigor imediatamente após a promulgação desta ação de governança. Isso cria um perfil de risco diferente de uma etapa de ativação puramente voltada ao futuro.

Também há preocupações levantadas no processo mais amplo de revisão a respeito de compatibilidade retroativa, potenciais efeitos sobre aplicações existentes e se algumas mudanças deveriam ter sido introduzidas por meio de uma nova versão do Plutus, em vez do caminho atual de atualização. Um rationale externo argumenta que as mudanças deveriam ser propostas sob Plutus V4, em vez de como uma extensão do Plutus V3, citando preocupações de compatibilidade retroativa e possíveis problemas downstream em transaction builders. Outro rationale observa explicitamente a confiança depositada nos Comitês de Parâmetros e Técnico Diretor da Intersect, ao mesmo tempo em que solicita uma atualização desses times caso problemas de compatibilidade retroativa precisem ser resolvidos.

As notas da reunião do TSC também indicam que havia consciência de riscos relacionados ao aumento de custos, testes cuidadosos, pressão de timing e possibilidade de retrair a ação de governança se problemas fossem encontrados antes da promulgação. Além disso, parte do material de comunicação de suporte parece ter acesso restrito, o que não é ideal para materiais destinados a apoiar a tomada de decisão pública em governança.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: ABSTAIN.

Dadas essas incertezas, a Agora não acredita que um voto YES seria responsável. Ao mesmo tempo, a Agora também não acredita que um voto NO seja justificado, porque houve forte apoio dos participantes técnicos envolvidos no processo, e não há base técnica suficiente para concluir que a ação deve ser bloqueada.

Portanto, a Agora se absterá.

Esta abstenção reflete incerteza e limites de competência técnica, não oposição ao objetivo de melhorar o Plutus ou apoiar o hard fork Van Rossem. Para ações de governança altamente técnicas em que há amplo apoio especializado, mas também preocupações de compatibilidade ou processo não resolvidas que não podem ser avaliadas independentemente, a abstenção é a posição mais responsável.

Condições ou sinais que poderiam alterar o voto: uma atualização dos Comitês de Parâmetros e Técnico Diretor da Intersect caso problemas de compatibilidade retroativa precisem ser resolvidos.

4. Conclusão

A ação de governança possui amplo apoio técnico e está ligada a melhorias do Plutus para a Versão de Protocolo 11, mas permanecem preocupações de compatibilidade e processo fora da capacidade técnica independente de avaliação da Agora. Um voto YES não seria responsável, enquanto um voto NO não seria justificado. A posição resultante é ABSTAIN.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report

1. Introduction

This Treasury Withdrawal requests ₳23,000,000 from the Cardano Treasury to fund CCI V2, a 12-month continuation, enhancement, and maintenance program for Cardano Critical Integrations.

The request covers ongoing operational and contracted Year 2 costs for integrations delivered or currently being integrated under CCI V1: Circle USDCx, LayerZero, Pyth Price Feeds, and Dune Analytics. It also includes a new full native integration of Cardano into Fireblocks, intended to support ADA, Cardano Native Tokens, and technical foundations for Cardano-specific workflows such as staking and governance delegation.

Funds would be administered by Intersect under the Treasury Reserve Smart Contract Framework. Drawdowns would occur after signed agreements and Statements of Work are submitted and verified. The proposal states that unused funds would be returned to the Cardano Treasury at the end of the 12-month period.

The budget is divided into three high-level categories: ₳20,700,000 for integration and maintenance costs, ₳1,150,000 for an enhancement and tooling reserve, and ₳1,150,000 for legal, audit, and contract administration. Vendor-level costs are not publicly disclosed due to confidentiality obligations.

The prospective recipient, acting through the Pentad steering structure with Intersect as Administrator, previously received ₳70,000,000 from the Cardano Treasury under the CCI V1 budget.

2. Governance Action Review

Risks and concerns

Cardano governance currently lacks a formal conflict-of-interest policy governing how DReps should participate in Treasury Withdrawal votes when they are direct beneficiaries, formal representatives, executives, employees, founders, controlling stakeholders, or otherwise institutionally linked to the entity requesting funds.

This is a weakness in the current governance framework. Some DAOs within the Cardano ecosystem already have explicit guidelines addressing conflicts of interest, which shows that such standards are both feasible and desirable.

In the absence of formal rules, each DRep effectively becomes their own arbiter of what constitutes acceptable conduct. For that reason, a personal standard based on basic governance prudence has been adopted.

It has been publicly stated that when a DRep votes YES on a Treasury Withdrawal proposal from which they, or the institution they formally represent, directly benefit, the general position will be to vote NO. This is not necessarily a judgment on the technical or strategic merits of the proposal itself, but rather a position on governance process, conflict management, and institutional legitimacy.

It would be unhealthy for the ecosystem to normalize situations where delegated voting power is used to support funding requests that benefit the same entity exercising that voting power.

In this case, the concern is amplified by the scale of the voting power involved. The DReps associated with this proposal control approximately 1.2 billion ADA in delegated voting power, placing them among the most influential governance actors in the Cardano ecosystem.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The vote is based on governance process, conflict management, and institutional legitimacy, not necessarily on the technical or strategic merits of the proposal itself.

Cardano governance currently lacks a formal conflict-of-interest policy governing how DReps should participate in Treasury Withdrawal votes when they are direct beneficiaries, formal representatives, executives, employees, founders, controlling stakeholders, or otherwise institutionally linked to the entity requesting funds.

In the absence of formal rules, each DRep effectively becomes their own arbiter of what constitutes acceptable conduct. For that reason, a personal standard based on basic governance prudence has been adopted.

When a DRep votes YES on a Treasury Withdrawal proposal from which they, or the institution they formally represent, directly benefit, the general position will be to vote NO.

It would be unhealthy for the ecosystem to normalize situations where delegated voting power is used to support funding requests that benefit the same entity exercising that voting power.

In this case, the concern is amplified by the scale of the voting power involved. The DReps associated with this proposal control approximately 1.2 billion ADA in delegated voting power, placing them among the most influential governance actors in the Cardano ecosystem.

4. Conclusion

The NO vote reflects a governance-process position. In the absence of a formal conflict-of-interest policy, delegated voting power should not be normalized as a tool to support Treasury withdrawals that directly benefit the same entity or institution exercising that voting power.

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Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança

1. Introdução

Esta Treasury Withdrawal solicita ₳23.000.000 do Tesouro da Cardano para financiar o CCI V2, um programa de 12 meses de continuidade, aprimoramento e manutenção das Cardano Critical Integrations.

A solicitação cobre custos operacionais contínuos e custos contratados do Ano 2 para integrações entregues ou atualmente em integração no CCI V1: Circle USDCx, LayerZero, Pyth Price Feeds e Dune Analytics. Também inclui uma nova integração nativa completa da Cardano ao Fireblocks, destinada a oferecer suporte a ADA, Cardano Native Tokens e bases técnicas para fluxos específicos da Cardano, como staking e delegação de governança.

Os fundos seriam administrados pela Intersect sob o Treasury Reserve Smart Contract Framework. Os saques ocorreriam após a submissão e verificação de acordos assinados e Statements of Work. A proposta afirma que fundos não utilizados seriam devolvidos ao Tesouro da Cardano ao final do período de 12 meses.

O orçamento é dividido em três categorias de alto nível: ₳20.700.000 para custos de integração e manutenção, ₳1.150.000 para uma reserva de aprimoramento e tooling, e ₳1.150.000 para custos jurídicos, auditoria e administração contratual. Custos por fornecedor não são divulgados publicamente devido a obrigações de confidencialidade.

O potencial recebedor, atuando por meio da estrutura de steering da Pentad com a Intersect como Administradora, recebeu anteriormente ₳70.000.000 do Tesouro da Cardano sob o orçamento CCI V1.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Riscos e preocupações

A governança da Cardano atualmente não possui uma política formal de conflito de interesse regulando como DReps devem participar de votos de Treasury Withdrawal quando são beneficiários diretos, representantes formais, executivos, empregados, fundadores, stakeholders controladores ou de outra forma institucionalmente vinculados à entidade que solicita os fundos.

Isso é uma fraqueza no atual framework de governança. Algumas DAOs dentro do ecossistema Cardano já possuem diretrizes explícitas tratando de conflitos de interesse, o que mostra que tais padrões são tanto viáveis quanto desejáveis.

Na ausência de regras formais, cada DRep efetivamente se torna seu próprio árbitro do que constitui uma conduta aceitável. Por essa razão, foi adotado um padrão pessoal baseado em prudência básica de governança.

Foi declarado publicamente que, quando um DRep vota SIM em uma proposta de Treasury Withdrawal da qual ele, ou a instituição que formalmente representa, se beneficia diretamente, a posição geral será votar NÃO. Isso não é necessariamente um julgamento sobre os méritos técnicos ou estratégicos da proposta em si, mas sim uma posição sobre processo de governança, gestão de conflitos e legitimidade institucional.

Seria prejudicial para o ecossistema normalizar situações em que poder de voto delegado é utilizado para apoiar solicitações de financiamento que beneficiam a mesma entidade que exerce esse poder de voto.

Neste caso, a preocupação é ampliada pela escala do poder de voto envolvido. Os DReps associados a esta proposta controlam aproximadamente 1,2 bilhão de ADA em poder de voto delegado, colocando-os entre os atores de governança mais influentes do ecossistema Cardano.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NÃO

O voto se baseia em processo de governança, gestão de conflitos e legitimidade institucional, não necessariamente nos méritos técnicos ou estratégicos da proposta em si.

A governança da Cardano atualmente não possui uma política formal de conflito de interesse regulando como DReps devem participar de votos de Treasury Withdrawal quando são beneficiários diretos, representantes formais, executivos, empregados, fundadores, stakeholders controladores ou de outra forma institucionalmente vinculados à entidade que solicita os fundos.

Na ausência de regras formais, cada DRep efetivamente se torna seu próprio árbitro do que constitui uma conduta aceitável. Por essa razão, foi adotado um padrão pessoal baseado em prudência básica de governança.

Quando um DRep vota SIM em uma proposta de Treasury Withdrawal da qual ele, ou a instituição que formalmente representa, se beneficia diretamente, a posição geral será votar NÃO.

Seria prejudicial para o ecossistema normalizar situações em que poder de voto delegado é utilizado para apoiar solicitações de financiamento que beneficiam a mesma entidade que exerce esse poder de voto.

Neste caso, a preocupação é ampliada pela escala do poder de voto envolvido. Os DReps associados a esta proposta controlam aproximadamente 1,2 bilhão de ADA em poder de voto delegado, colocando-os entre os atores de governança mais influentes do ecossistema Cardano.

4. Conclusão

O voto NÃO reflete uma posição sobre processo de governança. Na ausência de uma política formal de conflito de interesse, poder de voto delegado não deve ser normalizado como ferramenta para apoiar Treasury Withdrawals que beneficiam diretamente a mesma entidade ou instituição que exerce esse poder de voto.

The concern is further intensified by recent ecosystem discussions around delegation practices associated with the Yoroi wallet. EMURGO leadership has publicly acknowledged concerns regarding aspects of that delegation experience and the need to revisit those practices. Against that backdrop, exercising this concentrated voting power in support of a funding request benefiting the same institution creates a serious appearance-of-conflict issue.

Even where no formal rule is violated, governance legitimacy depends not only on procedural compliance, but also on whether conflicts are managed in a way that preserves trust in the decision-making process.

My vote therefore reflects concerns about conflict-of-interest management, voting power concentration, governance precedent, and institutional legitimacy.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Main reasons for voting NO

1. Insufficient strategic priority

The proposal addresses infrastructure decentralization and additional network resilience, which are valuable objectives. However, I do not consider this initiative sufficiently urgent under the current treasury constraints. Cardano is already highly decentralized relative to most blockchain networks, while several existing ecosystem projects are struggling to maintain continuity or remain operational. In this context, I believe treasury resources should prioritize more immediate ecosystem needs rather than additional resilience for infrastructure that is already comparatively decentralized.

1. Insufficient budget granularity

The budget is primarily presented through aggregated FTE rates of US$200,000 per year. If interpreted mainly as developer compensation, these rates would appear high even compared with expensive labor markets such as the United States. The proposal states that the rates include salaries, taxes, overhead, complementary personnel, compliance, legal expenses, and financial auditing, but it does not quantify these components separately. A dRep should not be required to infer the internal composition of a substantial treasury request. The burden of providing a sufficiently detailed and verifiable budget rests with the proposer.

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Principais motivos para o voto NÃO

1. Prioridade estratégica insuficiente

A proposta aborda a descentralização da infraestrutura e o aumento da resiliência da rede, objetivos que possuem valor. No entanto, não considero esta iniciativa suficientemente urgente diante das atuais restrições orçamentárias do Tesouro. A Cardano já apresenta um elevado nível de descentralização quando comparada à maioria das outras blockchains, enquanto diversos projetos existentes no ecossistema enfrentam dificuldades para manter sua continuidade ou permanecer operacionais. Nesse contexto, considero mais apropriado priorizar necessidades imediatas do ecossistema em vez de financiar resiliência adicional para uma infraestrutura que já é comparativamente descentralizada.

1. Granularidade orçamentária insuficiente

O orçamento é apresentado principalmente por meio de taxas agregadas de US$ 200 mil por FTE ao ano. Caso fossem interpretadas predominantemente como remuneração de desenvolvedores, essas taxas pareceriam elevadas até mesmo em comparação com mercados de trabalho caros, como o dos Estados Unidos. A proposta afirma que os valores incluem salários, impostos, despesas operacionais, pessoal complementar, compliance, custos jurídicos e auditoria financeira, mas não quantifica esses componentes separadamente. Não cabe ao dRep deduzir a composição interna de um pedido significativo ao Tesouro. O ônus de apresentar um orçamento suficientemente detalhado e verificável pertence ao proponente.

TWGA was deemed Unconstitutional my the majority of CCs.

Governance Action Report

1. Introduction

Cardano at TOKEN2049 Singapore 2026: Baseline ‘Platinum’ Sponsorship Proposal is a Treasury Withdrawal governance action requesting ₳3,303,750, equivalent to $792,900 USD at an estimated exchange rate of $0.24 per ada.

The proposal seeks to fund a Cardano presence at TOKEN2049 Singapore 2026, taking place on October 7–8, 2026. The requested funding would cover a ‘Platinum’ sponsorship package, booth build and logistics, management and community support, compliance and governance costs, and Intersect’s administration fee.

The proposal positions TOKEN2049 Singapore as a major opportunity to showcase Cardano builders to an audience of more than 25,000 attendees, including institutional investors, enterprise decision-makers, Web3 builders, and industry leaders. The planned activation includes a large Cardano booth, a dedicated builder substage, branded visibility, builder tickets, lead scanning, networking opportunities, professional content capture, and post-event reporting.

EMURGO would act as the operational facilitator. The proposal states that EMURGO is headquartered in Singapore, has maintained a multi-year relationship with TOKEN2049 from 2022 through 2025, and is positioned to coordinate the sponsorship, vendors, logistics, and builder participation.

The proposal also includes KPI targets related to lead generation, partnerships, thought leadership, brand reach, wallet sign-ups, Cardano Academy subscribers, media coverage, and post-event on-chain activity. Funds would be administered through Intersect, using treasury reserve and project-specific smart contract infrastructure, with milestone-based disbursements and post-event financial reporting.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Negative aspects

Unfortunately, Cardano governance currently lacks a formal conflict-of-interest policy governing how DReps should participate in Treasury Withdrawal votes when they are direct beneficiaries, formal representatives, executives, employees, founders, controlling stakeholders, or otherwise institutionally linked to the entity requesting funds.

This is a weakness in the current governance framework. Some DAOs within the Cardano ecosystem already have explicit guidelines addressing conflicts of interest, which shows that such standards are both feasible and desirable.

In the absence of formal rules, each DRep effectively becomes their own arbiter of what constitutes acceptable conduct. For that reason, a personal standard has been adopted based on basic governance prudence.

When a DRep votes YES on a Treasury Withdrawal proposal from which they, or the institution they formally represent, directly benefit, the general position will be to vote NO. This is not necessarily a judgment on the technical or strategic merits of the proposal itself, but rather a position on governance process, conflict management, and institutional legitimacy.

It would be unhealthy for the ecosystem to normalize situations where delegated voting power is used to support funding requests that benefit the same entity exercising that voting power.

A secondary factor influencing the vote concerns budget transparency and the ability to independently validate a significant portion of the requested expenditure.

The proposal provides a high-level budget breakdown and identifies the sponsorship package as a direct pass-through cost payable to TOKEN2049. However, it does not provide supporting commercial documentation that would allow DReps to independently verify the quoted sponsorship costs.

According to the proposal, EMURGO has maintained a multi-year strategic relationship with TOKEN2049 and possesses direct access to the event organizers. This relationship may very well create favorable commercial conditions for Cardano. However, the proposal does not provide sufficient information for DReps to assess whether the quoted sponsorship costs reflect standard market pricing, negotiated pricing, discounted pricing, or other commercial arrangements.

For a treasury withdrawal of this magnitude, it would be reasonable to provide supporting documentation such as sponsorship rate cards, commercial quotations, pricing schedules, or equivalent evidence demonstrating how the sponsorship costs were determined.

The concern is not that the figures are necessarily incorrect, inflated, or unreasonable. Rather, DReps have not been provided with sufficient information to independently validate one of the largest budget components within the proposal.

Risks and concerns

In this case, the concern is amplified by the scale of the voting power involved. The DRep associated with this proposal controls approximately 1 billion ada in delegated voting power, making it one of the most influential governance actors in the Cardano ecosystem.

The concern is further intensified by recent ecosystem discussions around delegation practices associated with the Yoroi wallet. EMURGO leadership has publicly acknowledged concerns regarding aspects of that delegation experience and the need to revisit those practices. Against that backdrop, exercising this concentrated voting power in support of a funding request benefiting the same institution creates a serious appearance-of-conflict issue.

Even where no formal rule is violated, governance legitimacy depends not only on procedural compliance, but also on whether conflicts are managed in a way that preserves trust in the decision-making process.

The vote therefore reflects concerns about conflict-of-interest management, voting power concentration, governance precedent, and institutional legitimacy. It should not be read primarily as an assessment of the operational competence of EMURGO or the potential marketing value of TOKEN2049 itself.

Regarding the broader marketing strategy itself, the position is largely neutral. There is not sufficient marketing expertise to confidently determine whether this sponsorship represents an optimal allocation of treasury resources relative to alternative ecosystem growth initiatives.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The NO vote reflects concerns regarding conflict-of-interest management, voting power concentration, governance precedent, institutional legitimacy, treasury accountability, and cost validation.

Cardano governance currently lacks a formal conflict-of-interest policy governing how DReps should participate in Treasury Withdrawal votes when they are direct beneficiaries, formal representatives, executives, employees, founders, controlling stakeholders, or otherwise institutionally linked to the entity requesting funds. In the absence of formal rules, a personal standard has been adopted: when a DRep votes YES on a Treasury Withdrawal proposal from which they, or the institution they formally represent, directly benefit, the general position will be to vote NO.

This position is not necessarily a judgment on the technical or strategic merits of the proposal itself, but rather a position on governance process, conflict management, and institutional legitimacy. It would be unhealthy for the ecosystem to normalize situations where delegated voting power is used to support funding requests that benefit the same entity exercising that voting power.

The concern is amplified by the scale of the voting power involved, as the DRep associated with this proposal controls approximately 1 billion ada in delegated voting power. It is further intensified by recent ecosystem discussions around delegation practices associated with the Yoroi wallet and public acknowledgement by EMURGO leadership that aspects of that delegation experience require revisiting.

A secondary factor concerns budget transparency. The proposal identifies the sponsorship package as a direct pass-through cost payable to TOKEN2049, but does not provide supporting commercial documentation that would allow DReps to independently verify the quoted sponsorship costs. For a treasury withdrawal of this magnitude, supporting documentation such as sponsorship rate cards, commercial quotations, pricing schedules, or equivalent evidence would be reasonable.

Had the proposal adequately addressed budget transparency concerns and had there been no conflict-of-interest concerns associated with the voting process, the position likely would have leaned toward ABSTAIN rather than NO, deferring more heavily to stakeholders with greater expertise in marketing, event sponsorships, and ecosystem growth initiatives.

4. Conclusion

The NO vote is based on governance process rather than primary opposition to marketing activities, EMURGO’s operational competence, or the strategic objectives of TOKEN2049 participation. The decisive concerns are conflict-of-interest management, concentrated voting power, institutional legitimacy, treasury accountability, and insufficient independent validation of major sponsorship costs.

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Relatório de Ação de Governança

1. Introdução

Cardano at TOKEN2049 Singapore 2026: Baseline ‘Platinum’ Sponsorship Proposal é uma ação de governança de retirada do tesouro que solicita ₳3.303.750, equivalente a US$792.900, com base em uma taxa estimada de US$0,24 por ada.

A proposta busca financiar a presença da Cardano no TOKEN2049 Singapore 2026, que ocorrerá em 7 e 8 de outubro de 2026. O financiamento solicitado cobriria um pacote de patrocínio ‘Platinum’, construção e logística do estande, gestão e suporte à comunidade, custos de conformidade e governança, além da taxa administrativa da Intersect.

A proposta apresenta o TOKEN2049 Singapore como uma grande oportunidade para expor builders da Cardano a uma audiência de mais de 25.000 participantes, incluindo investidores institucionais, tomadores de decisão empresariais, builders Web3 e líderes da indústria. A ativação planejada inclui um grande estande da Cardano, um subpalco dedicado a builders, visibilidade de marca, ingressos para builders, escaneamento de leads, oportunidades de networking, captura profissional de conteúdo e relatório pós-evento.

A EMURGO atuaria como facilitadora operacional. A proposta afirma que a EMURGO está sediada em Singapura, mantém uma relação de vários anos com o TOKEN2049 de 2022 a 2025, e está posicionada para coordenar o patrocínio, fornecedores, logística e participação dos builders.

A proposta também inclui metas de KPI relacionadas à geração de leads, parcerias, liderança de pensamento, alcance de marca, cadastros de carteiras, assinantes da Cardano Academy, cobertura de mídia e atividade on-chain pós-evento. Os fundos seriam administrados pela Intersect, usando infraestrutura de contratos inteligentes de reserva do tesouro e contratos específicos por projeto, com desembolsos baseados em marcos e relatório financeiro pós-evento.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos negativos

Infelizmente, a governança da Cardano atualmente não possui uma política formal de conflito de interesses que regule como DReps devem participar de votos de Treasury Withdrawal quando são beneficiários diretos, representantes formais, executivos, funcionários, fundadores, stakeholders controladores ou de outra forma institucionalmente vinculados à entidade que solicita fundos.

Isso é uma fraqueza no atual framework de governança. Algumas DAOs dentro do ecossistema Cardano já possuem diretrizes explícitas para lidar com conflitos de interesse, o que demonstra que tais padrões são tanto viáveis quanto desejáveis.

Na ausência de regras formais, cada DRep efetivamente se torna seu próprio árbitro sobre o que constitui conduta aceitável. Por essa razão, foi adotado um padrão pessoal baseado em prudência básica de governança.

Quando um DRep vota YES em uma proposta de Treasury Withdrawal da qual ele, ou a instituição que formalmente representa, se beneficia diretamente, a posição geral será votar NO. Isso não é necessariamente um julgamento sobre os méritos técnicos ou estratégicos da proposta em si, mas sim uma posição sobre processo de governança, gestão de conflitos e legitimidade institucional.

Seria prejudicial para o ecossistema normalizar situações em que poder de voto delegado é usado para apoiar solicitações de financiamento que beneficiam a mesma entidade que exerce esse poder de voto.

Um fator secundário que influencia o voto diz respeito à transparência orçamentária e à capacidade de validar independentemente uma parcela significativa do gasto solicitado.

A proposta fornece uma divisão orçamentária de alto nível e identifica o pacote de patrocínio como um custo direto de repasse pagável ao TOKEN2049. No entanto, ela não fornece documentação comercial de suporte que permitiria aos DReps verificar independentemente os custos de patrocínio apresentados.

Segundo a proposta, a EMURGO mantém uma relação estratégica de vários anos com o TOKEN2049 e possui acesso direto aos organizadores do evento. Essa relação pode muito bem criar condições comerciais favoráveis para a Cardano. No entanto, a proposta não fornece informações suficientes para que os DReps avaliem se os custos de patrocínio apresentados refletem preço padrão de mercado, preço negociado, preço com desconto ou outros arranjos comerciais.

Para uma retirada do tesouro dessa magnitude, seria razoável fornecer documentação de suporte, como tabelas de preços de patrocínio, cotações comerciais, cronogramas de preços ou evidência equivalente demonstrando como os custos de patrocínio foram determinados.

A preocupação não é que os valores estejam necessariamente incorretos, inflados ou irrazoáveis. Em vez disso, os DReps não receberam informações suficientes para validar independentemente um dos maiores componentes orçamentários da proposta.

Riscos e preocupações

Neste caso, a preocupação é ampliada pela escala do poder de voto envolvido. O DRep associado a esta proposta controla aproximadamente 1 bilhão de ada em poder de voto delegado, tornando-se um dos atores de governança mais influentes do ecossistema Cardano.

A preocupação é ainda intensificada por discussões recentes no ecossistema sobre práticas de delegação associadas à carteira Yoroi. A liderança da EMURGO reconheceu publicamente preocupações relacionadas a aspectos dessa experiência de delegação e a necessidade de revisitar essas práticas. Diante desse contexto, exercer esse poder de voto concentrado em apoio a uma solicitação de financiamento que beneficia a mesma instituição cria um sério problema de aparência de conflito.

Mesmo quando nenhuma regra formal é violada, a legitimidade da governança depende não apenas da conformidade procedimental, mas também de conflitos serem administrados de uma forma que preserve a confiança no processo decisório.

O voto, portanto, reflete preocupações sobre gestão de conflito de interesses, concentração de poder de voto, precedente de governança e legitimidade institucional. Ele não deve ser lido principalmente como uma avaliação da competência operacional da EMURGO ou do potencial valor de marketing do TOKEN2049 em si.

Em relação à estratégia de marketing mais ampla, a posição é majoritariamente neutra. Não há expertise suficiente em marketing para determinar com confiança se este patrocínio representa uma alocação ideal de recursos do tesouro em comparação com iniciativas alternativas de crescimento do ecossistema.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NO

O voto NO reflete preocupações relacionadas à gestão de conflito de interesses, concentração de poder de voto, precedente de governança, legitimidade institucional, accountability do tesouro e validação de custos.

A governança da Cardano atualmente não possui uma política formal de conflito de interesses que regule como DReps devem participar de votos de Treasury Withdrawal quando são beneficiários diretos, representantes formais, executivos, funcionários, fundadores, stakeholders controladores ou de outra forma institucionalmente vinculados à entidade que solicita fundos. Na ausência de regras formais, foi adotado um padrão pessoal: quando um DRep vota YES em uma proposta de Treasury Withdrawal da qual ele, ou a instituição que formalmente representa, se beneficia diretamente, a posição geral será votar NO.

Essa posição não é necessariamente um julgamento sobre os méritos técnicos ou estratégicos da proposta em si, mas sim uma posição sobre processo de governança, gestão de conflitos e legitimidade institucional. Seria prejudicial para o ecossistema normalizar situações em que poder de voto delegado é usado para apoiar solicitações de financiamento que beneficiam a mesma entidade que exerce esse poder de voto.

A preocupação é ampliada pela escala do poder de voto envolvido, já que o DRep associado a esta proposta controla aproximadamente 1 bilhão de ada em poder de voto delegado. Ela é ainda intensificada por discussões recentes no ecossistema sobre práticas de delegação associadas à carteira Yoroi e pelo reconhecimento público da liderança da EMURGO de que aspectos dessa experiência de delegação precisam ser revisitados.

Um fator secundário diz respeito à transparência orçamentária. A proposta identifica o pacote de patrocínio como um custo direto de repasse pagável ao TOKEN2049, mas não fornece documentação comercial de suporte que permitiria aos DReps verificar independentemente os custos de patrocínio apresentados. Para uma retirada do tesouro dessa magnitude, documentação de suporte como tabelas de preços de patrocínio, cotações comerciais, cronogramas de preços ou evidência equivalente seria razoável.

Caso a proposta tivesse abordado adequadamente as preocupações de transparência orçamentária e não houvesse preocupações de conflito de interesses associadas ao processo de votação, a posição provavelmente tenderia a ABSTAIN em vez de NO, deferindo mais fortemente a stakeholders com maior expertise em marketing, patrocínios de eventos e iniciativas de crescimento do ecossistema.

4. Conclusão

O voto NO se baseia no processo de governança, e não em oposição primária a atividades de marketing, à competência operacional da EMURGO ou aos objetivos estratégicos da participação no TOKEN2049. As preocupações decisivas são gestão de conflito de interesses, poder de voto concentrado, legitimidade institucional, accountability do tesouro e validação independente insuficiente dos principais custos de patrocínio.

Governance Action Review — Vote: NO

1. Introduction

This Treasury Withdrawal proposal, submitted by Harmonic Laboratories, requests ₳4,600,000 to fund a 12-month work program focused on two engineering tracks: Pebble development and TypeScript tooling maintenance.

Pebble is presented as a production-ready imperative smart-contract language for Cardano, designed with a TypeScript-shaped syntax and intended to provide a more familiar development path for TypeScript, JavaScript, Solidity, and other imperative-language developers. The proposal positions Pebble as complementary to Aiken, not as a replacement, arguing that Cardano benefits from supporting multiple smart-contract development paradigms targeting UPLC.

The second workstream covers hard-fork and tooling maintenance for HLabs’ TypeScript stack, including libraries such as cardano-ledger-ts, ouroboros-miniprotocols-ts, plutus-machine, and uplc. The proposal states that these libraries are used directly or transitively by projects such as Mesh, Lucid Evolution, Midgard, wallet integrations, indexers, and dApp backends.

The requested budget is based on 5 FTEs at an annual rate of US$200,000 per FTE, using a conversion rate of US$0.25 per ADA. The base budget is US$1,000,000, equivalent to ₳4,000,000, plus a 15% refundable contingency reserve of ₳600,000. The proposal includes milestone-based disbursement through escrow, independent oversight, monthly updates, quarterly reports, a public transaction journal, and adoption indicators for Pebble.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The technical value of the proposal and the competence of HLabs are not rejected.

The unbundling from the previous proposal was a positive improvement.

The maintenance component appears more directly urgent, especially given dependencies across the ecosystem.

Pebble may be strategically relevant.

Negative aspects

The proposal still bundles two workstreams with different urgency profiles: TypeScript stack maintenance and Pebble development.

The maintenance component appears more directly urgent, while Pebble remains a more uncertain adoption bet.

The budget provides a minimally acceptable breakdown, but the FTE model aggregates too much. Salaries, overhead, compliance, legal costs, audit costs, and complementary personnel are embedded into a single US$200k/FTE rate.

Based on market references, this appears to be a premium rate. That alone would not justify a NO vote, but it raises the standard for impact justification.

The proposed impact indicators do not meet that standard.

Onboarding at least 20 developers over 12 months is a weak and easily gamified metric relative to the requested budget.

The proposal does not sufficiently demonstrate how the investment translates into measurable ecosystem impact, adoption, or cost-benefit.

Risks and concerns

The main concerns are governance-related: budget proportionality, cost-benefit, KPI robustness, and treasury prioritization under a constrained NCL environment.

In a highly competitive treasury environment, dReps should be careful not to over-prioritize infrastructure spending at the expense of other strategic areas of the ecosystem.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The vote is moving toward NO, not because the technical value of the proposal or the competence of HLabs is rejected, but because the proposal combines a more urgent maintenance component with a less urgent strategic language-development component, while asking for a premium budget and presenting an impact framework that is not sufficiently robust.

If the only issue were technical uncertainty, abstention would be more likely, with greater deference to technically specialized dReps. However, the concerns are primarily governance-related: budget proportionality, cost-benefit, KPI robustness, and treasury prioritization under a constrained NCL environment.

The TypeScript stack maintenance component appears more directly urgent, especially given dependencies across the ecosystem. Pebble may be strategically relevant, but it remains a more uncertain adoption bet.

The budget provides a minimally acceptable breakdown, but the FTE model aggregates too much. Salaries, overhead, compliance, legal costs, audit costs, and complementary personnel are embedded into a single US$200k/FTE rate. Based on market references, this appears to be a premium rate. That alone would not justify a NO vote, but it raises the standard for impact justification.

The proposed impact indicators do not meet that standard. In particular, onboarding at least 20 developers over 12 months is a weak and easily gamified metric relative to the requested budget. The proposal does not sufficiently demonstrate how the investment translates into measurable ecosystem impact, adoption, or cost-benefit.

Despite recognizing the proposal’s strategic relevance, the governance concerns are sufficient to support a NO vote.

4. Conclusion

The proposal includes relevant technical work and a maintenance component with clearer urgency, but the bundled scope, premium FTE model, weak adoption indicators, and insufficient cost-benefit justification do not meet the standard required for a treasury withdrawal of this size under a constrained NCL environment.

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Revisão de Ação de Governança — Voto: NO

1. Introdução

Esta proposta de retirada do Tesouro, submetida pela Harmonic Laboratories, solicita ₳4.600.000 para financiar um programa de trabalho de 12 meses focado em duas frentes de engenharia: desenvolvimento da Pebble e manutenção de tooling TypeScript.

A Pebble é apresentada como uma linguagem imperativa de smart contracts pronta para produção na Cardano, desenhada com uma sintaxe semelhante a TypeScript e destinada a oferecer um caminho de desenvolvimento mais familiar para desenvolvedores de TypeScript, JavaScript, Solidity e outras linguagens imperativas. A proposta posiciona a Pebble como complementar à Aiken, não como substituta, argumentando que a Cardano se beneficia ao oferecer múltiplos paradigmas de desenvolvimento de smart contracts direcionados a UPLC.

A segunda frente cobre manutenção de tooling e preparação para hard fork no stack TypeScript da HLabs, incluindo bibliotecas como cardano-ledger-ts, ouroboros-miniprotocols-ts, plutus-machine e uplc. A proposta afirma que essas bibliotecas são usadas direta ou transitivamente por projetos como Mesh, Lucid Evolution, Midgard, integrações de carteiras, indexers e backends de dApps.

O orçamento solicitado é baseado em 5 FTEs a uma taxa anual de US$200.000 por FTE, usando uma taxa de conversão de US$0,25 por ADA. O orçamento base é de US$1.000.000, equivalente a ₳4.000.000, acrescido de uma reserva de contingência reembolsável de 15%, no valor de ₳600.000. A proposta inclui desembolso por marcos via escrow, supervisão independente, atualizações mensais, relatórios trimestrais, um diário público de transações e indicadores de adoção para a Pebble.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

O valor técnico da proposta e a competência da HLabs não são rejeitados.

A separação em relação à proposta anterior foi uma melhoria positiva.

O componente de manutenção parece mais diretamente urgente, especialmente considerando as dependências existentes no ecossistema.

A Pebble pode ser estrategicamente relevante.

Aspectos negativos

A proposta ainda reúne duas frentes de trabalho com perfis de urgência diferentes: manutenção do stack TypeScript e desenvolvimento da Pebble.

O componente de manutenção parece mais diretamente urgente, enquanto a Pebble permanece uma aposta de adoção mais incerta.

O orçamento apresenta um detalhamento minimamente aceitável, mas o modelo de FTE agrega elementos demais. Salários, overhead, compliance, custos legais, custos de auditoria e pessoal complementar estão incorporados em uma única taxa de US$200k/FTE.

Com base em referências de mercado, essa parece ser uma taxa premium. Isso, isoladamente, não justificaria um voto NO, mas eleva o padrão exigido para a justificativa de impacto.

Os indicadores de impacto propostos não atendem a esse padrão.

O onboarding de pelo menos 20 desenvolvedores ao longo de 12 meses é uma métrica fraca e facilmente manipulável em relação ao orçamento solicitado.

A proposta não demonstra suficientemente como o investimento se traduz em impacto mensurável no ecossistema, adoção ou custo-benefício.

Riscos e preocupações

As principais preocupações são relacionadas à governança: proporcionalidade orçamentária, custo-benefício, robustez dos KPIs e priorização do Tesouro em um ambiente de NCL restrito.

Em um ambiente de Tesouro altamente competitivo, dReps devem ter cuidado para não priorizar excessivamente gastos com infraestrutura em detrimento de outras áreas estratégicas do ecossistema.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NO

O voto caminha para NO, não porque o valor técnico da proposta ou a competência da HLabs sejam rejeitados, mas porque a proposta combina um componente de manutenção mais urgente com um componente estratégico de desenvolvimento de linguagem menos urgente, enquanto solicita um orçamento premium e apresenta uma estrutura de impacto que não é suficientemente robusta.

Se o único problema fosse incerteza técnica, a abstenção seria mais provável, com maior deferência a dReps tecnicamente especializados. No entanto, as preocupações são principalmente relacionadas à governança: proporcionalidade orçamentária, custo-benefício, robustez dos KPIs e priorização do Tesouro em um ambiente de NCL restrito.

O componente de manutenção do stack TypeScript parece mais diretamente urgente, especialmente considerando as dependências existentes no ecossistema. A Pebble pode ser estrategicamente relevante, mas permanece uma aposta de adoção mais incerta.

O orçamento apresenta um detalhamento minimamente aceitável, mas o modelo de FTE agrega elementos demais. Salários, overhead, compliance, custos legais, custos de auditoria e pessoal complementar estão incorporados em uma única taxa de US$200k/FTE. Com base em referências de mercado, essa parece ser uma taxa premium. Isso, isoladamente, não justificaria um voto NO, mas eleva o padrão exigido para a justificativa de impacto.

Os indicadores de impacto propostos não atendem a esse padrão. Em particular, o onboarding de pelo menos 20 desenvolvedores ao longo de 12 meses é uma métrica fraca e facilmente manipulável em relação ao orçamento solicitado. A proposta não demonstra suficientemente como o investimento se traduz em impacto mensurável no ecossistema, adoção ou custo-benefício.

Apesar de reconhecer a relevância estratégica da proposta, as preocupações de governança são suficientes para sustentar um voto NO.

4. Conclusão

A proposta inclui trabalho técnico relevante e um componente de manutenção com urgência mais clara, mas o escopo agrupado, o modelo premium de FTE, os indicadores fracos de adoção e a justificativa insuficiente de custo-benefício não atendem ao padrão exigido para uma retirada do Tesouro desse tamanho em um ambiente de NCL restrito.

EN

I have a conflict of interest regarding this proposal, as I am part of the Cardano Ambassador Program through the Cardano Foundation. Ambassadors may receive rewards or support for their activities and contributions, which creates a potential conflict in relation to a proposal connected to the Cardano Summit.

For this reason, I will abstain.

I believe this is the appropriate standard for governance participation. If we expect others in the Cardano ecosystem to properly disclose and avoid conflicts of interest, we should apply the same standard to ourselves. I encourage other DReps with relevant conflicts of interest to consider abstaining as well.

---

PT

Tenho um conflito de interesses em relação a esta proposta, pois faço parte do Programa de Embaixadores da Cardano por meio da Cardano Foundation. Embaixadores podem receber recompensas ou apoio por suas atividades e contribuições, o que cria um potencial conflito de interesse em relação a uma proposta conectada ao Cardano Summit.

Por esse motivo, irei me abster.

Acredito que este é o padrão adequado para participação em governança. Se esperamos que outras pessoas no ecossistema Cardano declarem e evitem conflitos de interesse de forma apropriada, devemos aplicar o mesmo padrão a nós mesmos. Recomendo que outros DReps que tenham conflitos de interesse relevantes também considerem a abstenção.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Review — Enhancing Plutus

1. Introduction

The governance action requests ₳11,877,575 from the Cardano Treasury to fund the proposal “Enhancing Plutus,” delivered through a partnership between Input Output and VacuumLabs. The proposal focuses on advancing the Plutus platform through improvements to developer experience, extensions to UPLC capabilities and primitives, formal specification, conformance testing, and security-related work.

The proposal is organized around three workstreams. The first workstream addresses Plutus capabilities and primitives, including built-in casing on the Data type, implementation of CIP-0156 multiIndexArray, additional BuiltinValue functions under CIP-0168, investigation of the scope check, and exploration of laziness and memoization in UPLC. The second workstream focuses on formal specification, correctness, and security, including property-based conformance testing, formalization of Plutus primitives in Agda, and security review of evaluator and costing logic. The third workstream focuses on developer experience, including compiler and optimizer architecture improvements, clearer source-level error messages, reduced boilerplate, multi-version GHC support, and simplified Plinth setup.

The roadmap spans Q3 2026 to Q2 2027. The proposal identifies a total treasury ask of ₳11,877,575, with ₳10,214,715 allocated to Development, representing 86% of the total budget. Additional categories include Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance, and Others. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The vote NO does not rely on technical opposition to the proposal, nor on rejection of Plutus development, UPLC, formal methods, developer experience, or improvements to Cardano’s smart contract base.

Potentially useful improvements for the ecosystem are recognized, including execution cost reduction, tooling improvements, formalization, conformance testing, and support for greater implementation diversity.

The proposal also presents a clearer technical structure than some other treasury requests, with workstreams, roadmap, and deliverables described across Q3 2026 to Q2 2027.

Negative aspects

The decisive issue is the lack of sufficient budget granularity.

The proposal requests ₳11,877,575, of which ₳10,214,715, or 86%, is allocated generically to “Development.” Although the proposal lists technical profiles and workstreams, it does not provide sufficient detail on FTEs, duration per role, rate assumptions, seniority, cost split between IO and VacuumLabs, cost per workstream, cost per deliverable, or cost per milestone.

For a treasury withdrawal of this size, this level of aggregation is not sufficient.

Risks and concerns

There is not enough deep technical knowledge of the tech stack to state with confidence that each proposed implementation is necessary, prioritized correctly, or properly priced.

Based on the proposal and rationales from other dReps, the work appears relevant and positive, but not necessarily critical or urgent enough to overcome budget transparency failures.

This point is especially important as a matter of institutional coherence. Over the years, in the Cardano ecosystem and Project Catalyst, many proposals with five-, six-, or seven-figure budgets were criticized or rejected due to lack of budget granularity. It would be inconsistent to lower the standard of rigor precisely when the request involves a founding entity, relevant technical infrastructure, and a budget of almost ₳12 million.

The technical relevance of a proposal does not remove the need for treasury discipline. On the contrary, the larger the budget and the more central the scope, the greater the level of transparency that should be required.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The vote NO should not be interpreted as opposition to the technical merit of the proposal or to the evolution of Plutus infrastructure.

The reason for the vote NO is exclusively the lack of sufficient budget granularity.

The proposal requests ₳11.877.575, of which ₳10.214.715, or 86%, is allocated generically to “Development.” Although technical profiles and workstreams are listed, there is not enough detail on FTEs, duration per function, rate assumptions, seniority, division of costs between IO and VacuumLabs, cost per workstream, cost per deliverable, or cost per milestone.

For a treasury withdrawal of this size, this level of aggregation is not sufficient.

Large treasury withdrawals need to present an auditable, proportional, and sufficiently granular cost model so that dReps and the community can evaluate whether the requested amount is reasonable, efficient, and well distributed.

Conditions or signals that could change the vote: Unknown.

4. Conclusion

The vote NO reflects a governance position on treasury discipline. The proposal may contain relevant technical work for Plutus and Cardano’s smart contract infrastructure, but a request of almost ₳12 million requires a more granular, auditable, and proportionate budget model before it can receive support.

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Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressada

Revisão de Ação de Governança — Enhancing Plutus

1. Introdução

A ação de governança solicita ₳11.877.575 do Tesouro da Cardano para financiar a proposta “Enhancing Plutus”, executada por meio de uma parceria entre Input Output e VacuumLabs. A proposta tem como foco avançar a plataforma Plutus por meio de melhorias na experiência de desenvolvedores, extensões de capacidades e primitivas de UPLC, especificação formal, testes de conformidade e trabalho relacionado à segurança.

A proposta é organizada em três workstreams. O primeiro workstream aborda capacidades e primitivas de Plutus, incluindo built-in casing para o tipo Data, implementação do multiIndexArray da CIP-0156, funções adicionais BuiltinValue da CIP-0168, investigação do scope check e exploração de laziness e memoization em UPLC. O segundo workstream foca em especificação formal, correção e segurança, incluindo testes de conformidade baseados em propriedades, formalização de primitivas Plutus em Agda e revisão de segurança da lógica de avaliação e costing. O terceiro workstream foca em experiência de desenvolvedores, incluindo melhorias na arquitetura de compilador e otimizador, mensagens de erro mais claras em nível de código-fonte, redução de boilerplate, suporte a múltiplas versões de GHC e simplificação do setup do Plinth.

O roadmap cobre o período de Q3 2026 a Q2 2027. A proposta identifica uma solicitação total ao tesouro de ₳11.877.575, com ₳10.214.715 alocados em Development, representando 86% do orçamento total. As demais categorias incluem Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance e Others. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

O voto NO não se baseia em oposição técnica à proposta, nem em rejeição ao desenvolvimento de Plutus, UPLC, formal methods, developer experience ou melhorias na base de smart contracts da Cardano.

São reconhecidas melhorias potencialmente úteis para o ecossistema, incluindo redução de custos de execução, aprimoramentos de tooling, formalização, testes de conformidade e suporte a maior diversidade de implementações.

A proposta também apresenta uma estrutura técnica mais clara do que algumas outras solicitações de tesouro, com workstreams, roadmap e entregas descritas ao longo de Q3 2026 a Q2 2027.

Aspectos negativos

O ponto decisivo é a falta de granularidade suficiente no orçamento.

A proposta solicita ₳11.877.575, dos quais ₳10.214.715, ou 86%, são alocados genericamente em “Development”. Embora a proposta liste perfis técnicos e workstreams, ela não fornece detalhamento suficiente sobre FTEs, duração por função, rate assumptions, senioridade, divisão de custos entre IO e VacuumLabs, custo por workstream, custo por deliverable ou custo por milestone.

Para uma retirada de tesouro desse porte, esse nível de agregação não é suficiente.

Riscos e preocupações

Não há conhecimento técnico profundo o suficiente do tech stack para afirmar, com segurança, que cada implementação proposta é necessária, prioritária ou corretamente precificada.

A partir da leitura da proposta e dos rationales de outros dReps, o trabalho parece relevante e positivo, mas não necessariamente crítico ou urgente a ponto de superar falhas de transparência orçamentária.

Esse ponto é especialmente importante por uma questão de coerência institucional. Ao longo dos anos, no ecossistema Cardano e no Project Catalyst, muitas propostas com orçamentos de cinco, seis ou sete figuras foram criticadas ou rejeitadas por falta de granularidade orçamentária. Seria inconsistente baixar o padrão de rigor justamente quando a solicitação envolve uma entidade fundadora, infraestrutura técnica relevante e um orçamento de quase ₳12 milhões.

A relevância técnica de uma proposta não elimina a necessidade de disciplina de tesouro. Pelo contrário: quanto maior o orçamento e quanto mais central o escopo, maior deveria ser o nível de transparência exigido.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NO

O voto NO não deve ser interpretado como oposição ao mérito técnico da proposta ou à evolução da infraestrutura Plutus.

O motivo do voto NO é única e exclusivamente a falta de granularidade suficiente no orçamento.

A proposta solicita ₳11.877.575, dos quais ₳10.214.715, ou 86%, são alocados genericamente em “Development”. Embora a proposta liste perfis técnicos e workstreams, ela não fornece detalhamento suficiente sobre FTEs, duração por função, rate assumptions, senioridade, divisão de custos entre IO e VacuumLabs, custo por workstream, custo por deliverable ou custo por milestone.

Para uma retirada de tesouro desse porte, esse nível de agregação não é suficiente.

Grandes retiradas do tesouro precisam apresentar um modelo de custo auditável, proporcional e suficientemente granular para que dReps e a comunidade possam avaliar se o valor solicitado é razoável, eficiente e bem distribuído.

Condições ou sinais que poderiam alterar o voto: Unknown.

4. Conclusão

O voto NO reflete uma posição de governança sobre disciplina de tesouro. A proposta pode conter trabalho técnico relevante para Plutus e para a infraestrutura de smart contracts da Cardano, mas uma solicitação de quase ₳12 milhões exige um modelo orçamentário mais granular, auditável e proporcional antes de receber apoio.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Report — Cardano High Assurance

1. Introduction

Cardano High Assurance requests ₳13,078,578 from the Cardano Treasury to deliver automated formal verification tooling and a unified, containerized developer environment for secure and verifiable smart contract development on Cardano.

The proposal is organized into two workstreams: Blaster, IO’s automated formal verification tool for Lean 4 and UPLC-based smart contracts, and CBDE, a Container-Based Developer Environment intended to reduce setup friction for developers using the Plinth high-assurance toolkit.

The Blaster workstream includes DApp-level verification, language integrations for Aiken, Pebble, Scalus, and Futura, a VS Code extension, a Common Vulnerability Library, an equivalence checking tool, and proof reconstruction.

The CBDE workstream includes a pre-configured environment with compilers, libraries, property-based testing, static analysis, formal verification, and profiling tools.

The proposal presents this work as a way to make high-assurance development more accessible and to support Cardano’s positioning around correctness, security, and institutional-grade applications.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

This vote should not be interpreted as opposition to formal verification, high-assurance development, developer tooling, or the technical capabilities of the teams involved.

The proposal addresses a legitimate area of technical improvement for Cardano. Tools such as Blaster, language integrations, the Common Vulnerability Library, VS Code support, and the Container-Based Developer Environment may contribute to safer smart contract development and better developer experience over time.

Negative aspects

Technical value alone is not sufficient to justify treasury funding at this scale.

The proposal requests ₳13,078,578, with ₳11,247,577, or 86% of the total budget, allocated to “Development.”

While the proposal provides a high-level split between the Blaster workstream and the CBDE workstream, it does not provide enough granular detail on FTE allocation, team-by-team budget distribution, rate assumptions, seniority levels, subcontractor allocations, or the specific mapping between budget amounts and deliverables.

For a multi-million-ADA treasury withdrawal, this level of budget abstraction is not sufficient for dReps and the community to assess whether the requested amount is proportionate, efficient, or properly scoped.

This concern is consistent with the standard applied in previous votes. Large treasury requests require clear budget breakdowns.

If dReps accept broad development categories without sufficient cost justification, it becomes difficult to enforce treasury discipline across the rest of the ecosystem.

A second concern is the lack of sufficiently concrete and measurable impact targets.

The proposal aligns itself with Cardano Vision 2030 and connects the work to KPIs such as TVL, monthly transactions, monthly active users, protocol revenue, and throughput capacity. However, many of these connections remain indirect, speculative, or difficult to verify.

Formal verification may improve security and confidence, but the proposal does not clearly demonstrate how this work will materially move the needle on adoption, liquidity, transaction volume, developer retention, or ecosystem growth within a measurable timeframe.

For example, the proposal states that CBDE could reduce a multi-day setup process to a 60-second initialization and expects a 3–5x increase in active Plinth developers within 12 months of release.

These are relevant claims, but they would be stronger with clearer baselines, current developer counts, measurement methodology, and independently verifiable milestone targets.

Risks and concerns

The proposal acknowledges that delivery alone may not produce adoption.

It states that community visibility and developer outreach are required to convert tool delivery into measurable MAU and KPI impact, but these activities are not fully funded within this proposal and depend on coordination with other initiatives.

This weakens the link between the requested treasury spend and the broader ecosystem outcomes used to justify it.

A third concern is prioritization.

This proposal is a desirable technical addition rather than a pressing ecosystem need.

It does not appear to be part of the direct continuity of core development or maintenance of existing critical infrastructure in the same way as some other IO-related proposals.

It may improve the quality and security of Cardano’s technical stack over time, but it is not clear that this is among the most urgent constraints currently facing the ecosystem.

Under the current Net Change Limit environment, this matters.

The ecosystem is already directing substantial treasury resources toward infrastructure, protocol development, maintenance, scalability, and other technical initiatives. A significant share of these resources is also flowing to IO or IO-affiliated workstreams.

The proposal itself states that IO and affiliated entities have already been allocated ₳130,708,860 across treasury-funded projects, with ₳78,459,777 withdrawn to date.

That does not mean IO should be excluded from funding. IO remains an important technical contributor to Cardano.

But repeated large allocations to the same organization increase the burden of transparency, cost justification, and prioritization.

If treasury funding continues to concentrate heavily in infrastructure and IO-led initiatives, other crucial areas of the ecosystem may be left without sufficient funding.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

This treasury withdrawal is rejected primarily due to insufficient budget granularity, limited measurable impact targets, and concerns about prioritization under the current Net Change Limit constraints.

The vote is based on three main concerns:

1. Insufficient budget granularity for a proposal of this size.
2. Insufficiently concrete impact metrics, targets, and baselines to evaluate contribution to Cardano Vision 2030.
3. Weak prioritization under current NCL constraints, since this appears to be a desirable high-assurance tooling initiative rather than an urgent ecosystem need.

This type of proposal would be more open to reconsideration if it included a more detailed budget breakdown, clearer team-level accountability, stronger KPI baselines and targets, measurable adoption criteria, and a clearer explanation of why this work should be prioritized over other competing treasury needs in this funding cycle.

4. Conclusion

The proposal addresses a valid technical area and may improve Cardano’s high-assurance development tooling over time.

However, the requested funding is not supported by sufficient budget granularity, concrete impact measurement, or prioritization strength under current NCL constraints.

For these reasons, the proposal cannot be supported in its current form.

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Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Relatório de Ação de Governança — Cardano High Assurance

1. Introdução

A Cardano High Assurance solicita ₳13.078.578 do Tesouro da Cardano para entregar ferramentas automatizadas de verificação formal e um ambiente de desenvolvimento unificado e containerizado para desenvolvimento seguro e verificável de smart contracts na Cardano.

A proposta é organizada em dois workstreams: Blaster, a ferramenta de verificação formal automatizada da IO para Lean 4 e smart contracts baseados em UPLC, e CBDE, um Container-Based Developer Environment destinado a reduzir a fricção de configuração para desenvolvedores que usam o toolkit de alta garantia Plinth.

O workstream Blaster inclui verificação em nível de DApp, integrações de linguagem para Aiken, Pebble, Scalus e Futura, uma extensão para VS Code, uma Common Vulnerability Library, uma ferramenta de equivalence checking e proof reconstruction.

O workstream CBDE inclui um ambiente pré-configurado com compiladores, bibliotecas, testes baseados em propriedades, análise estática, verificação formal e ferramentas de profiling.

A proposta apresenta esse trabalho como uma forma de tornar o desenvolvimento de alta garantia mais acessível e de apoiar o posicionamento da Cardano em torno de correção, segurança e aplicações de nível institucional.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

Este voto não deve ser interpretado como oposição à verificação formal, desenvolvimento de alta garantia, ferramentas para desenvolvedores ou às capacidades técnicas das equipes envolvidas.

A proposta aborda uma área legítima de melhoria técnica para a Cardano. Ferramentas como Blaster, integrações de linguagem, Common Vulnerability Library, suporte a VS Code e Container-Based Developer Environment podem contribuir para um desenvolvimento de smart contracts mais seguro e uma melhor experiência para desenvolvedores ao longo do tempo.

Aspectos negativos

Valor técnico, por si só, não é suficiente para justificar financiamento do tesouro nesta escala.

A proposta solicita ₳13.078.578, com ₳11.247.577, ou 86% do orçamento total, alocados para “Development.”

Embora a proposta forneça uma divisão de alto nível entre o workstream Blaster e o workstream CBDE, ela não fornece granularidade suficiente sobre alocação de FTEs, distribuição orçamentária por equipe, premissas de rate, níveis de senioridade, alocações para subcontratados ou o mapeamento específico entre valores orçamentários e entregáveis.

Para uma retirada de tesouro de vários milhões de ADA, esse nível de abstração orçamentária não é suficiente para que dReps e a comunidade avaliem se o valor solicitado é proporcional, eficiente ou adequadamente escopado.

Essa preocupação é consistente com o padrão aplicado em votos anteriores. Grandes solicitações de tesouraria exigem breakdowns orçamentários claros.

Se dReps aceitarem categorias amplas de desenvolvimento sem justificativa suficiente de custo, torna-se difícil aplicar disciplina de tesouraria no restante do ecossistema.

Uma segunda preocupação é a falta de metas de impacto suficientemente concretas e mensuráveis.

A proposta se alinha à Cardano Vision 2030 e conecta o trabalho a KPIs como TVL, transações mensais, usuários ativos mensais, receita do protocolo e capacidade de throughput. No entanto, muitas dessas conexões permanecem indiretas, especulativas ou difíceis de verificar.

Verificação formal pode melhorar segurança e confiança, mas a proposta não demonstra claramente como esse trabalho irá mover materialmente a agulha em adoção, liquidez, volume de transações, retenção de desenvolvedores ou crescimento do ecossistema dentro de um período mensurável.

Por exemplo, a proposta afirma que o CBDE poderia reduzir um processo de configuração de vários dias para uma inicialização de 60 segundos e espera um aumento de 3–5x no número de desenvolvedores Plinth ativos em até 12 meses após o lançamento.

Essas são afirmações relevantes, mas seriam mais fortes com baselines mais claros, contagens atuais de desenvolvedores, metodologia de mensuração e metas de milestone independentemente verificáveis.

Riscos e preocupações

A proposta reconhece que a entrega, por si só, pode não produzir adoção.

Ela afirma que visibilidade comunitária e outreach para desenvolvedores são necessários para converter a entrega das ferramentas em impacto mensurável em MAU e KPIs, mas essas atividades não são totalmente financiadas dentro desta proposta e dependem de coordenação com outras iniciativas.

Isso enfraquece o vínculo entre o gasto solicitado do tesouro e os resultados mais amplos do ecossistema usados para justificá-lo.

Uma terceira preocupação é priorização.

Esta proposta é uma adição técnica desejável, e não uma necessidade urgente do ecossistema.

Ela não parece fazer parte da continuidade direta do core development ou da manutenção de infraestrutura crítica existente da mesma forma que algumas outras propostas relacionadas à IO.

Ela pode melhorar a qualidade e a segurança do stack técnico da Cardano ao longo do tempo, mas não está claro que esteja entre as restrições mais urgentes enfrentadas atualmente pelo ecossistema.

No ambiente atual de Net Change Limit, isso importa.

O ecossistema já está direcionando recursos substanciais do tesouro para infraestrutura, desenvolvimento de protocolo, manutenção, escalabilidade e outras

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Review — Cardano Maintenance

1. Introduction

Cardano Maintenance is a treasury withdrawal proposal focused on core platform maintenance and support for the Cardano network. The proposal seeks continued support for the Cardano codebase and infrastructure from the second half of 2026 through the first half of 2027.

The proposal covers nine functional areas: Node Bugfixing and Architecture, DevOps and Infrastructure, Monitoring, Documentation, Open Source Support, Performance, Quality Assurance, Release and Support, and Component Maintenance. These areas include issue resolution, hot fixes, CI/CD maintenance, disaster recovery, testnet maintenance, mainnet monitoring, Cardano Blueprint documentation, GitHub issue triage, performance benchmarking, E2E testing, release management, incident support, Plutus maintenance, DB-Sync maintenance, Cardano API and CLI maintenance, and related component work.

The total treasury request is ₳62,134,630. The budget allocates ₳45,979,626 to Development, representing 74% of the total request. Additional allocations include Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance, and Others.

Delivery is presented as continuous rather than sequential, with all deliverables running in parallel across the funded period.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

This should not be interpreted as opposition to Cardano maintenance, to the continuation of core infrastructure work, or to the technical capability of the teams involved. Maintenance is essential. The proposal covers important areas such as node bugfixing, DevOps, infrastructure, monitoring, documentation, QA, release management, security support, and component maintenance. These activities are clearly relevant to the stability, reliability, and continuity of the Cardano network.

Negative aspects

Essential work still requires treasury discipline.

The proposal requests ₳62,134,630, making it one of the largest, if not the largest, treasury withdrawal requests in the current cycle. Of this amount, ₳45,979,626 is allocated to “Development,” representing 74% of the total budget. Yet the proposal does not provide enough detail on FTE allocation, salary or rate assumptions, team composition, seniority levels, work-package costing, or the distribution of responsibilities between IO and Ensurable Systems.

Without that level of detail, it is not possible to assess whether the requested amount is proportionate, efficient, inflated, or properly mapped to concrete maintenance activities.

Risks and concerns

This is also a governance standards issue. If dReps accept this level of budget abstraction for the largest proposal in the cycle, it becomes difficult to justify demanding stronger granularity from smaller proposals requesting far less from the treasury. The standard applied to major infrastructure proposals should not be weaker simply because the proposer is a well-known entity.

If the name of the proposing entity were removed and the community were asked to approve nearly ₳46 million under a generic “Development” category, without clear FTE assumptions, cost breakdown, seniority levels, or workstream-level pricing, this would not meet the level of scrutiny expected from responsible treasury governance.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The vote is NO on this treasury withdrawal due to insufficient budget granularity for a proposal of this magnitude.

The decision does not represent opposition to Cardano maintenance, to the continuation of core infrastructure work, or to the technical capability of the teams involved. The importance of the work is recognized, and the need for Cardano maintenance to be funded is also recognized.

However, the proposal does not provide enough detail on FTE allocation, salary or rate assumptions, team composition, seniority levels, work-package costing, or the distribution of responsibilities between IO and Ensurable Systems. Without that level of detail, the requested amount cannot be assessed as proportionate, efficient, inflated, or properly mapped to concrete maintenance activities.

For that reason, while the importance of the work and the need for Cardano maintenance funding are recognized, the proposal cannot be supported in its current form.

4. Conclusion

Maintenance is essential for Cardano’s stability, reliability, and continuity. However, a treasury request of this magnitude requires stronger budget granularity. Without clearer detail on staffing, cost assumptions, work-package pricing, and responsibility allocation, the proposal does not meet the standard expected for responsible treasury governance.

My vote is NO.

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Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Revisão de Ação de Governança — Cardano Maintenance

1. Introdução

Cardano Maintenance é uma proposta de retirada do tesouro focada em manutenção da plataforma central e suporte à rede Cardano. A proposta busca garantir suporte contínuo ao código-base e à infraestrutura da Cardano do segundo semestre de 2026 ao primeiro semestre de 2027.

A proposta cobre nove áreas funcionais: Node Bugfixing and Architecture, DevOps and Infrastructure, Monitoring, Documentation, Open Source Support, Performance, Quality Assurance, Release and Support, e Component Maintenance. Essas áreas incluem resolução de problemas, hot fixes, manutenção de CI/CD, recuperação de desastres, manutenção de testnets, monitoramento da mainnet, documentação do Cardano Blueprint, triagem de issues no GitHub, benchmarks de performance, testes E2E, gerenciamento de releases, suporte a incidentes, manutenção do Plutus, manutenção do DB-Sync, manutenção da Cardano API e CLI, e trabalhos relacionados a componentes.

O pedido total ao tesouro é de ₳62.134.630. O orçamento aloca ₳45.979.626 para Development, representando 74% do pedido total. Outras alocações incluem Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance e Others.

A entrega é apresentada como contínua, e não sequencial, com todos os entregáveis sendo executados em paralelo ao longo do período financiado.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

Isto não deve ser interpretado como oposição à manutenção da Cardano, à continuidade do trabalho de infraestrutura central ou à capacidade técnica das equipes envolvidas. A manutenção é essencial. A proposta cobre áreas importantes como correção de bugs do node, DevOps, infraestrutura, monitoramento, documentação, QA, gerenciamento de releases, suporte de segurança e manutenção de componentes. Essas atividades são claramente relevantes para a estabilidade, confiabilidade e continuidade da rede Cardano.

Aspectos negativos

Trabalho essencial ainda exige disciplina de tesouraria.

A proposta solicita ₳62.134.630, tornando-se uma das maiores, se não a maior, solicitação de retirada do tesouro no ciclo atual. Desse montante, ₳45.979.626 são alocados para “Development”, representando 74% do orçamento total. Ainda assim, a proposta não fornece detalhes suficientes sobre alocação de FTEs, premissas salariais ou de taxas, composição da equipe, níveis de senioridade, custeio por work-package ou distribuição de responsabilidades entre IO e Ensurable Systems.

Sem esse nível de detalhe, não é possível avaliar se o valor solicitado é proporcional, eficiente, inflado ou devidamente mapeado para atividades concretas de manutenção.

Riscos e preocupações

Isto também é uma questão de padrões de governança. Se os dReps aceitarem esse nível de abstração orçamentária para a maior proposta do ciclo, torna-se difícil justificar a exigência de maior granularidade de propostas menores que solicitam muito menos do tesouro. O padrão aplicado a grandes propostas de infraestrutura não deve ser mais fraco simplesmente porque o proponente é uma entidade conhecida.

Se o nome da entidade proponente fosse removido e a comunidade fosse solicitada a aprovar quase ₳46 milhões sob uma categoria genérica de “Development”, sem premissas claras de FTE, detalhamento de custos, níveis de senioridade ou precificação por workstream, isso não atenderia ao nível de escrutínio esperado de uma governança de tesouraria responsável.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NO

O voto é NO nesta retirada do tesouro devido à granularidade orçamentária insuficiente para uma proposta dessa magnitude.

A decisão não representa oposição à manutenção da Cardano, à continuidade do trabalho de infraestrutura central ou à capacidade técnica das equipes envolvidas. A importância do trabalho é reconhecida, assim como a necessidade de financiar a manutenção da Cardano.

No entanto, a proposta não fornece detalhes suficientes sobre alocação de FTEs, premissas salariais ou de taxas, composição da equipe, níveis de senioridade, custeio por work-package ou distribuição de responsabilidades entre IO e Ensurable Systems. Sem esse nível de detalhe, o valor solicitado não pode ser avaliado como proporcional, eficiente, inflado ou devidamente mapeado para atividades concretas de manutenção.

Por esse motivo, embora a importância do trabalho e a necessidade de financiamento da manutenção da Cardano sejam reconhecidas, a proposta não pode ser apoiada em sua forma atual.

4. Conclusão

A manutenção é essencial para a estabilidade, confiabilidade e continuidade da Cardano. No entanto, uma solicitação ao tesouro dessa magnitude exige maior granularidade orçamentária. Sem detalhes mais claros sobre equipe, premissas de custo, precificação por work-package e alocação de responsabilidades, a proposta não atende ao padrão esperado de uma governança de tesouraria responsável.

Meu voto é NO.****

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Review — Vote: NO

1. Introduction

The “Consensus Upgrades” treasury withdrawal requests ₳27,714,342 to continue Leios development as a consensus-layer scalability upgrade for Cardano. The proposal presents Leios as an enhancement to Ouroboros Praos, intended to increase throughput capacity and support faster settlement while preserving Cardano’s security guarantees.

The proposal positions Leios as necessary for Cardano’s 2030 strategy, which targets growth from approximately 800,000 transactions per month to more than 27 million monthly transactions.

The 2026/2027 cycle focuses on moving Leios from an early public testnet stage toward mainnet readiness. The work is organized around three objectives: producing a release candidate, increasing confidence through testing and adversarial validation, and enabling the conditions for a future Leios hard fork.

The proposal identifies Carlos Lopez De Lara and Sebastian Nagel as leads, with an expected duration of 6–9 months.

The budget allocates ₳23,834,334, or 86% of the total treasury ask, to Development. Additional categories include Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance, and Others.

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2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

This decision should not be interpreted as opposition to Leios, to L1 scalability, or to the technical capacity of the teams involved.

On the contrary, Leios is considered one of the most important scalability efforts currently under discussion in Cardano. Without a robust scalability path, Cardano cannot realistically achieve mass adoption, support broader use cases, increase transaction volume, grow protocol fee revenue, or fulfill its long-term ecosystem ambitions.

The importance of Leios and the strong technical case for improving Cardano’s scalability at the consensus layer are recognized.

Negative aspects

The treasury withdrawal cannot be supported primarily due to insufficient budget granularity for a proposal of this magnitude.

Strategic importance does not remove the need for treasury discipline.

The proposal requests ₳27,714,342, with ₳23,834,334, or 86% of the total budget, allocated to “Development.” This category is not broken down with enough detail to allow dReps and the community to assess whether the requested amount is proportionate, efficient, inflated, or properly mapped to concrete deliverables.

For a treasury withdrawal of this size, especially one related to consensus-layer infrastructure, clearer information would be expected on staffing assumptions, team composition, FTE allocation, rate assumptions, subcontractor scope, work-package costing, milestone-linked budget mapping, and artifact-based acceptance evidence.

Risks and concerns

This is also a matter of governance consistency. Throughout Project Catalyst and on-chain governance, many proposals with five-, six-, and seven-figure budgets have been rejected by reviewers and dReps due to insufficient budget detail.

Applying a lower standard to an eight-figure proposal would perpetuate an unhealthy dynamic. Larger requests should require stronger transparency, not weaker scrutiny.

A secondary concern is that some parts of Cardano’s core scalability roadmap may reasonably be perceived as work that should have been delivered as part of earlier roadmap commitments, especially considering the historical resources and allocations received by founding entities.

There is a legitimate governance question about how long the treasury should continue funding work that may be seen as correcting delayed delivery of foundational protocol evolution. However, this is not the main reason for the vote.

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3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The decisive issue is the lack of sufficient budget granularity.

The treasury withdrawal cannot be supported because the proposal requests an eight-figure amount while allocating 86% of the total budget to “Development” without enough detail for independent assessment.

The available budget structure does not provide sufficient clarity on whether the requested amount is proportionate, efficient, inflated, or properly mapped to concrete deliverables.

This decision is not opposition to Leios, L1 scalability, or the technical capacity of the teams involved. Leios remains one of the most important scalability efforts under discussion in Cardano, and there is a strong technical case for improving Cardano’s scalability at the consensus layer.

However, strategic importance does not remove the need for treasury discipline.

For a treasury withdrawal of this size, stronger transparency is required, especially in relation to staffing assumptions, FTE allocation, rate assumptions, subcontractor scope, work-package costing, milestone-linked budget mapping, and artifact-based acceptance evidence.

If the budget were revised with clearer cost decomposition, stronger milestone-linked financial accountability, and enough detail for independent assessment, the position would be open to reconsideration.

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4. Conclusion

Leios has strategic importance for Cardano’s scalability, and the technical case for consensus-layer improvement is recognized.

The vote remains NO because an eight-figure treasury withdrawal should not be approved with this level of budget opacity.

Stronger budget decomposition and milestone-linked accountability would be required for reconsideration.

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Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Revisão de Ação de Governança — Voto: NÃO

1. Introdução

A retirada do tesouro “Consensus Upgrades” solicita ₳27.714.342 para continuar o desenvolvimento do Leios como uma atualização de escalabilidade na camada de consenso da Cardano. A proposta apresenta o Leios como uma melhoria ao Ouroboros Praos, destinada a aumentar a capacidade de throughput e apoiar uma liquidação mais rápida, preservando as garantias de segurança da Cardano.

A proposta posiciona o Leios como necessário para a estratégia Cardano 2030, que mira um crescimento de aproximadamente 800.000 transações por mês para mais de 27 milhões de transações mensais.

O ciclo 2026/2027 foca em mover o Leios de uma etapa inicial de testnet pública em direção à prontidão para mainnet. O trabalho é organizado em três objetivos: produzir um release candidate, aumentar a confiança por meio de testes e validação adversarial, e viabilizar as condições para um futuro hard fork do Leios.

A proposta identifica Carlos Lopez De Lara e Sebastian Nagel como líderes, com duração esperada de 6 a 9 meses.

O orçamento aloca ₳23.834.334, ou 86% do valor total solicitado ao tesouro, para Desenvolvimento. Categorias adicionais incluem Infraestrutura, Segurança & Auditorias, Legal & Compliance, Engajamento & Suporte ao Ecossistema, Operações & Entrega, Governança e Outros.

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2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

Esta decisão não deve ser interpretada como oposição ao Leios, à escalabilidade de L1 ou à capacidade técnica das equipes envolvidas.

Pelo contrário, o Leios é considerado um dos esforços de escalabilidade mais importantes atualmente em discussão na Cardano. Sem um caminho robusto de escalabilidade, a Cardano não pode realisticamente alcançar adoção em massa, suportar casos de uso mais amplos, aumentar o volume de transações, crescer a receita de taxas do protocolo ou cumprir suas ambições ecossistêmicas de longo prazo.

A importância do Leios e o forte caso técnico para melhorar a escalabilidade da Cardano na camada de consenso são reconhecidos.

Aspectos negativos

A retirada do tesouro não pode ser apoiada principalmente devido à granularidade orçamentária insuficiente para uma proposta dessa magnitude.

A importância estratégica não remove a necessidade de disciplina do tesouro.

A proposta solicita ₳27.714.342, com ₳23.834.334, ou 86% do orçamento total, alocados para “Desenvolvimento”. Essa categoria não é detalhada o suficiente para permitir que dReps e a comunidade avaliem se o valor solicitado é proporcional, eficiente, inflado ou adequadamente mapeado para entregáveis concretos.

Para uma retirada do tesouro desse porte, especialmente uma relacionada à infraestrutura da camada de consenso, seriam esperadas informações mais claras sobre premissas de equipe, composição do time, alocação de FTEs, premissas de valores, escopo de subcontratados, custo por pacote de trabalho, mapeamento orçamentário vinculado a marcos e evidências de aceitação baseadas em artefatos.

Riscos e preocupações

Esta também é uma questão de consistência de governança. Ao longo do Project Catalyst e da governança on-chain, muitas propostas com orçamentos de cinco, seis e sete dígitos foram rejeitadas por revisores e dReps devido à insuficiência de detalhes orçamentários.

Aplicar um padrão inferior a uma proposta de oito dígitos perpetuaria uma dinamica prejudicial. Pedidos maiores devem exigir maior transparência, não menor escrutínio.

Uma preocupação secundária é que algumas partes do roadmap central de escalabilidade da Cardano podem razoavelmente ser percebidas como trabalho que deveria ter sido entregue como parte de compromissos anteriores de roadmap, especialmente considerando os recursos históricos e alocações recebidos por entidades fundadoras.

Existe uma questão legítima de governança sobre por quanto tempo o tesouro deve continuar financiando trabalho que pode ser visto como correção de entrega atrasada da evolução fundacional do protocolo. No entanto, esse não é o principal motivo do voto.

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3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NÃO

A questão decisiva é a falta de granularidade orçamentária suficiente.

A retirada do tesouro não pode ser apoiada porque a proposta solicita um valor de oito dígitos enquanto aloca 86% do orçamento total para “Desenvolvimento” sem detalhes suficientes para avaliação independente.

A estrutura orçamentária disponível não fornece clareza suficiente sobre se o valor solicitado é proporcional, eficiente, inflado ou adequadamente mapeado para entregáveis concretos.

Esta decisão não é oposição ao Leios, à escalabilidade de L1 ou à capacidade técnica das equipes envolvidas. O Leios continua sendo um dos esforços de escalabilidade mais importantes em discussão na Cardano, e há um forte caso técnico para melhorar a escalabilidade da Cardano na camada de consenso.

No entanto, a importância estratégica não remove a necessidade de disciplina do tesouro.

Para uma retirada do tesouro desse porte, é necessária maior transparência, especialmente em relação a premissas de equipe, alocação de FTEs, premissas de valores, escopo de subcontratados, custo por pacote de trabalho, mapeamento orçamentário vinculado a marcos e evidências de aceitação baseadas em artefatos.

Se o orçamento fosse revisado com decomposição de custos mais clara, accountability financeira mais forte vinculada a marcos e detalhes suficientes para avaliação independente, a posição estaria aberta a reconsideração.

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4. Conclusão

O Leios tem importância estratégica para a escalabilidade da Cardano, e o caso técnico para melhoria da camada de consenso é reconhecido.

O voto permanece NÃO porque uma retirada do tesouro de oito dígitos não deve ser aprovada com esse nível de opacidade orçamentária.

Maior decomposição orçamentária e accountability vinculada a marcos seriam necessárias para reconsideração.

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Review

1. Introduction

The proposal “Cardano Upgrades” requests ₳13,103,039 from the Cardano Treasury to fund three platform-level enhancements: CIP-159 Multi-Asset Micro Fees / Account Address Enhancement, CPS-23 Cardano Multi-Asset Treasury, and Babel Fees. The proposal states that these workstreams are technically independent but provide compounding benefits when combined. CIP-159 introduces ledger-level account primitives intended to support direct deposits, micro-fee collection, L2 reserve patterns, and future multi-asset account functionality. CPS-23 focuses on the design of a multi-asset Treasury, including the ability for the Cardano Treasury to hold assets beyond ADA. Babel Fees aims to allow users to pay transaction fees in native assets other than ADA, using Nested Transactions as its technical foundation.

The proposal allocates ₳7,069,985 to Workstream 1, ₳2,356,662 to Workstream 2, and ₳3,676,392 to Workstream 3. Its public funding distribution assigns ₳11,268,614, or 86% of the total budget, to Development, with several other categories assigned as high-level percentage allocations.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The underlying direction has value. A multi-asset treasury could improve treasury resilience and reduce exposure to ADA volatility. Babel Fees could reduce onboarding friction by allowing users to transact without first acquiring ADA. CIP-159 may enable important improvements for micro-fees, wallets, DeFi infrastructure, and future account-based patterns. These are meaningful and potentially necessary improvements for Cardano.

Although the proposal states that the three workstreams are technically independent, there is a plausible conceptual and strategic interconnection between them. CIP-159, Multi-Asset Treasury design, and Babel Fees all relate to broader improvements in Cardano’s economic usability, asset flexibility, fee mechanics, and treasury resilience. If only one or two of these workstreams were approved separately, the broader concept presented by the proposal might lose part of its coherence and potential impact.

For that reason, the bundled structure is not treated as a decisive negative factor in this vote. At the same time, it is also not treated as a positive justification for approval. The bundle may be defensible in concept, but it does not resolve the proposal’s more serious accountability problem.

Negative aspects

As a general governance principle, proposals and workstreams should be submitted with the highest reasonable level of granularity. Bundled proposals reduce the ability of dReps to assess each component independently and can force an all-or-nothing decision where a more nuanced vote would be preferable. This has been a relevant concern in previous governance actions and remains part of the evaluation framework.

However, in this specific case, bundling is not considered a sufficient reason for rejection.

The primary reason for voting NO is the lack of adequate budget granularity.

The proposal requests ₳13,103,039 from the Cardano Treasury, with ₳11,268,614, or 86% of the total budget, allocated broadly to “Development.” Several other categories appear to be assigned as high-level percentage estimates, including 1% allocations for areas such as infrastructure, security and audits, legal and compliance, governance, and others. The proposal does not provide a sufficiently detailed methodology explaining how these figures were calculated.

For a funding request of this size, the public budget breakdown is not detailed enough to support a responsible assessment of treasury prudence. There is no clear breakdown of FTEs, headcount, seniority assumptions, hourly or monthly rates, time allocation per workstream, or the specific distribution of engineering resources between the different components. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether the proposal is overbudgeted, underbudgeted, appropriately priced, or financially disciplined.

Strategic importance does not remove the need for budget accountability. Technical credibility should not operate as a blank check. The fact that a founding entity is considered technically capable does not justify approving a poorly detailed budget, especially when the requested amount is this large.

Risks and concerns

There is a broader institutional concern. Some of these capabilities, particularly Babel Fees, have been discussed in the Cardano ecosystem for years and have often been associated with the expected evolution of the protocol. When historically anticipated roadmap-adjacent deliverables are later submitted as new treasury-funded work, dReps should be cautious about normalizing a pattern where the Treasury becomes the default funding source for items that may reasonably be perceived as part of earlier protocol development expectations.

This does not mean the work is unimportant. It means that the standard for funding it should be higher, not lower.

Across the Cardano ecosystem, many smaller proposals with five- or six-figure budgets have been criticized or rejected for insufficient budget detail. It would be inconsistent to apply strict scrutiny to smaller community proposals while lowering the standard for an eight-figure ADA request from a major founding entity. If anything, larger treasury requests should be subject to stronger transparency requirements, clearer cost models, and more auditable delivery assumptions.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The vote is NO due primarily to insufficient budget granularity and the inability to assess whether the requested treasury allocation is financially prudent.

The bundled structure is neutral in this specific case. As a general governance principle, proposals and workstreams should be submitted with the highest reasonable level of granularity, because bundled proposals reduce the ability of dReps to assess each component independently and can force an all-or-nothing decision. However, in this case, bundling is not a sufficient reason for rejection, since there is a plausible conceptual and strategic interconnection between CIP-159, Multi-Asset Treasury design, and Babel Fees.

The decisive issue is the budget. The proposal requests ₳13,103,039 from the Cardano Treasury, with ₳11,268,614, or 86% of the total budget, allocated broadly to “Development.” The proposal does not provide a sufficiently detailed methodology explaining how these figures were calculated. There is no clear breakdown of FTEs, headcount, seniority assumptions, hourly or monthly rates, time allocation per workstream, or the specific distribution of engineering resources between the different components.

Despite recognizing the technical relevance and strategic potential of the workstreams, the proposal cannot be supported in its current form.

4. Conclusion

The workstreams may be strategically relevant and technically meaningful for Cardano, but the funding request does not provide enough budget granularity to support a responsible treasury decision. The bundled structure is neutral in this case. The decisive factor is the inability to assess whether the requested allocation is financially prudent.

Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Revisão de Ação de Governança

1. Introdução

A proposta “Cardano Upgrades” solicita ₳13.103.039 do Tesouro da Cardano para financiar três melhorias de nível de plataforma: CIP-159 Multi-Asset Micro Fees / Account Address Enhancement, CPS-23 Cardano Multi-Asset Treasury e Babel Fees. A proposta afirma que esses workstreams são tecnicamente independentes, mas geram benefícios compostos quando combinados. A CIP-159 introduz primitivas de conta em nível de ledger destinadas a permitir depósitos diretos, cobrança de microtaxas, padrões de reserva para L2s e funcionalidade futura de contas multiativos. A CPS-23 foca no desenho de um Tesouro multiativo, incluindo a capacidade de o Tesouro da Cardano manter ativos além de ADA. Babel Fees busca permitir que usuários paguem taxas de transação em ativos nativos diferentes de ADA, usando Nested Transactions como sua base técnica. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}

A proposta aloca ₳7.069.985 ao Workstream 1, ₳2.356.662 ao Workstream 2 e ₳3.676.392 ao Workstream 3. Sua distribuição pública de recursos atribui ₳11.268.614, ou 86% do orçamento total, a Desenvolvimento, com várias outras categorias atribuídas como alocações percentuais de alto nível. :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

A direção subjacente tem valor. Um tesouro multiativo poderia melhorar a resiliência do Tesouro e reduzir a exposição à volatilidade da ADA. Babel Fees poderia reduzir o atrito de onboarding ao permitir que usuários transacionem sem antes adquirir ADA. A CIP-159 pode permitir melhorias importantes para microtaxas, carteiras, infraestrutura DeFi e futuros padrões baseados em contas. Essas são melhorias significativas e potencialmente necessárias para a Cardano.

Embora a proposta afirme que os três workstreams são tecnicamente independentes, há uma interconexão conceitual e estratégica plausível entre eles. CIP-159, o desenho do Multi-Asset Treasury e Babel Fees estão todos relacionados a melhorias mais amplas na usabilidade econômica da Cardano, flexibilidade de ativos, mecânicas de taxas e resiliência do Tesouro. Se apenas um ou dois desses workstreams fossem aprovados separadamente, o conceito mais amplo apresentado pela proposta poderia perder parte de sua coerência e de seu impacto potencial.

Por esse motivo, a estrutura em bundle não é tratada como um fator negativo decisivo neste voto. Ao mesmo tempo, ela também não é tratada como uma justificativa positiva para aprovação. O bundle pode ser defensável em conceito, mas não resolve o problema mais sério de accountability da proposta.

Aspectos negativos

Como princípio geral de governança, propostas e workstreams devem ser submetidos com o maior nível razoável de granularidade. Propostas agrupadas reduzem a capacidade dos dReps de avaliar cada componente de forma independente e podem forçar uma decisão de tudo ou nada quando um voto mais nuançado seria preferível. Essa foi uma preocupação relevante em ações de governança anteriores e continua fazendo parte do framework de avaliação.

No entanto, neste caso específico, o agrupamento não é considerado uma razão suficiente para rejeição.

A principal razão para o voto NO é a falta de granularidade orçamentária adequada.

A proposta solicita ₳13.103.039 do Tesouro da Cardano, com ₳11.268.614, ou 86% do orçamento total, alocados amplamente para “Development”. Várias outras categorias parecem ser atribuídas como estimativas percentuais de alto nível, incluindo alocações de 1% para áreas como infraestrutura, segurança e auditorias, jurídico e compliance, governança, entre outras. A proposta não fornece uma metodologia suficientemente detalhada explicando como esses valores foram calculados.

Para uma solicitação de financiamento desse tamanho, a decomposição orçamentária pública não é detalhada o suficiente para sustentar uma avaliação responsável de prudência do Tesouro. Não há uma decomposição clara de FTEs, headcount, premissas de senioridade, taxas horárias ou mensais, alocação de tempo por workstream ou distribuição específica de recursos de engenharia entre os diferentes componentes. Como resultado, não é possível determinar se a proposta está superorçada, suborçada, adequadamente precificada ou financeiramente disciplinada.

A importância estratégica não remove a necessidade de accountability orçamentária. Credibilidade técnica não deve funcionar como um cheque em branco. O fato de uma entidade fundadora ser considerada tecnicamente capaz não justifica aprovar um orçamento pouco detalhado, especialmente quando o valor solicitado é tão alto.

Riscos e preocupações

Há uma preocupação institucional mais ampla. Algumas dessas capacidades, particularmente Babel Fees, foram discutidas no ecossistema Cardano por anos e muitas vezes foram associadas à evolução esperada do protocolo. Quando entregáveis historicamente antecipados e adjacentes ao roadmap são posteriormente submetidos como novo trabalho financiado pelo Tesouro, dReps devem ter cautela para não normalizar um padrão em que o Tesouro se torna a fonte padrão de financiamento para itens que podem ser razoavelmente percebidos como parte de expectativas anteriores de desenvolvimento

Governance Action Review [EN]

1. Introduction

The Developer Experience Initiative is a Treasury Withdrawal proposal requesting ₳3,601,926 to fund a focused six-month program led by Input Output’s Cardano Business Unit. The proposal aims to improve Cardano’s developer tooling, documentation, onboarding experience, and ecosystem coordination, with a stated target of achieving a 30%+ improvement in developer growth rate. Its stated objective is to help a builder new to Cardano move from zero to an MVP on testnet in under two weeks, reducing the initial time investment needed to validate Cardano as a platform choice.

The initiative includes workstreams such as community alignment, developer outreach, cardano-init, Developer HUB, ContractsLibrary, community collaboration, measurement through a hackathon, and reactive work addressing high-ROI DevX opportunities. The proposal identifies fragmented tooling, poor documentation, steep learning curve, subpar developer experience, and lack of ecosystem coordination as the main problems affecting Cardano developer adoption and retention.

The proposed funding distribution allocates ₳2,929,680, or 81%, to Development & Engineering teams, ₳432,231, or 12%, to Engagement & Ecosystem support, and smaller allocations to infrastructure, security and audits, legal and compliance, operations and delivery, governance, and other costs. The proposal also states that a written off-chain legal contract will be created between Input Output and Cardano Development Holdings, administered by Intersect, with milestone-based delivery, third-party assurance, treasury reserve smart contract management, refund conditions, and public reconciliation of unused funds.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The proposal addresses a real and relevant problem for Cardano. Developer experience remains an important bottleneck in the ecosystem, especially for new builders trying to move from zero to a functional MVP on testnet without spending weeks navigating fragmented documentation, inconsistent tooling, and a steep learning curve. In that sense, the general objective of the initiative is legitimate: improving onboarding, tooling, documentation, reusable patterns, and coordination around developer experience.

The proposal structures this objective around deliverables such as cardano-init, Developer HUB, ContractsLibrary, community collaboration, outreach, and DevX measurement mechanisms. These are potentially useful deliverables, and the proposal identifies an important need within the ecosystem.

The proposal also mentions collaboration with Intersect, Cardano Foundation, TxPipe, and community members, and states that the Developer Portal will be the main entry point for developers. This is positive and reduces part of the concern around institutional concentration.

Negative aspects

Recognizing that the problem is real does not mean accepting that this is the best structure to solve it. The main concern remains the budget. For a ₳3,601,926 withdrawal in a program lasting only six months, the level of financial detail is insufficient.

The proposal provides an aggregated distribution, with 81% allocated to “Development & Engineering” and 12% to “Engagement & Ecosystem support,” along with smaller categories such as infrastructure, security, legal, governance, and operations. However, this structure does not allow a clear evaluation of which amounts fund which deliverables, how many people will be involved, which roles will be hired, which rates or FTEs were assumed, how much will be allocated to bounties, how much will remain with IO, how much may go to external partners, and how each portion connects to verifiable milestones.

This point alone is sufficient to justify a vote against. The larger the Treasury withdrawal, the greater the required budget granularity should be. A multi-million-ADA budget should not depend on broad categories that make it difficult to evaluate proportionality, efficiency, and lower-cost alternatives.

The issue is not to presume bad faith or deny the team’s technical capability. The issue is that DReps must decide on the allocation of public ecosystem resources based on verifiable information, not generic institutional trust. Trust is great for friendships, not Treasury budgeting.

The proposal also appears to underestimate the current economic context of the ecosystem. Improving DevX may reduce technical friction for new developers, but it does not answer the most important question by itself: what will those developers find after being onboarded? The ecosystem is currently facing greater financial restriction, with several projects shutting down, funding becoming scarcer, Catalyst in transition or absent as a broad funding mechanism, and intense competition for available Treasury resources.

In this context, the ability to attract new builders depends not only on documentation and tooling, but also on real funding opportunities, liquidity, sustainability, and clear paths for projects to survive after the initial stage.

There is also a relevant strategic tension. The proposal aims to make it easier for new developers to enter the ecosystem, but at the same time it represents another significant Treasury withdrawal by an already established entity, in a cycle where a large portion of available resources is already being disputed or absorbed by major initiatives and consolidated actors.

This creates a practical contradiction: improving the ecosystem’s entry point is positive, but if the resources that could sustain new projects become increasingly concentrated in large institutional programs, onboarding may become only a partial solution to a broader problem. Cardano may have a better developer experience, but that does not guarantee retention if the economic environment remains unattractive for new teams.

Risks and concerns

There is an institutional centralization risk. Developer experience is not merely a neutral technical layer. It influences which tools are seen as standard, which workflows are recommended, which examples new builders follow, which libraries gain traction, which patterns become canonical, and which actors gain more influence over the formation of the next generation of Cardano developers. For that reason, governance of this layer matters.

Although the proposal mentions collaboration with Intersect, Cardano Foundation, TxPipe, and community members, the general structure of the initiative remains strongly led by IO. For an area as sensitive as onboarding, documentation, tooling direction, and canonical developer experience, a more neutral, open, and community-led approach would be more appropriate. Cardano Foundation, Intersect, Tooling DAO, dOSPO/OMF, targeted bounty programs, and community initiatives could play this role with lower institutional concentration risk.

This should not be read as a criticism of IO’s technical competence. The issue is different: the more strategic functions remain under the direct influence of founding entities, the harder it becomes to develop a broad, decentralized, and competitive execution layer in the ecosystem. In many cases, community or independent teams could deliver relevant parts of this work at lower cost, with greater proximity to active builders and greater diversity of approaches.

In the long term, practical decentralization requires critical functions to be distributed, not merely coordinated by large incumbents.

There is also a coordination concern with other initiatives. Multiple programs and proposals relate to tooling, open source, documentation, developer support, and developer experience improvements. The proposal itself includes broad items such as “Community Alignment,” “Developer Outreach,” “Community Collaboration,” and “Reactive” work. These may be useful, but they also make the scope elastic and potentially overlapping.

An initiative of this size should present more clearly how it differs from other workstreams, which responsibilities belong to IO, which would be executed by partners or the community, which specific gaps are not covered by existing initiatives, and why a centralized six-month proposal is preferable to a combination of bounties, RFPs, smaller grants, and open coordination.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The problem is not the existence of a proposal for DevX. The problem is the form. The proposal has merits, identifies a real need, and includes potentially useful deliverables, but it does not provide a sufficiently detailed budget, does not convincingly address the economic context of contraction and scarce funding for new builders, and concentrates an overly strategic layer under IO’s leadership.

The budget concern is the primary decision point. For a ₳3,601,926 Treasury withdrawal over six months, the proposal does not provide enough financial granularity to evaluate proportionality, efficiency, staffing assumptions, allocation between internal and external work, bounty amounts, partner distribution, or the relationship between each budget portion and verifiable milestones.

The current economic context further weakens the case for approval. Improving onboarding and tooling can help developers start building, but it does not solve the funding, liquidity, sustainability, and retention problem that new teams will face after entering the ecosystem.

The institutional structure also raises concerns. Developer experience shapes canonical tooling, documentation, workflows, libraries, and developer norms. Concentrating this layer under the leadership of an already established founding entity increases the risk of institutional centralization, even if the team is technically competent and even if collaboration with other actors is included.

The vote could be reconsidered if a future version presented substantially greater budget granularity, clearer separation of responsibilities among IO, partners, and community actors, stronger justification for why this centralized structure is preferable to bounties, RFPs, or smaller grants, and a more convincing response to the current funding constraints faced by new builders.

4. Conclusion

Developer experience is a legitimate priority for Cardano, and the proposal identifies a real ecosystem bottleneck. However, the current structure does not provide sufficient budget transparency, does not adequately address the broader economic constraints affecting builder retention, and concentrates a strategic developer layer too heavily under IO leadership. For these reasons, the appropriate vote is NO.

Revisão de Ação de Governança [PT]

1. Introdução

A Developer Experience Initiative é uma proposta de Retirada do Tesouro que solicita ₳3.601.926 para financiar um programa focado de seis meses liderado pela Cardano Business Unit da Input Output. A proposta busca melhorar o tooling, a documentação, a experiência de onboarding de desenvolvedores e a coordenação do ecossistema Cardano, com uma meta declarada de alcançar uma melhoria de mais de 30% na taxa de crescimento de desenvolvedores. Seu objetivo declarado é permitir que um builder novo na Cardano saia do zero e chegue a um MVP em testnet em menos de duas semanas, reduzindo o investimento inicial de tempo necessário para validar a Cardano como plataforma. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}

A iniciativa inclui frentes como alinhamento comunitário, developer outreach, cardano-init, Developer HUB, ContractsLibrary, colaboração comunitária, medição por meio de hackathon e trabalho reativo sobre oportunidades de alto ROI em DevX. A proposta identifica tooling fragmentado, documentação ruim, curva de aprendizado elevada, experiência de desenvolvimento abaixo do ideal e falta de coordenação no ecossistema como os principais problemas que afetam a adoção e retenção de desenvolvedores na Cardano. :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}

A distribuição de recursos proposta aloca ₳2.929.680, ou 81%, para equipes de Development & Engineering, ₳432.231, ou 12%, para Engagement & Ecosystem support, e valores menores para infraestrutura, segurança e auditorias, legal e compliance, operações e entrega, governança e outros custos. A proposta também afirma que será criado um contrato legal off-chain entre a Input Output e a Cardano Development Holdings, administrado pela Intersect, com entrega baseada em marcos, garantia por terceiro, gestão via Treasury Reserve Smart Contract, condições de reembolso e reconciliação pública de fundos não utilizados. :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

A proposta endereça um problema real e relevante para a Cardano. A experiência de desenvolvedores ainda é um gargalo importante do ecossistema, especialmente para novos builders que tentam sair do zero e chegar a um MVP funcional em testnet sem precisar atravessar semanas de documentação fragmentada, tooling inconsistente e curva de aprendizado elevada. Nesse sentido, o objetivo geral da iniciativa é legítimo: melhorar onboarding, tooling, documentação, padrões reutilizáveis e coordenação em torno da experiência de desenvolvimento.

A proposta estrutura esse objetivo em torno de entregáveis como cardano-init, Developer HUB, ContractsLibrary, colaboração comunitária, outreach e mecanismos de medição de DevX. Esses entregáveis são potencialmente úteis, e a proposta identifica uma necessidade importante dentro do ecossistema.

A proposta também menciona colaboração com Intersect, Cardano Foundation, TxPipe e membros da comunidade, e afirma que o Developer Portal será o ponto principal de entrada para desenvolvedores. Esse é um ponto positivo e reduz parte da preocupação com concentração institucional.

Aspectos negativos

Reconhecer que o problema é real não significa aceitar que esta seja a melhor estrutura para resolvê-lo. A principal preocupação continua sendo o orçamento. Para uma retirada de ₳3.601.926 em um programa de apenas seis meses, o nível de detalhamento financeiro é insuficiente.

A proposta informa uma distribuição agregada, com 81% para “Development & Engineering” e 12% para “Engagement & Ecosystem support”, além de categorias menores como infraestrutura, segurança, legal, governança e operações. Porém, essa estrutura não permite avaliar com clareza quais valores financiam quais entregáveis, quantas pessoas estarão envolvidas, quais funções serão contratadas, quais taxas ou FTEs foram assumidos, quanto será destinado a bounties, quanto ficará com IO, quanto poderá ir para parceiros externos, e como cada parcela se conecta a marcos verificáveis.

Esse ponto, por si só, já é suficiente para justificar um voto contrário. Quanto maior o saque do Tesouro, maior deve ser a granularidade exigida. Um orçamento multi-milionário não deveria depender de categorias amplas que dificultam a avaliação de proporcionalidade, eficiência e alternativas de menor custo.

A questão não é presumir má-fé ou negar a capacidade técnica da equipe. A questão é que DReps precisam decidir sobre alocação de recursos públicos do ecossistema com base em informações verificáveis, não em confiança institucional genérica. Confiança é ótimo para amizades, não para orçamento de Tesouro.

A proposta também parece subestimar o contexto econômico atual do ecossistema. Melhorar DevX pode reduzir a fricção técnica para novos desenvolvedores, mas isso não resolve sozinho a pergunta mais importante: o que esses desenvolvedores encontrarão depois de onboardados? O ecossistema está em um período de maior restrição financeira, com vários projetos fechando, funding mais escasso, Catalyst em transição ou ausente como mecanismo amplo de financiamento, e uma disputa intensa pelos recursos disponíveis no Tesouro.

Nesse cenário, a capacidade de atrair novos builders depende não apenas de documentação e tooling, mas também de oportunidades reais de financiamento, liquidez, sustentabilidade e caminhos claros para que projetos sobrevivam depois da fase inicial.

Há também uma tensão estratégica relevante. A proposta pretende facilitar a entrada de novos desenvolvedores no ecossistema, mas ao mesmo tempo representa mais uma retirada significativa do Tesouro por uma entidade já estabelecida, em um ciclo no qual boa parte dos recursos disponíveis já está sendo disputada ou absorvida por grandes iniciativas e atores consolidados.

Isso cria uma contradição prática: melhorar a porta de entrada do ecossistema é positivo, mas se os recursos que poderiam sustentar novos projetos forem cada vez mais concentrados em grandes programas institucionais, o onboarding pode se tornar apenas uma solução parcial para um problema mais amplo. A Cardano pode ter uma experiência de desenvolvimento melhor, mas isso não garante retenção se o ambiente econômico continuar pouco convidativo para novos times.

Riscos e preocupações

Existe um risco institucional de centralização. A experiência de desenvolvedor não é apenas uma camada técnica neutra. Ela influencia quais ferramentas são vistas como padrão, quais fluxos de trabalho são recomendados, quais exemplos os novos builders seguem, quais bibliotecas ganham tração, quais padrões se tornam canônicos e quais atores passam a ter maior influência sobre a formação da próxima geração de desenvolvedores Cardano. Por isso, a governança dessa camada importa.

Embora a proposta mencione colaboração com Intersect, Cardano Foundation, TxPipe e membros da comunidade, a estrutura geral da iniciativa permanece fortemente liderada por IO. Para uma área tão sensível quanto onboarding, documentação, tooling direction e experiência canônica de desenvolvedor, uma abordagem mais neutra, aberta e comunitária parece mais adequada. Cardano Foundation, Intersect, Tooling DAO, dOSPO/OMF, programas de bounties direcionados e iniciativas comunitárias poderiam exercer esse papel com menor risco de concentração institucional.

Esse ponto não deve ser lido como uma crítica à competência técnica da IO. A questão é outra: quanto mais funções estratégicas permanecem sob influência direta das entidades fundadoras, mais difícil se torna desenvolver uma camada ampla, descentralizada e competitiva de execução no ecossistema. Em muitos casos, equipes comunitárias ou independentes poderiam entregar partes relevantes desse trabalho com menor custo, maior proximidade com builders ativos e maior diversidade de abordagens.

A longo prazo, a descentralização prática exige que funções críticas sejam distribuídas, não apenas coordenadas por grandes incumbentes.

Também existe uma preocupação de coordenação com outras iniciativas. Há múltiplos programas e propostas relacionados a tooling, open source, documentação, developer support e melhoria da experiência de desenvolvedores. A própria proposta inclui itens amplos como “Community Alignment”, “Developer Outreach”, “Community Collaboration” e trabalho “Reactive”. Esses itens podem ser úteis, mas também tornam o escopo elástico e potencialmente sobreposto.

Uma iniciativa desse porte deveria apresentar com mais clareza como se diferencia de outras frentes, quais responsabilidades pertencem a IO, quais seriam executadas por parceiros ou comunidade, quais lacunas específicas não estão cobertas por iniciativas existentes, e por que uma proposta centralizada de seis meses é preferível a uma combinação de bounties, RFPs, grants menores e coordenação aberta.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NÃO

O problema não é a existência de uma proposta para DevX. O problema é a forma. A proposta tem méritos, identifica uma necessidade real e inclui entregáveis potencialmente úteis, mas não oferece orçamento suficientemente detalhado, não enfrenta de modo convincente o contexto econômico de retração e escassez de funding para novos builders, e concentra uma camada estratégica demais sob a liderança de IO.

A preocupação orçamentária é o principal ponto decisório. Para uma retirada de ₳3.601.926 do Tesouro ao longo de seis meses,

Governance Action Review [EN]

Blockfrost: Maintenance and Next Generation Indexing

Vote: NO

1. Introduction

The Governance Action requests ₳7,916,666, equivalent to $1,900,000 at a reference rate of $0.24/₳, to fund Blockfrost’s “Maintenance and Next Generation Indexing” proposal. The action combines two funding components: Project Cayley / Mandoline, a decentralized slice-indexing architecture intended to reduce the resource burden of full-chain indexing, and an operational subsidy to maintain Blockfrost’s existing free-tier infrastructure while the decentralized infrastructure matures.

Project Cayley proposes to enable SPOs and other Cardano node operators to participate in data-serving infrastructure without maintaining a full dataset index. The proposed deliverables include an initial Cardano indexer release, a GraphQL API layer, Bitcoin indexer support, and repeated service-level compliance milestones for maintaining 99.9% uptime of the community free tier across Q2, Q3, and Q4 2026.

The budget allocates ₳3,333,333 to Product, Engineering and R&D, ₳833,333 to Security Audits, and ₳3,750,000 to Ops & Infrastructure. The operational subsidy is presented as support for a free-tier service that Blockfrost states it has historically funded itself and that accounts for approximately 90% of all free-tier Cardano API traffic.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

Blockfrost is an important infrastructure provider. Many applications and developers have relied on its services to build and operate within the Cardano ecosystem, and the existence of accessible developer infrastructure remains valuable for adoption.

Project Cayley also appears to point toward a potentially useful technical direction, especially if future scalability improvements substantially increase Cardano’s data volume and make full-chain indexing more expensive for infrastructure providers.

The proposal frames Cayley as a response to future indexing challenges expected from increased throughput, particularly in relation to Leios. The basic logic is understandable: if Cardano processes more transactions, the blockchain dataset grows faster, and full-chain indexing becomes more expensive. Slice indexing could therefore reduce costs and allow more operators to participate in data infrastructure.

Negative aspects

The proposal combines two clearly distinguishable funding requests into a single all-or-nothing Treasury Withdrawal: the development of Project Cayley / Mandoline as a next-generation indexing architecture, and an operational subsidy to maintain Blockfrost’s existing free-tier infrastructure.

These two components may both be arguable on their own merits, but they are not sufficiently inseparable to justify being bundled into a single vote. This structure weakens governance clarity and forces dReps to accept or reject both components together, even if they support one and reject the other.

This type of bundling has increasingly become a governance concern. It creates unnecessary compromise, reduces the precision of treasury decision-making, and may ultimately harm proposers by generating additional opposition from voters who object to only part of the package.

In this case, Project Cayley and the free-tier maintenance subsidy could have been submitted and evaluated separately. Combining them creates a structural problem that weighs heavily against approval.

The operational subsidy component is also difficult to support in its current form. Blockfrost has already received ecosystem funding through previous Catalyst and Treasury processes, and it also operates paid tiers as part of its commercial model. Given that context, continued reliance on the Cardano Treasury raises sustainability concerns.

The proposal states that the operational subsidy would support the continuation of Blockfrost’s free tier and maintain a 99.9% SLA during the project period. It also explains that $600,000 would cover personnel and $300,000 would cover infrastructure costs. These are useful details, but they do not fully resolve the central issue: the proposal does not provide sufficient transparency regarding revenue, cost recovery, commercial sustainability, or a credible path toward financial independence from future Treasury support.

In addition, the budget breakdown remains very high-level and does not provide enough detail to instill confidence in the requested allocation.

The explanation of Cayley in the proposal also remains relatively high-level for a request of this size. The proposal describes the general problem of full-chain indexing costs and the intended solution of decentralized slice indexing, but provides limited concrete examples of current ecosystem pain points, current operators being priced out, measurable present demand, or specific scenarios where the absence of Cayley is already constraining Cardano adoption.

Risks and concerns

The Treasury should not become the default mechanism for annually subsidizing every important infrastructure provider whose free-tier model is not financially self-sustaining.

This concern is especially relevant because Cardano is already allocating substantial treasury resources toward infrastructure, maintenance, continuity of development, and alternative node implementations. If every relevant infrastructure provider is treated as eligible for recurring operational support, the Treasury risks becoming structurally committed to ongoing maintenance costs instead of preserving enough flexibility for new strategic priorities.

A stronger case for the free-tier maintenance component would require a clearer transition plan toward sustainability, more detailed justification for why the subsidy is necessary, and a stronger explanation of how the public benefit outweighs the risk of subsidizing an existing private infrastructure provider.

Without that, the proposal risks setting a precedent where the ecosystem socializes operational costs while commercial upside remains private.

The issue is not that Project Cayley lacks potential value. The issue is that the case for immediate Treasury funding is still largely based on projected future demand. Leios has not yet been implemented on mainnet, and the proposal does not sufficiently demonstrate that Cardano currently faces an urgent indexing bottleneck that justifies this level of expenditure now.

With a limited Net Change Limit and many competing priorities, funding a development path whose strongest justification depends on a future high-throughput environment appears premature.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

While recognizing Blockfrost’s historical relevance to the Cardano ecosystem and the value it has provided to many developers, this Governance Action presents significant concerns related to proposal structure, treasury discipline, funding prioritization, and the timing of the requested development work.

The issue is the current design of the Governance Action. It bundles separable components, asks the Treasury to subsidize an existing commercial service without sufficient sustainability commitments, and seeks funding for a future-oriented indexing architecture before the urgency of that architecture has been clearly demonstrated.

A more appropriate submission would separate the two components. A standalone Project Cayley proposal, focused on Cardano-first deliverables, with clearer technical detail, open-source commitments, SPO participation mechanics, and stronger evidence of timing necessity, could be evaluated on its own merits.

Likewise, a separate free-tier maintenance proposal with deeper financial transparency and a credible transition toward sustainability would allow dReps to assess whether temporary operational support is justified.

In its current form, however, the proposal presents too many structural, financial, and timing concerns to support.

4. Conclusion

Blockfrost’s contribution to Cardano and the potential value of improved data infrastructure are recognized. However, the bundled structure, insufficient sustainability commitments, unclear urgency, and weak Cardano-specific justification for some components create concerns that outweigh the case for approval in its current form.

Revisão de Ação de Governança [PT]

Blockfrost: Maintenance and Next Generation Indexing

Voto: NO

1. Introdução

A Ação de Governança solicita ₳7.916.666, equivalente a US$1.900.000 a uma taxa de referência de US$0,24/₳, para financiar a proposta “Maintenance and Next Generation Indexing” da Blockfrost. A ação combina dois componentes de financiamento: Project Cayley / Mandoline, uma arquitetura descentralizada de indexação por fatias destinada a reduzir a carga de recursos da indexação completa da blockchain, e um subsídio operacional para manter a infraestrutura gratuita existente da Blockfrost enquanto a infraestrutura descentralizada amadurece.

O Project Cayley propõe permitir que SPOs e outros operadores de nodes da Cardano participem da infraestrutura de fornecimento de dados sem manter um índice completo do conjunto de dados. As entregas propostas incluem uma versão inicial do indexador para Cardano, uma camada de API GraphQL, suporte a indexador de Bitcoin e marcos recorrentes de conformidade de nível de serviço para manter 99,9% de uptime do free tier comunitário ao longo de Q2, Q3 e Q4 de 2026.

O orçamento aloca ₳3.333.333 para Produto, Engenharia e P&D, ₳833.333 para Auditorias de Segurança e ₳3.750.000 para Operações e Infraestrutura. O subsídio operacional é apresentado como apoio a um serviço gratuito que a Blockfrost afirma ter historicamente financiado sozinha e que responde por aproximadamente 90% de todo o tráfego gratuito de API da Cardano.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

A Blockfrost é um provedor de infraestrutura importante. Muitas aplicações e desenvolvedores dependeram de seus serviços para construir e operar dentro do ecossistema Cardano, e a existência de infraestrutura acessível para desenvolvedores continua sendo valiosa para adoção.

O Project Cayley também parece apontar para uma direção técnica potencialmente útil, especialmente se futuras melhorias de escalabilidade aumentarem substancialmente o volume de dados da Cardano e tornarem a indexação completa da blockchain mais cara para provedores de infraestrutura.

A proposta apresenta Cayley como uma resposta a futuros desafios de indexação esperados com o aumento de throughput, particularmente em relação ao Leios. A lógica básica é compreensível: se a Cardano processar mais transações, o conjunto de dados da blockchain cresce mais rapidamente, e a indexação completa se torna mais cara. A indexação por fatias poderia, portanto, reduzir custos e permitir que mais operadores participem da infraestrutura de dados.

Aspectos negativos

A proposta combina dois pedidos de financiamento claramente distinguíveis em uma única Treasury Withdrawal de tudo ou nada: o desenvolvimento do Project Cayley / Mandoline como uma arquitetura de indexação de próxima geração, e um subsídio operacional para manter a infraestrutura gratuita existente da Blockfrost.

Esses dois componentes podem ser defensáveis por seus próprios méritos, mas não são suficientemente inseparáveis para justificar sua inclusão em um único voto. Essa estrutura enfraquece a clareza de governança e força dReps a aceitar ou rejeitar ambos os componentes juntos, mesmo que apoiem um e rejeitem o outro.

Esse tipo de agrupamento tem se tornado cada vez mais uma preocupação de governança. Ele cria compromissos desnecessários, reduz a precisão da tomada de decisão do Tesouro e pode, no fim, prejudicar os próprios proponentes ao gerar oposição adicional de votantes que discordam apenas de parte do pacote.

Neste caso, o Project Cayley e o subsídio de manutenção do free tier poderiam ter sido submetidos e avaliados separadamente. Combiná-los cria um problema estrutural que pesa fortemente contra a aprovação.

O componente de subsídio operacional também é difícil de apoiar em sua forma atual. A Blockfrost já recebeu financiamento do ecossistema por meio de processos anteriores do Catalyst e do Tesouro, e também opera planos pagos como parte de seu modelo comercial. Dado esse contexto, a dependência contínua do Tesouro da Cardano levanta preocupações de sustentabilidade.

A proposta afirma que o subsídio operacional apoiaria a continuidade do free tier da Blockfrost e manteria um SLA de 99,9% durante o período do projeto. Ela também explica que US$600.000 cobririam pessoal e US$300.000 cobririam custos de infraestrutura. Esses detalhes são úteis, mas não resolvem completamente a questão central: a proposta não fornece transparência suficiente sobre receita, recuperação de custos, sustentabilidade comercial ou um caminho crível para independência financeira em relação a futuro apoio do Tesouro.

Além disso, a divisão orçamentária permanece muito genérica e não fornece detalhes suficientes para gerar confiança na alocação solicitada.

A explicação de Cayley na proposta também permanece relativamente genérica para um pedido desse tamanho. A proposta descreve o problema geral dos custos de indexação completa da blockchain e a solução pretendida de indexação descentralizada por fatias, mas fornece exemplos concretos limitados de dores atuais do ecossistema, operadores atualmente excluídos por custo, demanda presente mensurável ou cenários específicos nos quais a ausência de Cayley já esteja limitando a adoção da Cardano.

Riscos e preocupações

O Tesouro não deve se tornar o mecanismo padrão para subsidiar anualmente todo provedor de infraestrutura importante cujo modelo de free tier não seja financeiramente autossustentável.

Essa preocupação é especialmente relevante porque a Cardano já está alocando recursos substanciais do Tesouro para infraestrutura, manutenção, continuidade de desenvolvimento e implementações alternativas de nodes. Se todo provedor de infraestrutura relevante for tratado como elegível para suporte operacional recorrente, o Tesouro corre o risco de ficar estruturalmente comprometido com custos contínuos de manutenção, em vez de preservar flexibilidade suficiente para novas prioridades estratégicas.

Um caso mais forte para o componente de manutenção do free tier exigiria um plano de transição mais claro em direção à sustentabilidade, uma justificativa mais detalhada para explicar por que o subsídio é necessário e uma explicação mais forte de como o benefício público supera o risco de subsidiar um provedor privado de infraestrutura já existente.

Sem isso, a proposta corre o risco de estabelecer um precedente no qual o ecossistema socializa custos operacionais enquanto o potencial comercial permanece privado.

O problema não é que o Project Cayley não tenha valor potencial. O problema é que o caso para financiamento imediato pelo Tesouro ainda se baseia amplamente em demanda futura projetada. Leios ainda não foi implementado na mainnet, e a proposta não demonstra suficientemente que a Cardano enfrenta atualmente um gargalo urgente de indexação que justifique esse nível de despesa agora.

Com um Net Change Limit limitado e muitas prioridades concorrentes, financiar uma linha de desenvolvimento cuja justificativa mais forte depende de um futuro ambiente de alto throughput parece prematuro.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NO

Embora a relevância histórica da Blockfrost para o ecossistema Cardano e o valor que ela forneceu a muitos desenvolvedores sejam reconhecidos, esta Ação de Governança apresenta preocupações significativas relacionadas à estrutura da proposta, disciplina do Tesouro, priorização de financiamento e ao timing do trabalho de desenvolvimento solicitado.

O problema é o desenho atual da Ação de Governança. Ela agrupa componentes separáveis, pede que o Tesouro subsidie um serviço comercial existente sem compromissos suficientes de sustentabilidade, e busca financiamento para uma arquitetura de indexação orientada ao futuro antes que a urgência dessa arquitetura tenha sido claramente demonstrada.

Uma submissão mais apropriada separaria os dois componentes. Uma proposta independente para o Project Cayley, focada em entregas Cardano-first, com maior detalhamento técnico, compromissos open-source, mecânicas de participação de SPOs e evidências mais fortes sobre a necessidade de timing, poderia ser avaliada por seus próprios méritos.

Da mesma forma, uma proposta separada de manutenção do free tier, com maior transparência financeira e uma transição crível em direção à sustentabilidade, permitiria aos dReps avaliar se um apoio operacional temporário se justifica.

Em sua forma atual, porém, a proposta apresenta preocupações estruturais, financeiras e de timing em excesso para ser apoiada.

4. Conclusão

A contribuição da Blockfrost para a Cardano e o valor potencial de uma infraestrutura de dados aprimorada são reconhecidos. No entanto, a estrutura agrupada, os compromissos insuficientes de sustentabilidade, a urgência pouco clara e a justificativa Cardano-specific fraca para alguns componentes criam preocupações que superam o caso para aprovação em sua forma atual.

Governance Action Review [EN]

Vote: NO

1. Introduction

Pogun is a Cardano Treasury proposal seeking ₳12.29M, equivalent to approximately $2.95M at a reference rate of $0.24/ADA, to build an end-to-end Bitcoin liquidity and credit engine on Cardano. The proposal presents three integrated components: a non-margin peer-to-peer credit market, a yield dApp, and a BitVM-powered trust-minimized BTC bridge. Its stated objective is to position Cardano as a destination for Bitcoin DeFi by enabling BTC-backed lending, yield generation, and Bitcoin liquidity deployment through Cardano-native infrastructure.

The proposal also includes a return model in which Pogun would pay 20% of quarterly EBITDA to the Cardano Treasury until the original USD-denominated funding amount is repaid, followed by a 5% perpetual return from Cardano-related products. The proposal discloses that Input Output has received or been allocated ₳130,708,860 from the Cardano Treasury across multiple workstreams in the prior 24 months, of which ₳78,459,777 had been received at the time of disclosure.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The strategic relevance of Bitcoin liquidity for Cardano is recognized.

The decision is not based on the assumption that the Pogun team lacks the technical capacity to develop the proposed solution. The proposal presents an ambitious and potentially valuable thesis: bringing Bitcoin liquidity into Cardano through a credit market, a yield layer, and a BitVM-powered BTC bridge. Cardano’s eUTxO architecture may indeed offer a more secure and structurally compatible environment for Bitcoin-related financial applications than many alternative ecosystems.

Bitcoin/Cardano interoperability, BTC liquidity expansion, and the broader exploration of Bitcoin-based DeFi on Cardano are valid and potentially important directions for the ecosystem.

Negative aspects

Technical ambition and strategic relevance are not sufficient grounds for direct Treasury funding, especially under current market conditions and with a highly contested Net Change Limit.

Pogun is not entering an empty design space. Several initiatives are already exploring different paths toward Bitcoin/Cardano interoperability, Bitcoin liquidity access, BTC-backed DeFi, atomic swaps, or bridge infrastructure. These include Sundial, BitcoinOS, Garden Finance/Tokeo, FluidTokens, and other adjacent efforts. The level of overlap varies across these projects. Some overlap more directly with Pogun’s bridge infrastructure, others with liquidity access, atomic swaps, yield infrastructure, or BTC-backed DeFi primitives.

This does not mean Pogun is irrelevant. It means the proposal should not be treated as a uniquely necessary public-good primitive.

The existence of multiple active efforts materially increases the burden of justification for a large direct Treasury withdrawal. The proposal needs to demonstrate not only that Bitcoin/Cardano integration is valuable, but why this specific vertically integrated commercial stack should receive preferential public funding over other approaches already being pursued by the ecosystem.

A second major concern is the funding instrument.

The Cardano ecosystem has already approved 50M ADA for the Orion Fund, an equity-first investment vehicle designed to support commercially viable ecosystem companies and strategic growth opportunities. This matters because Pogun has a strong commercial profile. It is not merely proposing neutral public infrastructure. It combines infrastructure with a credit market, a yield layer, institutional positioning, and future revenue generation.

If Pogun’s commercial thesis is as strong as presented, then an investment-oriented vehicle such as the Orion Fund, strategic private capital, or another venture-style mechanism appears more appropriate than a direct Treasury withdrawal.

The Treasury should not be used as non-dilutive venture capital for commercial products unless the protections for ADA holders and the upside participation for the public are significantly stronger.

Risks and concerns

The proposal attempts to address the public risk and commercial upside concern through a repayment model based on EBITDA, including 20% of quarterly EBITDA until the original USD-denominated amount is repaid, followed by a 5% perpetual return from Cardano-related products. This is better than a pure grant, but it does not fully resolve the problem.

EBITDA is an accounting outcome, not a hard Treasury protection mechanism. It can be affected by operating expenses, legal costs, infrastructure costs, salaries, related-party services, expansion costs, restructuring, and management decisions. Without stronger definitions, audit rights, enforcement mechanisms, and protections in the event of restructuring, acquisition, spinout, token issuance, or revenue migration, the proposed return model remains too weak for the level of commercial risk being assumed.

In practical terms, the Treasury would absorb significant early-stage risk, while the public upside remains uncertain and highly dependent on future execution, market adoption, accounting treatment, and commercial decisions.

A further concern is concentration.

Input Output already plays a central role in Cardano’s core infrastructure and has received substantial Treasury allocations across multiple workstreams. The Pogun proposal itself discloses that Input Output has received or been allocated significant Treasury funding in the prior 24 months, including a total allocation of ₳130,708,860, of which ₳78,459,777 had been received at the time of disclosure.

Given this existing concentration, it is not healthy for the ecosystem to further expand Treasury-funded activity around Input Output into commercial application development, especially when the proposal is not limited to core protocol infrastructure.

Input Output remains an important actor in the Cardano ecosystem. However, Treasury governance should also promote decentralization of development capacity. In close cases, or where strategic relevance and technical credibility are otherwise comparable, Treasury allocation should favor independent ecosystem builders and broader distribution of execution capacity rather than reinforcing already dominant institutional actors.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

While recognizing the strategic relevance of Bitcoin liquidity for Cardano, this Governance Action receives a NO vote.

The issue is the structure of this specific proposal. Pogun may be a technically capable and strategically interesting initiative, but the Cardano Treasury should not directly fund this vertically integrated commercial stack under the current terms, especially when other teams are already exploring overlapping infrastructure and when the ecosystem has already approved an investment-oriented vehicle better suited to commercial opportunities of this nature.

This vote should not be interpreted as opposition to Bitcoin/Cardano interoperability, BTC liquidity expansion, or the broader exploration of Bitcoin-based DeFi on Cardano. Those are valid and potentially important directions for the ecosystem.

The combination of existing overlap, commercial risk, insufficient Treasury protections, the existence of the Orion Fund as a more appropriate investment vehicle, and further concentration around Input Output makes the current structure difficult to justify.

4. Conclusion

Pogun presents a strategically relevant and technically ambitious direction for Cardano, but the current structure does not justify direct Treasury funding. Existing ecosystem overlap, weak public upside protections, commercial risk, opportunity cost under the Net Change Limit, and further concentration around Input Output support a NO vote.

Revisão de Ação de Governança

Voto: NÃO

1. Introdução

A Pogun é uma proposta ao Tesouro da Cardano que solicita ₳12,29 milhões, equivalente a aproximadamente US$2,95 milhões a uma taxa de referência de US$0,24/ADA, para construir um motor completo de liquidez e crédito em Bitcoin na Cardano. A proposta apresenta três componentes integrados: um mercado de crédito peer-to-peer sem margem, uma yield dApp e uma bridge BTC trust-minimized baseada em BitVM. Seu objetivo declarado é posicionar a Cardano como um destino para Bitcoin DeFi, permitindo empréstimos lastreados em BTC, geração de yield e uso de liquidez em Bitcoin por meio de infraestrutura nativa da Cardano.

A proposta também inclui um modelo de retorno no qual a Pogun pagaria 20% do EBITDA trimestral ao Tesouro da Cardano até que o valor original denominado em dólares fosse repago, seguido por um retorno perpétuo de 5% sobre produtos relacionados à Cardano. A proposta divulga que a Input Output recebeu ou teve alocações de ₳130.708.860 do Tesouro da Cardano em múltiplas frentes nos 24 meses anteriores, dos quais ₳78.459.777 haviam sido recebidos no momento da divulgação.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança [PT]

Aspectos positivos

A relevância estratégica da liquidez de Bitcoin para a Cardano é reconhecida.

A decisão não se baseia na premissa de que o time da Pogun não tenha capacidade técnica para desenvolver a solução proposta. A proposta apresenta uma tese ambiciosa e potencialmente valiosa: trazer liquidez de Bitcoin para a Cardano por meio de um mercado de crédito, uma camada de yield e uma bridge BTC baseada em BitVM. A arquitetura eUTxO da Cardano pode, de fato, oferecer um ambiente mais seguro e estruturalmente mais compatível para aplicações financeiras relacionadas ao Bitcoin do que muitos ecossistemas alternativos.

A interoperabilidade Bitcoin/Cardano, a expansão de liquidez em BTC e a exploração mais ampla de DeFi baseado em Bitcoin na Cardano são direções válidas e potencialmente importantes para o ecossistema.

Aspectos negativos

Ambição técnica e relevância estratégica não são suficientes para justificar financiamento direto do Tesouro, especialmente nas condições atuais de mercado e com um Net Change Limit altamente disputado.

A Pogun não está entrando em um espaço vazio. Várias iniciativas já estão explorando caminhos diferentes para interoperabilidade Bitcoin/Cardano, acesso à liquidez de Bitcoin, DeFi lastreado em BTC, atomic swaps ou infraestrutura de bridge. Entre elas estão Sundial, BitcoinOS, Garden Finance/Tokeo, FluidTokens e outras iniciativas adjacentes. O nível de sobreposição varia entre esses projetos. Alguns se sobrepõem mais diretamente à infraestrutura de bridge da Pogun, enquanto outros se relacionam mais com acesso à liquidez, atomic swaps, infraestrutura de yield ou primitivas DeFi lastreadas em BTC.

Isso não significa que a Pogun seja irrelevante. Significa que a proposta não deve ser tratada como um primitivo público único e indispensável.

A existência de múltiplas iniciativas ativas aumenta materialmente o ônus de justificativa para uma retirada direta e significativa do Tesouro. A proposta precisa demonstrar não apenas que a integração Bitcoin/Cardano é valiosa, mas por que este stack comercial verticalizado específico deveria receber financiamento público preferencial em relação a outros caminhos já sendo explorados pelo ecossistema.

Uma segunda preocupação central é o instrumento de financiamento.

O ecossistema Cardano já aprovou 50M ADA para o Orion Fund, um veículo de investimento com lógica equity-first voltado a empresas comercialmente viáveis e oportunidades estratégicas de crescimento no ecossistema. Isso importa porque a Pogun tem um perfil fortemente comercial. Ela não propõe apenas infraestrutura pública neutra. A proposta combina infraestrutura com mercado de crédito, camada de yield, posicionamento institucional e geração futura de receita.

Se a tese comercial da Pogun é tão forte quanto apresentada, então um veículo orientado a investimento, como o Orion Fund, capital privado estratégico ou outro mecanismo de venture capital, parece mais adequado do que uma retirada direta do Tesouro.

O Tesouro não deve ser usado como venture capital não-dilutivo para produtos comerciais, a menos que as proteções para os detentores de ADA e a participação pública no upside sejam significativamente mais robustas.

Riscos e preocupações

A proposta tenta responder à preocupação sobre risco público e upside comercial por meio de um modelo de retorno baseado em EBITDA, incluindo 20% do EBITDA trimestral até que o valor original denominado em dólares seja repago, seguido por um retorno perpétuo de 5% sobre produtos relacionados à Cardano. Isso é melhor do que um grant puro, mas não resolve totalmente o problema.

EBITDA é um resultado contábil, não um mecanismo rígido de proteção do Tesouro. Ele pode ser afetado por despesas operacionais, custos jurídicos, custos de infraestrutura, salários, serviços de partes relacionadas, custos de expansão, reestruturações e decisões gerenciais. Sem definições mais fortes, direitos de auditoria, mecanismos de execução e proteções em caso de reestruturação, aquisição, spinout, emissão de token ou migração de receita, o modelo de retorno proposto permanece fraco demais para o nível de risco comercial assumido.

Na prática, o Tesouro assumiria um risco relevante de estágio inicial, enquanto o upside público permaneceria incerto e altamente dependente de execução futura, adoção de mercado, tratamento contábil e decisões comerciais.

Outra preocupação é a concentração.

A Input Output já exerce um papel central na infraestrutura crítica da Cardano e recebeu alocações substanciais do Tesouro em múltiplas frentes. A própria proposta da Pogun divulga que a Input Output recebeu ou teve alocações significativas do Tesouro nos 24 meses anteriores, incluindo uma alocação total de ₳130.708.860, dos quais ₳78.459.777 já haviam sido recebidos no momento da divulgação.

Diante dessa concentração já existente, não é saudável para o ecossistema expandir ainda mais atividades financiadas pelo Tesouro em torno da Input Output para o desenvolvimento de aplicações comerciais, especialmente quando a proposta não se limita à infraestrutura essencial de protocolo.

A Input Output continua sendo um ator importante no ecossistema Cardano. No entanto, a governança do Tesouro também deve promover a descentralização da capacidade de desenvolvimento. Em casos próximos, ou quando relevância estratégica e credibilidade técnica forem comparáveis, a alocação do Tesouro deveria favorecer builders independentes e uma distribuição mais ampla da capacidade de execução, em vez de reforçar atores institucionais já dominantes.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NÃO

Embora a relevância estratégica da liquidez de Bitcoin para a Cardano seja reconhecida, esta Ação de Governança recebe voto NÃO.

O problema está na estrutura desta proposta específica. A Pogun pode ser uma iniciativa tecnicamente capaz e estrategicamente interessante, mas o Tesouro da Cardano não deve financiar diretamente este stack comercial verticalizado sob os termos atuais, especialmente quando outros times já exploram infraestruturas sobrepostas e quando o ecossistema já aprovou um veículo orientado a investimento mais adequado para oportunidades comerciais dessa natureza.

Este voto não deve ser interpretado como oposição à interoperabilidade Bitcoin/Cardano, à expansão de liquidez em BTC ou à exploração mais ampla de DeFi baseado em Bitcoin na Cardano. Essas são direções válidas e potencialmente importantes para o ecossistema.

A combinação de sobreposição com iniciativas existentes, risco comercial, proteções insuficientes para o Tesouro, existência do Orion Fund como veículo mais adequado para esse tipo de oportunidade e maior concentração em torno da Input Output torna a estrutura atual difícil de justificar.

4. Conclusão

A Pogun apresenta uma direção estrategicamente relevante e tecnicamente ambiciosa para a Cardano, mas a estrutura atual não justifica financiamento direto do Tesouro. Sobreposição com iniciativas existentes, proteções frágeis ao upside público, risco comercial, custo de oportunidade sob o Net Change Limit e maior concentração em torno da Input Output sustentam o voto NÃO.

Vote: NO

Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]

Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.

My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.

In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.

At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.

Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.

Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.

This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.

Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:

• Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
• Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
• Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
• Lack of credible execution capacity;
• Structural governance or transparency concerns;
• Severe budgetary or coordination risks.

Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.

This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.

Governance Action Review

While recognizing the strategic importance of scalability for Cardano’s future and considering it legitimate for multiple teams to work on complementary infrastructure solutions, this proposal raises significant concerns related to execution, operational capacity, treasury discipline, and proposal structure.

This position should not be interpreted as opposition to scalability development within Cardano. Scalability remains one of the most important areas of Cardano’s roadmap and one of the major technical domains still under active development, alongside governance. There is a valid case for continued investment in scalability, and some degree of redundancy among different teams and approaches can be beneficial for ecosystem resilience. However, redundancy must remain disciplined, especially under current market conditions and treasury constraints.

The existence of other scalability initiatives already funded and currently under development within the ecosystem, including Treasury Withdrawals that have already received strong community support such as the “IO: Consensus Initiative” [1], which focuses on Leios development, reduces the urgency of immediately expanding treasury exposure through another major funding allocation tied to Midgard.

The primary concern is not necessarily the technical direction of the proposal, but rather the Midgard team’s execution track record. After reviewing previously funded Midgard-related proposals, including both Catalyst [2] and Treasury Withdrawals [3][4], a pattern of substantial delays, timeline extensions, and long-running incomplete milestones becomes evident. The explanations provided for these delays appear to stem primarily from internal capacity and management limitations rather than exceptional external circumstances.

It is also concerning that key members of the Midgard team are simultaneously involved in multiple initiatives across the Cardano ecosystem, raising reasonable questions regarding focus, execution capacity, and operational dispersion. It does not appear prudent to continue expanding treasury-funded parallel initiatives while previously funded deliverables remain delayed or incomplete.

Having open proposals is not, by itself, sufficient reason for rejection. However, when there is a consistent history of significant delays across multiple previously funded initiatives, this becomes a material risk factor for additional treasury exposure.

Another factor contributing to this rejection is the proposal structure itself. Previous Hydra- and Midgard-related funding proposals/initiatives were submitted separately, allowing DReps and the broader community to evaluate each workstream independently according to its own execution history, maturity level, risks, and strategic relevance. In this case, however, multiple distinct scalability initiatives were grouped together into a single Treasury Withdrawal proposal without sufficiently clear justification for why they must be inseparable from a governance and funding perspective.

This approach raises concerns regarding proposal bundling practices within Cardano governance. Combining loosely related or independently viable initiatives into a single budget proposal or Treasury Withdrawal, when there is no strong and unavoidable interdependence between them, reduces decision granularity. It makes it impossible for DReps to support one component while opposing another based on execution history, delivery confidence, or treasury prioritization concerns.

In this proposal specifically, Hydra and Midgard represent materially different execution profiles, maturity levels, and operational histories. Bundling both together effectively forces an all-or-nothing governance decision despite the fact that reasonable concerns may apply unevenly across the workstreams.

Even if the broader scalability direction is strategically important for Cardano, the use of bundled proposals in situations where components could reasonably be evaluated independently is not considered a healthy governance practice, particularly in situations where the bundled workstreams carry materially different execution histories, risk profiles, and funding backgrounds.

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Nota sobre a metodologia e escopo da análise [PT]

Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.

Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.

Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.

Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.

Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.

Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.

Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.

Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:

• Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
• Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
• Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
• Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
• Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
• Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.

Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.

Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.

Revisão de Ação de Governança

Embora seja reconhecida a importância estratégica da escalabilidade para o futuro da Cardano e seja considerado legítimo que múltiplos times trabalhem em soluções complementares de infraestrutura, esta proposta levanta preocupações significativas relacionadas à execução, capacidade operacional, disciplina do treasury e estrutura da proposta.

Este posicionamento não deve ser interpretado como oposição ao desenvolvimento de soluções de escalabilidade na Cardano. A escalabilidade permanece como uma das áreas mais importantes do roadmap da Cardano e como um dos principais domínios técnicos ainda em desenvolvimento ativo, junto com a governança. Há um argumento válido para a continuidade de investimentos em escalabilidade, e algum grau de redundância entre diferentes times e abordagens pode ser benéfico para a resiliência do ecossistema. No entanto, essa redundância deve permanecer disciplinada, especialmente sob as atuais condições de mercado e restrições do treasury.

A existência de outras iniciativas de escalabilidade já financiadas e atualmente em desenvolvimento no ecossistema, incluindo Treasury Withdrawals que já receberam forte apoio da comunidade, como a “IO: Consensus Initiative” [1], focada no desenvolvimento de Leios, reduz a urgência de expandir imediatamente a exposição do treasury por meio de uma nova alocação significativa de recursos vinculada à Midgard.

A principal preocupação não está necessariamente na direção técnica da proposta, mas sim no histórico de execução do time da Midgard. Após revisar propostas relacionadas à Midgard previamente financiadas, incluindo tanto Catalyst [2] quanto Treasury Withdrawals [3][4], torna-se evidente um padrão de atrasos substanciais, extensões de cronograma e milestones incompletos por longos períodos. As explicações fornecidas para esses atrasos parecem decorrer principalmente de limitações internas de capacidade e gestão, e não de circunstâncias externas excepcionais.

Também é preocupante que membros-chave do time da Midgard estejam simultaneamente envolvidos em múltiplas iniciativas no ecossistema Cardano, levantando dúvidas razoáveis sobre foco, capacidade de execução e dispersão operacional. Não parece prudente continuar expandindo iniciativas paralelas financiadas pelo treasury enquanto entregas previamente financiadas permanecem atrasadas ou incompletas.

Ter propostas em aberto não é, por si só, razão suficiente para rejeição. No entanto, quando existe um histórico consistente de atrasos significativos em múltiplas iniciativas previamente financiadas, isso se torna um fator material de risco para uma exposição adicional do treasury.

Outro fator que contribui para esta rejeição é a própria estrutura da proposta. Iniciativas/propostas de financiamento relacionadas à Hydra e à Midgard foram anteriormente submetidas separadamente, permitindo que dReps e a comunidade mais ampla avaliassem cada workstream de forma independente, de acordo com seu próprio histórico de execução, nível de maturidade, riscos e relevância estratégica. Neste caso, porém, múltiplas iniciativas distintas de escalabilidade foram agrupadas em uma única proposta de Treasury Withdrawal sem uma justificativa suficientemente clara sobre por que elas devem ser inseparáveis sob uma perspectiva de governança e financiamento.

Essa abordagem levanta preocupações quanto à prática de bundling de propostas dentro da governança da Cardano. Combinar iniciativas vagamente relacionadas ou viáveis de forma independente em uma única budget proposal ou Treasury Withdrawal, quando não há uma interdependência forte e inevitável entre elas, reduz a granularidade da decisão. Isso torna impossível que dReps apoiem um componente enquanto se opõem a outro com base em histórico de execução, confiança na entrega ou preocupações de priorização do treasury.

Nesta proposta especificamente, Hydra e Midgard representam perfis de execução, níveis de maturidade e históricos operacionais materialmente diferentes. Agrupar ambas em uma mesma proposta força, na prática, uma decisão de governança do tipo tudo-ou-nada, apesar de preocupações razoáveis poderem se aplicar de forma desigual entre os workstreams.

Mesmo que a direção mais ampla de escalabilidade seja estrategicamente importante para a Cardano, o uso de propostas agrupadas em situações nas quais os componentes poderiam razoavelmente ser avaliados de forma independente não é considerado uma prática saudável de governança, especialmente em casos nos quais os workstreams agrupados possuem históricos de execução, perfis de risco e antecedentes de financiamento materialmente diferentes.

References/Referências

[1] IO: Consensus Initiative
https://adastat.net/governances/73e171a4c0730b4b59ecae271ab89f12a9d56360b02920e1f95107dbdc1d676202

[2] Catalyst Midgard proposal
https://milestones.projectcatalyst.io/projects/1200027

[3] Treasury Withdrawal EC-0008-25
https://treasury.sundae.fi/budgets/9e65e4ed7d6fd86fc4827d2b45da6d2c601fb920e8bfd794b8ecc619/project/EC-0008-25

[4] Treasury Withdrawal EC-0001-25
https://treasury.sundae.fi/budgets/9e65e4ed7d6fd86fc4827d2b45da6d2c601fb920e8bfd794b8ecc619/project/EC-0001-25

EN

At this stage, the ecosystem still lacks a sufficiently clear view of the full demand for treasury funding within the current NCL window. Intersect’s budget process is still in its proposal intake and refinement phase, meaning that the broader set of funding requests will only become clearer around mid-May.

This matters because direct Treasury Withdrawal submissions currently create a structural imbalance. In practice, this path favors teams with strong technical capacity, governance familiarity, and enough ADA to provide the required on-chain deposit. Meanwhile, proposers who rely on the more coordinated budget process are forced to wait longer before their proposals can be evaluated and consolidated.

I continue to support the right of proposers to submit Treasury Withdrawals independently. That option should remain available. However, approving individual withdrawals too early risks giving priority to better-capitalized or more technically prepared actors before the ecosystem has visibility over the broader funding pipeline.

This creates an unfair sequencing problem: proposals should not gain an advantage simply because their teams are more able to navigate the direct on-chain submission process or provide the required deposit upfront.

For that reason, I believe it is more prudent to delay approvals until the ecosystem has a clearer view of total funding demand, trade-offs, and priorities within the current NCL window.

---

PT

Neste momento, o ecossistema ainda não possui uma visão suficientemente clara da demanda total por financiamento do tesouro dentro da janela atual de NCL. O processo orçamentário da Intersect ainda está na fase de admissão e refinamento de propostas, o que significa que o conjunto mais amplo de solicitações de financiamento só ficará mais claro por volta de meados de maio.

Isso é importante porque as submissões diretas de Treasury Withdrawals atualmente criam uma assimetria estrutural. Na prática, esse caminho favorece times com maior capacidade técnica, familiaridade com governança e ADA suficiente para realizar o depósito on-chain exigido. Enquanto isso, proponentes que dependem do processo orçamentário mais coordenado precisam esperar mais tempo até que suas propostas possam ser avaliadas e consolidadas.

Eu continuo defendendo o direito de proponentes submeterem Treasury Withdrawals de forma independente. Essa opção deve permanecer disponível. No entanto, aprovar retiradas individuais cedo demais corre o risco de dar prioridade a atores mais capitalizados ou tecnicamente mais preparados antes que o ecossistema tenha visibilidade sobre o pipeline mais amplo de financiamento.

Isso cria um problema injusto de sequenciamento: propostas não deveriam ganhar vantagem simplesmente porque seus times conseguem navegar melhor o processo direto de submissão on-chain ou fornecer antecipadamente o depósito exigido.

Por esse motivo, acredito que é mais prudente adiar aprovações até que o ecossistema tenha uma visão mais clara da demanda total por financiamento, dos trade-offs e das prioridades dentro da janela atual de NCL.

EN - I have a conflict of interest regarding this proposal, therefore I will abstain.
PT - Tenho um conflito de interesses em relação a esta proposta, portanto, irei me abster.

English

1. Introduction

An Info Action has been submitted to approve the Cardano Foundation as the new managing entity of Project Catalyst, replacing Input Output Global in the management role of the Catalyst Foundation Company. The immediate purpose is to allow Catalyst operations and responsibilities to transition without interruption, especially for grant administration, milestone reviews, and eligible payouts connected to Funds 10 to 14. According to the action text, this approval is required under the statutes of the Catalyst Foundation Company, which require a Cardano community decision before a new administrator can assume the role. [Source: Governance Action]

The proposal states that this transition is unrelated to Intersect’s role as constitutionally mandated budget administrator for Funds 14 to 16, and also unrelated to the previously announced return of approved allocations for Funds 15 and 16 to the Cardano Treasury. It further states that, without community approval of a new managing entity by the end of May, Catalyst operations would likely face an undetermined pause, with potential delays in fund disbursements and uncertainty over continuation of the program. Approval is defined in the text as more than 50% of active DRep voting stake voting YES at expiration. [Source: Governance Action]

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

Under the current circumstances, approving the transfer of Catalyst management from Input Output Global to the Cardano Foundation is the least harmful and most institutionally responsible option available.

At its narrowest level, the proposal addresses a specific operational need: appointing a new managing entity for the Catalyst Foundation Company so that existing grant administration, particularly for Funds 10 to 14, can continue without interruption.

Rejecting the Info Action would likely produce a worse outcome. Without a clear successor managing the Catalyst Foundation Company, operations could enter an undefined pause. This would affect the administration of ongoing grants and further harm projects already operating under limited funding conditions.

The available institutional options are limited. IOG has effectively stepped away from continuing the program. EMURGO has not historically operated Catalyst. No other organization currently appears capable of assuming operational responsibility at this scale.

The Cardano Foundation therefore emerges as the only viable institution able to assume stewardship without further disruption.

Support is also informed by the observation that the Cardano Foundation has previously demonstrated concern about structural weaknesses within Catalyst. Some of its earlier actions were controversial but reflected an awareness that Catalyst’s governance model required scrutiny and improvement.

The Foundation’s mandate regarding ecosystem integrity, reputation, and governance oversight positions it as a credible steward capable of stabilizing the program during this transitional period.

Negative aspects

This vote should not be interpreted as an endorsement of how the current situation was reached.

A corrective administrative decision is being taken in response to a prolonged deterioration in confidence, performance, transparency, and stewardship surrounding Project Catalyst.

Several treasury-funded Catalyst-related deliverables remain unresolved. Across multiple funding rounds, significant treasury resources were allocated to proposals intended to deliver technical improvements, infrastructure, and operational tooling for the Catalyst platform. Some of these deliverables remain incomplete, substantially delayed, or unclear in status.

In certain cases, delays appear to exceed one year despite portions of the allocated funds already having been disbursed.

Legitimate questions remain open: what is the status of incomplete Catalyst-related deliverables funded by the treasury, which obligations remain outstanding and under whose responsibility, what accounting exists for funds already spent on unfinished work, and whether IOG retains responsibility for outputs funded under previous approved proposals.

The ecosystem cannot accept a situation in which treasury-funded development work simply disappears during a managerial transition without clear accounting. If public funds were allocated to build specific technical infrastructure for Catalyst, traceability, accountability, and closure regarding those commitments remain necessary.

Catalyst did not arrive at its current situation due to a single event. Years of structural weaknesses were insufficiently addressed. Members of the Cardano community repeatedly raised concerns about governance design, responsiveness to feedback, and delivery capacity.

Although Catalyst enabled valuable initiatives across the ecosystem, critical structural issues persisted for extended periods without adequate resolution. Several promised platform improvements were delayed far beyond expected timelines. At the same time, decision-making gradually became more centralized, reducing meaningful community influence over category design, review processes, and operational parameters.

A funding mechanism of this scale cannot remain chronically delayed, structurally centralized, and insufficiently accountable while continuing to expect sustained community confidence.

The events surrounding Fund 15 significantly intensified these concerns. Hundreds of participants engaged in Fund 15 in good faith. Proposers invested time, coordination, and resources. Community reviewers and moderators collectively dedicated thousands of hours to proposal assessment and quality control.

The decision to pause and ultimately cancel Fund 15 occurred very late in the process, shortly before voting was expected to begin. Communication prior to that decision was often vague and did not clearly reflect the institutional nature of the underlying issues.

If reviewers and contributors are not compensated for work already performed, that represents a serious institutional failure. The community should not treat this outcome lightly.

Primary operational responsibility for Catalyst during this period rested with IOG, which administered the program.

Risks and concerns

This Info Action does not close the questions surrounding unresolved treasury-funded obligations.

The transition period should include public reporting on incomplete treasury-funded deliverables, transparent accounting of associated expenditures, operational and financial review where necessary, and a written post-mortem explaining why Catalyst reached its current state.

A YES vote does not mean that the Fund 15 situation has been adequately explained, that treasury-funded deliverables no longer require scrutiny, that community labor already performed can be ignored, or that previous stewardship has been absolved.

If this transition is approved, it should be followed by transparency on treasury-funded work, clear responsibility for incomplete deliverables, explanation of decisions leading to the collapse of Fund 15, and structural reforms restoring community confidence.

This does not imply unconditional trust. A comparative institutional judgment is being made under constrained circumstances.

Potential impacts

Economic — Ongoing grant administration and eligible payouts for Funds 10 to 14 can continue without interruption. Rejecting the transition would likely increase harm to projects already operating under limited funding conditions. Unresolved treasury-funded deliverables and previously disbursed funds still require transparent accounting and review.

Technical — Incomplete or substantially delayed Catalyst-related technical improvements, infrastructure, and operational tooling remain unresolved. Clear traceability and closure are still required for treasury-funded technical commitments.

Governance / political — A new managing entity can prevent an undefined operational pause, but the transition does not resolve long-standing concerns about centralization, limited community influence, weak responsiveness to feedback, and inadequate accountability. Structural reforms remain necessary to restore confidence.

Reputational — Prolonged deterioration in confidence, transparency, performance, and stewardship has already damaged trust around Project Catalyst. A poorly accounted transition, unresolved deliverables, and the handling of Fund 15 risk further harm to institutional credibility across the ecosystem.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: YES

A YES vote is being cast because, under the current circumstances, approving the transfer of Catalyst management from IOG to the Cardano Foundation is the least harmful and most institutionally responsible option available.

This should not be read as endorsement of how the present situation emerged. A corrective administrative decision is being taken in response to prolonged deterioration in confidence, performance, transparency, and stewardship surrounding Project Catalyst.

The proposal addresses an immediate operational need by appointing a new managing entity for the Catalyst Foundation Company so that existing grant administration, especially for Funds 10 to 14, can continue without interruption. At the same time, the vote takes place amid unresolved governance and accountability failures, including incomplete treasury-funded deliverables, unclear responsibility for unfinished work, delayed platform improvements, growing centralization, and the late-stage collapse of Fund 15 under IOG’s operational stewardship.

Despite these failures, rejecting the transition would likely produce a worse outcome. Without a clear successor, Catalyst operations could enter an undefined pause, further harming ongoing projects. The institutional alternatives are limited. IOG has stepped away, EMURGO has not historically operated Catalyst, and no other organization currently appears capable of assuming this responsibility at scale. The Cardano Foundation therefore appears to be the only viable institution able to assume stewardship without further disruption.

Support for the transition is also informed by previous signs that the Cardano Foundation recognized structural weaknesses within Catalyst and had shown concern about the program’s governance model. This remains a comparative institutional judgment under constrained circumstances, not a blank cheque.

If approved, the transition should be followed by public transparency on treasury-funded work, clear responsibility for incomplete deliverables, explanation of decisions leading to Fund 15’s collapse, and structural reforms capable of restoring community confidence.

4. Conclusion

Support is being given because Catalyst requires a new administrative steward, because previous stewardship accumulated significant delivery and transparency failures, and because rejecting the transition would likely cause further harm to projects and to the ecosystem. The Cardano Foundation currently appears to be the only viable institution able to assume this role, but unresolved accountability questions remain open.

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Português (PT-BR)

1. Introdução

Foi submetida uma Info Action para aprovar a Cardano Foundation como a nova entidade gestora do Project Catalyst, substituindo a Input Output Global na função de gestão da Catalyst Foundation Company. O objetivo imediato é permitir que as operações e responsabilidades do Catalyst sejam transferidas sem interrupção, especialmente na administração de grants, milestone reviews e pagamentos elegíveis relacionados aos Funds 10 a 14. Segundo o texto da ação, essa aprovação é exigida pelos estatutos da Catalyst Foundation Company, que requerem uma decisão da comunidade Cardano antes que um novo administrador possa assumir a função. [Source: Governance Action]

A proposta afirma que essa transição não está relacionada ao papel da Intersect como administradora orçamentária constitucionalmente mandatada para os Funds 14 a 16, nem ao retorno já anunciado ao Tesouro da Cardano das alocações previamente aprovadas para os Funds 15 e 16. Afirma ainda que, sem a aprovação da comunidade para uma nova entidade gestora até o fim de maio, as operações do Catalyst provavelmente enfrentariam uma pausa indeterminada, com potenciais atrasos nos desembolsos e incerteza quanto à continuidade do programa. A aprovação é definida no texto como mais de 50% do stake ativo de voto dos DReps votando YES no vencimento da ação. [Source: Governance Action]

2. Análise da Governance Action

Aspectos positivos

Nas circunstâncias atuais, aprovar a transferência da gestão do Catalyst da Input Output Global para a Cardano Foundation é a opção menos prejudicial e mais institucionalmente responsável disponível.

No seu nível mais imediato, a proposta atende a uma necessidade operacional específica: nomear uma nova entidade gestora para a Catalyst Foundation Company para que a administração dos grants existentes, especialmente dos Funds 10 a 14, possa continuar sem interrupção.

Rejeitar a Info Action provavelmente produziria um resultado pior. Sem uma sucessora clara na gestão da Catalyst Foundation Company, as operações poderiam entrar em uma pausa indefinida. Isso afetaria a administração de grants em andamento e prejudicaria ainda mais projetos que já operam sob condições financeiras limitadas.

As opções institucionais disponíveis são limitadas. A IOG se afastou da continuidade do programa. A EMURGO não operou historicamente o Catalyst. Nenhuma outra organização parece atualmente capaz de assumir responsabilidade operacional nessa escala.

A Cardano Foundation, portanto, surge como a única instituição viável capaz de assumir a stewardship sem causar maior disrupção.

O apoio também é informado pela observação de que a Cardano Foundation já demonstrou preocupação com fragilidades estruturais do Catalyst. Algumas de suas ações anteriores foram controversas, mas refletiram consciência de que o modelo de governança do programa exigia escrutínio e melhorias.

O mandato da Fundação em relação à integridade do ecossistema, reputação e supervisão de governança a posiciona como uma steward crível, capaz de estabilizar o programa durante este período de transição.

Aspectos negativos

Este voto não deve ser interpretado como um endosso da forma como a situação atual foi alcançada.

Uma decisão administrativa corretiva está sendo tomada em resposta a uma deterioração prolongada de confiança, desempenho, transparência e stewardship em torno do Project Catalyst.

Vários entregáveis do Catalyst financiados pelo Tesouro permanecem sem resolução. Ao longo de múltiplos ciclos de funding, recursos significativos do Tesouro foram alocados para propostas destinadas a entregar melhorias técnicas, infraestrutura e ferramentas operacionais para a plataforma Catalyst. Parte desses entregáveis permanece incompleta, substancialmente atrasada ou com status pouco claro.

Em certos casos, os atrasos parecem ultrapassar um ano, apesar de parte dos recursos aprovados já ter sido desembolsada.

Permanecem em aberto questões legítimas: qual é o status dos entregáveis do Catalyst financiados pelo Tesouro que seguem incompletos, quais obrigações permanecem pendentes e sob responsabilidade de quem, qual prestação de contas existe para recursos já gastos em trabalho inacabado, e se a IOG continua responsável por outputs financiados por propostas aprovadas anteriormente.

O ecossistema não pode aceitar uma situação em que trabalho de desenvolvimento financiado pelo Tesouro simplesmente desapareça durante uma transição gerencial sem prestação de contas clara. Se recursos públicos foram alocados para construir infraestrutura técnica específica para o Catalyst, rastreabilidade, accountability e encerramento dessas obrigações continuam necessários.

O Catalyst não chegou à situação atual por causa de um único evento. Anos de fragilidades estruturais foram insuficientemente enfrentados. Membros da comunidade Cardano levantaram repetidamente preocupações sobre design de governança, responsividade ao feedback e capacidade de entrega.

Embora o Catalyst tenha viabilizado iniciativas valiosas em todo o ecossistema, problemas estruturais críticos persistiram por longos períodos sem resolução adequada. Diversas melhorias prometidas para a plataforma foram atrasadas muito além dos prazos esperados. Ao mesmo tempo, a tomada de decisão tornou-se gradualmente mais centralizada, reduzindo a influência comunitária significativa sobre design de categorias, processos de revisão e parâmetros operacionais.

Um mecanismo de funding dessa escala não pode permanecer cronicamente atrasado, estruturalmente centralizado e insuficientemente accountable enquanto continua esperando confiança sustentada da comunidade.

Os acontecimentos em torno do Fund 15 intensificaram significativamente essas preocupações. Centenas de participantes se engajaram no Fund 15 de boa-fé. Proposers investiram tempo, coordenação e recursos. Community reviewers e moderadores dedicaram coletivamente milhares de horas à avaliação de propostas e ao controle de qualidade.

A decisão de pausar e, posteriormente, cancelar o Fund 15 ocorreu muito tarde no processo, pouco antes do início esperado da votação. A comunicação anterior a essa decisão foi frequentemente vaga e não refletiu claramente a natureza institucional dos problemas subjacentes.

Se revisores e contribuintes não forem remunerados pelo trabalho já realizado, isso representa uma falha institucional séria. A comunidade não deve tratar esse desfecho com leveza.

A responsabilidade operacional primária pelo Catalyst durante esse período estava com a IOG, que administrava o programa.

Riscos e preocupações

Esta Info Action não encerra as questões relativas às obrigações financiadas pelo Tesouro que permanecem sem resolução.

O período de transição deve incluir relatórios públicos sobre entregáveis financiados pelo Tesouro que permanecem incompletos, prestação de contas transparente dos gastos associados, revisão operacional e financeira quando necessário, e um post-mortem escrito explicando como o Catalyst chegou ao seu estado atual.

Um voto YES não significa que a situação do Fund 15 foi adequadamente explicada, que entregáveis financiados pelo Tesouro deixaram de exigir escrutínio, que o trabalho comunitário já realizado pode ser ignorado, ou que a gestão anterior foi absolvida.

Se essa transição for aprovada, ela deve ser seguida por transparência sobre o trabalho financiado pelo Tesouro, definição clara de responsabilidade por entregáveis incompletos, explicação das decisões que levaram ao colapso do Fund 15 e reformas estruturais que restaurem a confiança da comunidade.

Isso não implica confiança incondicional. Está sendo feito um julgamento institucional comparativo sob circunstâncias restritas.

Impactos potenciais

Econômico — A administração contínua de grants e os pagamentos elegíveis dos Funds 10 a 14 podem prosseguir sem interrupção. Rejeitar a transição provavelmente ampliaria o dano a projetos que já operam sob condições financeiras limitadas. Entregáveis financiados pelo Tesouro ainda não resolvidos e recursos previamente desembolsados continuam exigindo prestação de contas transparente e revisão.

Técnico — Melhorias técnicas, infraestrutura e ferramentas operacionais do Catalyst que permanecem incompletas ou substancialmente atrasadas seguem sem resolução. Rastreabilidade e encerramento claros ainda são necessários para compromissos técnicos financiados pelo Tesouro.

Governança / político — Uma nova entidade gestora pode evitar uma pausa operacional indefinida, mas a transição não resolve preocupações antigas sobre centralização, influência comunitária limitada, baixa responsividade ao feedback e accountability inadequada. Reformas estruturais continuam necessárias para restaurar a confiança.

Reputacional — A deterioração prolongada de

Governance Action Review

Governance Action: Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs

I am voting NO on this Treasury Withdrawal at this stage.

This vote should not be interpreted as a rejection of the proposal itself or of treasury funding in principle. My concern relates primarily to the timing and coordination of treasury allocations under the current governance environment.

At present, the ecosystem still lacks a sufficiently clear view of the full pipeline of proposals that may seek funding within the current NCL window.

Approving Treasury Withdrawals before proposers have had a meaningful opportunity to participate in a broader coordination process risks reinforcing an uncoordinated funding dynamic, where requests are assessed in isolation rather than in relation to the wider ecosystem’s needs, trade-offs, and budget constraints. My concern is not with individual submissions as such, but with the absence of a more collaborative and comparative process through which scope, budget, and priority can be better optimized across the current funding cycle.

Given the expectation that Intersect’s budgeting process may surface a broader set of requests in the coming weeks, I believe a short delay would likely improve decision quality and reduce the risk of inefficient allocation.

Approving withdrawals too early may also create downstream pressure to expand the NCL in order to accommodate proposals that emerge later but may prove strategically more relevant.

This should not be read as an attempt to block funding or paralyze governance. The ecosystem has already had roughly a full year to learn from the weaknesses of the previous cycle and to build a more credible coordination layer for the next one. That response has progressed more slowly than it should have.

I was willing to accept greater urgency last year because continuity of development mattered and the system was still in an early transition phase. But if we never reach the point where dReps are willing to demand greater accountability, coordination, and rigor, then the ecosystem simply carries the same loose standards into yet another funding cycle.

I do not consider that acceptable after the time already available to improve the process.

For these reasons, I believe it is preferable to delay approvals temporarily rather than normalize allocation decisions under incomplete and uncoordinated information.

This vote reflects a preference for better coordination and prioritization of treasury spending, not opposition to the goals of Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs.

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Revisão de Ação de Governança

Ação de Governança: Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs

Estou votando NÃO nesta Treasury Withdrawal neste momento.

Este voto não deve ser interpretado como uma rejeição da proposta em si ou do financiamento via tesouro em princípio. Minha preocupação está principalmente relacionada ao timing e à coordenação das alocações do tesouro no atual ambiente de governança.

No momento, o ecossistema ainda não possui uma visão suficientemente clara do conjunto completo de propostas que podem buscar financiamento dentro da janela atual de NCL.

Aprovar Treasury Withdrawals antes que os proponentes tenham tido uma oportunidade real de participar de algum processo mais amplo de coordenação corre o risco de reforçar uma dinâmica de financiamento descoordenada, na qual pedidos são avaliados isoladamente, em vez de serem analisados em relação às necessidades mais amplas do ecossistema, aos trade-offs existentes e às restrições orçamentárias.

Minha preocupação não é com submissões individuais em si, mas com a ausência de um processo mais colaborativo e comparativo por meio do qual escopo, orçamento e prioridade possam ser melhor otimizados ao longo deste ciclo de financiamento.

Considerando que o processo de orçamento conduzido pela Intersect pode trazer à tona um conjunto mais amplo de solicitações nas próximas semanas, acredito que um pequeno atraso provavelmente melhoraria a qualidade das decisões e reduziria o risco de alocações ineficientes.

Aprovar retiradas muito cedo também pode gerar pressão posterior para expandir o NCL, a fim de acomodar propostas que venham a surgir depois e que eventualmente se revelem mais relevantes do ponto de vista estratégico.

Isso não deve ser interpretado como uma tentativa de bloquear financiamento ou paralisar a governança. O ecossistema já teve aproximadamente um ano inteiro para aprender com as fragilidades do ciclo anterior e desenvolver uma camada de coordenação mais sólida para o próximo ciclo. Essa resposta avançou mais lentamente do que deveria.

No ano passado eu aceitei um maior senso de urgência porque a continuidade do desenvolvimento era importante e o sistema ainda estava em uma fase inicial de transição. No entanto, se nunca chegarmos ao ponto em que os dReps estejam dispostos a exigir maior accountability, coordenação e rigor, o ecossistema simplesmente carregará os mesmos padrões frouxos para mais um ciclo inteiro de financiamento.

Depois do tempo que já tivemos para melhorar o processo, não considero isso aceitável.

Por essas razões, acredito ser preferível adiar temporariamente as aprovações em vez de normalizar decisões de alocação baseadas em informações incompletas e descoordenadas.

Este voto reflete uma preferência por maior coordenação e melhor priorização do gasto do tesouro, e não uma oposição aos objetivos da Dingo: a Production-Grade Block Producer in Go by Blink Labs.

Governance Action Review

Governance Action: Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1

I am voting NO on this Treasury Withdrawal at this stage.

This vote should not be interpreted as a rejection of the proposal itself or of treasury funding in principle. My concern relates primarily to the timing and coordination of treasury allocations under the current governance environment.

At present, the ecosystem still lacks a sufficiently clear view of the full pipeline of proposals that may seek funding within the current NCL window.

Approving Treasury Withdrawals before proposers have had a meaningful opportunity to participate in a broader coordination process risks reinforcing an uncoordinated funding dynamic, where requests are assessed in isolation rather than in relation to the wider ecosystem’s needs, trade-offs, and budget constraints. My concern is not with individual submissions as such, but with the absence of a more collaborative and comparative process through which scope, budget, and priority can be better optimized across the current funding cycle.

Given the expectation that Intersect’s budgeting process may surface a broader set of requests in the coming weeks, I believe a short delay would likely improve decision quality and reduce the risk of inefficient allocation.

Approving withdrawals too early may also create downstream pressure to expand the NCL in order to accommodate proposals that emerge later but may prove strategically more relevant.

This should not be read as an attempt to block funding or paralyze governance. The ecosystem has already had roughly a full year to learn from the weaknesses of the previous cycle and to build a more credible coordination layer for the next one. That response has progressed more slowly than it should have.

I was willing to accept greater urgency last year because continuity of development mattered and the system was still in an early transition phase. But if we never reach the point where dReps are willing to demand greater accountability, coordination, and rigor, then the ecosystem simply carries the same loose standards into yet another funding cycle.

I do not consider that acceptable after the time already available to improve the process.

For these reasons, I believe it is preferable to delay approvals temporarily rather than normalize allocation decisions under incomplete and uncoordinated information.

This vote reflects a preference for better coordination and prioritization of treasury spending, not opposition to the goals of Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1.

---

Revisão de Ação de Governança

Ação de Governança: Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1

Estou votando NÃO nesta Treasury Withdrawal neste momento.

Este voto não deve ser interpretado como uma rejeição da proposta em si ou do financiamento via tesouro em princípio. Minha preocupação está principalmente relacionada ao timing e à coordenação das alocações do tesouro no atual ambiente de governança.

No momento, o ecossistema ainda não possui uma visão suficientemente clara do conjunto completo de propostas que podem buscar financiamento dentro da janela atual de NCL.

Aprovar Treasury Withdrawals antes que os proponentes tenham tido uma oportunidade real de participar de algum processo mais amplo de coordenação corre o risco de reforçar uma dinâmica de financiamento descoordenada, na qual pedidos são avaliados isoladamente, em vez de serem analisados em relação às necessidades mais amplas do ecossistema, aos trade-offs existentes e às restrições orçamentárias.

Minha preocupação não é com submissões individuais em si, mas com a ausência de um processo mais colaborativo e comparativo por meio do qual escopo, orçamento e prioridade possam ser melhor otimizados ao longo deste ciclo de financiamento.

Considerando que o processo de orçamento conduzido pela Intersect pode trazer à tona um conjunto mais amplo de solicitações nas próximas semanas, acredito que um pequeno atraso provavelmente melhoraria a qualidade das decisões e reduziria o risco de alocações ineficientes.

Aprovar retiradas muito cedo também pode gerar pressão posterior para expandir o NCL, a fim de acomodar propostas que venham a surgir depois e que eventualmente se revelem mais relevantes do ponto de vista estratégico.

Isso não deve ser interpretado como uma tentativa de bloquear financiamento ou paralisar a governança. O ecossistema já teve aproximadamente um ano inteiro para aprender com as fragilidades do ciclo anterior e desenvolver uma camada de coordenação mais sólida para o próximo ciclo. Essa resposta avançou mais lentamente do que deveria.

No ano passado eu aceitei um maior senso de urgência porque a continuidade do desenvolvimento era importante e o sistema ainda estava em uma fase inicial de transição. No entanto, se nunca chegarmos ao ponto em que os dReps estejam dispostos a exigir maior accountability, coordenação e rigor, o ecossistema simplesmente carregará os mesmos padrões frouxos para mais um ciclo inteiro de financiamento.

Depois do tempo que já tivemos para melhorar o processo, não considero isso aceitável.

Por essas razões, acredito ser preferível adiar temporariamente as aprovações em vez de normalizar decisões de alocação baseadas em informações incompletas e descoordenadas.

Este voto reflete uma preferência por maior coordenação e melhor priorização do gasto do tesouro, e não uma oposição aos objetivos da Cardano Defi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1.

Governance Action Review

Governance Action: Cardano x Draper Dragon: Orion Fund

I am voting NO on this Treasury Withdrawal at this stage.

This vote should not be interpreted as a rejection of the proposal itself or of treasury funding in principle. My concern relates primarily to the timing and coordination of treasury allocations under the current governance environment.

At present, the ecosystem still lacks a sufficiently clear view of the full pipeline of proposals that may seek funding within the current NCL window.

Approving Treasury Withdrawals before proposers have had a meaningful opportunity to participate in a broader coordination process risks reinforcing an uncoordinated funding dynamic, where requests are assessed in isolation rather than in relation to the wider ecosystem’s needs, trade-offs, and budget constraints. My concern is not with individual submissions as such, but with the absence of a more collaborative and comparative process through which scope, budget, and priority can be better optimized across the current funding cycle.

Given the expectation that Intersect’s budgeting process may surface a broader set of requests in the coming weeks, I believe a short delay would likely improve decision quality and reduce the risk of inefficient allocation.

Approving withdrawals too early may also create downstream pressure to expand the NCL in order to accommodate proposals that emerge later but may prove strategically more relevant.

This should not be read as an attempt to block funding or paralyze governance. The ecosystem has already had roughly a full year to learn from the weaknesses of the previous cycle and to build a more credible coordination layer for the next one. That response has progressed more slowly than it should have.

I was willing to accept greater urgency last year because continuity of development mattered and the system was still in an early transition phase. But if we never reach the point where dReps are willing to demand greater accountability, coordination, and rigor, then the ecosystem simply carries the same loose standards into yet another funding cycle.

I do not consider that acceptable after the time already available to improve the process.

For these reasons, I believe it is preferable to delay approvals temporarily rather than normalize allocation decisions under incomplete and uncoordinated information.

This vote reflects a preference for better coordination and prioritization of treasury spending, not opposition to the goals of Cardano x Draper Dragon: Orion Fund.

---

Revisão de Ação de Governança

Ação de Governança: Cardano x Draper Dragon: Orion Fund

Estou votando NÃO nesta Treasury Withdrawal neste momento.

Este voto não deve ser interpretado como uma rejeição da proposta em si ou do financiamento via tesouro em princípio. Minha preocupação está principalmente relacionada ao timing e à coordenação das alocações do tesouro no atual ambiente de governança.

No momento, o ecossistema ainda não possui uma visão suficientemente clara do conjunto completo de propostas que podem buscar financiamento dentro da janela atual de NCL.

Aprovar Treasury Withdrawals antes que os proponentes tenham tido uma oportunidade real de participar de algum processo mais amplo de coordenação corre o risco de reforçar uma dinâmica de financiamento descoordenada, na qual pedidos são avaliados isoladamente, em vez de serem analisados em relação às necessidades mais amplas do ecossistema, aos trade-offs existentes e às restrições orçamentárias.

Minha preocupação não é com submissões individuais em si, mas com a ausência de um processo mais colaborativo e comparativo por meio do qual escopo, orçamento e prioridade possam ser melhor otimizados ao longo deste ciclo de financiamento.

Considerando que o processo de orçamento conduzido pela Intersect pode trazer à tona um conjunto mais amplo de solicitações nas próximas semanas, acredito que um pequeno atraso provavelmente melhoraria a qualidade das decisões e reduziria o risco de alocações ineficientes.

Aprovar retiradas muito cedo também pode gerar pressão posterior para expandir o NCL, a fim de acomodar propostas que venham a surgir depois e que eventualmente se revelem mais relevantes do ponto de vista estratégico.

Isso não deve ser interpretado como uma tentativa de bloquear financiamento ou paralisar a governança. O ecossistema já teve aproximadamente um ano inteiro para aprender com as fragilidades do ciclo anterior e desenvolver uma camada de coordenação mais sólida para o próximo ciclo. Essa resposta avançou mais lentamente do que deveria.

No ano passado eu aceitei um maior senso de urgência porque a continuidade do desenvolvimento era importante e o sistema ainda estava em uma fase inicial de transição. No entanto, se nunca chegarmos ao ponto em que os dReps estejam dispostos a exigir maior accountability, coordenação e rigor, o ecossistema simplesmente carregará os mesmos padrões frouxos para mais um ciclo inteiro de financiamento.

Depois do tempo que já tivemos para melhorar o processo, não considero isso aceitável.

Por essas razões, acredito ser preferível adiar temporariamente as aprovações em vez de normalizar decisões de alocação baseadas em informações incompletas e descoordenadas.

Este voto reflete uma preferência por maior coordenação e melhor priorização do gasto do tesouro, e não uma oposição aos objetivos da Cardano x Draper Dragon: Orion Fund.

`## Governance Action Review

Governance Action: Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2026

I am voting NO on this Treasury Withdrawal at this stage.

This vote should not be interpreted as a rejection of the proposal itself or of treasury funding in principle. My concern relates primarily to the timing and coordination of treasury allocations under the current governance environment.

At present, the ecosystem still lacks a sufficiently clear view of the full pipeline of proposals that may seek funding within the current NCL window.

Approving Treasury Withdrawals before proposers have had a meaningful opportunity to participate in a broader coordination process risks reinforcing an uncoordinated funding dynamic, where requests are assessed in isolation rather than in relation to the wider ecosystem’s needs, trade-offs, and budget constraints. My concern is not with individual submissions as such, but with the absence of a more collaborative and comparative process through which scope, budget, and priority can be better optimized across the current funding cycle.

Given the expectation that Intersect’s budgeting process may surface a broader set of requests in the coming weeks, I believe a short delay would likely improve decision quality and reduce the risk of inefficient allocation.

Approving withdrawals too early may also create downstream pressure to expand the NCL in order to accommodate proposals that emerge later but may prove strategically more relevant.

This should not be read as an attempt to block funding or paralyze governance. The ecosystem has already had roughly a full year to learn from the weaknesses of the previous cycle and to build a more credible coordination layer for the next one. That response has progressed more slowly than it should have.

I was willing to accept greater urgency last year because continuity of development mattered and the system was still in an early transition phase. But if we never reach the point where dReps are willing to demand greater accountability, coordination, and rigor, then the ecosystem simply carries the same loose standards into yet another funding cycle.

I do not consider that acceptable after the time already available to improve the process.

For these reasons, I believe it is preferable to delay approvals temporarily rather than normalize allocation decisions under incomplete and uncoordinated information.

This vote reflects a preference for better coordination and prioritization of treasury spending, not opposition to the goals of Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2026.

---

Revisão de Ação de Governança

Ação de Governança: Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2026

Estou votando NÃO nesta Treasury Withdrawal neste momento.

Este voto não deve ser interpretado como uma rejeição da proposta em si ou do financiamento via tesouro em princípio. Minha preocupação está principalmente relacionada ao timing e à coordenação das alocações do tesouro no atual ambiente de governança.

No momento, o ecossistema ainda não possui uma visão suficientemente clara do conjunto completo de propostas que podem buscar financiamento dentro da janela atual de NCL.

Aprovar Treasury Withdrawals antes que os proponentes tenham tido uma oportunidade real de participar de algum processo mais amplo de coordenação corre o risco de reforçar uma dinâmica de financiamento descoordenada, na qual pedidos são avaliados isoladamente, em vez de serem analisados em relação às necessidades mais amplas do ecossistema, aos trade-offs existentes e às restrições orçamentárias.

Minha preocupação não é com submissões individuais em si, mas com a ausência de um processo mais colaborativo e comparativo por meio do qual escopo, orçamento e prioridade possam ser melhor otimizados ao longo deste ciclo de financiamento.

Considerando que o processo de orçamento conduzido pela Intersect pode trazer à tona um conjunto mais amplo de solicitações nas próximas semanas, acredito que um pequeno atraso provavelmente melhoraria a qualidade das decisões e reduziria o risco de alocações ineficientes.

Aprovar retiradas muito cedo também pode gerar pressão posterior para expandir o NCL, a fim de acomodar propostas que venham a surgir depois e que eventualmente se revelem mais relevantes do ponto de vista estratégico.

Isso não deve ser interpretado como uma tentativa de bloquear financiamento ou paralisar a governança. O ecossistema já teve aproximadamente um ano inteiro para aprender com as fragilidades do ciclo anterior e desenvolver uma camada de coordenação mais sólida para o próximo ciclo. Essa resposta avançou mais lentamente do que deveria.

No ano passado eu aceitei um maior senso de urgência porque a continuidade do desenvolvimento era importante e o sistema ainda estava em uma fase inicial de transição. No entanto, se nunca chegarmos ao ponto em que os dReps estejam dispostos a exigir maior accountability, coordenação e rigor, o ecossistema simplesmente carregará os mesmos padrões frouxos para mais um ciclo inteiro de financiamento.

Depois do tempo que já tivemos para melhorar o processo, não considero isso aceitável.

Por essas razões, acredito ser preferível adiar temporariamente as aprovações em vez de normalizar decisões de alocação baseadas em informações incompletas e descoordenadas.

Este voto reflete uma preferência por maior coordenação e melhor priorização do gasto do tesouro, e não uma oposição aos objetivos da Amaru Treasury Withdrawal 2026.`

English

1. Introduction

This Governance Information Action formalizes the Intersect Budget Process Framework for 2026 and future cycles, until modified. It does not approve spending directly. Instead, it defines the process through which Treasury-funded activities may be prepared, reviewed, consolidated, and later advanced.

The framework establishes a five-stage annual cycle. Before the process can begin, three prerequisites must already be active on-chain: a strategic vision and strategy, an approved Budget Process Metadata Info Action, and an active Net Change Limit (NCL). It then sets rules for proposal submission, structured data requirements, off-chain review and polling through Ekklesia, consolidation into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions, and execution and monitoring where Intersect acts as Administrator.

Its stated purpose is to improve consistency, transparency, predictability, and accountability in ecosystem budgeting, while aligning proposals with shared strategic priorities and providing a structured path from budget planning to Treasury execution.

2. Governance Action Review

Upsides

2.1) The framework provides a necessary coordination layer for ecosystem budgeting

One of my strongest criticisms of prior NCL-related Governance Actions was precisely the absence of a non-binding coordination mechanism capable of mapping ecosystem funding needs before a spending ceiling is set. In my view, establishing an NCL in isolation, without first coordinating expected budget demand, strategic priorities, and treasury posture, is backwards.

That is why I see the core purpose of this Info Action as genuinely positive and necessary.

Cardano should not rely exclusively on independent actors submitting Treasury funding requests in an uncoordinated way while expecting the community to somehow infer priorities and trade-offs in real time. The ecosystem does not currently have the decision-making capacity to prioritize spending coherently without some form of structured coordination. There are too many variables, too many competing demands, and too much asymmetry in information.

Now that Cardano Vision 2030 / Cardano 2030 has been approved as a community-endorsed strategic reference,[2] the ecosystem finally has a shared “north star.” That makes a coordination framework not just useful, but essential. Without a shared strategic reference and a process to map expected budget needs against it, discussions around Treasury spending, and Treasury-related governance actions more broadly, become far more arbitrary than they should be.

From that perspective, this framework fills a gap that has existed for too long. Even if it still needs important improvements, its core function is valuable: it creates a non-binding coordination layer through which projected funding needs, strategic alignment, and community priorities can be surfaced before Treasury allocations are finalized.

Given that Intersect is currently the only actor attempting to operationalize this role at ecosystem level, I consider this framework a crucial instrument for Cardano at this stage. My criticisms of the proposal are therefore not a rejection of its purpose, but a recognition that this coordination layer is important enough that it should be made more robust before becoming the reference process for Treasury allocation.

2.2) The framework also gets an important design choice right: standardization and comparability (“apples-to-apples”)

Beyond the need for a coordination layer itself, one of the strongest aspects of this framework is its attempt to make proposals more comparable. If the ecosystem wants to coordinate a serious budget cycle, standardization is not optional. Without a common structure, proposals become difficult to compare, reviewers fall back on narrative persuasion, and selection becomes inconsistent and political. Intersect’s own recap of the 2025 cycle explicitly identified these problems, including inconsistent formats, multiple tools, difficulty comparing initiatives objectively, heavy review workload, and weak linkage between proposals and strategy.

Why tying proposals to Cardano Vision 2030 / Cardano 2030 pillars + KPIs is a real upgrade

Requiring proposers to state which strategic pillar(s) they are targeting and to connect their proposal to measurable ecosystem KPIs is one of the few scalable ways to anchor selection to shared outcomes instead of vague intuition. The framework explicitly encourages alignment with the Cardano Vision 2030 / Cardano 2030 strategic framework and asks proposers to identify measurable outcomes through KPIs.

This is also consistent with the already endorsed Info Action “Cardano 2030: Vision, Mission, Strategy Framework and KPIs” being used as a shared reference point for long-term direction and measurement.

Why “work package-based budgeting” helps (when implemented with clear boundaries)

The requirement to structure budgets around work packages, including scope, objectives, metrics, and cost breakdown by category, improves comparability and makes it harder to hide vague scope behind a single headline number. It also supports benchmarking across proposals: reviewers can compare expected value and cost structure more directly when proposals use the same logic.

That said, this still needs tighter definitions elsewhere in the framework to avoid bundling ambiguity. But as a budget transparency tool, work-package budgeting is the correct direction.

Why this matters institutionally

The goal is not to force “alignment theater.” The goal is to create a shared evaluation grammar so DReps can ask more consistent questions:

• Which Cardano 2030 pillar does this advance?
• Which KPI does it claim to affect, and by what mechanism?
• Is the scope broken down into components that are reviewable and comparable?

That is a much healthier baseline than simply asking whether something “sounds good for Cardano.”

Downsides

2.3) Bundling risk remains unresolved, and the current “work package” framing may enable it

“Bundling” (what I mean here, and why it matters)

In this context, bundling is when multiple distinct workstreams, deliverables, or initiatives are packaged together and presented as a single unit for review or approval. The core risk is not necessarily bad intent. The risk is structural: when one package contains many different items, decision-makers are often pushed into an all-or-nothing choice.

A useful analogy is how unrelated or controversial provisions sometimes get inserted into large legislative bills as “riders” or hidden clauses. The bill may contain essential parts that most people support, but it can also carry additional items that receive less scrutiny because they are embedded inside a larger must-pass package. Even without malicious intent, the practical effect is reduced visibility and weaker item-by-item accountability.

The same dynamic applies to budget packages. When proposals are bundled, each sub-item may have been produced by different people, using different assumptions and methodologies, with varying levels of rigor and evidence. As a result, quality is uneven across the bundle: strong components can effectively carry weaker components, and reviewers cannot apply consistent scrutiny to every part under time constraints. This distorts merit-based evaluation, increases governance noise, and makes it harder to reject low-quality items without also blocking genuinely valuable work.

In the 2025 cycle, bundling repeatedly appeared as a practical failure mode: DReps were pressured into accepting “package deals” where rejecting weak components meant blocking higher-value components that happened to be bundled alongside them.

This framework does not clearly address that failure mode. More importantly, the way “work packages” are described can reasonably be read as enabling bundling within proposals, unless the framework explicitly restricts what a work package is and how it may be used.

The implied structure appears to allow multiple layers of aggregation:

work package → proposal → consolidation into TWGAs (and potentially into multiple on-chain brackets based on support levels)

That creates a risk of “compound compromise”: bundling inside a proposal, and bundling again at the consolidation stage.

This may not be the intended design. However, the current text leaves enough ambiguity that it should be clarified. If work packages are meant to improve budget transparency and review granularity, the framework should explicitly define:

• What qualifies as a work package, including scope boundaries, dependency requirements, and separability
• What does not qualify, such as unrelated streams combined for convenience
• When proposals should be split into separate submissions rather than bundled

If bundling is not intended, the Info Action should be rewritten to make that unambiguous and to establish a clear anti-bundling posture as a process expectation.

2.4) The framework depends heavily on “deep review” by DReps, but that assumption is unsustainable and unreliable

A framework is only as strong as its operating assumptions. This one relies on DReps performing a “Deep Review” stage to validate accuracy, compliance, and strategic alignment, an approach that has proven unsustainable and unreliable in practice over the last two years.

In practice, the 2025 cycle showed that review quality varies widely across DReps and that workload spikes lead to shortcuts. Many DReps do not consistently publish detailed rationales, and only a small subset performs deep, systematic analysis at scale. Under higher volume, this gap becomes more significant.

The Cardano ecosystem is effectively asking DReps to evaluate a large volume of proposals within a short time span, and those proposals should be assessed with at least a minimum standard of rigor, individually, on their own merits.

No sampling, no skimming, no guesswork.

Anything less is unacceptable, in my view, for a framework coordinating the allocation of tens of millions of dollars from a Treasury that is not infinite.

It is already clear that DReps face serious review overload during these stages. Treating bundling as a solution to that overload is not acceptable in my view. Bundling does not fix the underlying capacity problem; it mostly hides it. In that context, bundling is likely to incentivize shortcuts: incomplete review, limited scrutiny, and decisions driven more by packaging convenience than by merit.

This is a structural risk: the framework increases standardization and volume management, but it does not address the incentive and capacity constraints that determine whether “deep review” is realistic.

If the process intends to rely on deep review, it should include credible mechanisms to support it, such as:

• Incentive and reputation mechanisms that reward diligent review, not necessarily “funding” alone, so that DReps who invest dozens of hours into serious analysis receive something in return, such as reputation signals and/or optional funding mechanisms. The goal here is incentive alignment, not necessarily “paying DReps,” so this should not be framed as compensation by default
• Clear, non-binding review standards and minimum expectations, explicitly framed as guidance rather than enforceable rules, so the process does not pretend “deep review” exists when it often doesn’t. At minimum, the framework should define what “review” means in practice and what is acceptable when time is constrained. Examples of minimum expectations that should be discussed and documented
• Default behavior when a DRep cannot review: should “NO” be treated as a default when a DRep had no time to assess a proposal, or should the default be ABSTAIN / explicit non-participation? If some DReps have been using “NO” as a workload coping mechanism, the framework should address whether that is considered valid practice, since it materially changes the meaning of “NO.”
• Rationale expectations: should votes be expected to include at least a short rationale, even if non-binding? If the framework depends on review quality, requiring some minimal justification is the only way to distinguish “reviewed NO” from “unreviewed NO.”
• Minimum scrutiny threshold: what is the minimum a proposal should pass before it is treated as “reviewed”? For example, confirming scope clarity, deliverable specificity, budget structure sanity, and KPI claims being measurable rather than decorative
• Adopting a lightweight review template: a standardized checklist-style review format, even if optional, would reduce variance and make it easier for the community to compare assessments. This also makes it harder for “deep review” to degrade into partial reading and guesswork while still looking legitimate

Workload reality check

In the prior cycle, 194 proposals were submitted on Ekklesia.[3] With an off-chain advancement threshold that requires ≥67% support from participating DRep stake, the implied operating assumption is not simply that “someone” will review the backlog, but that a large share of DReps must engage with a large share of proposals for the process to function as designed. If many DReps do not meaningfully review most proposals, achieving that level of support becomes harder, and the system either incentivizes shallow, high-speed voting or fails to advance items consistently.

This tension should be addressed explicitly through workload-aware process design, such as structured division of review responsibilities by theme, SME recommendation layers, or staged triage, rather than assuming broad, deep engagement at scale under time pressure.

Suggestion (a workable precedent already exists)

A practical way to reduce overload without relying on bundling is to add a structured “subject-matter recommendation” layer inside the framework. A precedent already exists: in Fund 14, the Cardano Foundation introduced a pilot for an upcoming “Catalyst Representative” role, where subject-matter experts reviewed proposals within their domains and published recommendations to help voters navigate high proposal volume, while the Foundation explicitly did not vote on those recommendations.[4][5]

Pilot context:

Read the full article: https://cardanofoundation.org/blog/catalyst-f14

A similar mechanism could be adapted for the ecosystem budget process: create an opt-in “Representative / SME Review” track where qualified experts, from established organizations and from the wider community, publish standardized, evidence-based reviews and shortlists by theme, such as Infrastructure, Governance tooling, Developer Growth, DeFi, and Interoperability, etc. This would not replace DRep judgment, but it would provide a credible, workload-aware way to improve diligence, reduce shallow voting, and help DReps focus attention where it matters.

Without these supports, KPI-based strategic alignment risks turning into a shallow compliance exercise rather than meaningful evaluation.

2.5) The framework is underspecified on NCL usage, contingencies, and emergency capacity

The framework describes allocating proposals in rank order up to the available Net Change Limit (NCL), but it does not clearly state what happens if the annual process consumes the available NCL capacity.

That creates a basic governance and risk-management question: what is the intended pathway for genuinely emergent or unforeseen needs during the same fiscal window?

The current framing also implies an additional operating assumption: that any project or proposer seeking Treasury funding within the current NCL period will either:

• Participate through this Intersect-facilitated pipeline
• Submit independently in parallel before Intersect completes its consolidation and TWGA submissions

If the practical intent is to consume the available NCL through the annual cycle, then there is little or no remaining fiscal space for anything outside that pipeline, unless a new NCL is proposed later.

Is that deliberate? If so, why? If not, what is the intended buffer?

If the process implicitly aims to “fill the NCL” through the annual budget cycle, then, unless a reserve is explicitly planned, the system is left with a limited set of options when emergencies arise:

• Defer or reject emergent initiatives regardless of urgency
• Treat “submit a new NCL” as the default escape valve

The second outcome is particularly concerning because it risks normalizing repeated NCL expansions whenever the ceiling becomes inconvenient, which undermines the credibility of the NCL as a coordination and discipline instrument.

I’m not opposed to coordination. The issue is that the current text does not explain the rationale for this apparent design choice, nor does it clearly describe how non-planned spending, emergencies, or time-sensitive opportunities are meant to be handled.

If the intent is not to consume the full NCL, the framework should say so explicitly and document a minimal policy posture, even if non-binding, such as:

• Whether a contingency / reserve margin is expected
• What qualifies as “emergent” versus “annual-cycle” spending
• How exceptions should be handled without turning NCL revision into routine practice

2.6) Requiring an “active NCL” upfront risks separating the spending ceiling from real budget demand

The framework treats an active Net Change Limit (NCL) as a prerequisite for launching the annual budget process. Constitutionally, that may be necessary. Strategically, however, it creates a sequencing problem: the spending ceiling is effectively locked in before the ecosystem has produced a structured view of funding demand for that same period.

If the purpose of this framework is to coordinate budgeting, the process should make the relationship between demand and the ceiling more explicit. Otherwise, the ecosystem ends up operating under a cap that may be justified mainly by inflow heuristics, for example “how much entered the treasury last year,” rather than by a deliberate budgeting posture.

A more coherent approach would include an explicit step that:

• Maps expected ecosystem funding needs for the relevant fiscal window, using standardized submissions and comparable data
• Evaluates that demand against strategic priorities, such as Vision 2030, and an explicit treasury policy posture, for example preserve principal versus runway control versus controlled drawdown
• Uses that structured view to inform what an appropriate NCL should be for the period, even if the final NCL still requires a separate on-chain action

Without that linkage, the budget process risks becoming a “best effort within whatever cap already exists,” instead of a coordinated system where the cap is set with clear reference to both strategy and realistic demand.

2.7) Submission contribution and minimum request thresholds reduce spam, but introduce access and incentive trade-offs

A submission contribution, a 1,000 ADA donation to the Treasury, can reduce low-effort submissions and spam. However, it may also exclude smaller or early-stage contributors who have credible ideas but limited capital. This becomes even more important in the current context: with Project Catalyst Funds 15 and 16 cancelled, community-level funding pathways are more constrained and many contributors are effectively “hungry” for viable routes to participate. In that environment, adding a fixed 1,000 ADA gate will predictably impose a cost on small contributors and reduce inclusivity.

If inclusion matters, the framework should clarify whether any support or alternative mechanism exists to cover this contribution for vetted cases. I’m not prescribing a specific design here, but even a basic pathway, such as some form of vetting or sponsorship model, would be better than treating the fee as an unavoidable barrier that smaller ecosystem contributors must simply absorb.

Similarly, a 100,00

English

1. Introduction

This Governance Action proposes a Net Change Limit of 300,000,000 ADA for the period from the start of Epoch 613, on 13 February 2026, to the end of Epoch 713, on 3 July 2027. If approved, this limit would apply to Epochs 613 to 713 and would replace any previously agreed Net Change Limit covering the same period.

A Net Change Limit establishes the maximum net amount that may be withdrawn from the Treasury during a defined window. In this case, the proposed period was selected to align the cycle with the mid-year budget season and to ensure that a full prior year of Treasury inflow data is available before the next limit is set.

The motivation provided is procedural: a Net Change Limit must be established for a defined period in accordance with the Constitution. The justification for the 300 million ADA figure is based on 2025 Treasury inflows, defined as the inflows from Epoch 532 through Epoch 604, which are stated as totaling 306,940,195 ADA.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The proposed Net Change Limit of 300,000,000 ADA is lower than the previously proposed 350,000,000 ADA. From a Treasury resource preservation standpoint, this may be regarded as a positive element.

The current concern is not limited to the nominal cap itself, but to the absence of structured guardrails around its use, including lack of non-binding allocation frameworks, lack of anti-concentration expectations, lack of anti-bundling signals, and lack of a clearer strategic posture for Treasury use. Under those conditions, a lower cap reduces the maximum amount of Treasury resources that may be deducted within an insufficiently structured governance environment.

To that extent, even without resolving the underlying governance deficiencies, the lower value may be viewed as a partial restraint on resource outflows under unfavorable conditions.

Negative aspects

An operational role for an NCL is acknowledged, since establishing a cap is required to keep the Treasury withdrawal process constitutionally workable. However, the issue is not whether an NCL should exist, but whether this specific Governance Action meets a minimum standard of institutional quality and governance discipline.

A prior NCL action for the same period had already been evaluated and rejected. In that prior vote, structural gaps had already been identified that went beyond the nominal cap value: lack of clear auditability, lack of coordination guidance, lack of safeguards against concentration, lack of anti-bundling expectations, unclear revision cadence, and absence of any stated fiscal posture for the Treasury. Those gaps are not meaningfully addressed here. The present Governance Action is materially more underspecified.

The justification provided is extremely thin. “Fiscal discipline” is asserted and 2025 inflows are referenced as the benchmark, but no verifiable source, link, annex, dataset reference, or reproducible methodology is provided in the text. There is also no discussion of what fiscal model is being pursued, whether preservation of principal, runway control, or growth-first drawdown. No Treasury floor or drawdown constraints are provided, and no framework is stated for how the cap should behave under changing conditions. The NCL is therefore reduced to a number without coherent fiscal policy context.

The action also fails to address governance failure modes that have already surfaced in practice: concentration and bundling. A single aggregate cap, without accompanying public allocation guidance, even if non-binding, and without anti-bundling expectations, creates predictable incentives for large actors to capture a disproportionate share of fiscal space and for heterogeneous work to be packaged in ways that reduce accountability and force bad compromises. These dynamics are not hypothetical and have already appeared in prior cycles. No corrective posture is provided, even at the level of norms and expectations.

No clarity is provided on revision cadence. Without an explicit norm such as a minimum cooldown period and clearly defined exceptional circumstances, the NCL risks remaining a malleable parameter that can be revisited whenever it becomes inconvenient. Its credibility as a coordination and discipline instrument is thereby further weakened. Reducing the nominal cap from a prior proposal does not solve this problem. Only the number is changed, while the underlying governance dynamics remain intact.

Risks and concerns

Externalities that matter to Treasury governance in practice are neither acknowledged nor mitigated. These include sell-pressure risk and the incentives created by USD-indexed budgeting converted into ADA with large volatility buffers. Even if milestone-based disbursement exists elsewhere in the ecosystem’s operational machinery, a proposal that sets the macro fiscal ceiling should at least recognize these risks and articulate baseline expectations for mitigation and reporting.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The need for an NCL mechanism is recognized, but this Governance Action does not meet a minimum threshold of completeness, auditability, or governance seriousness.

A prior NCL action for the same period had already been rejected on structural grounds, including lack of auditability, lack of coordination guidance, lack of safeguards against concentration, lack of anti-bundling expectations, unclear revision cadence, and absence of a stated fiscal posture for the Treasury. Those deficiencies remain. The present proposal reduces the cap, but provides less structure, less evidence, and no meaningful response to the structural gaps already identified.

The justification offered for the 300 million ADA figure is not sufficient to support the cap as a credible governance instrument. A benchmark based on prior inflows is referenced, but no verifiable source or reproducible methodology is included, no fiscal model is stated, no Treasury floor or drawdown constraint is defined, and no framework is provided for how the cap should function under changing conditions.

The action also leaves unresolved governance dynamics that have already emerged in practice, especially concentration and bundling, and provides no clear norm for revision cadence. For those reasons, the position remains unchanged.

4. Conclusion

An NCL mechanism is necessary for Treasury governance, but this specific Governance Action remains too incomplete and underspecified to support. The nominal cap is reduced, yet the structural deficiencies previously identified remain unresolved, including weak auditability, lack of fiscal framing, absence of governance safeguards, and no meaningful discipline around revision.

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Português do Brasil

1. Introdução

Esta Governance Action propõe um Net Change Limit de 300.000.000 ADA para o período entre o início da Epoch 613, em 13 de fevereiro de 2026, e o fim da Epoch 713, em 3 de julho de 2027. Se aprovada, essa regra se aplicará às Epochs 613 a 713 e substituirá qualquer Net Change Limit previamente acordado para a mesma janela.

Um Net Change Limit estabelece o valor líquido máximo que pode ser retirado do Tesouro durante um período definido. Neste caso, o intervalo proposto foi escolhido para alinhar o ciclo com a temporada orçamentária do meio do ano e para garantir que um ano completo de dados de entradas no Tesouro esteja disponível antes da definição do próximo limite.

A motivação apresentada é procedural: um Net Change Limit deve ser estabelecido para um período definido em conformidade com a Constituição. A justificativa para o valor de 300 milhões de ADA se baseia nas entradas do Tesouro em 2025, definidas como as entradas entre a Epoch 532 e a Epoch 604, que são indicadas como totalizando 306.940.195 ADA.

2. Análise da Governance Action

Aspectos positivos

O Net Change Limit proposto de 300.000.000 ADA é inferior ao valor anteriormente proposto de 350.000.000 ADA. Do ponto de vista de preservação de recursos do Tesouro, isso pode ser considerado um elemento positivo.

A preocupação atual não se limita ao valor nominal do teto em si, mas à ausência de guardrails estruturados para seu uso, incluindo falta de frameworks não vinculantes de alocação, falta de expectativas contra concentração, falta de sinais contra bundling e falta de uma postura estratégica mais clara para o uso do Tesouro. Nessas condições, um teto menor reduz o montante máximo de recursos do Tesouro que pode ser deduzido em um ambiente de governança insuficientemente estruturado.

Nessa medida, mesmo sem resolver as deficiências de governança subjacentes, o valor mais baixo pode ser visto como uma contenção parcial das saídas de recursos sob condições desfavoráveis.

Aspectos negativos

Um papel operacional para o NCL é reconhecido, já que estabelecer um limite é necessário para manter o processo de Treasury Withdrawals constitucionalmente viável. No entanto, a questão não é se um NCL deve existir, mas se esta Governance Action específica atende a um padrão mínimo de qualidade institucional e disciplina de governança.

Uma ação anterior de NCL para o mesmo período já havia sido avaliada e rejeitada. Naquele voto anterior, já haviam sido identificadas lacunas estruturais que iam além do valor nominal do limite: falta de auditabilidade clara, falta de diretrizes de coordenação, falta de salvaguardas contra concentração, falta de expectativas anti-bundling, cadência de revisão pouco clara e ausência de qualquer postura fiscal declarada para o Tesouro. Essas lacunas não são abordadas de forma significativa aqui. A presente Governance Action é materialmente ainda mais subespecificada.

A justificativa apresentada é extremamente fraca. “Disciplina fiscal” é afirmada e as entradas de 2025 são usadas como referência, mas nenhuma fonte verificável, link, anexo, referência de dataset ou metodologia reproduzível é fornecida no texto. Também não há discussão sobre qual modelo fiscal está sendo buscado, seja preservação do principal, controle de runway ou drawdown orientado a crescimento. Nenhum piso do Tesouro ou restrição de drawdown é apresentado, e nenhum framework é definido para como esse limite deveria se comportar sob condições variáveis. O NCL, portanto, é reduzido a um número sem contexto coerente de política fiscal.

A ação também falha em enfrentar modos de falha de governança que já apareceram na prática: concentração e bundling. Um único limite agregado, sem diretrizes públicas complementares de alocação, ainda que não vinculantes, e sem expectativas anti-bundling, cria incentivos previsíveis para que grandes atores capturem uma parcela desproporcional do espaço fiscal e para que trabalhos heterogêneos sejam empacotados de formas que reduzem accountability e forçam maus compromissos. Essas dinâmicas não são hipotéticas e já apareceram em ciclos anteriores. Nenhuma postura corretiva é apresentada, nem mesmo no nível de normas e expectativas.

Nenhuma clareza é fornecida sobre a cadência de revisão. Sem uma norma explícita, como um período mínimo de cooldown e circunstâncias excepcionais claramente definidas, o NCL corre o risco de permanecer um parâmetro maleável, que pode ser revisitado sempre que se tornar inconveniente. Sua credibilidade como instrumento de coordenação e disciplina é, assim, ainda mais enfraquecida. Reduzir o valor nominal em relação a uma proposta anterior não resolve esse problema. Apenas o número é alterado, enquanto a dinâmica de governança subjacente permanece intacta.

Riscos e preocupações

Externalidades relevantes para a governança do Tesouro na prática não são reconhecidas nem mitigadas. Entre elas estão o risco de pressão de venda e os incentivos criados por orçamentos indexados em USD convertidos para ADA com grandes margens de volatilidade. Mesmo que desembolsos baseados em milestones existam em outras partes da maquinaria operacional do ecossistema, uma proposta que define o teto fiscal macro deveria ao menos reconhecer esses riscos e articular expectativas mínimas de mitigação e reporte.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NÃO

A necessidade de um mecanismo de NCL é reconhecida, mas esta Governance Action não atinge um limiar mínimo de completude, auditabilidade ou seriedade de governança.

Uma ação anterior de NCL para o mesmo período já havia sido rejeitada por razões estruturais, incluindo falta de auditabilidade, falta de diretrizes de coordenação, falta de salvaguardas contra concentração, falta de expectativas anti-bundling, cadência de revisão pouco clara e ausência de uma postura fiscal declarada para o Tesouro. Essas deficiências permanecem. A proposta atual reduz o limite, mas oferece menos estrutura, menos evidência e nenhuma resposta significativa às lacunas estruturais já identificadas.

A justificativa apresentada para o valor de 300 milhões de ADA não é suficiente para sustentar o limite como um instrumento de governança crível. Uma referência baseada em entradas anteriores é mencionada, mas nenhuma fonte verificável ou metodologia reproduzível é incluída, nenhum modelo fiscal é declarado, nenhum piso do Tesouro ou restrição de drawdown é definido, e nenhum framework é apresentado para como o limite deveria funcionar sob condições variáveis.

A ação também deixa sem resposta dinâmicas de governança que já surgiram na prática, especialmente concentração e bundling, e não apresenta nenhuma norma clara para a cadência de revisão. Por essas razões, a posição permanece inalterada.

4. Conclusão

Um mecanismo de NCL é necessário para a governança do Tesouro, mas esta Governance Action específica continua incompleta e subespecificada demais para receber apoio. O limite nominal é reduzido, mas as deficiências estruturais previamente identificadas permanecem sem solução, incluindo fraca auditabilidade, ausência de enquadramento fiscal, falta de salvaguardas de governança e nenhuma disciplina significativa em torno da revisão.

Governance Action Report

1. Introduction

A Treasury Withdrawal governance action requests 500,000 ADA from the Cardano Treasury to establish the legal framework and smart contract infrastructure required for the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget. The withdrawal covers three components: (1) formation of a Cayman Islands Foundation Company (FC) as the legal vehicle for fund management, (2) development of an administrating smart contract and user interfaces, and (3) a comprehensive security audit of the smart contract system.

All funds are to be received by an Amaru contract administered by a 9-person Interim Committee with a 5-of-9 multisignature requirement for disbursements. Named service providers include Walkers (Cayman) LLP for legal work, Invariant0 LLC for auditing, and Sundae Labs for Amaru contract setup and support. The proposal includes an ADA-denominated cost breakdown, notes that some values (e.g., director fees) are estimates, and states that monthly reporting and on-chain oversight mechanisms will apply.

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2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

1) “Rails first” structuring (governance and controls before large capital deployment)

Building the legal structure + contract + audit + governance before releasing the bulk of the capital signals operational maturity.

Separating “setup” (500k ADA) from “capital deployment” (49.5M ADA) reduces the risk of “releasing everything” without:

an audited contract,
a legal framework,
selection processes,
oversight mechanisms.

From a governance standpoint, this aligns with the idea that the treasury should fund institutional infrastructure when it increases auditability and discipline.

2) Internal coherence and governance design with checks

The original Info Action lays out a relatively complete model:

5-of-9 multisig for executive actions,
a dRep-based tDAO with impeachment, election, and shutdown powers,
the ability to freeze operations and allow only return-to-treasury flows.

Having the contract hold LP tokens and assets increases on-chain auditability (at least in theory), because tracking fund state and protocol positions becomes easier.

3) Stablecoin liquidity has a plausible economic rationale

Stablecoin liquidity is often a real bottleneck for:

onboarding,
lower-friction trading,
lower slippage,
greater attractiveness for market makers,
higher DeFi composability.

A slippage reduction KPI (e.g., “50% reduction”) connects to practical utility for users and traders and can be interpreted as a collective benefit (not only for a single app).

4) Attempt to avoid a “pure grant” (treasury return narrative)

The design mentions revenue return to the treasury (e.g., 15% of monthly revenue converted and sent; annual return expectations).

This creates a “treasury deployment with return” narrative rather than “treasury donation.”

In theory, this is closer to “capital allocation” than “subsidy with no consideration.”

Negative aspects

1) Constitutional risk and institutional transition risk (nullification)

The Treasury Withdrawal was submitted during a period when a new Constitution was being voted on.

If constitutional changes alter requirements, the action may become invalid or require rewriting.

This is not a legal detail. It is a direct governance risk. If CC members were already voting against it, the probability of being blocked was high early on.

2) “Info Action as authorization” does not hold under the new Constitution

The CC critique is coherent: under the current Constitution, Budget Info Actions are non-binding and therefore cannot “authorize” or “ground” a withdrawal.

If the Withdrawal depends on “approved by Info Action” as its legitimacy base, it starts with a structural defect.

Without a transition/grandfathering clause, the CC tends to evaluate only the current text and require the Withdrawal to be self-contained, without “references as substitutes.”

3) Mutable documentation (GitHub) vs immutability requirement

If supporting documentation points to mutable URLs, this violates an explicit constitutional immutability requirement (as alleged by some CC members).

Even with a “commit hash,” if the primary URL or evidence package is not explicitly immutable, it remains vulnerable to:

later content changes,
ambiguity about which version was “approved.”

This compromises integrity and verifiability.

4) Severe institutional problem: KPIs and commitments outside the binding document

A central point: with Info Actions losing normative effect, everything not inside the Treasury Withdrawal does not exist as an enforceable commitment.

If KPIs (slippage, returns, reporting) stayed in the Info Action and were not carried into the Withdrawal:

they cannot be enforced,
continuity cannot be conditioned,
ex post claims that “they promised” cannot be justified.

This destroys accountability. What remains is reputational trust, which is the opposite of robust governance.

5) Conceptual issue: “DeFi” label vs centralized execution

The naming is criticized: calling it “DeFi Liquidity Budget” can mislead perception.

Execution is centralized:

committee,
legal structure,
integration with desks/OTC,
administrative decisions.

The community may interpret “DeFi” in the strong sense (operational decentralization), but the mechanism looks closer to an administered fund with governance.

This matters because many people vote on headlines, not full reading.

6) Overlap / double funding with already-approved initiatives (PentaD as example)

A medium-weight argument is raised: another large initiative is already approved and funded with the objective of integrations and improvements that tend to impact liquidity and attractiveness.

Even if it is not “the same thing,” there is overlap in outcomes:

stablecoin/integrations may increase liquidity indirectly,
improved on/off-ramp infrastructure and partnerships may change the landscape.

If significant capital is already allocated to this “vector,” adding another 50M on the same axis may be inefficient.

7) Structural critique: subsidy for commercial niche and market distortion

This is treated as a high-weight argument:

Treasury funding for open source/public goods makes sense (market failure, low commercial appeal).

Treasury funding for commercial projects should require harder consideration (equity-like, loan, robust revenue share, or another mechanism that internalizes risk).

Subsidizing liquidity may become a band-aid that:

does not solve the structural cause of DeFi weakness in Cardano,
creates dependence on incentives,
repeats market patterns (temporary yield farming, mercenary liquidity).

DeFi in Cardano has had enough time (years) and many initiatives have already failed. Before allocating more, there should be:

a diagnosis,
a retrospective,
an evaluation of historical ROI,
an understanding of what went wrong.

8) Proposed return is low for high risk (poor risk/return profile)

The annual return KPI (e.g., 4%) looks low relative to:

stablecoin depeg risk,
impermanent loss risk,
oracle / market structure risk,
committee operational risk,
regulatory/jurisdictional risk,
smart contract / bridge / custody / desk risk.

A comparison is made implicitly to conservative real-world alternatives where similar returns do not require this degree of operational and crypto-specific risk.

Result: too much risk for too little upside in terms of treasury return.

9) “If it’s so good, VC funds it” argument

A provocative but relevant point is raised:

If the risk/return profile were truly attractive and well-priced, private capital (VC/market makers) could fund it.

This reinforces the “treasury as subsidy” thesis: if the market does not fund it, risk-adjusted return may not be good enough, or the design depends on the treasury as a patient donor.

10) Preference for investment in research and structural solutions

A superior long-term alternative is suggested:

invest a fraction of this amount into research and development of DeFi models suited to eUTXO,
architecture standards, tooling, primitives, design space,
a decentralized and replicable approach.

This targets causes rather than symptoms (liquidity) and reduces dependence on recurring capital injections.

11) Budget is still crude and weakly anchored to external references

Notes such as “director fees estimated” and high-level breakdowns are flagged.

Even with auditor-days, the following are missing:

salary references,
benchmarks,
vendor quotes,
robust justification for amounts.

For an “administrative/legal” phase, precision should be higher because this is where “governance and control” is being purchased.

Risks and concerns

1) Psychological trade-off: sunk cost trap (even if small vs total)

Even if it is “only” 500k vs 50M (1%), there is still risk of psychological and institutional bias:

“we already spent on structure, so now we must go all the way.”

This effect is treated as minor, but acknowledged as possible. In governance, “minor” effects can become dominant narratives.

2) Real risk of money loss due to non-binding sequence

Because withdrawals are separate and non-binding, a plausible scenario exists:

Withdrawal 1 approved,
structure built,
Withdrawal 2 not approved due to market change, NCL ceiling, budget competition, or political support loss.

In that case, 500k becomes sunk cost and fails to achieve the macro objective.

This is not exotic: governance shifts quickly, especially with NCL revisited frequently.

3) Technical and operational risks remain even with “anti-collusion”

Even with reputation and governance mechanisms, risks remain:

collusion (5 signatures can be obtained),
process failures (protocol/desk selection),
conflicts of interest,
human error in management,
political capture of the tDAO,
“soft corruption” via indirect incentives.

Mitigation exists, but risk does not go to zero. Capital size amplifies any failure.

Potential impacts

Economic — Allocating 50M ADA now is a large share of the current NCL (without needing exact fractions). In a constrained environment, the evidentiary and return bar should be higher. The annual return KPI (e.g., 4%) looks low relative to the risk bundle (depeg, IL, oracles, operational, regulatory, technical). Subsidizing liquidity may create incentive dependence and repeat mercenary liquidity dynamics. If the market does not fund it, risk-adjusted return may not be strong, or the design depends on the treasury as a patient donor.

Technical — An audited contract is proposed, but technical and operational risks remain: depeg, impermanent loss, oracle/market structure, smart contract/bridge/custody/desk risk, plus process failures and human error.

Governance / political — Constitutional change may invalidate the action or require rewriting. Non-binding Budget Info Actions weaken the “approved by Info Action” base. Commitments outside the binding document reduce enforceability (KPIs, reporting, shutdown). Non-binding sequencing across withdrawals creates sunk-cost risk if the second stage fails. Risk of tDAO political capture and multisig collusion remains.

Reputational — “DeFi Liquidity Budget” may mislead perception while execution is centralized (committee, legal structure, administrative decisions). Many vote on headlines, not full reading.

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3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

The core of the negative vote is conceptual and economic, not only constitutional:

rejection of subsidizing a commercial niche in a constrained environment,
high opportunity cost,
low return for high risk,
risk of repeating the pattern of subsidized DeFi initiatives that do not sustain.

Additionally, even if the concept were acceptable, the current design fails on formal governance:

dependency on a non-binding Info Action,
absence of binding KPIs inside the Withdrawal,
risk of “phase 1 approved, phase 2 rejected.”

What could move toward ABSTAIN or YES (conditional, but unlikely)

Macro change (more bullish market, more treasury slack).
Size reduction (smaller share of NCL).
More convincing and robust return to treasury (better risk/return pricing).
KPIs, metrics, reporting, and shutdown conditions inside the binding document.
Better-defined risk mitigations (depeg, IL, oracles, operational risk).
Explicit coordination with already-approved initiatives, reducing overlap.
A “post-mortem” / evaluation stage of past DeFi investment history before another large allocation.

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4. Conclusion

Separating “setup” from “capital deployment” reduces premature release risk, but formal failures and economic risks remain: reliance on a non-binding Info Action, KPIs outside the enforceable document, sunk-cost risk across withdrawals, and a weak risk/return profile for subsidizing a commercial niche in a constrained environment.

RATIONALE[EN]

1. Introduction

A Parameter Update governance action is proposed to increase Plutus script memory unit limits for both per-transaction and per-block execution. The proposed parameter changes are: maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] from 14,000,000 to 16,500,000, and maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] from 62,000,000 to 72,000,000. The intent is to increase flexibility for DApp developers by allowing more work to fit within the execution budget, while keeping per-transaction and per-block limits consistent. No other protocol parameters or Plutus cost model settings are proposed to change.

The change is presented as the first part of a two-step plan toward an overall 25% increase, with a later governance action expected to propose 17,500,000 (tx) and 77,500,000 (block), no less than two epochs after enactment. The change was recommended by Intersect’s Parameter Committee on 2025-05-08 and ratified by Intersect’s Technical Steering Committee on 2025-10-01. Equivalent changes were enacted on Preview (October 2025) and PreProd (November 2025). The governance action states no specific security concerns, and reports benchmarking indicating adequate headroom and maintained Praos timing guarantees.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

Less friction for developers, without changing how Plutus works. The main upside is practical: today, some projects can do what they need, but only by splitting logic into multiple steps, adding workarounds, or over-optimizing scripts in ways that hurt UX and increase complexity. Raising the per-transaction memory limit helps reduce that friction. This does not change Plutus semantics, the cost model, or consensus rules. It just allows slightly more work to fit inside the allowed execution "budget". “Budget” here means the network’s execution allowance: the maximum memory/time Plutus scripts may consume per transaction and per block. Raising it lets scripts do more work, but uses more computational capacity.

More execution capacity per block, without distorting block composition. The proposal keeps a consistent relationship between per-transaction and per-block limits. The point is not “cram more transactions per block”, but allow more expressive scripts per transaction while keeping overall block-level constraints coherent.

Technical evidence exists and is consistent across node versions. This proposal is supported by tests and benchmarking across node versions 10.2, 10.3, and more recently 10.6. These tests were run in a controlled and reproducible environment, using a synthetic worst-case workload where scripts deliberately consume 100% of the allowed memory budget under each tested configuration, including the increased limits. Across versions, results are consistent: the main impact shows up as increased block adoption time (validation and processing), while end-to-end propagation remains largely stable thanks to pipelining and early header announcements. In other words, the risk is not about larger blocks or diffusion failures, but about extra computation per block. This shows up as a performance cost, not a threat to consensus safety or Praos timing.

A staged change is a governance positive. Presenting this as Part 1 of a staged update signals restraint. It shows awareness that parameter changes should be incremental and observed, not pushed in one shot. It also creates a window (even if imperfect) to compare expectations vs reality before the next step.

Incremental rollout is a real operational win for SPO diversity. Even when a parameter change is “conservative”, the network still needs to absorb it across hundreds of SPOs running different setups and operating under different constraints. Doing this in stages (Part 1 → observe → Part 2) reduces the chance of sudden disruption, gives operators time to validate their configs, and makes the transition smoother across the long tail of SPO infrastructure. In other words: the staged approach isn’t just “nice governance framing”, it’s a practical way to avoid forcing heterogeneous operators to adapt overnight.

Negative aspects

A practical “one-way door”, especially at the transaction level. The most significant downside is not short-term breakage, but asymmetry over time. While parameters are technically reversible, once applications and users begin to rely on higher per-transaction limits, reverting becomes socially and economically costly. Contracts and UX may implicitly depend on the new parameters setup, and reduction could break flows or degrade UX. Rollback might be feasible in the short term, there is a reversion plan in principle, which is positive, its feasibility is highly time-sensitive. If degradation is detected late, rollback becomes politically and operationally difficult.

Post-enactment monitoring is not expressed as clear public thresholds. Monitoring of the blockchain already exists and has existed for years. But the GA itself doesn’t clearly define “what would be bad enough to stop or revert”. Without explicit metrics and thresholds mentioned in the Governance Action, future debates risk turning into perception vs authority instead of objective signals.

More adoption-time pressure in the tail, especially under peak load. The most plausible technical downside is higher block adoption time per node. This doesn’t change raw geographic latency, but it adds processing time, which can amplify tail effects under load. In edge regions or weaker infra, that could marginally worsen adoption timing during busy periods. In practice, this is largely mitigated by normal SPO best practices (multiple relays, good peering, redundancy), so it’s more an operational consideration than a centralization alarm.

Demand signaling is still the weak. The attached survey (22 responses) shows support, especially for the per-transaction change, but it’s not strong evidence of ecosystem-wide demand. It helps, but it doesn’t prove scale. Stronger signals like real failure patterns, common blockers, or usage data would have reduced how much we’re relying on expert judgment.

Headroom exists, but it is weakly specified — and mistakes become hard to undo over time. The proposal relies on the idea that the network has sufficient spare capacity (“headroom”) to absorb a 25% increase in Plutus memory limits with manageable performance cost. Benchmarks and past observations support that this increase stays well within safe operating ranges today. However, the governance action does not clearly define where that margin ends: which metrics matter most, what level of degradation would be considered unacceptable, or what concrete signals would trigger concern. This matters because increasing execution limits is, over time, a practical one-way door. While rollback may be feasible shortly after enactment, once applications begin to rely on higher per-transaction budgets, reducing limits can break UX and established flows. If headroom is overestimated or conditions change and issues are detected late, reversal becomes politically and operationally costly. The risk is not immediate failure, but late discovery turning an adjustable parameter into a sticky decision without clear exit criteria. That said, multiple people directly involved with the governance action, including technical experts reached out to, indicated that available headroom is substantially larger than what this change consumes, and that the current execution budget is set very conservatively. Based on that guidance, this downside is viewed as less concerning for this increment. It is still kept because this change does consume part of a finite execution budget, and whenever capacity is spent, it is good practice to explicitly weigh the trade-off rather than treat headroom as unlimited by default.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: YES

After weighing the evidence, support is given for a YES vote for this governance action, for bounded reasons. The increase is conservative, staged, and supported by benchmarking and test validation. The main measurable impact is understood (adoption time), and the available data frames it as a performance cost that appears manageable, not a systemic risk.

At the same time, this is not a blank check for future increases. Execution budgets are easier to raise than to reduce later, especially once the ecosystem adapts. For that reason, Part 2 is expected to strengthen the “institutional discipline” side: clearer post-enactment observations, with concrete metrics and criteria for what would count as unacceptable degradation. Supporting Part 1 should raise the bar for Part 2, not lower it.

4. Conclusion

A YES vote is supported on the basis of a conservative, staged increase with benchmarking and test validation, with adoption time identified as the primary measurable impact and treated as a manageable performance cost rather than a systemic risk. Future increases are expected to be conditioned by clearer post-enactment observations, with concrete metrics and criteria for unacceptable degradation, given the practical “one-way door” dynamics of execution budget increases.

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JUSTIFICATIVA[PT]

1. Introdução

Uma governance action de Parameter Update é proposta para aumentar os limites de unidades de memória de scripts Plutus, tanto por transação quanto por bloco. As mudanças de parâmetro propostas são: maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] de 14.000.000 para 16.500.000, e maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] de 62.000.000 para 72.000.000. A intenção é aumentar a flexibilidade para desenvolvedores de DApps ao permitir que mais trabalho caiba dentro do orçamento de execução, mantendo consistentes os limites por transação e por bloco. Nenhum outro parâmetro de protocolo ou configuração do cost model do Plutus é proposto para mudança.

A mudança é apresentada como a primeira parte de um plano em duas etapas rumo a um aumento total de 25%, com uma governance action posterior esperada para propor 17.500.000 (tx) e 77.500.000 (bloco), não menos que dois epochs após a promulgação. A mudança foi recomendada pelo Parameter Committee da Intersect em 2025-05-08 e ratificada pelo Technical Steering Committee da Intersect em 2025-10-01. Mudanças equivalentes foram promulgadas na Preview (outubro de 2025) e na PreProd (novembro de 2025). A governance action afirma não haver preocupações específicas de segurança e relata benchmarking indicando headroom adequado e garantias de timing do Praos mantidas.

2. Análise da Governance Action

Aspectos positivos

Menos fricção para desenvolvedores, sem mudar como o Plutus funciona. O principal ganho é prático: hoje, alguns projetos conseguem fazer o que precisam, mas apenas dividindo a lógica em múltiplas etapas, adicionando workarounds, ou hiper-otimizando scripts de formas que prejudicam a UX e aumentam a complexidade. Aumentar o limite de memória por transação ajuda a reduzir essa fricção. Isso não muda a semântica do Plutus, o cost model, nem as regras de consenso. Apenas permite que um pouco mais de trabalho caiba dentro do “orçamento” de execução permitido. “Orçamento” aqui significa a margem de execução da rede: o máximo de memória/tempo que scripts Plutus podem consumir por transação e por bloco. Aumentar isso permite que scripts façam mais trabalho, mas consome mais capacidade computacional.

Mais capacidade de execução por bloco, sem distorcer a composição do bloco. A proposta mantém uma relação consistente entre os limites por transação e por bloco. O ponto não é “enfiar mais transações por bloco”, mas permitir scripts mais expressivos por transação, mantendo coerentes as restrições em nível de bloco.

Evidência técnica existe e é consistente entre versões de nó. Esta proposta é suportada por testes e benchmarking nas versões de nó 10.2, 10.3 e, mais recentemente, 10.6. Esses testes foram executados em um ambiente controlado e reprodutível, usando uma carga sintética de pior caso em que os scripts deliberadamente consomem 100% do orçamento de memória permitido sob cada configuração testada, incluindo os limites aumentados. Entre versões, os resultados são consistentes: o principal impacto aparece como aumento do tempo de adoção do bloco (validação e processamento), enquanto a propagação ponta a ponta permanece em grande parte estável graças a pipelining e anúncios antecipados de header. Em outras palavras, o risco não é sobre blocos maiores ou falhas de difusão, mas sobre computação extra por bloco. Isso aparece como um custo de performance, não como uma ameaça à segurança de consenso ou ao timing do Praos.

Uma mudança em etapas é um positivo de governança. Apresentar isso como Parte 1 de uma atualização em etapas sinaliza contenção. Mostra consciência de que mudanças de parâmetros devem ser incrementais e observadas, não empurradas de uma vez. Também cria uma janela (ainda que imperfeita) para comparar expectativa vs realidade antes do próximo passo.

Rollout incremental é um ganho operacional real para a diversidade de SPOs. Mesmo quando uma mudança de parâmetro é “conservadora”, a rede ainda precisa absorvê-la através de centenas de SPOs rodando setups diferentes e operando sob restrições diferentes. Fazer isso em etapas (Parte 1 → observar → Parte 2) reduz a chance de disrupção súbita, dá tempo para operadores validarem suas configs, e torna a transição mais suave ao longo da cauda longa da infraestrutura de SPOs. Em outras palavras: a abordagem em etapas não é só “um bom framing de governança”, é uma forma prática de evitar forçar operadores heterogêneos a se adaptar de um dia para o outro.

Aspectos negativos

Uma “porta de mão única” prática, especialmente no nível de transação. O downside mais significativo não é quebra de curto prazo, mas assimetria ao longo do tempo. Embora parâmetros sejam tecnicamente reversíveis, uma vez que aplicações e usuários comecem a depender de limites maiores por transação, reverter se torna social e economicamente custoso. Contratos e UX podem depender implicitamente da nova configuração de parâmetros, e a redução pode quebrar fluxos ou degradar a UX. Rollback pode ser viável no curto prazo, há um plano de reversão em princípio, o que é positivo, sua viabilidade é altamente sensível ao tempo. Se a degradação for detectada tarde, rollback se torna politicamente e operacionalmente difícil.

Monitoramento pós-promulgação não é expresso como limiares públicos claros. O monitoramento da blockchain já existe e existe há anos. Mas a própria GA não define claramente “o que seria ruim o suficiente para parar ou reverter”. Sem métricas e limiares explícitos mencionados na Governance Action, debates futuros correm o risco de virar percepção vs autoridade em vez de sinais objetivos.

Mais pressão de tempo de adoção na cauda, especialmente sob carga de pico. O downside técnico mais plausível é um tempo de adoção de bloco maior por nó. Isso não muda a latência geográfica bruta, mas adiciona tempo de processamento, o que pode amplificar efeitos de cauda sob carga. Em regiões de borda ou infraestrutura mais fraca, isso poderia piorar marginalmente o timing de adoção durante períodos de alta atividade. Na prática, isso é amplamente mitigado por boas práticas normais de SPOs (múltiplos relays, bom peering, redundância), então é mais uma consideração operacional do que um alarme de centralização.

Sinalização de demanda ainda é fraca. O survey anexado (22 respostas) mostra suporte, especialmente para a mudança por transação, mas não é evidência forte de demanda em escala de ecossistema. Ajuda, mas não prova escala. Sinais mais fortes como padrões reais de falha, bloqueios comuns, ou dados de uso teriam reduzido o quanto se está confiando em julgamento de especialistas.

Headroom existe, mas é fracamente especificado — e erros ficam difíceis de desfazer ao longo do tempo. A proposta depende da ideia de que a rede tem capacidade ociosa suficiente (“headroom”) para absorver um aumento de 25% nos limites de memória do Plutus com custo de performance administrável. Benchmarks e observações passadas suportam que esse aumento fica bem dentro de faixas operacionais seguras hoje. No entanto, a governance action não define claramente onde essa margem termina: quais métricas importam mais, qual nível de degradação seria considerado inaceitável, ou quais sinais concretos disparariam preocupação. Isso importa porque aumentar limites de execução é, ao longo do tempo, uma porta de mão única prática. Embora rollback possa ser viável logo após a promulgação, uma vez que aplicações comecem a depender de orçamentos maiores por transação, reduzir limites pode quebrar UX e fluxos estabelecidos. Se o headroom for superestimado ou condições mudarem e problemas forem detectados tarde, a reversão se torna politicamente e operacionalmente custosa. O risco não é falha imediata, mas descoberta tardia transformando um parâmetro ajustável em uma decisão “grudenta” sem critérios claros de saída. Dito isso, múltiplas pessoas diretamente envolvidas com a governance action, incluindo especialistas técnicos contatados, indicaram que o headroom disponível é substancialmente maior do que o que essa mudança consome, e que o orçamento atual de execução é definido de forma muito conservadora. Com base nessa orientação, esse downside é visto como menos preocupante para este incremento. Ele ainda é mantido porque esta mudança consome parte de um orçamento de execução finito, e sempre que capacidade é gasta, é boa prática ponderar explicitamente o trade-off em vez de tratar headroom como ilimitado por padrão.

3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: YES

Depois de ponderar as evidências, o apoio é dado a um voto YES para esta governance action, por razões delimitadas. O aumento é conservador, em etapas, e suportado por benchmarking e validação em testes. O principal impacto mensurável é entendido (tempo de adoção), e os dados disponíveis o enquadram como um custo de performance que parece administrável, não um risco sistêmico.

Ao mesmo tempo, isso não é um cheque em branco para aumentos futuros. Orçamentos de execução são mais fáceis de aumentar do que de reduzir depois, especialmente uma vez que o ecossistema se adapta. Por essa razão, espera-se que a Parte 2 fortaleça o lado de “disciplina institucional”: observações pós-promulgação mais claras, com métricas concretas e critérios para o que contaria como degradação inaceitável. Apoiar a Parte 1 deve elevar a barra para a Parte 2, não baixá-la.

4. Conclusão

Um voto YES é apoiado com base em um aumento conservador e em etapas, com benchmarking e validação em testes, com tempo de adoção identificado como o principal impacto mensurável e tratado como um custo de performance administrável em vez de um risco sistêmico. Aumentos futuros são esperados como condicionados por observações pós-promulgação mais claras, com métricas concretas e critérios para degradação inaceitável, dadas as dinâmicas práticas de “porta de mão única” de aumentos de orçamento de execução.

Governance Action Report (EN)

1. Introduction

This Governance Action proposes establishing a Net Change Limit (NCL) required by the Cardano Constitution, defining the maximum amount of lovelace that can be withdrawn from the treasury during a specified period. The proposed NCL starts at the beginning of Epoch 613 (13 February 2026) and ends at the close of Epoch 713 (3 July 2027), setting a cap of 350,000,000,000,000 lovelace (350M ADA) for total withdrawals across that window.

The NCL is intended to be applied when reviewing Treasury Withdrawal governance actions for compliance with Article IV of the Cardano Constitution and the Treasury Withdrawal Guardrails in Appendix I. The rationale defines 2025 “Net Income” as treasury inflows from Epoch 532 through Epoch 604, totaling 306,940,195 ADA, and sets the limit at 350M ADA (about 115% of that figure), driven in part by inclusion of a previously approved 50M ADA Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget. An adjustment to the period length is justified as a way to realign the NCL cycle with a mid-year budget season and ensure completed prior-year inflow data exists when setting the next NCL.

The voting threshold is stated as greater than 50% of active voting DRep stake, with Constitutional Committee members encouraged (but not required) to provide an opinion via rationale. An attached methodology states the action would be treated as ratified at expiry if 50% + 1 lovelace of active voting DRep stake supports it, using Koios’ Proposal Voting Summary as the reference where tooling diverges. [Source: A]

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2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

The Net Change Limit is not optional under the constitutional treasury framework. Without a formally agreed cap, Treasury Withdrawals become unconstitutional and blocked, creating operational stalemate and preventing execution of initiatives that depend on on-chain funding. Approving an NCL keeps the funding mechanism functional and avoids leaving treasury governance in limbo due to absence of a basic parameter.

Even with weak proposer framing, a technically favorable point remains: once annualized across the longer time window, the effective spend rate per unit of time tends to be lower than the prior active cap. Even where “115% of inflow” sounds negative at first glance, the longer period dilutes the cap and can represent tighter fiscal discipline on a time-adjusted basis.

The inclusion of spreadsheets and assumptions is treated as a positive. This does not resolve governance problems, but it meets a minimum acceptable baseline for auditability by enabling public scrutiny and verification instead of relying on an arbitrary figure.

Negative aspects

A procedural issue is raised as primary. The action was drafted while citing the prior Constitution’s structure and framing, in a context where a new Constitution was already being voted on with high likelihood of ratification. Even if the older Constitution was formally active at submission time, enough information existed to anticipate that the governing text could change during the voting process. Submitting the action on that timing, without aligning language to the document about to become operative, creates unnecessary confusion and normalizes referencing dated documents and “fixing” meaning later through interpretation.

Governance by over-interpretation follows directly. When a text is outdated or misaligned with the governing document, reliance shifts to context outside the text to justify what it “was supposed to mean.” On-chain governance requires auditable, self-contained text. Normalizing “the document says X, but it really means Y because everyone knows” moves governance into informal ambiguity shaped by convenience, and that precedent is not treated as acceptable.

A structural issue is identified in the rationale used to justify the cap. Incorporating a prior “signal” via an Info Action as justification to raise the NCL cap “to respect dReps’ will” inverts the purpose of the NCL. The NCL is meant to function as macro discipline that forces coordination and prioritization. Calibrating the cap to fit what has already been signaled stops it from functioning as a control mechanism and turns it into a stamp for demand, producing the expectation that if the cap gets in the way, the cap will be revisited. If normalized, this encourages a race to the treasury and erodes the meaning of the parameter.

Two chronic ecosystem issues are treated as amplifiers: absence of guardrails discouraging concentration by entity and absence of an anti-bundling standard. With the NCL functioning only as an aggregate limit and no minimally structured public guidance discouraging concentration or encouraging decomposition of requests, the predictable outcome is large actors consuming disproportionate fiscal space while community-led initiatives are squeezed. Without anti-bundling pressure, incentives persist to package heterogeneous work together, blending controversial items with “must-pass” items, forcing poor compromises and weakening decision quality.

Review cadence is also treated as weak as a norm. The prior cycle saw the NCL revised multiple times to accommodate changes and new demands. Flexibility and some emergency mechanism are not rejected in principle, but the current practice is treated as too malleable. Without minimum stability, predictability, and political restraint around revisions, incentives shift toward poor planning and coordination in favor of “playing the timing game,” destroying the NCL’s coordinating function and discouraging fiscal responsibility.

Methodological narrative problems are identified. The inflow description and rhetorical blending of fees and monetary expansion degrade institutional quality. Governance should not depend on a reader reconstructing intended meaning. More importantly, an explicit fiscal objective for the treasury is missing. Without stating whether the goal is preserving principal, spending aggressively for growth, or controlling drawdown through a treasury floor and contingencies, the NCL becomes a floating number supported by superficial heuristics like “don’t spend more than what comes in,” despite inflow being substantially monetary expansion that declines over time.

Risks and concerns

Unaddressed externalities are flagged: the relationship between withdrawals and sell pressure; incentives created by budgeting in USD and converting to ADA with large cushions in a bear market; and the risk of opportunistic behavior or abandonment when ADA price moves materially. An easy solution is not claimed, and on-chain hard-coding is not demanded. A minimally professional proposal is expected to acknowledge these dynamics and provide mitigation principles, even if only as off-chain guidance or best-practice expectations.

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

A Net Change Limit is treated as necessary for constitutional treasury withdrawals, and approving an NCL is acknowledged as keeping the funding mechanism functional and avoiding governance deadlock. Technical merit is also acknowledged in the annualized interpretation of the longer window, and the presence of annexed spreadsheets and assumptions is treated as meeting a minimum baseline for auditability.

Despite those points, the document is treated as crossing an unacceptable line for governance precedent. The timing and drafting are treated as procedurally weak by anchoring language and framing in a constitution structure likely to change during the vote, increasing confusion and normalizing a practice of referencing dated documents and repairing meaning later through interpretation. That is directly linked to a broader risk: governance by over-interpretation, where context outside the on-chain text becomes the mechanism to justify meaning, undermining auditability and self-containment.

The rationale for expanding the cap is also treated as structurally inverted: using prior signaling to justify a higher limit turns the NCL from a discipline mechanism into a demand-fitting stamp, encouraging the expectation that the cap will be revisited whenever it becomes constraining. With weak or absent ecosystem norms around anti-concentration, anti-bundling, and restrained revision cadence, this pattern is treated as likely to accelerate a treasury race, weaken coordination, and erode the NCL’s coordinating function.

Methodological confusion and the absence of an explicit fiscal objective further undermine institutional quality, and externalities around sell pressure and price-based incentives are treated as insufficiently acknowledged. A revised Governance Action aligned to the operative constitution and grounded in coherent premises, with at least non-binding public guidance on coordination, concentration, and anti-bundling, is treated as the appropriate path rather than approving this version as written.

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4. Conclusion

An NCL is treated as required to keep treasury withdrawals operational under the constitutional framework, and the annualized framing plus annexed data provide limited technical and auditability value. Even so, procedural weakness, reliance on interpretation outside the text, demand-fitting cap logic, and missing structural norms around concentration, bundling, and revision stability are treated as unacceptable precedent for fiscal governance, leading to rejection of this version.

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Relatório de Ação de Governança (PT-BR)

1. Introdução

Esta Ação de Governança propõe estabelecer um Net Change Limit (NCL) exigido pela Constituição de Cardano, definindo o valor máximo de lovelace que pode ser retirado do tesouro durante um período especificado. O NCL proposto inicia no começo da Epoch 613 (13 de fevereiro de 2026) e termina no fim da Epoch 713 (3 de julho de 2027), fixando um teto de 350.000.000.000.000 lovelace (350M ADA) para o total de retiradas ao longo dessa janela.

O NCL deve ser aplicado na revisão de ações de governança de Treasury Withdrawal para verificação de conformidade com o Artigo IV da Constituição de Cardano e com os Treasury Withdrawal Guardrails do Apêndice I. A justificativa define “Net Income” de 2025 como a soma dos inflows do tesouro entre as Epochs 532 e 604, totalizando 306.940.195 ADA, e estabelece o limite em 350M ADA (cerca de 115% desse valor), impulsionado em parte pela inclusão de um orçamento de 50M ADA para Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity previamente aprovado. Um ajuste no comprimento do período é justificado como forma de realinhar o ciclo do NCL com a temporada orçamentária de meio de ano e assegurar que dados completos de inflow do ano anterior existam ao definir o próximo NCL.

O limiar de aprovação é apresentado como superior a 50% do stake ativo votante de DReps, com membros do Comitê Constitucional incentivados (mas não obrigados) a registrar opinião via rationale. Uma metodologia anexada afirma que a ação seria tratada como ratificada no vencimento se 50% + 1 lovelace do stake ativo votante de DReps apoiar a ação, usando o Proposal Voting Summary da Koios como referência quando houver divergência entre ferramentas. [Source: A]

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2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

O Net Change Limit não é opcional no framework constitucional do tesouro. Sem um teto formalmente acordado, Treasury Withdrawals tornam-se inconstitucionais e bloqueados, criando um impasse operacional e impedindo a execução de iniciativas que dependem de funding on-chain. Aprovar um NCL mantém o mecanismo de funding funcional e evita deixar a governança do tesouro em limbo pela ausência de um parâmetro básico.

Mesmo com um enquadramento fraco por parte do proponente, permanece um ponto tecnicamente favorável: ao anualizar o valor proposto na janela de tempo mais longa, a taxa efetiva de gasto por unidade de tempo tende a ser menor do que o teto ativo anterior. Mesmo quando “115% do inflow” soa ruim à primeira vista, o período mais longo dilui o teto e pode representar disciplina fiscal mais restrita em base ajustada ao tempo.

A inclusão de planilhas e premissas é tratada como positiva. Isso não resolve problemas de governança, mas atende a um mínimo aceitável de auditabilidade ao permitir escrutínio e verificação públicos, em vez de depender de um número arbitrário.

Aspectos negativos

Um problema procedimental é tratado como o mais importante. A ação foi redigida citando a estrutura e o enquadramento da Constituição anterior, em um contexto em que uma nova Constituição já estava sendo votada com alta probabilidade de ratificação. Mesmo que a Constituição antiga ainda fosse formalmente ativa no momento da submissão, havia informação suficiente para antecipar que o texto governante poderia mudar durante o processo de votação. Submeter a ação nesse timing, sem alinhar a linguagem ao documento prestes a se tornar operativo, cria confusão desnecessária e normaliza a prática de referenciar documentos datados e “consertar” o sentido depois via interpretação.

Governança por over-interpretation decorre diretamente disso. Quando um texto está desatualizado ou desalinhado com o documento governante, a comunidade passa a depender de contexto fora do texto para justificar o que “deveria significar”. Governança on-chain precisa ser auditável e autocontida. Normalizar “o documento diz X, mas na verdade significa Y porque todo mundo sabe” desloca a governança para ambiguidade informal moldada por conveniência, e esse precedente não é tratado como aceitável.

Um problema estrutural também é apontado na justificativa usada para o teto. Incorporar um “sinal” prévio via Info Action como justificativa para elevar o teto do NCL “para respeitar a vontade dos dReps” inverte o propósito do NCL. O NCL deveria funcionar como disciplina macro que força coordenação e priorização. Calibrar o teto para caber o que já foi sinalizado faz com que ele deixe de ser um mecanismo de controle e vire um carimbo de demanda, produzindo a expectativa de que, se o teto atrapalhar, o teto será revisado. Se isso virar norma, incentiva corrida ao tesouro e erosão do significado do parâmetro.

Dois problemas crônicos do ecossistema são tratados como agravantes: ausência de guardrails contra concentração e ausência de qualquer padrão anti-bundling. Com o NCL funcionando apenas como limite agregado e sem orientação pública minimamente estruturada para desencorajar concentração por entidade ou pressionar decomposição de pedidos, o resultado previsível é o já observado: grandes atores consumindo parcela desproporcional do espaço fiscal enquanto iniciativas lideradas pela comunidade são comprimidas. Sem pressão anti-bundling, persistem incentivos para empacotar trabalhos heterogêneos, misturando itens controversos com itens “que precisam passar”, forçando maus compromissos e enfraquecendo a qualidade decisória.

A cadência de revisão também é tratada como fraca como norma. No ciclo anterior, o NCL foi revisitado múltiplas vezes para acomodar mudanças e novas demandas. Flexibilidade e algum mecanismo de emergência não são rejeitados em princípio, mas a prática atual é tratada como excessivamente maleável. Sem estabilidade mínima, previsibilidade e contenção política em revisões, o ecossistema aprende o comportamento errado: não planejar e coordenar, mas “jogar o jogo do timing”, destruindo a função coordenadora do NCL e desincentivando responsabilidade fiscal.

Problemas na narrativa metodológica são destacados. A forma como inflows são descritos e a mistura retórica entre fees e monetary expansion degradam a qualidade institucional. Governança não deveria depender de o leitor reconstruir a lógica pretendida. Mais importante, falta uma discussão explícita sobre o objetivo fiscal do tesouro. Sem declarar se o objetivo é preservar principal, gastar agressivamente para crescimento, ou controlar drawdown por meio de um piso do tesouro e contingências, o NCL vira um número flutuante sustentado por heurísticas superficiais como “não gastar mais do que entra”, em um contexto em que grande parte do inflow é monetary expansion e essa expansão declina ao longo do tempo.

Riscos e preocupações

Externalidades não endereçadas são apontadas: a relação entre retiradas e sell pressure; os incentivos criados por orçamentação em USD e conversão para ADA com grandes colchões em bear market; e o risco real de comportamento oportunista ou abandono quando o preço de ADA muda materialmente. Uma solução fácil não é alegada, e hard-code on-chain não é exigido. Uma proposta minimamente profissional deveria ao menos reconhecer esses pontos e apresentar princípios de mitigação, ainda que apenas como orientação off-chain ou expectativas de best practice.

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3. Voto e Fundamentação

Voto: NÃO

Um Net Change Limit é tratado como necessário para retiradas constitucionais do tesouro, e o valor funcional de aprovar um NCL é reconhecido por manter o mecanismo de funding operacional e evitar deadlock de governança. Também é reconhecido mérito técnico na leitura anualizada do período mais longo, e a presença de planilhas e premissas anexadas é tratada como atendendo a um mínimo de auditabilidade.

Apesar desses pontos, o documento é tratado como ultrapassando uma linha inaceitável de precedente de governança. O timing e a redação são tratados como procedimentalmente fracos ao ancorar linguagem e enquadramento em uma estrutura constitucional com alta chance de mudar durante a votação, ampliando confusão e normalizando a prática de referenciar documentos datados e reparar o sentido depois via interpretação. Isso é ligado diretamente a um risco mais amplo: governança por over-interpretation, onde contexto fora do texto on-chain vira o mecanismo para justificar significado, minando auditabilidade e autocontenção.

A justificativa para expandir o teto também é tratada como estruturalmente invertida: usar sinalização prévia para justificar um limite maior transforma o NCL de mecanismo de disciplina em carimbo que se ajusta à demanda, incentivando a expectativa de que o teto será revisado sempre que virar restritivo. Com normas fracas ou ausentes no ecossistema sobre anti-concentração, anti-bundling e contenção em revisões, esse padrão é tratado como propenso a acelerar corrida ao tesouro, enfraquecer coordenação e erodir a função coordenadora do NCL.

Confusão metodológica e ausência de objetivo fiscal explícito reduzem ainda mais a qualidade institucional, e externalidades sobre sell pressure e incentivos baseados em preço são tratadas como insuficientemente reconhecidas. Em vez de aprovar esta versão como está, o caminho adequado é tratado como submeter uma nova Ação de Governança alinhada à constituição operativa e baseada em premissas coerentes, com ao menos orientação pública não vinculante sobre coordenação, concentração e anti-bundling, para que o NCL deixe de ser um número performativo e passe a ser um instrumento real de governança fiscal.

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4. Conclusão

Um NCL é tratado como necessário para manter retiradas do tesouro operacionais sob o framework constitucional, e a leitura anualizada mais dados anexados oferecem valor técnico e de auditabilidade limitado. Mesmo assim, fraqueza procedimental, dependência de interpretação fora do texto, lógica de teto ajustada à demanda e ausência de normas estruturais sobre concentração, bundling e estabilidade de revisão são tratados como precedente inaceitável, levando à rejeição desta versão.

Governance Action Report (EN)

1. Introduction

Intersect’s Hard Fork Working Group proposes naming the next Cardano hard fork (Protocol Version 11) the “van Rossem Hard Fork”, in memory of Cardano community contributor Max van Rossem. The motivation is to continue Cardano’s tradition of naming eras and hard forks after notable historical figures or honored community members, following prior names such as Byron, Shelley, Allegra, Mary, Alonzo, Vasil, Valentine, Chang, and Plomin. The action is presented as a symbolic commemoration intended to preserve the memory of an impactful contributor for the ecosystem and for his family, highlighting Max’s governance involvement, constitutional contributions, and community work.

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2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

I valued a lot the Cardano’s tradition of using symbolic names for eras and major protocol updates. This is important because it helps cultivate and preserve a distinct community culture, rather than treating upgrades as purely technical artifacts.

This proposal is viewed positively, and the idea of paying tribute to Max van Rossem is also viewed positively. Even though he was not known to me personally, it was clear that many people across the ecosystem were genuinely moved, and many consistently highlighted his contributions, especially in governance-related work. Honoring that kind of contribution feels noble and aligned with Cardano’s values and community ethos.

Negative aspects

None.

Risks and concerns

Additionally, this action carries no meaningful risk: it is purely a naming decision for a hard fork update and does not introduce protocol changes, parameter changes, treasury impact, or execution dependencies. It is a low-cost, symbolic act with no operational downside.

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3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: YES

For that reasons mentioned before, this governance action is fully supported and will be voted YES.

Additionally, this action carries no meaningful risk: it is purely a naming decision for a hard fork update and does not introduce protocol changes, parameter changes, treasury impact, or execution dependencies. It is a low-cost, symbolic act with no operational downside.

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4. Conclusion

Support is grounded in preserving Cardano’s symbolic naming tradition as a cultural instrument and in honoring a contributor whose governance work was widely recognized, with no operational or treasury implications stated.

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Relatório de Ação de Governança (PT-BR)

1. Introdução

O Hard Fork Working Group da Intersect propõe nomear o próximo hard fork da Cardano (Protocol Version 11) como “van Rossem Hard Fork”, em memória do contribuidor da comunidade Cardano Max van Rossem. A motivação é dar continuidade à tradição da Cardano de nomear eras e hard forks em homenagem a figuras históricas notáveis ou a membros honrados da comunidade, seguindo nomes anteriores como Byron, Shelley, Allegra, Mary, Alonzo, Vasil, Valentine, Chang e Plomin. A ação é apresentada como uma homenagem simbólica destinada a preservar a memória de um contribuidor impactante para o ecossistema e para sua família, destacando o envolvimento de Max em governança, contribuições constitucionais e atuação comunitária.

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2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

A tradição da Cardano de usar nomes simbólicos para eras e grandes atualizações de protocolo foi muito valorizada. Isso é importante porque ajuda a cultivar e preservar uma cultura comunitária distinta, em vez de tratar atualizações como artefatos puramente técnicos.

Esta proposta é vista positivamente, e a ideia de prestar tributo a Max van Rossem também é vista positivamente. Mesmo sem tê-lo conhecido pessoalmente, ficou claro que muitas pessoas em todo o ecossistema ficaram genuinamente tocadas, e muitas destacaram de forma consistente suas contribuições, especialmente em trabalho relacionado à governança. Honrar esse tipo de contribuição parece nobre e alinhado aos valores e ao ethos comunitário da Cardano.

Aspectos negativos

Nenhum.

Riscos e preocupações

Além disso, esta ação não carrega risco significativo: trata-se apenas de uma decisão de nome para uma atualização de hard fork e não introduz mudanças de protocolo, mudanças de parâmetros, impacto no tesouro ou dependências de execução. É um ato simbólico, de baixo custo, sem desvantagem operacional.

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3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: YES

Pelos motivos mencionados anteriormente, esta ação de governança é totalmente apoiada e será votada YES.

Além disso, esta ação não carrega risco significativo: trata-se apenas de uma decisão de nome para uma atualização de hard fork e não introduz mudanças de protocolo, mudanças de parâmetros, impacto no tesouro ou dependências de execução. É um ato simbólico, de baixo custo, sem desvantagem operacional.

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4. Conclusão

O apoio se baseia na preservação da tradição de nomeação simbólica da Cardano como instrumento cultural e na homenagem a um contribuidor cujo trabalho em governança foi amplamente reconhecido, sem implicações operacionais ou de tesouro indicadas.

Governance Action Report (EN)

1. Introduction

This Budget Info Action asks dReps and the Cardano community to signal support for a ₳1,500,000, 6-month budget to harden and scale DeltaDeFi, a Hydra-based, low-latency order-book exchange intended to provide a “CEX-grade” trading venue for ADA and Cardano native tokens (CNTs). The budget targets three tracks:

• Hardening the existing beta Hydra spot DEX into a production-grade venue (security reviews/audits, risk controls, monitoring/incident response, API stability, and a public status page)
• Scaling Hydra/indexing infrastructure and integrations so DeltaDeFi can be used as ecosystem infrastructure
• Delivering a Vision 2030 KPI Measurement Programme consisting of a baseline report, a public KPI dashboard, and a final 6-month progress report

The split is 80% for trading infrastructure and 20% for the KPI programme, plus ₳100,000 for administration and independent audit.

Funds are proposed to be released in three phases (start, month 3, month 6) and administered via a 4-of-6 multisig under a proposed DeltaDeFi Administration Committee, with a stated fund return policy if the project is stopped.

No treasury withdrawal is executed by this action; it only signals whether this budget direction is desirable in principle.

2. Governance Action Analysis

Scope of what is being assessed

The proposal positions DeltaDeFi as a trading “venue” delivering a “CEX-grade” experience (low latency, fast execution, order book) using Hydra for throughput/latency, plus a data/dashboard layer to measure market quality.

The request is large (₳1.5M) and the text attempts to anchor part of its framing and KPIs to Cardano Vision 2030 (still under vote/refinement).

The institutional focus of this review is:

• Use-case coherence
• Centralization risk
• Treasury justification
• KPI adequacy/ambition
• Budget transparency
• Evidence of demand and liquidity
• Track record

Upsides

A plausible Hydra use case

Low-latency and high-frequency trading applications are among cases where Hydra can be a natural fit: L2 absorbs fast operations (orders/cancellations/market data), while L1 acts as the settlement and security layer.

The L2 throughput KPI (order-of-magnitude L2 transactions) can serve as a practical demonstration of a Hydra use case in production, provided the metric is well-defined and resistant to “inflating numbers”.

Execution capacity and public, verifiable evidence (track record)

Two prior proposals related to DeltaDeFi (Catalyst, total ~₳500k) were identified as completed with publicly verifiable evidence:

• A functional MVP/testnet and open-source repositories (smart contracts/scripts and backend)
• Open-source SDKs in multiple languages with demos, plus a Python trading bot with a public session

This reduces “non-delivery” risk within the specific DeltaDeFi scope and reinforces engineering capability, documentation quality, and the ability to publish public artifacts.

Additionally, the team (SIDAN Lab) has a broader history of participation in Catalyst and ecosystem initiatives, with other deliveries and contributions beyond the two proposals directly tied to DeltaDeFi.

Tooling reputation (Mesh and documentation standards)

The team has a strong technical reputation in the ecosystem, including relevant contributions in developer tooling (e.g., Mesh), with a history of delivery and documentation.

This track record is an institutional strength: it increases confidence in implementation quality and the ability to produce reusable documentation and repositories.

An attempt at “observable DeFi” via baselines/dashboards

The proposal attempts to tie execution to market quality metrics (spread, slippage, CEX gap, etc.) and promises baselines/dashboards/reports.

Even if the product does not become a market leader, a public standard to measure “market quality” could benefit the ecosystem, as long as the methodology is clear, auditable, and reusable.

Negative aspects

“CEX-grade venue” is a strong claim, but under-specified

“CEX-grade” implies strict operational requirements (observability, resilience, failover, SLOs, incident response, operational security, API stability, market data integrity).

The text uses the term as framing, but no explicit set of requirements/acceptance criteria was observed defining what “CEX-grade” means in operational metrics.

Without a definition, the term risks becoming aspirational marketing rather than a verifiable target.

Technical architecture and “feature scope” are insufficiently described

Even though a Catalyst-funded testnet already exists, this is a new, treasury-scale proposal. The proposal does not provide sufficient technical detail on:

• Which concrete features will be implemented (real increments vs generic “hardening”)
• The platform design in this new phase (matching, data infrastructure, indexers, Hydra integration)
• The operating model and technical governance in production

This matters because risk assessment (centralization, security, replicability, community participation) depends on design.

Without a clear technical scope, the proposal asks for trust where it should provide specification and evidence.

Minimum expectation: a technical appendix (or set of appendices) covering architecture, components, interfaces, and user-facing trust implications.

KPIs are insufficient to justify the scale of the investment

Targets for TVL, active traders, monthly volume, and revenue appear low relative to the ₳1.5M request, with a risk of delivering a “functional pilot” that later becomes a precedent for a larger follow-up request.

There is also the historical context: after years of funding DeFi-related proposals by multiple teams and contributors with resources from the treasury, mainly through Project Catalyst, the standard should be raised and recurring subsidies should not be extended indefinitely for products that should become financially sustainable and profitable without requiring repeated returns to Catalyst.

Under this context, “signs of life” are no longer an adequate KPI for large checks. The bar should be impact and sustainability, not mere functionality.

Metrics such as “protocol revenue” (e.g., 10k ADA/year) were interpreted as particularly weak to justify the allocation, even considering externalities.

Positive externalities are plausible but not operationalized

Possible arguments include: improved price discovery, lower slippage, reduced friction for broader DeFi, market-quality benchmarking, reduced reliance on CEX as a price source.

However, these effects were not translated into convincing, measurable KPIs (e.g., on-chain market share, share of volume on strategic pairs, spread/depth targets, integration targets with aggregators/routers, presence targets in relevant execution flows).

Without operationalization, externalities become difficult to audit.

Using Cardano Vision 2030 as an anchor before ratification/refinement

The proposal references Vision 2030, but the document is still under vote and its KPIs are explicitly subject to refinement.

This is seen as institutional premature anchoring: it creates an alignment framing without ensuring adherence to final KPIs that may be formalized/refined later.

Aligning with the roadmap is conceptually positive. The issue is using a “moving document” as a rhetorical pillar to justify treasury allocation without revisitable commitments.

Risks and concerns

Conceptual tension: “DEX” vs potentially centralized architecture

A relevant conceptual critique applies: an order-book model with off-chain matching (potentially operated by infrastructure controlled by a single operator) can exhibit centralized characteristics, even if custody remains non-custodial.

This creates semantic misalignment risk: self-identifying as a DEX while core elements (matching/data infrastructure) may function as centralized services.

For an ecosystem that values decentralization, the proposal should be more explicit:

• Which components are permissionless
• Which are operated by the team
• Which are replicable by third parties
• What the progressive decentralization path is

Trust model / Hydra topology / user risk are poorly explained

Even for an L2 trading product, the trust model must be explicit:

• Who runs the Hydra Head?
• Must users be head participants, or are they “clients” of operators?
• What are the failure modes (operator offline, partial collusion, network partition)?
• Is there unilateral exit to L1 if the operator goes down?

Without this, the proposal leaves a gray zone where the user may be in a system that should be trust-minimized but becomes trust-shifted.

Decentralization and community participation as a counterbalance to centralization

Across several Cardano DEX designs, centralization is sometimes mitigated via infrastructure operated by third parties (e.g., SPOs acting as batchers/relayers/operators, depending on the design).

Here, it is unclear whether an analogous mechanism exists or whether there is any auditable path to broaden participation and reduce operational concentration. Without that, the system risks reinforcing a central bottleneck.

Structural dependency on liquidity and market makers: insufficient evidence

The proposal suggests improving market quality and attracting professional traders, but no robust evidence was observed of:

• Structured interviews/research with market makers
• LOIs/pilots/commitments (even non-binding)
• A clear diagnosis of MM blockers on Cardano (stablecoin rails, settlement risk, infra, operational compliance, etc.)
• A concrete liquidity bootstrapping strategy that does not rely on ongoing treasury funding

This is critical because a “CEX-grade venue” without liquidity becomes a “well-built but empty product”, and Cardano DeFi history already shows a risk of chronic treasury dependence.

Throughput analysis: unclear math and unit definition (risk of “inflating the KPI”)

A throughput section was identified that mixes:

• A “theoretical L1 tx/month ceiling” (derived from TPS)
• A “gap” to reach a target (3x)
• The “contribution” of an L2 transactions KPI as a percentage of that gap

Problems:

• The “gap” (e.g., 18M) is not transparently derived
• Assumptions and rounding are not stated
• There may be a unit mismatch: L1 throughput is used to give weight to L2 transactions, which only makes sense if the KPI formally considers “L1+L2 activity”, not only L1

Without a clear methodology, the section reads as quantitative narrative rather than evidence.

Transparency and accountability failures

Budget: insufficient granularity for any treasury standard

Even with a macro split (Hydra/trading infra; baseline+dashboard; admin+audit), the proposal lacks minimal breakdown:

• Headcount by function and time allocation
• Cost/rate assumptions
• Monthly burn rate
• Infrastructure/observability costs (cloud, indexers, storage, data)
• Independent audit scope and cost (what is audited, by whom, criteria)
• Contingency and risks

This prevents proportionality evaluation and overlap identification with previously funded work.

KPI Measurement Program / dashboards: high cost and potential redundancy with ecosystem solutions

Allocating ~20% of the budget to dashboards is difficult to justify given analytics solutions already being developed/adopted in the ecosystem (e.g., Dune and related tooling), which can produce many of the metrics (TVL, volume, MAU, transactions) with lower marginal cost and public reusability.

If additional analytics are needed, a neutral, ecosystem-wide initiative would be more appropriate than embedding a large dashboards line into a single venue’s budget.

Responsibility mapping and technical workstreams

Without a breakdown, it is unclear whether critical areas (SRE/ops, security, data infra, indexing, matching engine, etc.) have sufficient capacity. Therefore, it is not possible to judge whether “CEX-grade” is achievable within the proposed time and budget.

Evidence and annexes are incomplete for the requested amount

Even with the track record identified, the GA does not appear to have fully attached/referenced:

• Links and IDs for prior proposals
• Consolidated evidence of what was delivered
• A structured “already paid vs new ask” diff
• Organized learnings and technical gaps

For ₳1.5M, the evidence package should be substantially stronger.

Institutional considerations on the Treasury

Public goods vs subsidizing private commercial models

The treasury should prioritize public goods, open source, and common infrastructure, avoiding recurring funding of profit-oriented private businesses without clear terms.

Subsidy can be justified as a strategic initial contribution, but not as chronic dependence.

Lack of clear policy and “narratives to legitimize withdrawals”

The lack of shared policy encourages proposals to fit narratives (e.g., Vision 2030) to legitimize large withdrawals. The larger the check, the higher the accountability requirements should be:

• Ambitious KPIs
• Granular budgets
• Demand evidence
• Technical transparency

What is “Unknown” and must be explicitly marked

• Evidence of real demand from market makers and professional traders via API (method, LOIs, pilots)
• A concrete liquidity bootstrapping plan without chronic treasury dependence
• Operational definition of “CEX-grade” (SLOs, uptime, incident response, status page)
• Rigorous methodology for market-quality KPIs (baseline, attribution, verification, auditability)
• Formal methodology for throughput analysis (gap, assumptions, L1 vs L2 unit)
• Budget breakdown and team allocation by workstream
• Progressive decentralization plan and community participation (what is centralized today and how it evolves)
• Technical scope of this new phase: new features and architectural changes vs generic “hardening”

Objective questions and requirements for the proposer

• Full budget pack: headcount/rates/monthly burn/infra/audit scope/contingency
• “Delivered vs new” map: what was funded in Catalyst vs what is requested now and why
• “CEX-grade” definition: measurable SLOs and acceptance criteria (p95 latency, uptime, error budgets, failover, incident playbooks)
• Liquidity/MM: structured evidence, blockers, and commitment signals (or acquisition plan)
• KPI revisions: targets calibrated to the amount, including market quality (spread/depth/slippage), relative adoption (on-chain market share), and sustainability
• Throughput methodology: fix units, derive the gap transparently, and add anti-inflation criteria for L2 transactions
• Technical architecture: appendices with design and user-facing trust implications
• Decentralization: clarify what is permissionless/replicable by third parties and whether there is a participation mechanism (e.g., external operators) to counterbalance centralization

3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO

There is technical merit and real delivery track record: the team ships artifacts and demonstrates engineering capability. The Hydra trading use case is plausible and could serve as a production proof point.

However, the current package fails basic requirements to justify treasury-scale support: low-impact KPIs, insufficient budget detail, weak demand and liquidity evidence, and missing technical detail needed to assess centralization, trust model, and community participation. The dashboards/KPI measurement line also appears expensive and potentially redundant.

Alignment with Vision 2030 is conceptually positive but institutionally weak due to reliance on a moving document and refinable KPIs, which can function as rhetorical framing without revisitable commitments.

4. Conclusion

Technical merit and delivery capability are present, and the Hydra trading use case is plausible as a production proof point. Treasury-scale support is not justified under the current package due to low-impact KPIs, insufficient budget granularity, weak liquidity/market-maker demand evidence, and missing technical detail needed to evaluate centralization and the trust model.

Relatório de Ação de Governança (PT-BR)

1. Introdução

Esta Budget Info Action solicita que dReps e a comunidade Cardano sinalizem apoio a um orçamento de ₳1.500.000 por 6 meses para reforçar e escalar a DeltaDeFi, uma exchange de livro de ordens baseada em Hydra, de baixa latência, destinada a oferecer um “venue” de negociação com padrão “CEX-grade” para ADA e ativos nativos da Cardano (CNTs). O orçamento mira três frentes:

• Endurecimento da Hydra spot DEX atualmente em beta para um nível de produção (revisões/auditorias de segurança, controles de risco, monitoramento/resposta a incidentes, estabilidade de API e uma página pública de status)
• Escalonamento de infraestrutura de Hydra/indexação e integrações para que a DeltaDeFi possa ser usada como infraestrutura do ecossistema
• Entrega de um Programa de Mensuração de KPIs da Visão 2030 composto por um relatório de baseline, um dashboard público de KPIs e um relatório final de progresso ao fim de 6 meses

A divisão proposta é 80% para infraestrutura de trading e 20% para o programa de KPIs, além de ₳100.000 para administração e auditoria independente.

Os fundos são propostos para liberação em três fases (início, mês 3, mês 6) e administração via multisig 4-de-6 sob um Comitê de Administração da DeltaDeFi proposto, com uma política declarada de devolução de fundos caso o projeto seja interrompido.

Nenhum saque do tesouro é executado por esta ação; ela apenas sinaliza se essa direção orçamentária é desejável em princípio.

2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Escopo do que está sendo avaliado

A proposta posiciona a DeltaDeFi como um “venue” de negociação entregando uma experiência “CEX-grade” (baixa latência, execução rápida, livro de ordens) usando Hydra para throughput/latência, além de uma camada de dados/dashboard para mensurar qualidade de mercado.

O pedido é grande (₳1,5M) e o texto tenta ancorar parte do seu framing e KPIs à Visão 2030 da Cardano (ainda em votação/refinamento).

O foco institucional desta revisão é:

• Coerência do caso de uso
• Risco de centralização
• Justificativa de tesouro
• Adequação/ambição de KPIs
• Transparência orçamentária
• Evidência de demanda e liquidez
• Histórico de entregas

Pontos favoráveis

Um caso de uso plausível para Hydra

Aplicações de trading de baixa latência e alta frequência estão entre os casos em que Hydra pode ser um encaixe natural: a L2 absorve operações rápidas (ordens/cancelamentos/dados de mercado), enquanto a L1 atua como camada de liquidação e segurança.

O KPI de throughput em L2 (ordem de grandeza de transações em L2) pode servir como uma demonstração prática de um caso de uso de Hydra em produção, desde que a métrica seja bem definida e resistente a “inflar números”.

Capacidade de execução e evidências públicas e verificáveis (histórico)

Duas propostas anteriores relacionadas à DeltaDeFi (Catalyst, total ~₳500k) foram identificadas como concluídas com evidência publicamente verificável:

• Um MVP/testnet funcional e repositórios open source (contratos/scripts e backend)
• SDKs open source em múltiplas linguagens com demos, além de um bot de trading em Python com uma sessão pública

Isso reduz o risco de “não entrega” dentro do escopo específico da DeltaDeFi e reforça capacidade de engenharia, qualidade de documentação e habilidade de publicar artefatos públicos.

Além disso, a equipe (SIDAN Lab) tem histórico mais amplo de participação no Catalyst e em iniciativas do ecossistema, com outras entregas e contribuições além das duas propostas diretamente ligadas à DeltaDeFi.

Reputação em tooling (Mesh e padrões de documentação)

A equipe tem forte reputação técnica no ecossistema, incluindo contribuições relevantes em tooling para desenvolvedores (ex.: Mesh)

GOVERNANCE ACTION REPORT [EN]

1. Introduction

This proposal submits Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4 as a constitutional amendment. It removes non-binding “expectations” and “encouragement” clauses, eliminates the Budget Info Action mechanism, and removes the constitutional obligation to create a CC Code of Conduct, with the stated goal of simplifying governance and removing redundant mechanisms. It also unifies terminology and adds definitions (e.g., Active Voting Stake, DRep, SPO, Net Change Limit, Treasury Withdrawal Recipient) to reduce ambiguity.
In addition, it strengthens formal requirements for governance actions by requiring that any document hosted via URL be immutable, ensuring proposals cannot be altered after submission. After the removal of the Budget Info Action, accountability requirements are shifted into Treasury Withdrawals, including audit and oversight safeguards. In the transition from v2.3 to v2.4, three specific wording changes are reverted back to the v1.0 wording following formal objections raised by EMURGO.

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2. Governance Action Analysis

Positive aspects

There is no principled objection to several substantive elements, including the removal of the Budget Info Action. The position here is pragmatic: if budgeting via Info Action is primarily meant for signaling and coordination, that can be handled more efficiently off-chain (e.g., via Ekklesia), while accountability requirements should be concentrated where execution actually occurs, namely in Treasury Withdrawals. On this specific point, the direction is acceptable and desirable.
Support is also given to the requirement that proposal documents hosted via URL must be immutable, as this protects proposal integrity, prevents post-submission tampering, and strengthens trust in the governance process.

Negative aspects

For a constitutional amendment with high institutional impact, the minimum requirement is not “good intentions” or a well-written summary, but auditable comparability between versions. When attempting a manual verification of Constitution v1.0 against v2.4, a serious issue became evident in the supporting material: the v1.0 → v2.4 diff/check file is misaligned and confusing, with sections out of order and enough editorial noise to make identical passages appear as additions/removals. This defeats the primary purpose of a diff, which is to enable dReps to assess the real scope of changes quickly and accurately.
From Article 3 onward in the original text, the changes appear even more substantial: rewrites, deletions, and structural rearrangements, which would normally increase the need for a high-quality diff. However, the current materials do not support responsible due diligence.

Risks and concerns

A clear institutional risk is created: erroneous decisions driven by poor auditability, and incentives for shortcuts (heuristics, reliance on third parties, voting by fatigue). This risk is amplified by a recurring accountability gap in the ecosystem, with many votes lacking rationale and rationales that are often superficial when present.
There is also a methodological problem: editorial changes (grammar/style/formatting) were bundled together with conceptual changes. In a constitutional text, this packaging dramatically increases review complexity, reduces scanability, and raises the likelihood that important changes slip through. The expected standard would be to clearly separate cosmetic edits from substantive amendments, with section-by-section documentation and explicit mapping of moved blocks.

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3. Vote and Rationale

Vote: NO.
A constitutional amendment cannot be endorsed under a process where the core comparability artifact (the v1.0 → v2.4 diff) fails. The vote is NO on methodology and auditability grounds.

Reconsideration (a potential YES) would be conditional on a re-submission that meets minimum verification standards, including: (1) canonical text versions with stable structure, (2) a section-by-section diff with anchors and moved-block detection, (3) explicit separation of editorial vs conceptual changes, and (4) a granular, verifiable changelog. Without this, transparency, adequate scrutiny, and responsible decision-making cannot be assured.

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4. Conclusion

The vote is NO due to methodology and auditability failure: comparability between v1.0 and v2.4 is not verifiable with the provided materials. The substance includes acceptable directions, but there is no operational basis to endorse a constitutional amendment without a reliable, verifiable diff.

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RELATÓRIO DE AÇÃO DE GOVERNANÇA [PT]

1. Introdução

A proposta submete a Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4 como emenda constitucional. O texto remove cláusulas não vinculantes de “expectations” e “encouragements”, elimina o mecanismo de Budget Info Action e remove a obrigação constitucional de criação de um CC Code of Conduct, com a justificativa de simplificação de governança e redução de mecanismos redundantes. Também consolida terminologia e adiciona definições (ex.: Active Voting Stake, DRep, SPO, Net Change Limit, Treasury Withdrawal Recipient), buscando reduzir ambiguidades.
Além disso, reforça requisitos formais para ações de governança ao exigir que o documento hospedado via URL seja imutável, garantindo que propostas não possam ser alteradas após submissão. Após a remoção do Budget Info Action, requisitos de accountability são deslocados para o contexto de Treasury Withdrawals, incluindo salvaguardas de auditoria e supervisão. Na transição de v2.3 para v2.4, três mudanças específicas de redação são revertidas para o wording da v1.0 após objeções formais da EMURGO.

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2. Análise da Ação de Governança

Aspectos positivos

Não há objeção de princípio a aspectos relevantes do conteúdo, incluindo a remoção do Budget Info Action. A posição aqui é pragmática: se o objetivo do budgeting via Info Action é principalmente sinalização e coordenação, isso pode ser tratado com maior eficiência off-chain (por exemplo, via Ekklesia), enquanto requisitos de accountability devem ficar concentrados onde a execução ocorre, isto é, em Treasury Withdrawals. Nesse ponto específico, a direção é aceitável e desejável.
Há também apoio ao requisito de que documentos de proposta hospedados via URL sejam imutáveis, pois isso protege a integridade das propostas, previne alterações após a submissão e fortalece a confiança no processo de governança.

Aspectos negativos

Para uma emenda constitucional com alto impacto institucional, o requisito mínimo não é “boa intenção” ou um resumo bem escrito, mas comparabilidade auditável entre versões. Ao tentar uma verificação manual da Constituição v1.0 contra a v2.4, tornou-se evidente um problema sério no material de apoio: o arquivo de diff/check v1.0 → v2.4 está desalinhado e confuso, com seções fora de ordem e ruído editorial suficiente para fazer passagens idênticas parecerem adições/remoções. Isso frustra a finalidade do diff, que é permitir avaliação rápida e acurada do escopo real das mudanças.
A partir do Artigo 3 em diante no texto original, mudanças parecem ainda mais substanciais (reescritas, deleções e rearranjos estruturais), o que aumenta a necessidade de um diff de alta qualidade. Porém, os materiais atuais não sustentam due diligence responsável.

Riscos e preocupações

Há um risco institucional claro: decisões errôneas motivadas por baixa auditabilidade e incentivos a atalhos (heurísticas, dependência de terceiros, voto por fadiga). Esse risco é amplificado por uma lacuna recorrente de accountability no ecossistema, com muitos votos sem justificativa e justificativas frequentemente superficiais quando existem.
Há também um problema metodológico: mudanças editoriais (gramática/estilo/formatação) foram empacotadas junto com mudanças conceituais. Em texto constitucional, isso aumenta dramaticamente a complexidade de revisão, reduz a scanability e eleva a probabilidade de que mudanças importantes passem despercebidas. O padrão esperado seria separar claramente ajustes cosméticos de emendas substantivas, com documentação seção a seção e mapeamento explícito de blocos movidos.

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3. Voto e Justificativa

Voto: NO.
Uma emenda constitucional não pode ser endossada sob um processo em que o artefato central de comparabilidade (o diff v1.0 → v2.4) falha. O voto é NO por metodologia e auditabilidade.
Uma reconsideração (potencial YES) fica condicionada a uma re-submissão que atenda padrões mínimos de verificação, incluindo: (1) versões canônicas do texto com estrutura estável, (2) diff seção a seção com âncoras e detecção de blocos movidos, (3) separação explícita de mudanças editoriais versus conceituais, e (4) changelog granular e verificável. Sem isso, transparência, escrutínio adequado e decisão responsável não podem ser assegurados.

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4. Conclusão

O voto é NO por falha de metodologia e auditabilidade: a comparabilidade entre v1.0 e v2.4 não é verificável com o material fornecido. A substância inclui direções aceitáveis, mas não há base operacional para endossar uma emenda constitucional sem um diff confiável e verificável.

GOVERNANCE ACTION REVIEW [EN]

UPSIDES

• The importance of a shared vision and strategic orientation for a highly decentralized ecosystem is recognized. The pillar set, in its general formulation, is treated as essential, relevant, and broadly aligned with the core areas of the ecosystem, without an explicit major domain being relegated to a secondary or neglected position.

• A broad feedback process is acknowledged, including multiple workshops held across different regions, with workshop inputs largely reflected in the final output. A relatively mature strategic definition process is supported, with refinement prioritized over refoundation, and the overall effort treated as fundamentally positive.

• Workshop macro-alignment is noted across core themes such as infrastructure/security, adoption/UX, governance, ecosystem growth, and economic sustainability.

• During the first year of Cardano on-chain governance, there was a severe funding bottleneck for small teams, small builders, and emerging contributors. In practice, the vast majority of treasury resources were allocated to founding entities and large, consolidated actors, while smaller initiatives faced extremely limited access to funding.

• This was amplified by a governance posture where many dReps prioritized what was labeled as “core” work without sufficient pushback against multi-million-ADA budget requests that lacked acceptable levels of detail, KPIs, or accountability criteria. The systemic effect is damaging: it signals permissiveness toward established actors while eroding trust among small and mid-sized contributors who lack political leverage, visibility, or social capital.

• This is especially concerning in an ecosystem that does not benefit from strong Venture Capitals/private investment backing. The treasury is therefore a critical instrument for decentralized innovation. Yet rising bureaucratic barriers (high deposits to submit Governance Actions, complex budgeting processes (e.g., Ekklesia), and popularity-driven dynamics) further excluded competent but less visible teams. The outcome was frustration, disengagement, and, ultimately, brain drain, precisely when the ecosystem should be attracting and retaining talent.

• For this reason, I welcome the explicit inclusion of incubators, accelerators, grants, and community programs in the Vision 2030 text. Without these mechanisms functioning effectively, governance risks becoming formally decentralized but materially concentrated.

DOWNSIDES

• Blockchain space is a highly dynamic environment due to narratives, macro conditions, regulation, and technological paradigms, making evolving priorities and revisions reasonable expectations.

• While the pillars can function as high-level strategic guidance, the current framework, including KPI design, target-setting approach, governance parameters, and supporting accountability mechanisms, remains insufficient to create the pressure, accountability, and institutional discipline required over a five-year horizon.

• The proposed KPI set is treated as insufficient given the scope and systemic relevance of the 2030 framework. Metrics such as USD-denominated TVL, address-based MAU, and raw transaction counts are treated as highly sensitive to market cycles, speculative inflows, technical artifacts, and non-human activity, allowing targets to be met without corresponding structural improvement in adoption, real utility, ecosystem quality, or user experience.

• The acknowledgment that more granular and actionable KPIs are expected in 2026 is treated as positive but insufficient to justify approving under-specified instrumentation at this stage, given the signaling power and intended five-year reference role.

• Several workshop-raised areas are treated as not explicitly articulated, increasing execution risk through deprioritization of implicit topics. Accountability, quality assurance, and reputation systems are treated as notably under-reflected despite explicit workshop discussion. Alternative voting models discussed as mechanisms to address plutocracy and perceived fairness are treated as lacking observable instrumentation.

• The absence of any meaningful framing for AI (Artificial Intelligence) in the Vision 2030 is concerning. For a cutting-edge technology project articulated in 2025, this omission is difficult to justify. AI is not a buzzword; it is a transversal capability that can materially improve productivity, coordination in decentralized systems, developer tooling, onboarding, security monitoring, and execution quality. AI could be used as an assiting tool to every single pillar described on the stratgic plan for 2030.

• The lack of even a minimal strategic framing for AI, including principles and boundaries, is therefore a notable downside.

RISKS AND CONCERNS

• Accountability, audit, quality assurance, delivery performance, historical track record, and reputation systems for proposers, executors, and governance actors are treated as missing strategic priorities, weakening ex-post evaluation, consequences, and institutional learning. Without mechanisms and metrics capturing quality, execution reliability, and long-term performance, macro-level KPIs risk remaining aspirational rather than operational.

• Treasury Withdrawal practice in 2025 included dozens of approvals with weak cost definitions, generic or absent KPIs, and poor ex-ante and ex-post criteria. In that context, a small number of ecosystem-wide KPIs are insufficient to create systemic pressure for proposal-level rigor. System-level KPIs are non-substitutes for mandatory minimum standards on cost breakdowns, milestones, outcome metrics, and auditability.

• The governance decentralization KPI targeting 50% + 1 of effective voting power being controlled by more than 22 dReps is a minimal anti-collusion threshold rather than a meaningful decentralization objective, setting a low bar that can be satisfied without substantial improvement in stake dispersion or governance pluralism. Limited incentive is created for broader delegation, emergence of new influential dReps, or reduction of concentration beyond a narrow safety margin.

• Treasury funding concentration per entities/groups and development decentralization are insufficiently instrumented. Thresholds limiting treasury funding concentration by a single entity or related group are absent, alongside metrics evaluating decentralization of development and execution. A “two or more nodes” diversity measure is insufficient to mitigate systemic risk; development decentralization, executor diversity, and funding dispersion are requiring explicit instrumentation.

• A five-year horizon is incompatible with weak and sparse KPIs amid observed treasury withdrawal pace and limited replenishment mechanisms, increasing the risk of institutional complacency. A longer horizon require stronger targets, more granular instrumentation, and periodic recalibration.

• A funding bottleneck for small teams and emerging contributors is relevant risk, with the practical effect of allocating most treasury resources to founding entities and consolidated actors while smaller initiatives face limited access.

• Bureaucratic barriers (high deposits to submit Governance Actions, complex budgeting processes, popularity-driven dynamics) are exclusionary pressures that can drive frustration, disengagement, and brain drain, especially in an ecosystem without strong VC backing, undermining material decentralization even when formal decentralization exists.

VOTE RATIONALE

A shared vision and strategic orientation are supported, and the pillars are treated as broadly relevant as an organizing framework. However, the KPI set, targets, and parameters are treated as inadequate as a five-year reference for governance and resource allocation.

Market-sensitive metrics (USD-denominated TVL, address-based MAU, raw transaction counts) are vulnerable to vanity outcomes and capable of being satisfied without structural improvement in adoption, real utility, ecosystem quality, or user experience.

Accountability, auditability, execution quality, delivery performance, and reputation systems are insufficiently prioritized, despite being raised in workshops. System-level KPIs are non-substitutes for minimum proposal-level standards for Treasury Withdrawals (cost breakdowns, milestones, outcome metrics, ex-ante and ex-post evaluation criteria).

Governance decentralization instrumentation is weak and poorly suited to incentivize real decentralization, while funding concentration and development decentralization remain insufficiently instrumented.

A vote change to YES is conditioned on a revised version that adds more KPIs per pillar and sub-items; strengthens and normalizes targets (e.g., TVL in ADA and/or TVL/market cap); reinforces minimum standards for Treasury Withdrawals; and introduces explicit anti-concentration thresholds for treasury funding plus accountability, reputation, execution-quality, and development-decentralization metrics.

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REVISÃO DE AÇÃO DE GOVERNANÇA [PT]

PONTOS POSITIVOS

• Reconhece-se a importância de uma visão compartilhada e de uma orientação estratégica para um ecossistema altamente descentralizado. O conjunto de pilares, em sua formulação geral, é tratado como essencial, relevante e amplamente alinhado às áreas centrais do ecossistema, sem que um domínio principal seja explicitamente rebaixado a uma posição secundária ou negligenciada.

• Reconhece-se um processo amplo de coleta de feedback, incluindo múltiplos workshops realizados em diferentes regiões, com insumos desses workshops em grande parte refletidos no resultado final. Apoia-se um processo relativamente maduro de definição estratégica, com priorização de refinamento em vez de refundação, e o esforço geral é tratado como fundamentalmente positivo.

• Nota-se um macroalinhamento dos workshops em torno de temas centrais como infraestrutura/segurança, adoção/UX, governança, crescimento do ecossistema e sustentabilidade econômica.

• Durante o primeiro ano da governança on-chain da Cardano, houve um gargalo severo de financiamento para equipes pequenas, pequenos builders e contribuidores emergentes. Na prática, a vasta maioria dos recursos do tesouro foi alocada a entidades fundadoras e atores grandes e consolidados, enquanto iniciativas menores enfrentaram acesso extremamente limitado a financiamento.

• Isso foi amplificado por uma postura de governança em que muitos dReps priorizaram o que foi rotulado como trabalho “core” sem contraposição suficiente a pedidos de orçamento de múltiplos milhões de ADA que careciam de níveis aceitáveis de detalhamento, KPIs ou critérios de accountability. O efeito sistêmico é danoso: sinaliza permissividade com atores estabelecidos enquanto corrói a confiança de contribuidores pequenos e médios que não têm alavancagem política, visibilidade ou capital social.

• Isso é especialmente preocupante em um ecossistema que não se beneficia de forte suporte de Venture Capitals/investimento privado. O tesouro é, portanto, um instrumento crítico para inovação descentralizada. Ainda assim, o aumento de barreiras burocráticas (depósitos altos para submeter Governance Actions, processos complexos de orçamento, por exemplo Ekklesia, e dinâmicas orientadas por popularidade) excluiu ainda mais equipes competentes porém menos visíveis. O resultado foi frustração, desengajamento e, por fim, fuga de cérebros, exatamente quando o ecossistema deveria estar atraindo e retendo talentos.

• Por esse motivo, acolhe-se a inclusão explícita de incubadoras, aceleradoras, grants e programas comunitários no texto da Vision 2030. Sem esses mecanismos funcionando de forma efetiva, a governança corre o risco de se tornar formalmente descentralizada, mas materialmente concentrada.

PONTOS NEGATIVOS

• O espaço blockchain é um ambiente altamente dinâmico devido a narrativas, condições macroeconômicas, regulação e paradigmas tecnológicos, tornando prioridades evolutivas e revisões expectativas razoáveis.

• Embora os pilares possam funcionar como orientação estratégica de alto nível, o framework atual, incluindo desenho de KPIs, abordagem de definição de metas, parâmetros de governança e mecanismos de accountability de suporte, permanece insuficiente para criar a pressão, a responsabilização e a disciplina institucional requeridas ao longo de um horizonte de cinco anos.

• O conjunto proposto de KPIs é tratado como insuficiente dada a abrangência e a relevância sistêmica do framework 2030. Métricas como TVL denominado em USD, MAU baseado em endereços e contagens brutas de transações são tratadas como altamente sensíveis a ciclos de mercado, entradas especulativas, artefatos técnicos e atividade não-humana, permitindo que metas sejam atingidas sem melhoria estrutural correspondente em adoção, utilidade real, qualidade do ecossistema ou experiência do usuário.

• O reconhecimento de que KPIs mais granulares e acionáveis são esperados em 2026 é tratado como positivo, mas insuficiente para justificar a aprovação de instrumentação subespecificada neste estágio, dado o poder de sinalização e o papel pretendido como referência de cinco anos.

• Diversas áreas levantadas nos workshops são tratadas como não explicitamente articuladas, aumentando o risco de execução por despriorização de tópicos implícitos. Accountability, garantia de qualidade e sistemas de reputação são tratados como sub-refletidos de forma notável, apesar de discussão explícita nos workshops. Modelos alternativos de votação discutidos como mecanismos para lidar com plutocracia e percepção de justiça são tratados como carentes de instrumentação observável.

• A ausência de qualquer enquadramento minimamente significativo para IA (Inteligência Artificial) na Vision 2030 é preocupante. Para um projeto de tecnologia de ponta articulado em 2025, essa omissão é difícil de justificar. IA não é buzzword; é uma capacidade transversal que pode melhorar materialmente produtividade, coordenação em sistemas descentralizados, ferramental para desenvolvedores, onboarding, monitoramento de segurança e qualidade de execução. IA poderia ser usada como ferramenta de apoio a cada pilar descrito no plano estratégico para 2030.

• A falta de sequer um enquadramento estratégico mínimo para IA, incluindo princípios e limites, é, portanto, um ponto negativo relevante.

RISCOS E PREOCUPAÇÕES

• Accountability, auditoria, garantia de qualidade, desempenho de entrega, histórico de execução e sistemas de reputação para proponentes, executores e atores de governança são tratados como prioridades estratégicas ausentes, enfraquecendo avaliação ex-post, consequências e aprendizado institucional. Sem mecanismos e métricas que capturem qualidade, confiabilidade de execução e desempenho de longo prazo, KPIs macro correm o risco de permanecer aspiracionais, em vez de operacionais.

• A prática de Treasury Withdrawals em 2025 incluiu dezenas de aprovações com definições de custo fracas, KPIs genéricos ou ausentes e critérios ex-ante e ex-post deficientes. Nesse contexto, um pequeno número de KPIs de nível ecossistêmico é insuficiente para criar pressão sistêmica por rigor no nível das propostas. KPIs sistêmicos não substituem padrões mínimos obrigatórios para detalhamento de custos, marcos, métricas de resultado e auditabilidade.

• O KPI de descentralização de governança que mira 50% + 1 do poder efetivo de voto controlado por mais de 22 dReps é um limiar mínimo anti-conluio, e não um objetivo significativo de descentralização, estabelecendo um patamar baixo que pode ser satisfeito sem melhora substancial em dispersão de stake ou pluralismo de governança. Cria-se pouco incentivo para delegação mais ampla, surgimento de novos dReps influentes ou redução de concentração além de uma margem estreita de segurança.

• A concentração de funding do tesouro por entidades/grupos e a descentralização do desenvolvimento estão insuficientemente instrumentadas. Ausentam-se limiares que limitem a concentração de funding do tesouro por uma única entidade ou grupo relacionado, assim como métricas que avaliem descentralização de desenvolvimento e execução. Uma medida de diversidade “dois ou mais nós” é insuficiente para mitigar risco sistêmico; descentralização de desenvolvimento, diversidade de executores e dispersão de funding exigem instrumentação explícita.

• Um horizonte de cinco anos é incompatível com KPIs fracos e esparsos diante do ritmo observado de retiradas do tesouro e de mecanismos limitados de reposição, aumentando o risco de complacência institucional. Um horizonte mais longo requer metas mais fortes, instrumentação mais granular e recalibração periódica.

• Um gargalo de financiamento para equipes pequenas e contribuidores emergentes é um risco relevante, com o efeito prático de alocar a maior parte dos recursos do tesouro a entidades fundadoras e atores consolidados, enquanto iniciativas menores enfrentam acesso limitado.

• Barreiras burocráticas (depósitos altos para submeter Governance Actions, processos complexos de orçamento, dinâmicas orientadas por popularidade) são pressões excludentes que podem gerar frustração, desengajamento e fuga de cérebros, especialmente em um ecossistema sem forte suporte de VC, minando a descentralização material mesmo quando existe descentralização formal.

JUSTIFICATIVA DO VOTO

Uma visão compartilhada e uma orientação estratégica são apoiadas, e os pilares são tratados como amplamente relevantes como framework organizador. No entanto, o conjunto de KPIs, metas e parâmetros é tratado como inadequado como referência de cinco anos para governança e alocação de recursos.

Métricas sensíveis ao mercado (TVL denominado em USD, MAU baseado em endereços, contagens brutas de transações) são vulneráveis a resultados de vaidade e podem ser satisfeitas sem melhoria estrutural em adoção, utilidade real, qualidade do ecossistema ou experiência do usuário.

Accountability, auditabilidade, qualidade de execução, desempenho de entrega e sistemas de reputação são insuficientemente priorizados, apesar de terem sido levantados nos workshops. KPIs sistêmicos não substituem padrões mínimos no nível de proposta para Treasury Withdrawals (detalhamento de custos, marcos, métricas de resultado, critérios de avaliação ex-ante e ex-post).

A instrumentação de descentralização de governança é fraca e pouco adequada para incentivar descentralização real, enquanto concentração de funding e descentralização do desenvolvimento permanecem insuficientemente instrumentadas.

Uma mudança de voto para YES fica condicionada a uma versão revisada que: adicione mais KPIs por pilar e subitens; fortaleça e normalize metas (por exemplo, TVL em ADA e/ou TVL/market cap); reforce padrões mínimos para Treasury Withdrawals; e introduza limiares explícitos anti-concentração para funding do tesouro, além de métricas de accountability, reputação,

[EN] Abstaining on the ₳70M TWGA for Critical Integrations, despite promising impact and strategic union of founding entities (positive balance to rivalries). Signaling for greater budget rigor, efficient resource use, robust KPIs for treasury best practices, and ensured commitment.

[PT] Abstendo-me na TWGA de ₳70M para Integrações Críticas, apesar do impacto promissor e união estratégica das entidades fundadoras (balanço positivo às rixas). Pressiono por mais rigor na descrição orçamentária, uso eficiente de recursos e KPIs robustos para boas práticas no tesouro e compromisso.

[EN] approve the 2025 NCL extension as it keeps the 350M ADA spending cap unchanged. It's just a minor 8-epoch time shift to fit open governance actions and prevent disruptions—given the CC seat reelection and recess period. Not extending could lead to greater downsides.

[PT]Aprovo a extensão do NCL 2025, pois mantém o teto de 350M ADA intacto. É apenas um ajuste temporal de 8 epochs para alinhar ações de governança abertas, evitando disrupções – especialmente com a reeleição de um assento no CC e o recesso atual. Não estender traria mais riscos.

Crucial to maintain governance layer functional.

📋 Evaluation Checklist — Cardano Builder DAO (₳12M)

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1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality → ✅ Yes

Evidence:

“This proposal seeks to address the lack of dedicated, sustainable financial support and strategic oversight for functioning dApps that drive real usage, transaction volume, and Total Value Locked (TVL) on the Cardano blockchain.”

Context:
The proposal focuses on sustaining active dApps with direct impact on adoption and network usage — a gap not currently addressed by Project Catalyst or infrastructure committees.
Its uniqueness is strategically important: Cardano’s funding model has been heavily centralized around Catalyst for almost five years, with no comparable ecosystem-wide grant mechanism for post-launch projects. Redundancy in grant programs and the absence of alternative funding channels represent a critical gap to be filled.
This is further amplified by Cardano’s weaker access to venture capital compared to other top-10 blockchains like Ethereum and Solana, making the treasury and alternative grant programs even more important for sustaining and expanding the application layer.

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2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail → 🟡 Partial

Evidence:

“$5.79M (11,580,000 ADA) — to direct project funding… $210K (420,000 ADA) — to DAO operational overhead.”
Overhead breakdown:

• $50,000 (₳ 100,000) — Board member compensation (part-time stipends for 3–7 elected board members)
• $60,000 (₳ 120,000) — Legal & compliance (creation/maintenance of DUNA, contracts, legal consultancy, KYB oversight)
• $50,000 (₳ 100,000) — Service contracts (technical consultants, accounting, critical providers)
• $80,000 (₳ 160,000) — Infrastructure & tooling (hosting, storage, analytics, dashboards, daily technical coordination)
• $20,000 (₳ 40,000) — Contingency reserve (unforeseen operational needs)

Context:
While the operational overhead is itemized at a high level, it is not granular enough given the size of the request. There is no breakdown by man-hours, hourly rates, or detailed scope for each category. The range of “3–7 board members” without clear workload expectations prevents assessment of compensation fairness. Infrastructure costs are aggregated without unit pricing (e.g., GB/month, traffic volume). Service contracts are vague and not tied to specific deliverables.

The ₳5.79M project funding allocation is presented as a lump sum without recipient-level breakdown, prioritization methodology, or cost-per-output estimates. For an ask of this magnitude, a granular budget with justifications would be expected.

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3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers → ❌ No

Evidence:

“Projects must publicly report KPIs such as… transaction volume, user activity, and development contributions.”

Context:
The DAO will require funded projects to report KPIs, but the proposal does not define quantifiable KPIs, baselines, or target thresholds for its own performance. Without DAO-level metrics, it will be difficult to evaluate the systemic impact of allocating ₳12M to this mechanism.

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4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables → 🟡 Partial

Evidence:

“Initial Member Onboarding… Board Election… Legal Entity Formation… DAO Launch… First Funding Cycle Execution… KPI Impact Reports…”

Context:
The roadmap lists sequential milestones and broad timelines, but there are no explicit acceptance criteria for deliverables, no independent verification process, and no contingency plan if milestones are delayed or under-deliver. KPI reporting is mentioned but without a defined methodology for validation, and no baseline is provided for comparison.

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5️⃣ Internal Consistency → ✅ Yes

Evidence:

“$6M USD (12,000,000 ADA)… ADA price assumption $0.50.”

Context:
Figures are consistent across sections; minor differences are explained by inclusion or exclusion of overhead in totals.

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6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record → 🟡 Partial

Evidence:

“Our team… building and maintaining Clarity… smart contracts have governed over $10 million in TVL… used by four DAOs.”
Coalition members include: NMKR, ADA Handle, Dex Hunter, Flux Point Studios, Tap Tools, Wanchain, NFTCDN.io, Vespr, Tokeo, Xerberus, Minswap, Indigo, Iagon, Clarity.

Context:
The participating teams include several projects with strong reputations and robust delivery histories. However, the proposal does not provide names of individual members or team leads for each development area. This absence of personal-level identification creates uncertainty in the evaluation and reduces the ability to assess individual accountability within the DAO’s operations.

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7️⃣ Conflict of Interest → ✅ No material COI identified

Context:
No disclosed relationships that would materially compromise impartial evaluation.

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📌 Critical Summary

The Cardano Builder DAO seeks ₳12M to establish a smart contract-governed funding mechanism for high-impact, live dApps. It builds on existing audited infrastructure (Agora, Clarity) and is supported by a coalition of major Cardano ecosystem players.

Strengths:

• Addresses a real, long-standing funding gap in Cardano’s ecosystem.
• High strategic value given Cardano’s over-reliance on Catalyst and lack of VC-level support compared to other top-10 chains.
• Team with proven governance infrastructure and operational capability.
• Transparent on-chain treasury with unused funds returned to the Treasury.

Weaknesses:

1. Budget transparency: Overhead categories are too broad for the amounts requested, lacking man-hour estimates, hourly rates, or detailed scope. Project funding allocation (₳5.79M) has no per-recipient breakdown or prioritization criteria.
2. KPIs: No DAO-level quantifiable KPIs or baselines to assess success.
3. Milestones: Lacks acceptance criteria, independent validation, and contingency measures.
4. Team detail: No disclosure of individual members or leads for key operational areas.
5. Risk concentration: Without transparent allocation rules, funds could disproportionately benefit established incumbents.

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🗳 Voting Recommendation: ABSTAIN

Rationale:
The proposal is strategically relevant for diversifying Cardano’s funding mechanisms beyond Catalyst, especially given the ecosystem’s VC scarcity. The DAO framework is credible and the team has relevant experience. However, approval should be paired with strict oversight to ensure:

• A granular budget with justifications is implemented before fund disbursement.
• DAO-level KPIs and baselines are defined.
• Clear allocation criteria for the ₳5.79M in project funding are published.
• Named accountability for individuals in key roles is provided.

Suggested on-chain note:
“Supports diversification of funding beyond Catalyst — strategically important in a VC-scarce environment. Concerns: lacks DAO-level KPIs, detailed budget granularity, individual accountability, and transparent project allocation. Full rationale available on GitHub.”

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

This vote was submitted based on a completed checklist. A detailed rationale is available at:
👉 https://github.com/Agora-Cardano

🧭 Evaluation Methodology and Rationale

Given the unprecedented volume and technical depth of the 39 Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions submitted in this cycle, a comprehensive, proposal-by-proposal audit of budgets, scopes, and implementation frameworks would demand a level of time and resourcing incompatible with the available review window.

Rather than abstaining from participation, I adopted a hybrid evaluation methodology that combines AI-assisted content parsing with structured human analysis. This standardized checklist framework was designed to streamline high-volume assessment while preserving critical reasoning, contextual understanding, and value-based judgment.

All final decisions reflect deliberate human oversight — AI outputs serve to accelerate comprehension and comparison, but no vote is cast without manual review and a principled assessment of relevance, feasibility, and accountability.

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📋 Checklist Criteria Explained

Each proposal is evaluated across seven standardized dimensions using a three-point scale:
✅ Yes — fully meets the criterion
🟡 Partial — partially meets the criterion
❌ No — does not meet the criterion

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality

Does the proposal address a critical function within Cardano, or is it peripheral or redundant?
This criterion assesses the strategic relevance of the initiative. Proposals should contribute meaningfully to Cardano’s infrastructure, decentralization, usability, or long-term resilience. Initiatives that duplicate existing efforts or lack demonstrable alignment with ecosystem priorities may score lower.

2️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers

Does the proposal define measurable success indicators or quantifiable outcomes?
This includes Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), numerical targets, milestones with metrics, or other tangible proxies of progress. The absence of quantifiable measures introduces uncertainty around potential impact and limits effective performance tracking.

3️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables

Are there clear, time-bound milestones with verifiable deliverables and acceptance criteria?
Effective proposals define not only what will be delivered, but also when and how success will be verified. This enables staged disbursement, delivery monitoring, and community oversight. Lack of milestone clarity may indicate execution risk.

4️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record

Is the proposing team clearly identified, with relevant expertise and a verifiable delivery history?
This criterion evaluates the transparency and credibility of the individuals or organizations responsible for delivery. Established contributors with proven ecosystem involvement are preferred. Anonymous or unvetted teams may raise accountability concerns.

5️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail

Is the budget transparently structured, with clear categories, amounts, and justification?
A strong proposal includes itemized costs (e.g., per workstream, staff role, tooling), explains the rationale behind budget allocations, and clarifies estimation methods. Lack of detail in budget structure reduces transparency and erodes confidence in treasury stewardship.

6️⃣ Internal Consistency

Are the on-chain metadata, proposal content, and budget details aligned?
Consistency across all proposal components — including funding amounts, receiving addresses, project scope, and references — is essential. Misalignment creates confusion, undermines credibility, and may signal governance process weaknesses.

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest

Does this proposal present a potential conflict of interest that could compromise the impartiality of the evaluation?
To preserve the integrity of the voting process, any proposal in which I (as evaluator) hold a significant, non-marginal conflict of interest will be automatically met with an ABSTAIN vote. Minor or indirect associations are disclosed where relevant, but only material conflicts — such as direct financial involvement, employment, or formal partnership — trigger abstention. This ensures all evaluations remain transparent, independent, and in service of the broader Cardano community.

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🗳 Governance Action Evaluation – Final Review

Proposal: Withdraw ₳220,914 for Pallas – Sustaining Critical Rust Tooling for Cardano
Vendor: TxPipe (administered by Intersect)
Type: Treasury Withdrawal
Requested Amount: ₳220,914
Governance Action ID: gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlqghuqg03

---

📋 Evaluation Checklist

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality

🟡 Partial

Proposal excerpt:

“Currently in its early stages, UTxO RPC is already being adopted by key projects in the Cardano ecosystem, including Lace, Mesh, Amaru, and many others.”

Critical analysis:
While the proposal claims UTxO RPC is being adopted by "many projects," only three are explicitly named: Lace (IOG), Mesh, and Amaru. I could not find any public evidence of adoption by independent or community-driven wallets such as Eternl, Nami, Typhon, Flint, or Yoroi.

The tool remains in an early phase, and although its goal of RPC standardization is valuable, it does not yet represent a critical dependency for the broader Cardano ecosystem.

Decision:
Given the experimental nature of the project and its limited adoption, I am casting an neutral evaluation on this criterion. Funding decisions for infrastructure of this kind should be made when clearer technical consensus or broader multi-party adoption is demonstrated.

---

2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail

✅ Yes

“0.5 FTE Blockchain Developer for 12 months = $99,412 = ₳165,686”
“0.125 FTE Tech Lead for 12 months = $33,137 = ₳55,228”

The proposal provides a clear labor-based cost breakdown using daily rates and FTE percentages. The rate of $825/day for the developer and $1,100/day for the tech lead are slightly above market averages, but within reason for experienced Rust-based infrastructure work in the Web3 space.

No other cost categories (infrastructure, security, support, etc.) are included — all work is expected to be delivered via internal labor. There is no per-task hour allocation, but the transparency in rate calculations offsets this gap for a proposal of limited complexity.

---

3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers

❌ No

Evidence:
No quantifiable KPIs, metrics, or output volume estimates are provided. For example, there is no mention of:

• Expected number of SDK improvements
• Number of ecosystem integrations to be supported
• Performance benchmarks
• GitHub activity milestones
• Documentation output

Analysis:
The proposal leans on qualitative impact ("simplify integrations", "support developers") without grounding these in verifiable or measurable outcomes. This limits the ability to monitor success.

---

4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables

🟡 Partial

Evidence:

“All milestones, acceptance criteria, payment amounts and expected delivery dates will be agreed between the Vendor and Intersect, acting on behalf of the CDH.”
“Acceptance of the above work is expected to be supported by a 3rd Party Assurer…”

Analysis:
While the proposal asserts that milestones will exist and be governed via legal contract and third-party assurance, no concrete milestones, acceptance criteria or deliverables are defined within the on-chain proposal itself. This defers clarity to a future contract. The structure is present, but the content is not.

---

5️⃣ Internal Consistency

✅ Yes

Evidence:

• Requested amount: ₳220,914
• Governance Action references the broader ₳275M budget ratified in gov_action1u9x73...
• Disbursement mechanism, smart contract address, and metadata anchor are aligned.

Analysis:
No discrepancies found between declared scope, metadata, disbursement mechanism, and broader budget structure.

---

6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record

🟡 Partial

“TxPipe has helped develop several dApps… successfully completed several Catalyst proposals… participated in Partnerchain SDK…”

TxPipe has a strong technical reputation in Cardano. However, they are currently managing 8 active Catalyst proposals, most of which are delayed by weeks to months. This indicates possible overextension and unacknowledged bandwidth risk. The proposal does not disclose these commitments, nor does it offer any mitigation plan or delivery prioritization.

---

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest

✅ No Conflict
I have no professional or financial ties to TxPipe or Intersect.

---

🧠 Critical Summary

This proposal seeks funding to continue developing and maintaining UTxO RPC, a standardized interface for UTxO-based blockchain interaction. While the goals are promising — especially for improving developer experience and standardization — its current status does not yet justify Treasury prioritization.

Only three projects are listed as adopters. The proposal lacks broader community support, measurable KPIs, and concrete deliverables. Although the budget is clear and the team experienced, TxPipe is simultaneously handling numerous Catalyst projects, many delayed.

The governance process is meant to fund infrastructure that is strategically critical, measurably impactful, and broadly supported. This proposal does not fully meet those conditions at this time.

---

🗳 Voting Decision: ABSTAIN

This is a technically competent proposal with potential long-term value — but its current adoption, dependency level, and delivery clarity do not justify a Yes vote. I am casting an ABSTAIN vote to reflect this middle ground: supporting neither premature funding nor outright rejection, but signaling the need for greater validation, coordination, and ecosystem endorsement before future requests.

🗳 Governance Action Review

Proposal: Withdraw ₳45,217 for MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Cardano.nix
Vendor: MLabs LTD (administered by Intersect)
Governance Action ID: gov_action18nefry4qacd80xzs2srjahxm2e4vz3c8wvrr03rrtk8mdqfuknysq66459t
Submitted: 16 July 2025
Expires: 17 August 2025
Type: Treasury Withdrawal
Budget Requested: ₳45,217

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📋 Evaluation Checklist

---

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality → ✅ Yes

“Cardano.nix provides foundational toolsets for building and deploying Cardano infrastructure reproducibly using Nix.”
“Known adopters include: Input Output Global (IOG), Daedalus Wallet (IOHK), Kwarxs.”

Analysis:
Cardano.nix is already in use by key ecosystem teams. Its role as a reproducible deployment framework directly supports infrastructure reliability, onboarding, and maintenance. This is a foundational, not peripheral, component.

---

2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail → 🟡 Partial
“Estimated 260 hours total effort over 12 months. Developer Effort (Maintenance – 160 hrs): approx. $19.2k; Developer Effort (Enhancements – 100 hrs): approx. $12k; Project Management / QA Overhead: 10% or $3.1k.”

Analysis:
The budget provides a breakdown by work category and estimates a total of 260 hours. However, the effective hourly rate is $120/hour, which is on the high end even for senior-level technical contractors in open-source maintenance.

There is no justification provided for this rate, nor clarification on whether it includes embedded costs such as tooling, testing infrastructure, or indirect expenses. While the effort estimation appears internally consistent, the lack of transparency in rate composition weakens budget accountability.

In future proposals, a breakdown of cost components — e.g., developer base rate, overhead assumptions, or included indirect costs — would support better evaluation of reasonableness and comparability.

---

3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers → ❌ No

📌 “Please list any key dependencies (if any) for this proposal?”
📌 “What tangible milestones or outcomes are to be delivered and what will the community ultimately receive?”

Analysis:
The proposal outlines deliverables such as updates, bug fixes, and minor enhancements, but does not define any quantitative KPIs, success metrics, or impact benchmarks. No targets for frequency of updates, turnaround time, adoption, usage, or efficiency gains are presented.
This is a missed opportunity, especially for a tool with wide ecosystem usage. Even minimal indicators — such as number of node versions supported, update response time, or integration reach — would enhance transparency.

---

4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables → ❌ No

📌 “Duration Estimate: 12 months”
📌 “Maintenance Deliverables: Regular updates ensuring compatibility… DoD: Updates merged and tested…”
📌 “Enhancement Deliverables: … within the scope of 100 hours… DoD: Enhancement code merged, tested, documented…”
📌 “All milestones, acceptance criteria, payment amounts and expected delivery dates will be agreed between the Vendor and Intersect... within the Legal Contract.”

Analysis:
Although some technical deliverables are mentioned, there is no publicly verifiable project timeline, no milestone schedule, and no disclosure of acceptance checkpoints. The reliance on private legal contracting with Intersect to define key aspects of delivery significantly limits transparency and public accountability.

---

5️⃣ Internal Consistency → ✅ Yes

ADA request: ₳45,217
USD equivalent: $31,200 @ ₳0.69
All fields align.

Analysis:
No metadata or budget mismatches were identified.

---

6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record → ✅ Yes

“MLabs LTD is the primary developer and maintainer of Cardano.nix... with deep expertise in Nix, Cardano infra deployment... used by IOG, Daedalus.”
Social handle: @MLabs10

Analysis:
The vendor is publicly known, experienced, and trusted. Their contributions to Cardano.nix are well-established and widely adopted across the ecosystem.

In addition, MLabs has a strong delivery history within Project Catalyst, having completed 36 proposals and currently managing 8 active projects, with no significant delays reported. This reinforces their credibility and operational reliability across both infrastructure and community-funded domains.

---

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest → ✅ No Conflict Identified

No material conflicts identified. No financial, employment, or formal affiliation between the evaluator and the vendor.

---

🧾 Critical Summary

This Governance Action requests ₳45,217 to fund ongoing maintenance of Cardano.nix—a critical infrastructure tool for reproducible builds in the Cardano ecosystem. MLabs is a respected and qualified team, the budget is reasonable and clearly structured, and the technical scope is valid.

However, the proposal suffers from two major transparency gaps:

• It includes no measurable KPIs or performance metrics;
• It presents no public timeline or milestone schedule, relying entirely on private contracting.
• SOme budget items should be better detailed.

These omissions are not minor oversights — they are structural weaknesses that reflect a conscious decision to internalize accountability. As such, the proposal cannot be meaningfully audited or tracked by the community, even though it operates with public funds.

---

🟨 Voting Recommendation: ABSTAIN

🎯 Rationale:

While the technical significance and vendor credibility support a positive outlook, the lack of ex-ante accountability mechanisms — specifically KPIs, budget breakdown and public delivery timelines — makes this proposal unfit for approval without reservations.

ABSTAIN reflects the recognition of the project’s relevance while upholding a minimum standard of transparency and trackability for public funding.

🗳 Governance Action Review

Proposal: Withdraw ₳1,161,000 for zkFold ZK Rollup
Vendor: zkFold SA (administered by Intersect)
Governance Action ID: gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlqwtnrdnx
Submitted: 18 July 2025
Expires: 17 August 2025
Type: Treasury Withdrawal
Budget Requested: ₳1,161,000

---

📋 Evaluation Checklist

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality → ✅ Yes

“ZK rollups enable Cardano to process significantly more transactions per second (TPS) by bundling and verifying transactions off-chain.”
“This treasury withdrawal funds zkFold ZK Rollup which will provide the following services: … a general-purpose zero knowledge rollup solution for Cardano.”

🔍 The proposal targets a key component of Cardano’s scalability roadmap. Zero-knowledge rollups are a well-established technique to boost throughput and reduce costs, and this offering appears tailored to Cardano’s architecture.

---

2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail → ❌ No

“Budget for 12 months:
• Complete MVP: 180k $
• Integration with wallets: 100k $
• Integration with Cardano indexers: 100k $
• Aggregation server optimization: 120k $
• Client-side proving optimization: 120k $
• Tools for DApp integration: 240k $”

🔍 While top-level cost categories are presented in USD, there is no breakdown by labor, infrastructure, or tooling. Terms like “Complete MVP” or “Tools for DApp integration” are too vague to assess allocation logic. No hourly rates, and resource mapping are included.
💬 Important: Due to zkFold’s history of receiving Catalyst funding for similar technical scopes, a more granular budget is necessary to identify potential cost duplication with previous grants.

---

3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers → ❌ No

The proposal references potential impact areas (e.g. "improved scalability", "lower fees", "increased adoption") but does not include any quantifiable KPIs or success metrics.

🔍 There are no throughput targets, DApp onboarding goals, system benchmarks, or adoption milestones.
💬 Suggested examples: TPS performance goals, number of transactions handled in testnet, contracts integrated with zkFold, or number of DApps adopting the rollup over time.

---

4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables → ❌ No

“Milestones:
• Rollup documentation
• Transaction aggregation server
• Wallet API
• Indexer API
• Rollup validation logic implementation
• Toolkit for DApp integration”

🔍 While milestone titles are listed, the proposal lacks delivery timelines, success criteria, or sequencing. It’s unclear whether items are parallel or sequential, and no public checkpoints are offered.
💬 Important: zkFold has received 7 grants via Project Catalyst, with 3 completed, 1 nearing official closure, and 3 significantly delayed. This raises concerns about parallel workload management and execution feasibility for this Governance Action.

---

5️⃣ Internal Consistency → ✅ Yes

No internal contradictions were found between the proposal metadata and narrative.

---

6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record → 🟡 Partial

“The zkFold team consists of expert Haskell, Rust, and ZKP developers and Cryptographers.”
“zkFold team has successfully [been] moving towards the TestNet of our ZK Rollup.”

• zkFold is known for developing ZK-based tooling such as zkFold Symbolic, zkFold Prover Backend, and UPLC converter, using Haskell and ZKP frameworks.
• The team was featured in Cardano’s L2 expansion events and has received 7 Project
  Catalyst grants:
  • 3 completed (e.g., zkFold Symbolic, zkFold Prover Backend).
  • 1 near completion.
  • 3 are delayed by several months.
• Despite a credible technical profile, the absence of these references in the proposal diminishes evaluability and accountability.

💬 The team appears competent and Cardano-native, but the lack of direct transparency and the accumulation of unfinished Catalyst scopes introduce legitimate risk. These omissions are particularly critical when requesting treasury funds of this size.

---

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest → ✅ No

No conflict of interest identified at the time of evaluation.
If any material conflict emerges, the evaluator commits to automatic abstention under a standing policy of governance neutrality.

---

🧾 Summary and Recommendation

Summary:

This proposal by zkFold SA requests ₳1.16M to deliver a general-purpose ZK Rollup solution for Cardano. While the project aligns well with strategic priorities for Layer 2 scaling and zkFold has demonstrated past technical contributions via Catalyst, the Governance Action lacks essential information. Budget items are vague and unauditable. No KPIs or adoption targets are included. Milestones are underspecified, and the team’s execution history—while credible—is burdened by parallel delays not disclosed in the proposal.

Voting Recommendation:

❌ Vote NO

Rationale:

Strategic relevance does not override execution risk and opacity. Without clear KPIs, a traceable roadmap, or detailed costing, this treasury withdrawal poses material risk of misallocation or redundancy. High-value ZK infrastructure is vital, but it must be accompanied by strong accountability. This proposal, as written, does not meet that bar.

🧾 Governance Action Review

Proposal: Withdraw ₳700,000 for ZK Bridge
Vendor: Eryx (administered by Intersect)
Governance Action ID: gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlq77jt4x4
Submitted: 18 July 2025
Expires: 17 August 2025
Type: Treasury Withdrawal
Budget Requested: ₳700,000

---

📋 Evaluation Checklist

---

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality → ✅ Yes
Excerpt & Context:

“Cardano still lacks a secure, trustless, and modular zk-based bridge infrastructure.”
“Without a native zero-knowledge bridge, Cardano is unable to safely connect with external chains, severely limiting access to external liquidity, composability with other ecosystems, and the ability to scale horizontally.”

Analysis:
The solution is complementary, not duplicative. The proposal addresses a well-defined and critical gap in Cardano's infrastructure: the absence of a modular, trustless ZK-based bridge to enable interoperability with other blockchains. Current bridges rely on multisig or centralized validators — a clear security risk. A native ZK bridge would enhance liquidity, composability, and protocol flexibility. While other scalability initiatives like Hydra and Midgard are in development, they do not currently deliver production-ready or trustless cross-chain asset movement. This solution is strategically aligned with Cardano’s long-term ZK and interoperability roadmap.

2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail → 🟡 Partial

The proposal provides a clear, internally consistent headcount-based budget, with roles, timeframes, and ADA/USD equivalence. However, it lacks granularity: there are no work-hour estimates, and no explicit allocation for infrastructure, security, or tooling. Although documentation, workshops, and community engagement are mentioned, they appear to be bundled within the $40k PM/Ops line — with no breakdown to assess feasibility. This simplification limits transparency and makes it harder to evaluate whether key non-technical deliverables are properly resourced.

3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers → ❌ No

Excerpt & Context:

No KPIs, quantifiable targets, or measurable outcome metrics are presented in either the metadata or the attached proposal.

Analysis:
Despite strong technical articulation, the proposal fails to define quantitative metrics such as adoption targets, developer integrations, testnet deployments, or measurable liquidity effects. Absence of KPIs weakens accountability and makes it difficult to assess post-funding success. This is a critical shortcoming.

---

4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables → 🟡 Partial

Excerpt & Context:

"1. Documentation of the communication protocol
2. Bridge smart contracts in Aiken for locking funds in Cardano
3. Bridge smart contracts in Aiken for minting wrapped assets, mocking ZK proof verification
4. ZK proof of locking transaction inclusion
5. Smart contract to verify ZK proof"

Analysis:
Milestones are clear and technically sound, but lack timeline segmentation, acceptance criteria, and delivery dates. There is also no breakdown of which outputs correspond to which portion of the ₳700k. This prevents full traceability of execution. The 8-month timeline is mentioned but not linked to milestone pacing.

---

5️⃣ Internal Consistency → ✅ Yes

Excerpt & Context:

Budget in metadata = ₳700,000
Budget in PDF = ₳700,000
Legacy and current IDs match; scope and cost consistent across documents.

Analysis:
No discrepancies found. Budget, scope, authorship, and Intersect admin details are all consistent across the metadata, PDF, and description.

6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record → ✅ Yes
The proposal is submitted by Eryx, a worker-owned cooperative with a strong track record in ZK cryptography and smart contract development. Team members are named and include verified contributors to Cardano-native tooling and privacy protocols. Notably, they have successfully completed one Catalyst-funded proposal (“ZK Proof of Innocence”, ₳150k, delivered June 2025) and are currently delivering another (“API for ZK-Snark in Aiken”, ₳200k, on schedule). These demonstrate direct, recent, and relevant engagement with the Cardano ecosystem under public accountability mechanisms.

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest → ✅ No conflict
I have no personal or professional relationship with the proposer or affiliated organizations. I do not hold any financial or operational ties to Eryx, Intersect, or their related projects. Evaluation is conducted independently and impartially. Should any material conflict arise, I will abstain from voting.

⚠️ Critical Summary
This proposal presents a strategically relevant initiative for the Cardano ecosystem: the development of a modular, trustless ZK-based bridge for cross-chain interoperability. The team is technically capable, with a clear track record of relevant Catalyst-funded work and active engagement in Cardano-native tooling. The scope is well-aligned with long-term ecosystem needs, particularly as zero-knowledge technology matures.

However, the execution framework remains underdeveloped relative to the ₳700,000 requested. The proposal lacks any measurable KPIs or success metrics, and its milestone plan consists of general technical deliverables without defined acceptance criteria, delivery pacing, or linkage to payment conditions. The budget, while internally consistent, is overly simplistic. Given the lack of verifiability and outcome measurement, this proposal does not currently meet the desired level of accountability expected for large-scale treasury withdrawals.

🗳 Voting Rationale: ABSTAIN
I am abstaining from this vote due to the absence of objective KPIs, acceptance criteria, and milestone validation mechanisms. While the technical ambition is high and the team has proven credibility, the proposal lacks the accountability structures necessary to justify disbursement at this scale. At the same time, the initiative is not harmful, redundant, or misaligned with ecosystem priorities — which rules out a NO vote. Therefore, ABSTAIN is the appropriate choice under current conditions.

🗳 Governance Action Review

Proposal: Withdraw ₳26,840,000 for Input Output Research (IOR): Cardano Vision – Work Program 2025
Vendor: Input Output Research (administered by Intersect)
Governance Action ID: gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlzqhm6e8q
Submitted: 18 July 2025
Expires: 17 August 2025
Type: Treasury Withdrawal
Budget Requested: ₳26,840,000

---

📋 Evaluation Checklist

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality → ✅ Yes

“IOR aims to support research initiatives that deliver value over 3–5 years for the continued growth of the Cardano ecosystem… guided by a Strategic Research Agenda rooted in an Evidence-Based Methodology.”
“Cardano Vision is an ambitious five-year research initiative… [targeting] breakthroughs in critical technologies, including next-generation consensus protocols like Ouroboros Omega, zero-knowledge proofs, quantum-resistant cryptography…”

📌 Context:
The proposal covers 20 research streams and 6 validation streams aimed at foundational infrastructure and long-term innovation. These include consensus design, scalability, ZK tech, cryptography, governance, and smart contracts — areas that directly impact Cardano’s roadmap.

📌 Strategic Relevance:
While bundling this volume of streams under a single proposal may obscure the strategic weight of each individually, the scope reinforces Cardano’s continued reliance on IOG’s research leadership. The dependency may be undesirable long-term, but its current importance is indisputable.

---

2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail → ✅ Yes

“The $13.42M total budget proposed is to finance all activities… with a total of 56.1 FTEs… including all costs such as equipment, licenses, sub-contracting, admin, travel, and program management.”

📌 Breakdown by domain:

• Research Dept. → $5.895M across 27.5 FTEs
• Validation Dept. → $7.525M across 28.6 FTEs

“This equates to an average of $239k per FTE (or $1,030 per day based on 232 working days/year).”

📌 The documents provide breakdowns by department, average workstream cost, and per-FTE allocation, as well as qualitative details about required roles (e.g., Chief Scientist, Cryptographer, PM, Engineer, etc.).

📌 While not granular to the line-item level (e.g., specific audit costs), the cost structure is internally consistent, detailed, and well-justified for a research-focused proposal.

---

3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers → 🟡 Partial

📌 Stated Output Goals:

• “20 high-impact research initiatives annually (SRL2), with 6 validated per year (SRL4/5).”
• “At least 20 peer-reviewed publications and technical artefacts per year.”

📌 Per-stream KPIs (in annex):

• Leios: “5x throughput improvement using 85% of network bandwidth.”
• k-parameter reduction: “10¹¹-fold increase in grinding complexity.”
• SPO Incentives: “Achieve 50–60% stake in community pools.”

📌 Analysis:
While several streams define performance-based technical KPIs, many others rely only on general deliverables. There’s no unified system for post-delivery impact measurement, nor aggregate targets for adoption, citations, or implementation rates.

⚠️ For a research program of this size, the lack of KPIs tracking downstream utility, adoption, or network integration is a weakness.

---

4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables → 🟡 Partial

“Each fundamental research stream runs for ~2 years.”
“Each validation stream receives 6–12 months of effort… frequently spanning two calendar years.”
“All milestones, acceptance criteria and payment terms will be specified in a legal contract with CDH and Intersect.”

📌 Stream-level deliverables (listed in annexes) include:

• Formal specifications
• Simulations
• Prototypes
• Technical reports
• CIPs and CPSs

📌 Gaps:
While the annexes outline expected outputs and estimated durations, no start/end dates or milestone deadlines are defined per stream. The delivery framework is expected to be contractually enforced later.

📌 Conclusion:
The proposal includes qualitative deliverables and effort estimates, but lacks time-bound milestone planning at submission. For a treasury withdrawal of this magnitude, the absence of explicit timeline commitments weakens transparency and accountability, even if deferred to contract enforcement.

---

5️⃣ Internal Consistency → ✅ Yes

📌 The requested amount (₳26,840,000) matches metadata and proposal descriptions.
📌 Referenced budget info action and Treasury Reserve Smart Contract details are coherent.
📌 No discrepancies were found between budget anchors, figures, or process descriptions.

---

6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record → ✅ Yes

“IOR is the leading blockchain academic group… over 200 peer-reviewed, published papers… more than 150 academics… 50 papers core to Cardano's five development phases.”

📌 The proposal provides institutional credibility and historical performance by Input Output Research.

📌 Importantly, named stream leads are disclosed in the annex, enabling independent due diligence. Examples include:

• Bernardo David, Daniel Fritz, Matheus Ferreira, Philipp Kant, Marek Mahut, among others — many with longstanding IOG affiliations and peer-reviewed research output.

🔎 Independent verification confirms that listed leads are qualified researchers with demonstrable domain experience, strengthening the case for credibility.

---

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest → ✅ No conflict

The evaluator declares no personal, financial, or formal ties to the vendor (IOR) or any entities involved in the administration of this Governance Action. No abstention is warranted.

---

🗳 Voting Recommendation: 🔵 ABSTAIN

Rationale:

Despite the strategic relevance and technical merit of this proposal, the following concerns justify abstention at this time:

• The number and granularity of KPIs are insufficient to properly evaluate research adoption, utility, or downstream integration.
• Milestones and deliverables are not bound to dates, weakening accountability for a large-scale treasury withdrawal.
• The bundling of 26 distinct streams into a single action creates opacity and reinforces dependency on a single vendor.

A revised submission with stronger KPI structures, milestone accountability, and modular proposal design would provide higher confidence for a YES vote in the future.

🗳 Governance Action Review
Proposal: Withdraw ₳212,000 for AdaStat.net Cardano blockchain explorer
Vendor: AdaStat.net (administered by Intersect)
Governance Action ID: gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlpgcp0jyh
Submitted: 18 July 2025
Expires: 17 August 2025
Type: Treasury Withdrawal
Budget Requested: ₳212,000

🧭 Evaluation Methodology and Rationale
Given the unprecedented volume and technical depth of the 39 Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions submitted in this cycle, a comprehensive, proposal-by-proposal audit of budgets, scopes, and implementation frameworks would demand a level of time and resourcing incompatible with the available review window.

Rather than abstaining from participation, I adopted a hybrid evaluation methodology that combines AI-assisted content parsing with structured human analysis. This standardized checklist framework was designed to streamline high-volume assessment while preserving critical reasoning, contextual understanding, and value-based judgment.

All final decisions reflect deliberate human oversight — AI outputs serve to accelerate comprehension and comparison, but no vote is cast without manual review and a principled assessment of relevance, feasibility, and accountability.

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality → 🟡 Partial

Excerpt:

“AdaStat.net supports this goal by providing real-time, mobile-optimized, and feature-rich explorer for Cardano…”

Analysis:
AdaStat is a useful and well-designed tool. As a Cardano dRep, I personally use AdaStat and appreciate its clean UI and governance-focused features — particularly for tracking votes, dReps, and transaction metadata in a lightweight, mobile-friendly environment.

The proposal reports approximately 20,000 unique users per month, based on server-side logs — a strong indicator of adoption and community trust. In addition, I am aware that many community members and fellow dReps frequently rely on AdaStat for easy access to governance data, which reinforces its perceived value and usability in the ecosystem.

That said, high usage does not equate to systemic criticality. While AdaStat may offer particular UX and design benefits, the proposal does not establish it as a functionally unique or strategically indispensable component of the Cardano stack. Its core features significantly overlap with other available tools — such as Cexplorer.io, GovTool, Tempo Vote, and Koios — which already serve similar roles in governance and data accessibility.

In this context, I view AdaStat as an important redundant infrastructure, which is valuable for resilience and user choice — but not as a single point of dependency for the community. Redundancy has merit, but lack of uniqueness limits the argument for essentiality. The proposal itself does not make a case for AdaStat being critical to the continuity of governance processes.

AdaStat remains a complementary and relevant tool, but does not meet the threshold of ecosystem essentiality as defined here.

2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail → 🟡 Partial

Excerpt:

“Each team member contributes part-time (1 hour/day), totaling 100 hours/month… salary rate is $50/hour… infrastructure costs ~$300/month… Total: $5,300/month × 24 months = $127,200 = ₳212,000.”

Analysis:
The proposal outlines a simple but internally coherent budget, based on four part-time contributors working a combined 100 hours per month, at a rate of $50/hour, plus infrastructure expenses of $300/month. The total of $127,200 (₳212,000 at the provided exchange rate) appears reasonable and proportionate to the stated scope and 24-month duration focused on ongoing maintenance, infrastructure uptime, and UI/UX improvements.

However, a critical limitation is the lack of clarity regarding budget boundaries between this proposal and the team’s previously funded Catalyst project — which also covers AdaStat development, including performance upgrades, governance integrations, and backend refactoring.

There is no explicit breakdown of which deliverables belong to the Fund11 proposal versus this Governance Action. Because of that, it is not possible to rule out funding overlap, and the absence of separation between scopes introduces a gray area that affects budget traceability and public accountability.

While the requested amount is modest and aligned with market norms, the lack of delineation between concurrent proposals leads to a partial score for this item.

3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers → ❌ No
Analysis:
The proposal does not provide any measurable success indicators, quantitative or qualitative:

No performance targets (uptime, API traffic);

No community impact metrics;

No before/after comparisons or usage data.

This is a critical weakness in terms of outcome visibility, community accountability, and monitoring capacity.

4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables → 🟡 Partial
Excerpt:

“Duration: 24 months, which corresponds to 24 Milestones (1 Milestone = 1 Month)... milestones will be outlined within the metadata of a legal contract with Intersect.”

Analysis:
Monthly pacing is declared, but no public milestone list, no acceptance criteria, and no clear deliverable schedule are included in the proposal. Voters cannot evaluate what will be delivered, when, or how success will be determined. Everything is deferred to a legal contract that is not made available. This is insufficient for transparent governance.

5️⃣ Internal Consistency → ✅ Yes
Analysis:
The ADA amount matches the USD-based estimates using the provided conversion rate. There are no discrepancies between metadata, body text, and requested amount. The proposal is properly linked to the overarching ₳275M Info Action budget structure.

6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record → 🟡 Partial
Excerpt:

“AdaStat.net has been actively developed and maintained since Shelley Incentivized Testnet in 2019…”

Analysis:
The team is clearly identified, publicly known, and technically competent, with a long-standing product that has maintained availability and community relevance. However, it is important to note that the same team is currently executing another project funded through Project Catalyst (Fund11) — a reboot of AdaStat.net — which was awarded ₳180,300 and remains in progress at the time of this Governance Action.

That earlier project includes multiple deliverables that may overlap with the current proposal — such as UI/UX improvements, performance enhancements, governance data integrations, and backend restructuring. While two milestones have been completed, others have experienced notable delays: for example, the beta version originally targeted for July 2024 was only released in March 2025.

The current proposal does not reference this ongoing Catalyst-funded work, nor does it provide a clear delineation between previously funded scope and new objectives. This omission makes it more difficult for voters to assess the proposal’s added value and to understand how it complements — rather than duplicates — existing commitments.

When teams submit proposals while still delivering on active grants, it is generally considered good practice to:

Provide a brief summary of ongoing work;

Clarify which elements are already funded vs. newly proposed;

Offer assurance that new funding will not be used to complete existing obligations.

These elements are not present in this submission, and their absence affects transparency and evaluability, even if unintentionally.

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest → ✅ No Conflict
Analysis:
I have no financial, contractual, or institutional ties to AdaStat.net, its proposers, or Intersect. This evaluation was conducted independently and without conflict of interest.

🧩 Critical Summary
AdaStat.net is a widely used and appreciated Cardano blockchain explorer, offering a clean UI, real-time data access, and governance-focused features — including lightweight, mobile-optimized tools that many dReps and community members rely on. The reported 20,000 unique monthly users is a strong indicator of adoption, and the tool plays a valuable role in providing accessible, on-chain data to a broad user base.

The budget request is modest and appears proportionate to the intended scope of 24 months of maintenance and development. The team has demonstrated long-term engagement and technical reliability, and the proposal outlines a straightforward operational model with part-time team contributions and reasonable infrastructure costs.

However, the Governance Action presents important limitations:

It does not differentiate its scope from an active Catalyst-funded project also focused on AdaStat development. This lack of clarity creates a gray area around budget separation, raising the risk of unintentional funding overlap.

The proposal does not include impact metrics or KPIs, nor a public milestone structure — limiting transparency and evaluability.

While the tool has proven value, the proposal does not articulate a uniqueness argument or establish AdaStat as critical or irreplaceable within the broader governance tooling ecosystem.

Still, redundancy in infrastructure can be healthy and strategic — and the community’s demonstrated use of AdaStat reinforces its relevance.

🗳 Voting Recommendation: ABSTAIN
This Governance Action presents a valuable and respected tool, maintained by a technically capable team, with clear signs of ecosystem adoption. However, due to the absence of scope separation from an existing funded project, and the lack of KPIs and public milestones, I am unable to confidently assess the proposal’s added value or ensure accountability in its execution.

For these reasons, I choose to abstain from voting. I encourage the team to address these gaps in a future iteration by providing stronger scope delineation, measurable outcomes, and milestone transparency — which would allow the community to fully support the continued growth and utility of AdaStat.

🗳 Governance Action Review
Proposal: Withdraw ₳266,667 for Cexplorer.io – Developer-Focused Blockchain Explorer for Cardano
Vendor: Cexplorer.io (administered by Intersect)
Governance Action ID: gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlpyflfc4s
Submitted: 18 July 2025
Expires: 17 August 2025
Type: Treasury Withdrawal
Budget Requested: ₳266,667

🧭 Evaluation Methodology and Rationale
Due to the volume and complexity of Governance Actions submitted in this cycle, a full deep-dive into each technical and budgetary scope was infeasible within the available voting window.

Rather than abstain, I applied a hybrid evaluation methodology: AI-assisted content parsing combined with structured human review. A standardized checklist guided all assessments, with deliberate human judgment applied to all final decisions. No vote was cast without manual validation of feasibility, scope alignment, and accountability.

📋 Evaluation Checklist
1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality → 🟡 Partial
📌 Evidence:

“Cexplorer.io serves over 50,000 monthly users and processes millions of data requests…”
“It supports developers, SPOs, researchers, and everyday users with tools for exploring transactions, addresses, tokens, and stake pools.”

🔍 Analysis:
Cexplorer is a mature, well-maintained, and widely adopted explorer. With over 50,000 monthly users and millions of data requests served, it demonstrates clear utility and trust from the Cardano community.

This strong usage serves as a compelling value proposition, underscoring its effectiveness and relevance. However, high adoption alone does not establish systemic uniqueness. The ecosystem already benefits from a range of explorers and data tools — including Koios, Blockfrost, Cardanoscan, Adastat, and others — which provide overlapping functionality for many of the same use cases.

While Cexplorer may offer unique/performance advantages and UX refinement, the proposal does not establish it as a strategically irreplaceable or infrastructure-critical component. Its role is important, but complementary — reinforcing ecosystem resilience rather than forming a single point of dependency.

Accordingly, the proposal partially meets the threshold of ecosystem essentiality.

2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail → 🟡 Partial
📌 Evidence:

“Milestone 1: ₳66,667... Milestone 2: ₳66,667... etc.”
“Team Size: 2 backend developers, 1 frontend developer, 1 part-time UI/UX designer, 1 DevOps, 1 part-time coordinator.”
“Fixed-price milestone contract.”

🔍 Analysis:
The budget is reasonably structured, with total costs evenly distributed across four project phases. Team roles are defined and correlate with deliverables. However, no detailed line-item breakdown is provided by cost category (e.g., infrastructure, design, QA, DevOps, audit).

This lack of granularity weakens transparency and makes it harder to assess proportionality of labor vs. tooling vs. hosting vs. management. For ₳266,667 over 18 months, a clearer breakdown would have improved accountability.

3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers → ❌ No
📌 Evidence:

“Continuous uptime of core services (>99.9% availability)”

🔍 Analysis:
The proposal includes only a single forward-facing KPI — maintaining >99.9% uptime for the explorer — which, while technically relevant, is wholly insufficient as a measure of impact.

Despite referencing strong historical usage metrics (50,000+ monthly users), the team failed to define future-facing adoption or engagement targets. No KPIs are presented for:

Growth in user base

API usage or developer integrations

Performance improvements (e.g. latency, throughput)

New user acquisition

Developer satisfaction or feature adoption

Community-reported usage or impact proxies

For a proposal claiming to enhance developer experience and platform accessibility, the absence of even baseline success metrics raises concerns. Without measurable outcomes, it's impossible to gauge whether the proposed work will meaningfully advance the platform’s utility, reach, or ecosystem alignment.

4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables → ✅ Yes
📌 Evidence:
The proposal outlines four fixed-price milestones of ₳66,667 each, covering a 12–18 month period. Each milestone includes a general description of focus areas and expected outputs.

Definitions of Done are presented in qualitative terms (e.g., “continuous uptime,” “feature publicly released,” “documentation published”).

🔍 Analysis:
The milestone structure is coherent and matches the nature of the proposed work. It reflects a reasonable phased approach to infrastructure maintenance, platform evolution, and developer experience enhancement. The timeline and deliverable types align with standard expectations for long-term platform support.

However, acceptance criteria lack precision. The proposal does not include measurable targets, functional specifications, or verification methods for each milestone.

While such omissions are not uncommon in infrastructure funding proposals, greater specificity would enhance auditability, strengthen accountability, and reduce ambiguity during milestone reviews.

Overall, the milestone plan is structurally sound but would benefit from clearer acceptance thresholds.

5️⃣ Internal Consistency → ✅ Yes
📌 Evidence:

Total budget (₳266,667) matches milestone allocation (4 x ₳66,667)

ADA-to-EUR conversion (₳266,667 ≈ €185,000) is coherent

Metadata, scope, and delivery framework are aligned across all sources

🔍 Analysis:
The proposal is internally coherent. All components — budget, timeline, and deliverables — are consistent with each other. The legal contracting process with Intersect is clearly defined. No inconsistencies or structural contradictions were identified.

6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record → ✅ Yes
📌 Evidence:

“Cexplorer.io (formerly Adapools) has been live since 2020…”
“The team has strong experience in backend systems, frontend development, API design, and DevOps...”
“The team has successfully delivered one Catalyst-funded project, with two more in progress.”

🔍 Analysis:
The team is well-established in the Cardano ecosystem, with a verifiable track record of delivery. Cexplorer has been publicly available and actively maintained. The team is technically capable and has completed one Project Catalyst-funded proposal, with two others nearing completion.

Importantly, we reviewed the scopes of those two ongoing Catalyst proposals — “Cexplorer 2.0” and “Advanced DRep & SPO Analytics” — to assess for potential redundancy. Based on milestone documentation and stated outcomes, there appears to be no significant scope or budget overlap with the current Governance Action.

While there is some thematic alignment (e.g., developer features, SPO insights), the Catalyst-funded projects focused on one-time platform redevelopment and a discrete analytics module. In contrast, this proposal addresses post-launch infrastructure support, operational continuity, incremental improvements, and ongoing developer engagement over 12 to 18 months.

This continuity is consistent with long-term infrastructure stewardship. However, as with all treasury-funded work, continued transparency and community oversight will be essential to ensure clear separation of scope and accountability over time.

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest → ✅ No known conflict
🔍 Analysis:
There is no direct, material conflict of interest between the evaluator and the proposal team. If such a conflict were to arise, I would abstain from voting as per my policy.

🧠 Critical Summary
This proposal requests ₳266,667 to fund the ongoing maintenance and incremental development of Cexplorer.io — a widely used Cardano blockchain explorer focused on developer experience. The team is technically capable and has a solid history of delivery within the ecosystem, including prior successful Catalyst-funded projects. The structure of the proposal is coherent, the budget is proportionally framed, and the project phases are reasonably articulated.

However, the lack of outcome-oriented KPIs, the absence of measurable impact targets, and the minimal granularity in cost justification raise concerns around strategic accountability and transparency. While the proposal refers to significant historical usage, it fails to define how continued treasury funding would result in measurable gains for the ecosystem. Acceptance criteria are vague, and qualitative claims (e.g., improving UX or reducing friction) are not verifiable.

Notably, an audit of the team’s ongoing Catalyst projects suggests no significant scope duplication, and this Governance Action appears to serve as a logical continuation — funding long-term sustainability after the delivery of Cexplorer 2.0.

This proposal stands at the intersection of justified continuity and under-specified accountability. It offers value, but does not meet the full bar of rigor expected for funding at this level.

🗳 Voting Decision: ABSTAIN
Rationale:
While the proposal presents clear strengths — including team credibility, ecosystem relevance, and operational readiness — it lacks sufficient impact framing, success metrics, and auditability to justify an unequivocal YES. At the same time, the proposal’s overall structure, continuity of scope, and absence of critical flaws do not justify a NO.

Given this balance of considerations, I will abstain from voting. My abstention reflects both the importance of supporting infrastructure continuity and the need to uphold standards of accountability and measurable outcomes in treasury-funded work.

🧾 Governance Action Review
Proposal: Withdraw ₳130,903 for Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Vendor: Anastasia Labs (Administered by Intersect)
Governance Action ID: gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlqvckzwqt
Submitted: 18 July 2025
Expires: 17 August 2025
Type: Treasury Withdrawal
Budget Requested: ₳130,903

📋 Evaluation Checklist

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality → ✅ Yes
Does the proposal address a critical function or unique capability within Cardano?

“Lucid Evolution is an open-source library designed to simplify and enhance the development of off-chain smart contract interactions on Cardano.”

“One of the most used offchain library called Lucid Evolution needs constant maintenance and upgrades.”

📌 Analysis:
Lucid is widely adopted by developers building Cardano DApps. Maintaining compatibility with network changes (e.g., hard forks) is essential. The proposal also cites multiple community endorsements and GitHub activity.

2️⃣ Budget Transparency & Cost Breakdown → ❌ No

Rationale:
The proposal requests ₳130,903 (equivalent to $100,000 USD) to support 3 full-time developers for one year, resulting in an estimated hourly rate of ~$16 per FTE — a figure notably below market standards for blockchain development.

However, this seemingly low budget is undermined by multiple gaps:

• No hourly rates or cost breakdown are explicitly provided;
• The identities and roles of the three contributors are not disclosed;
• There is no mention of whether this effort overlaps with other ongoing or funded Lucid-related initiatives;
• The proposal does not indicate whether the reduced cost is intentional or subsidized.

Given the significant overlap with other Catalyst-funded work and lack of transparency around personnel and costing structure, the budget cannot be considered well-justified, even if the absolute amount appears modest.

###3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers → ❌ No

Rationale:
The proposal lacks any quantifiable Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) or structured success metrics.

While it lists general deliverables such as “maintain Lucid,” “improve documentation,” and “implement requested features,” none of these are framed with measurable goals or deadlines. There is also no clarity on how progress will be tracked, how success will be defined, or when the community can expect results.

The absence of milestones, adoption targets, usage benchmarks, or delivery timelines makes it impossible to evaluate accountability or follow-up on the proposed work.

This severely limits transparency and undermines the proposal’s ability to demonstrate cost-effectiveness or ecosystem impact.

4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables → 🟡 Partial

Rationale:
The proposal lists several clear deliverables, including:

• Ensuring Lucid compatibility with all Cardano hard forks
• Enhancing developer documentation and tooling
• Implementing requested features and performance optimizations
• Supporting community adoption and maintaining Lucid as a public good

These outputs are relevant and appropriate for a lightweight maintenance-focused proposal. However, the absence of a structured timeline weakens the planning clarity.

• There is no defined roadmap or phased breakdown across the 12-month period
• No intermediate milestones, review points, or delivery sequencing are provided
• Success criteria for each output remain unspecified

Given that Anastasia Labs is already engaged in three concurrent Catalyst-funded Lucid projects (₳600,000 total) — with some deliverables behind schedule — the lack of a concrete timeline in this Governance Action makes it difficult to assess how this new scope will be balanced and executed over time.

5️⃣ Internal Consistency → ✅ Yes
Are the metadata fields, budget amounts, and SAC description aligned?

ADA Amount: ₳130,903
USD equivalent: $100,000 at 1.31 ADA/USD
Receiving address matches metadata
Governance Action references correct bundle ID (gov_action1u9x73...)

6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record → ❌ No

Rationale:
Anastasia Labs is a technically capable and well-established team within the Cardano ecosystem. Their stewardship of the Lucid Evolution library and related tooling is widely recognized and demonstrably impactful. Contributions to SDKs, off-chain infrastructure, and developer experience are visible across multiple projects and repositories.

However, some concerns merit attention regarding transparency, delivery load, and coordination across funding streams.

📌 Concurrent Catalyst Proposals

Anastasia Labs is currently executing three active Catalyst-funded proposals focused on Lucid Evolution 2.0, each approved for ₳200,000, totaling ₳600,000 in allocated funding. These include:

• Blueprint & Enhanced Plutus Schema
• Private Testnet SDK & L2 Integration
• Maintenance & Development Strategy

A fourth proposal — Lucid Evolution: Redefining Off-Chain Transactions — was completed in 2024 with full disbursement of ₳200,000, also focused on upgrades, maintenance, and documentation.

The current Governance Action describes deliverables that substantially overlap with the Catalyst-funded work:

• Ongoing library maintenance
• Compatibility with protocol upgrades (e.g. Chang HF)
• Developer documentation and onboarding
• Community engagement and support
• Feature implementation and performance improvements

Despite this, the proposal does not reference the existing Catalyst funding nor clarify how the requested ₳130,903 complements or extends the prior work.

📌 Delivery Load and Timeline Slippage

All three active proposals remain open, with several milestones initially scheduled for March and April 2025 still pending as of August. This raises questions about the team’s current delivery bandwidth and capacity to absorb an additional project without compromising existing commitments.

While milestone-based disbursement helps mitigate risk, the presence of simultaneous and delayed deliverables suggests that tighter coordination and pacing may be needed.

📌 Broader Pattern

Similar gaps in funding disclosure and scope integration have been observed in other proposals by the team. In the Midgard zk-rollup, for instance, a Governance Action was submitted without mention of an active ₳500,000 Catalyst grant covering overlapping components such as validator logic and fraud-proof infrastructure.

✅ Overall Assessment

While Anastasia Labs’ technical contributions are clear and significant, the absence of context around ongoing funding, combined with delayed deliverables and a growing workload, limits the evaluability of this proposal.

This criterion is rated NO, based on the need for greater clarity around cumulative funding, active workload, and how this new initiative would integrate with work already underway. A public clarification would go a long way toward reinforcing accountability and trust.

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest → ✅ No Conflict

📌 Analysis:
There is no direct involvement of the reviewer with Anastasia Labs, Intersect, or the associated contracts.

🧠 Critical Summary

The proposal to withdraw ₳130,903 for Lucid Evolution maintenance acknowledges the crucial role this open-source library plays in simplifying and sustaining off-chain smart contract interactions within the Cardano ecosystem. Lucid is widely adopted, and its continued upkeep is unquestionably important.

However, despite the modest budget request, several issues limit evaluability:

• No detailed cost breakdown: The proposal lacks transparency regarding hourly rates, contributor roles, or rationale for the stated budget.
• No quantifiable KPIs: Deliverables are presented only in broad terms, with no metrics, adoption targets, or timelines to track success.
• No roadmap or sequencing: The proposal does not include a timeline, milestone schedule, or phased execution plan.
• Significant scope overlap: Three ongoing Catalyst-funded Lucid proposals by the same team (₳600,000 total) cover nearly identical deliverables. Some of those projects are behind schedule as of August 2025.
• No integration context: It is unclear how this new request complements or extends the existing funded work.

The technical strength of Anastasia Labs is not in question. However, the absence of planning and coordination clarity — especially with concurrent grants already underway — reduces confidence in execution and accountability.

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🗳 Voting Decision: NO

I believe in the strategic importance of Lucid and fully recognize its value to the Cardano developer ecosystem. I want to vote YES — and would gladly do so with the following clarifications:

• A clearer explanation of how this funding complements rather than duplicates existing Catalyst-funded Lucid work
• Quantifiable and measurable KPIs
• A slightly more detailed budget breakdown
• A clearer timeline or delivery roadmap over the proposed 12-month period

Without these elements, the proposal lacks the transparency and accountability expected for a Treasury Withdrawal. I encourage the proposer to revise and resubmit with these clarifications.

📋 Evaluation Checklist

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality → 🟡 Partial

Does the proposal address a critical function or unique capability within Cardano?

📌 Evidence:

“Dolos is a specialized Cardano data node designed to maintain an updated copy of the ledger and respond efficiently to queries.”
“Unlike a full Cardano node, Dolos is optimized for minimal resource usage while maintaining high data integrity and responsiveness.”

📌 Analysis:

Dolos provides a technically valid solution that enables efficient, lightweight access to Cardano ledger data without requiring the full infrastructure of a full node. This capability is relevant for dApps and developers operating with constrained resources.

❗Critical note: While Dolos fills a valid technical niche as a lightweight data node, the proposal fails to provide any direct comparison or positioning relative to existing ecosystem solutions such as Ogmios, Kupo, UTxO-RPC, Koios, or Blockfrost.

This omission weakens the case for Dolos as a strategically essential or unique infrastructure component and makes it harder to assess the relative impact or necessity of funding this particular initiative at this time.

This omission of a comparative analysis of technical differentiators, architectural advantages, or user adoption suggests a lack of argumentative effort on the part of the proposer reduces clarity around the distinct value this proposal brings to the ecosystem and weakens the strategic justification for funding.

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2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail

✅ Yes

“0.5 FTE Blockchain Developer for 12 months = $99,412 = ₳165,686”
“0.125 FTE Tech Lead for 12 months = $33,137 = ₳55,228”

The proposal provides a clear labor-based cost breakdown using daily rates and FTE percentages. The rate of $825/day for the developer and $1,100/day for the tech lead are slightly above market averages, but within reason for experienced Rust-based infrastructure work in the Web3 space.

No other cost categories (infrastructure, security, support, etc.) are included — all work is expected to be delivered via internal labor. There is no per-task hour allocation, but the transparency in rate calculations offsets this gap for a proposal of limited complexity.

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3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers → 🟡 Partial

Are there QUANTIFIABLE impact metrics?

📌 Evidence:

“Dolos remains fully compatible with the latest Cardano releases.”
“Identified issues and bugs are addressed in a timely manner.”
“Performance and resource optimizations are implemented.”

📌 Analysis:

The definition of success is based on qualitative criteria (compatibility, bug resolution, optimization), but there are no concrete numerical targets such as number of users, commit frequency, test coverage, or average node response time.

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4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables → 🟡 Partial

Does the proposal present a clear timeline with essential milestones and well-defined, verifiable deliverables?

📌 Evidence:

“All milestones, acceptance criteria, payment amounts and expected delivery dates will be agreed between the Vendor and Intersect, acting on behalf of the CDH.”
“The vendor will deliver according to the agreed-upon project schedule within the Legal Contract…”
“Acceptance of the above work is expected to be supported by a 3rd Party Assurer…”

From the original proposal:

• Key Deliverables include maintenance, protocol updates, performance optimizations, and documentation.
• Definition of Done describes general conditions: continued compatibility with Cardano, timely bug fixes, consistent documentation and engagement.

📌 Analysis:

While the proposal outlines a delivery framework that includes a legal contract with milestones, acceptance criteria, and third-party review, it fails to provide this information at the time of voting.
There is no public timeline, no phased breakdown of deliverables, and no explicit conditions for milestone acceptance. The provided "Definition of Done" is entirely qualitative and lacks measurable targets or deadlines.

This reliance on post-approval structuring undermines transparency and verifiability during the governance decision process, even if the formal infrastructure for delivery is described.

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5️⃣ Internal Consistency

✅ Yes
All details (amount requested, metadata, description) are internally consistent and match the budget Info Action from which this withdrawal is sourced.

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6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record

🟡 Partial

“TxPipe has helped develop several dApps… successfully completed several Catalyst proposals… participated in Partnerchain SDK…”

TxPipe has a strong technical reputation in Cardano. However, they are currently managing 8 active Catalyst proposals, most of which are delayed by weeks to months. This indicates possible overextension and unacknowledged bandwidth risk. The proposal does not disclose these commitments, nor does it offer any mitigation plan or delivery prioritization.

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7️⃣ Conflict of Interest

✅ No Conflict
No material or financial conflict identified. I have no professional or financial ties to TxPipe or Intersect.

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🧠 Critical Summary

The proposal requests ₳220,914 to sustain development and maintenance of Dolos, a lightweight Cardano data node designed to provide efficient, low-resource access to ledger data. Its core function is relevant, and its low-infrastructure footprint offers a valuable option for developers and dApps seeking alternatives to full node setups or centralized APIs.

However, the proposal fails to articulate how Dolos meaningfully differentiates itself from existing ecosystem tools such as Ogmios, Kupo, UTxO-RPC, Koios, or Blockfrost. This lack of comparative analysis undermines the case for strategic necessity and leaves its ecosystem impact uncertain.

While the cost structure is reasonable and clearly calculated, the absence of concrete KPIs, public milestones, and explicit acceptance criteria reduces overall transparency. The proposal leans heavily on post-approval contractual structuring, which limits pre-vote accountability.

Additionally, the team’s current delivery capacity is in question: TxPipe is managing multiple ongoing Catalyst-funded projects, most of which are delayed. This operational risk is not addressed in the proposal.

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🗳 Final Recommendation: 🟡 ABSTAIN

While Dolos may provide technical value, the proposal lacks critical comparative positioning, measurable impact indicators, and delivery assurances.
The absence of clear differentiators and the team’s current delivery load introduce too much uncertainty for a confident YES, while the legal structure and open-source history mitigate grounds for a firm NO.
I am abstaining due to insufficient evidence of urgency or uniqueness to justify this Treasury Withdrawal at this time.

🧭 Evaluation Methodology and Rationale

Given the unprecedented volume and technical depth of the 39 Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions submitted in this cycle, a comprehensive, proposal-by-proposal audit of budgets, scopes, and implementation frameworks would demand a level of time and resourcing incompatible with the available review window.

Rather than abstaining from participation, I adopted a hybrid evaluation methodology that combines AI-assisted content parsing with structured human analysis. This standardized checklist framework was designed to streamline high-volume assessment while preserving critical reasoning, contextual understanding, and value-based judgment.

All final decisions reflect deliberate human oversight — AI outputs serve to accelerate comprehension and comparison, but no vote is cast without manual review and a principled assessment of relevance, feasibility, and accountability.

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📋 Checklist Criteria Explained

Each proposal is evaluated across seven standardized dimensions using a three-point scale:
✅ Yes — fully meets the criterion
🟡 Partial — partially meets the criterion
❌ No — does not meet the criterion

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality

Does the proposal address a critical function within Cardano, or is it peripheral or redundant?
This criterion assesses the strategic relevance of the initiative. Proposals should contribute meaningfully to Cardano’s infrastructure, decentralization, usability, or long-term resilience. Initiatives that duplicate existing efforts or lack demonstrable alignment with ecosystem priorities may score lower.

2️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers

Does the proposal define measurable success indicators or quantifiable outcomes?
This includes Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), numerical targets, milestones with metrics, or other tangible proxies of progress. The absence of quantifiable measures introduces uncertainty around potential impact and limits effective performance tracking.

3️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables

Are there clear, time-bound milestones with verifiable deliverables and acceptance criteria?
Effective proposals define not only what will be delivered, but also when and how success will be verified. This enables staged disbursement, delivery monitoring, and community oversight. Lack of milestone clarity may indicate execution risk.

4️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record

Is the proposing team clearly identified, with relevant expertise and a verifiable delivery history?
This criterion evaluates the transparency and credibility of the individuals or organizations responsible for delivery. Established contributors with proven ecosystem involvement are preferred. Anonymous or unvetted teams may raise accountability concerns.

5️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail

Is the budget transparently structured, with clear categories, amounts, and justification?
A strong proposal includes itemized costs (e.g., per workstream, staff role, tooling), explains the rationale behind budget allocations, and clarifies estimation methods. Lack of detail in budget structure reduces transparency and erodes confidence in treasury stewardship.

6️⃣ Internal Consistency

Are the on-chain metadata, proposal content, and budget details aligned?
Consistency across all proposal components — including funding amounts, receiving addresses, project scope, and references — is essential. Misalignment creates confusion, undermines credibility, and may signal governance process weaknesses.

7️⃣ Conflict of Interest

Does this proposal present a potential conflict of interest that could compromise the impartiality of the evaluation?
To preserve the integrity of the voting process, any proposal in which I (as evaluator) hold a significant, non-marginal conflict of interest will be automatically met with an ABSTAIN vote. Minor or indirect associations are disclosed where relevant, but only material conflicts — such as direct financial involvement, employment, or formal partnership — trigger abstention. This ensures all evaluations remain transparent, independent, and in service of the broader Cardano community.

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🗳 Governance Action Evaluation – Final Review

Proposal: Withdraw ₳220,914 for Pallas – Sustaining Critical Rust Tooling for Cardano
Vendor: TxPipe (administered by Intersect)
Type: Treasury Withdrawal
Requested Amount: ₳220,914
Governance Action ID: gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlqghuqg03

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📋 Evaluation Checklist

1️⃣ Ecosystem Essentiality

✅ Yes

“Pallas has become a critical Rust-native foundation for Cardano development, providing essential blockchain primitives such as cryptographic primitives and CBOR encoding.”
“Projects like Aiken, Lucid, Mithril, and Amaru already utilize Pallas…”

Pallas is a strategically essential component in Cardano’s infrastructure. It provides reusable primitives for CBOR parsing, cryptographic functions, and decoding of chain data structures. These enable modern development efforts in Rust and allow the ecosystem to expand beyond Haskell-centric tooling.

Key dependencies such as Aiken, Lucid, Mithril, and the Amaru node rely on Pallas for low-level operations. Without it, these projects would face significant maintenance overhead, code duplication, and higher risk of inconsistencies.

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2️⃣ Budget Structure and Detail

✅ Yes

“0.5 FTE Blockchain Developer for 12 months = $99,412 = ₳165,686”
“0.125 FTE Tech Lead for 12 months = $33,137 = ₳55,228”

The proposal provides a clear labor-based cost breakdown using daily rates and FTE percentages. The rate of $825/day for the developer and $1,100/day for the tech lead are slightly above market averages, but within reason for experienced Rust-based infrastructure work in the Web3 space.

No other cost categories (infrastructure, security, support, etc.) are included — all work is expected to be delivered via internal labor. There is no per-task hour allocation, but the transparency in rate calculations offsets this gap for a proposal of limited complexity.

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3️⃣ KPIs or Impact Identifiers

🟡 Partial

“At least one major feature or optimization is implemented.”
“Pallas remains fully compatible with the latest Cardano releases.”
“With 591 commits, over 430 pull requests, and 39 contributors…”

The proposal includes some functional targets under its “definition of done,” and references past performance indicators. However, it lacks measurable, forward-looking KPIs, such as usage growth, performance metrics, or defined success thresholds. The absence of outcome metrics limits external accountability and auditability.

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4️⃣ Milestones and Deliverables

🟡 Partial

“All milestones, acceptance criteria, payment amounts and expected delivery dates will be agreed between the Vendor and Intersect… detailed in the Legal Contract.”

A general scope is outlined, and the team commits to maintaining compatibility, delivering one new feature, and engaging with the community. However, no public roadmap, timed milestones, or acceptance criteria are provided before ratification. While this is less problematic due to the project's maintenance nature, it still hinders transparency.

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5️⃣ Internal Consistency

✅ Yes
All details (amount requested, metadata, description) are internally consistent and match the budget Info Action from which this withdrawal is sourced.

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6️⃣ Team Visibility & Track Record

🟡 Partial

“TxPipe has helped develop several dApps… successfully completed several Catalyst proposals… participated in Partnerchain SDK…”

TxPipe has a strong technical reputation in Cardano. However, they are currently managing 8 active Catalyst proposals, most of which are delayed by weeks to months. This indicates possible overextension and unacknowledged bandwidth risk. The proposal does not disclose these commitments, nor does it offer any mitigation plan or delivery prioritization.

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7️⃣ Conflict of Interest

✅ No Conflict
No material or financial conflict identified. I have no professional or financial ties to TxPipe or Intersect.

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🧠 Critical Summary

This proposal requests ₳220,914 to sustain Pallas, a critical Rust-native toolkit used widely across the Cardano ecosystem. It plays a foundational role in enabling developer tooling beyond Haskell, especially for Aiken, Lucid, Mithril, and node alternatives like Amaru.

The labor-based budget is clearly structured, and the technical scope is well-understood. However, the lack of transparent milestones, verifiable KPIs, and public delivery planning reduces accountability, especially given that TxPipe is already behind schedule on multiple concurrent Catalyst projects.

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🗳 Voting Decision: ABSTAIN

While the value of Pallas is not in question, I abstain from this vote due to the following:

• No public KPIs or success metrics
• No milestone roadmap or timing disclosures
• High delivery risk from overlapping commitments
• No declared mitigation for known execution delays

A more transparent and realistically scoped proposal — with milestones and resourcing aligned to current delivery bandwidth — would be better positioned for funding.